Gulliver

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

By WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

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THE Athenian people, whoſe numbers were far below the name of a nation, being indeed a very ſmall portion of the Greek nation, but whoſe men were all ſoldiers and ſeamen; poſſeſſing a fleet that no power then

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on earth could reſiſt, high diſcipline; military as well as naval, officers of extenſive experience, a civil and political ſyſtem upon the whole admirably arranged, with large revenue from mines and from tributary ſtates; there is no foreſeeing how far their tyrannous dominion might not have been extended over Greeks and among forein nations, but that the folly of democracy unreſtrained would of courſe work its own ruin. The evident weakneſs in the political conduct of the only rival power, Lacedæmon, operated to the incouragement of chiefs and people; and in the ſame winter in which the inhabitants of the little iland of Melos were cut off from the face of the earth, the wild ambition of the people of Athens became eager in project for the conqueſt of another iland, many times larger, not only than Melos, but than Attica; ignorant at the ſame time, almoſt all of them, of its magnitude, its population, its value if conquered, and its means to reſiſt conqueſt.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 1. Plut. vit. Nic.

In the ſuccinct hiſtory of Sicily already given, we left Gelon, from a private citizen of Gela become king of that city and of Syracuſe, at the head of the Grecian intereſt in the iland. Gelon, after an illuſtrious reign of only ſeven years, dying at no very advanced age, in the next year, if we can underſtand and may truſt Diodorus, after the glorious battle of Himera, was ſucceeded by his brother Hieron; his dominion then comprehending all the Grecian ſettlements on the eaſtern coaſt of the iland, the

Ch. 10. of this hiſt.

Ariſt. de Rep. l. 5. c. 12. Diod. l. 11. c. 38.

B. C. 479.

the greateſt part of thoſe on the ſouthern, with ſome on the northern, and extenſive command over the inland barbarians. The only conſiderable power beſides in Sicily, was that of Theron prince of Agrigentum; who died, according to Diodorus, in the firſt year of the ſeventy-ſeventh Olympiad, after a reign of only ten years, leaving his throne to his ſon Thraſydæus. Theron, who, like Gelon, had raiſed himſelf from a private ſtation, had alſo, like Gelon, merited his advancement. His ſon Thraſydæus, who ſucceeded him, was of a different character: arrogant abroad, as tyrannical at home, he ingaged in war with Hieron: being defeated, he loſt the reſpect of his own people, was expelled, and flying for refuge to the Miſæan Megarians, was by them put to death. The democratical party, acquiring the ſway in Agrigentum, immediately made peace with the Syracuſan prince. SECT. I. B. C. 472.

Gelon's reign was too ſhort for completing a work of ſuch complex difficulty as that of molding into one regular government, and well fixing in their ſeveral places, the many parts, little diſpoſed to coaleſce, of which his dominion conſiſted. His policy had made Syracuſe a very large city. Probably before his acceſſion its population was become too great to be contained within the limits of Ortygia, the original ſite. The narrow channel, ſeparating that iland from the northern ſhore of the bay, was in part filled, and the town was extended upon the mainland. The increaſe of inhabitants un-

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der Gelon, however, required a very great addition of buildings. Among the advantages of the ſituation of Syracuſe, was an inexhauſtible ſtore of free ſtone; of a kind eaſily wrought, yet, after expoſure to the weather, ſufficiently hard. On the northern ſide of the harbour, a hill compoſed intirely of ſuch ſtone, was, in extent and form, commodious for the ſite of the new town. Riſing precipitous from the ſea and from the plain, ſo that ſlight fortifications would be ſtrong defences, its height was moderate, and its ſummit level; the weſtern end only riſing into lofty craggs. The level part, ten or twelve miles in circuit, became intirely covered with the new town; which was divided by fortifications into two parts, diſtinguiſhed by the names of Achradina and Tychë; the former eaſtward againſt the ſea, the other reaching weſtward toward the craggy height; ſo that Syracuſe became compoſed of three towns, Achradina, Tychë, and Ortygia, capable of ſeparate defence againſt a common enemy, or againſt each other. A fourth, with the name of Neapolis, Newtown, was afterward added on the ſouth, below Tychë, ſtretching along the ſhore of the great port, toward the river Anapus. This may have had its beginning under Hieron. In proceſs of time the weſtern height was incloſed within the walls. Thus much it may be convenient to obſerve here; but the extraordinary extent and population which Syracuſe finally acquired, will rather be for future notice.

Hieron,

SECT. I.

Hieron, as well as Gelon, was a man of superior character, but of a character less exactly fitted for the difficult situation to which, on his brother's death, he had succeeded. Learned and a munificent encourager of learning; splendid and of elegant taste; humane and of fine feelings; he was rather qualified to preside beneficially and with dignity over an established government, than to direct the affairs of a state so compounded as that of which Syracuse was the capital. He had talents for war, which he had displayed under his brother's reign. After he came himself to the throne, no dispute with forein powers required his personal exertion in military command; but his fleet relieved the Cumæans of Italy by a victory over the Tuscan fleet. In peace therefore his wealth inabled him, as his taste disposed him, to shine in the costly race of chariots on the Olympian course, and liberally to reward those who had talents for mixing his fame with the atchievements of his coursers there. Accordingly the poetical abilities of Pindar have been peculiarly dedicated to promote the renown of Hieron. At the same time men of genius from various parts of Greece were entertained in his court; among whom the poets Æschylus, Simonides, and Bacchilides, are principally mentioned. Yet, if we may trust that elegant dialogue remaining to us from Xenophon, in which Hieron and Simonides are the supposed speakers, he was utterly unable to accomplish his anxious wish for changing the nature of his government, and

Xenoph. Hieron.

Diod. l. 11. c. 51. Ol. 76. 3.

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converting his tyranny into a conſtitutional monarchy. He there pathetically laments that, while his ſubjects could paſs, as buſineſs or amuſement led them, wherever they pleaſed, without fear, he could be free from apprehenſion nowhere; but muſt go, as tyrants it ſeems uſually did, himſelf conſtantly armed, as well as ſurrounded by armed attendants; and he particularly regrets that his ſubjects were more to be dreaded by him than any forein enemy. Apparently Hieron had not the art, like Gelon, to mediate between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, and compoſe their jarring pretenſions. His diſpoſition led him to be more attentive to the ſplendor of his court, the converſation of men of genius and ſcience, and perhaps the great buſineſs of fleets, armies, and forein connections, than to the detail of interior government, and the ſecret workings of political fermentation. It is not unlikely that, diſguſted with petulance and illiberality, he might ſhow himſelf indiſpoſed to the democratical intereſt, more than political prudence would allow. For the lower people of the Greeks, unlike thoſe of the freeſt and moſt high-ſpirited nations of modern Europe, who are generally the moſt orderly as well as the moſt induſtrious, were, on the contrary, diſdainful of labor, as the office of ſlaves, and, unleſs in military employment, buſy only in faction. Of particulars we are not informed, but we learn that to hold his high ſtation, and ſupport thoſe who ſupported him, Hieron was reduced,

Xen. Hier. Ariſtot. de Rep. l. 5. c. 12. Diod. l. 11. c. 66.

reduced, againſt his nature, to uſe ſeverities. He died nevertheleſs in peace, in the eleventh year of his reign, and was ſucceeded in his authority by his younger brother Thraſybulus. SECT. I. Ol. 78. 2. B. C. 467.

The circumſtances of the revolution, which quickly followed, are very deficiently reported to us. Thraſybulus is accuſed of cruel ſeverity, and a conduct generally deſpotic. The democratical party were certainly ſtrong throughout the cities of his dominion: they ingaged in their cauſe the adminiſtrations of Agrigentum, Himera, Selinus, and ſome other towns, and then openly revolted. The people of higher rank, however, generally adhered to Thraſybulus; and the two parties divided the city itſelf of Syracuſe between them; Thraſybulus maintaining himſelf in Ortygia and Achradina, while the reſt was occupied by the inſurgents. War was thus carried on for ſome time; but at length Thraſybulus, finding his force inſufficient for any hope of final ſucceſs, retired to Locri in Italy, where he paſſed the remainder of his days in private life. Diod. l. 11. c. 67, 68.

Diodorus is, unfortunately, the only author from whom we have any account, with any attempt at connection, of theſe and the inſuing events; which could not but abound in political matter, at the ſame time curious and inſtructive. His ſuccinct narrative of the demolition of Gelon's fabric of empire, is little conſiſtent with what we learn, from the more authentic pen of Herodotus, concerning its eſtabliſhment, and as little conſiſtent with the

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account given, even by himſelf, of Gelon's uncommon popularity while he lived, and of the high reſpect in which his memory continued for ages to be held. It is a confuſed maſs, injudiciouſly compoſed of the contradictory reports, evidently, of contending factions. Nevertheleſs, comparing that narrative, ſuch as it is, with the purer tho more ſcanty ſources of Herodotus and Thucydides, we may acquire no unſatisfactory general idea of the train and of the character of political events in Sicily.

Diod. l. 11. c. 72. Ol. 79. 2. B. C. 463.

On the expulſion of Thraſybulus, the democratical party everywhere predominating, and the democracy of Syracuſe not being yet ſtrong or ſettled enough to aſſert command, every town of the dominion of the tyrants aſſumed its ſeparate independency. But as the acquiſition of this independency had been effected through communication among all, it was propoſed ſtill to ſecure it by friendly political intercourſe; and for this purpoſe a congreſs was held, of deputies from the ſeveral towns. Two reſolutions, reported by Diodorus as the principal meaſures of this meeting, ſtrongly characterize the democratical principle which animated it. The firſt eſtabliſhed a feſtival, to be called the Eleutheria or Feaſt of Freedom, common for all the Sicilian cities; and it directed that a coloſſal ſtatue ſhould be erected of the Eleutherian Jupiter, to whom, on every return of the feſtival, four hundred and fifty oxen ſhould be ſacrificed, on whoſe carcaſes the citizens intitled to partake in the rites ſhould feaſt. The other reſolution excluded, if we may

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may truſt our copies of Diodorus, no leſs than ſeven thouſand citizens of Syracuſe, including moſt of the principal families, from the honors of magiſtracy in the commonwealth. The hiſtorian, with much apparent reaſon, aſcribes to this ſource the long troubles that followed. Thoſe injured men refuſed to acquieſce under the tyrannous decree, poſſeſſed themſelves of two diviſions of the city, Achradina and Ortygia, and carried on war by land and ſea againſt their opponents. From ſimilar cauſes, troubles nearly ſimilar aroſe about the ſame time in Agrigentum, Gela, Himera, Meſſena, and Catana. Everywhere the parties were nearly balanced; and the acquiſition of freedom, as it was called, ſerved only to involve one of the moſt productive countries upon earth, after much ineffectual bloodſhed, in univerſal want. This at length produced a general compoſition. A portion of the Meſſenian territory was allotted as a poſſeſſion and reſidence for all who could not accommodate matters with thoſe at the time holding the principal power in their reſpective towns; and the territory of every town was anew divided among thoſe admitted in the roll of its citizens.

Diod. l. 11. c. 73.

Ol. 79. 4. B. C. 461.

This favorite meaſure of democracy, the equal diviſion of lands, difficult to execute at all, more difficult to execute equitably, impoſſible, perhaps, to be maintained, and of very dubious advantage if it could be executed and maintained, produced neither quiet, nor any other public benefit in Sicily. Party operated every-

Diod. l. 11. c. 85.

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everywhere, in every tranſaction. In the inſcription of citizens, many, through favor of thoſe in power in the ſeveral towns, were admitted haſtily and with little examination; others were arbitrarily rejected; and while ſome thus, with political power, acquired the portion of land annexed to the rank of citizen, others, deprived of both property and municipal rights, were reduced to the condition of vagabonds and beggars. Hence aroſe new and violent diſſentions. At the ſame time in many towns the government, with the favorite name of democracy, was ſo unſteddy, that through the diſcontent of the lower people, ſometimes ariſing from caprice, ſometimes from oppreſſion, an opening was offered for the powerful and wealthy to aſpire to tyranny. Nowhere was this experienced more than at Syracuſe, where, however, none ſucceeded, and Tyndarion loſt his life in the purſuit.

Diod. l. 11. c. 86.

Ol. 81. 3. B. C. 454.

The death of Tyndarion was followed by a ſhort ſeaſon of reſt, under democratical government; and in this period an exertion was made againſt a forein foe, which proved that, amid all the troubles, forein commerce had not ceaſed, and the marine of Syracuſe was not totally decayed. The Tuſcans, long powerful pirates in the weſtern parts of the Mediterranean, but repreſſed by the able and vigorous exertions of Gelon and Hieron, took advantage of the diſſentions among the Sicilian commonwealths, to renew their depredations on the Grecian commerce and coaſts. The Syracuſans fitted out

out a fleet againſt them, of ſixty triremes, which, under the command of Apelles, ſpred terror through the Tuſcan ſeas; and a debarkation being made in Corſica, then chiefly under the Tuſcan dominion, the coaſt was plundered, the town of Æthalia taken, and the fleet returned to Sicily laden with booty, particularly priſoners, who were made valuable as ſlaves. B. C. 453. Ol. 81. 4. Diod. l. 11. c. 67.

The long diſtraction of the Grecian intereſt in Sicily, however, afforded ſome reſpite from oppreſſion to the inland barbarians; from which Dcetius, a Sicel prince, profited, ſo as to become the principal potentate of the iland. Long confined to ſtrong holds among the hills, carrying thither from the vallies whatever of their harveſts they could ſave from the rapacity of the Greeks, and cultivating thoſe vallies only as they could ſnatch opportunity, at the riſk of being themſelves carried off for ſlaves, the Sicels had maintained little connection among themſelves, every village having its ſeparate and independent polity. Ducetius united all, except the Hyblæans, under one dominion; and then he ventured to move his reſidence and the ſeat of his government from Neæ, among the mountains, to a new town which he founded, with the name of Palicē, in the plain beneath, by which he would of courſe acquire more complete command of that plain, and more effectually vindicate its produce. Whether ambition or political neceſſity produced the meaſures which followed we are without means to know; but, becoming ingaged in war with c. 78. c. 87.

Diod. l. 12. c. 90. Ol. 82. 1. B. C. 452. with the Agrigentines, Ducetius had ſo far the advantage that he took Motya, then held by an Agrigentine garriſon; and the Syracuſans ſending aſſiſtance to the Agrigentines, he defeated their united forces. Popular rage, upon this occaſion at Syracuſe, wreaked its illiberal vengeance againſt the unfortunate general who had commanded; he was condemned to ſuffer death as a traitor, and accordingly executed. When paſſion ſubſiding gave room for reflection, wiſer meaſures were adoped. The power, the proved abilities, and the various ſucceſſes of Ducetius excited general apprehenſion among the Sicilian Greeks, unaccuſtomed to ſuch a potentate within their iland. The Syracuſans and Agrigentines taking together the lead, a large force was in the next ſummer collected; a battle was fought, and after a very obſtinate reſiſtance, the Sicels were routed. The Agrigentines quickly retook Motya, and then rejoining the Syracuſans, their united forces followed the motions of the Sicel prince.

Ducetius had not the reſources of a ſettled government, or of the command of a civilized nation. Deſerted by ſome of the troops who had attended his firſt flight, and upon the point of being betrayed by ſome of thoſe who ſtill accompanied him, he took a meaſure which the completeſt deſpair only could dictate. Mounting his horſe by night, he rode alone into Syracuſe, and placed himſelf at an altar in the agora. Early in the morning the circumſtance became known, and the magiſtrates aſſembled the peo-

Diod. l. 11. c. 91.

ple,

SECT. I.

ple, to receive their orders for meaſures to be taken with a ſuppliant of ſuch importance. Diodorus, the warm advocate of the Sicilian Greeks, acknowleges that there were ſome among the Syracuſans, who thought only of revenge againſt the unhappy prince for what they had ſuffered from his able conduct in war againſt them; but the majority was decided by more generous ſentiments. To permit him to remain in Sicily being judged imprudent, he was conducted to Corinth, where he was liberally maintained at the public expence of the Syracuſan commonwealth.

The government of Syracuſe, after a long courſe of troubles, appears at this time to have been ſettled into ſome conſiſtency; and the city, large, populous, and wealthy, began to feel its weight in the ſcale of Sicilian politics. On the other hand, the people of the ſmaller towns in the iland were become ſenſible that they had been making themſelves miſerable for an independency which they could not maintain, that they were equally unable to coaleſce in federal union, and that they muſt unavoidably lean upon a ſuperior. The only competitor with Syracuſe, for ſuperiority among the Sicilian towns, was Agrigentum; and while the competition remained, laſting peace could not eaſily ſubſiſt between them. The Syracuſan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, apparently to make him inſtrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather incouraged him to eſtabliſh a colony of mixed people,

Diod. l. 12. c. 9. Ol. 83. 3. B. C. 446.

Greeks

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Greeks and Sicels, at Calë Actë, on the northern coaſt of the iland. This was conſidered by the Agrigentines as a meaſure inimical to them: a war followed; the Agrigentines were defeated, and compelled to receive terms of peace from Syracuſe. Thus the Syracuſan democracy became decidedly the leading power among the Greeks of Sicily.

Diod. l. 12. c. 26. c. 29.

One Sicel town, Trinacia, among all the troubles of the iland, had always preſerved independency; and its people, now alone within Sicily, except the Carthaginian garriſons and perhaps the Elymian towns, refuſed to acknowlege the ſovereinty of the people of Syracuſe. This was deemed a ſufficient cauſe for war; and the wretched barbarians, after a moſt gallant reſiſtance, were compelled to yield. All the principal men, of vigorous age, had firſt fallen in action; the elder, to avoid the ignominy and miſery of ſervitude or of maſſacre from the hands of their implacable enemies, put themſelves to death; the ſurviving inhabitants were made ſlaves, and the town was deſtroyed.

Ol. 84. 4. B. C. 441.

Diod. l. 12. c. 30.

The Syracuſans, having thus overborne oppoſition, proceeded to take meaſures for ſecuring the dominion they had acquired. They exacted tribute, and from time to time augmented the exaction, from all the cities of the iland. With the revenue thus ariſing they increaſed their navy and their eſtabliſhment of cavalry; and when the Peloponneſian war broke out, Syracuſe, by its extent of dominion, and its naval force, was among the moſt powerful of the Grecian republics. Its alliance was therefore a great

Thucyd.

great object for both the contending powers in Greece. As a Dorian people, the Syracuſans were diſpoſed to favor the Peloponneſians, and actually ingaged in their confederacy, but as democratical, they were not zealous in a cauſe which was in ſo great a degree the cauſe of oligarchy. Circumſtances moreover quickly aroſe, within their iland, to prevent them from giving that aſſiſtance which the Peloponneſians hoped, and which, ſtrong as Syracuſe was in marine, had its force been exerted while Athens was weak from peſtilence and revolt, might have given a very different turn to the war. SECT. I.

But the empire of democracy being of courſe oppreſſive, opportunity only was wanting for revolt againſt that of Syracuſe. The Leontines, whether ſuffering more than others, or incouraged by better hope of forein aſſiſtance, were the firſt to reſiſt. They were of Ionian origin, from Chalcis in Eubœa, and their revolt was a ſignal for all the Ionian ſtates in Sicily to take arms againſt Syracuſe. The powerful city of Rhegium in Italy, whoſe people were alſo partly of Chalcidian race, joined them; and Camarina, originally a Dorian city, yet having particular quarrel with Syracuſe, entered zealouſly into the confederacy. How indeed Camarina was repeopled after the removal of its inhabitants to Syracuſe, under Gelon, we are not informed. But all the other Dorian cities, more Thucyd. l. 3. c. 86. Diod. l. 12. c. 53. B. C. 428 a. Ol. $\frac{87}{88}$. 1.

a This date is gathered from the circumſtances. Thucydides has not ſpecified the time when the war began, and Diodorus is inaccurate.

numerous

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numerous and powerful than the Ionian, adhered to the Syracuſans; and the Epizephyrian Locrians of Italy concurred in their alliance.

B. C. 427.

In the fifth year of the Peloponneſian war, during the revolt of Leſbos and the ſedition of Corcyra, the Syracuſans, already undiſputed maſters of the field, blockaded Leontium by land and ſea. The Ionian towns then all trembled for their own fate: a ſubjection ſtill more ſevere than that which had excited the revolt, would be the certain conſequence of the fall of Leontium, which they were unable to relieve. In theſe circumſtances, and under theſe apprehenſions, they turned their thoughts to Athens, as the mother-ſtate of the Ionian blood; and a deputation was ſent thither to requeſt aſſiſtance, urging the claim, not only of conſanguinity, but of antient treaties of alliance.

The factions of Sicily, and the general prevalence of democracy, had promoted the cultivation of oratory; and Gorgias the Leontine, the firſt rhetorican who reduced his profeſſion to an art, which he taught for pay, was at this time in high reputation. Gorgias, according to Diodorus, was placed at the head of the embaſſy to Athens; and the novelty of his artificial and flowery eloquence, tho afterward juſtly reprobated by maturer Attic taſte, is ſaid, in the moment, to have wonderfully captivated the Athenian people. The ſeaſon was, however, favorable for the effect of his talents: the rebellious Mitylenæans had already yielded to the arms of Paches; and the Athenian intereſt triumphed

triumphed in Corcyra, under the auſpices of the Athenian admiral Eurymedon, through the horrid maſſacre of the oligarchal party there. Nor were inducements wanting for the interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Sicily. The Peloponneſians derived thence ſupplies of corn, which, by a ſquadron in the Sicilian ſeas, or rather, according to the manner of cruizing among the antients, on the Sicilian coaſt, it was propoſed to ſtop; and hopes were entertained that, under the name of alliance, the Athenian dominion might be extended in Sicily; which would bring at the ſame time increaſe of income to the ſtate, increaſe of office and emolument for powerful men, and increaſe of importance, with ſometimes profit, to every Athenian citizen. Thus incited, in oppoſition to the ſalutary advice left them as a legacy by their great miniſter Pericles, the Athenians ingaged in the affairs of Sicily. A ſquadron of twenty ſhips of war, under Laches ſon of Melanopus, and Charœades ſon of Euphiletus, being in the autumn ſent to aſſiſt the Leontines, took its ſtation in the friendly port of Rhegium.

SECT. I.

Thucyd. l. 3. c. 86.

B. C. 427. Ol. 88. 1. P. W. 5.

The immediate effect of this reïnforcement, as appears from the tenor of the narrative of Thucydides, was, that the blockade of Leontium by ſea was given up or became ineffectual, and ſupplies could be introduced. In the winter an expedition of little conſequence was made, with no ſucceſs, by the Athenian commanders, againſt the Liparæan, called alſo the Æolian

Thucyd. l. 3. c. 115. & l. 4. c. 25.

Thucyd. l. 3. c. 88. ilands, inhabited by a colony of Greeks from Cnidos, then in alliance with the Syracuſans, and probably troubleſome to the Rhegians and their allies by maritime depredation. In the following ſummer the relief of Leontium from the land blockade being undertaken, Charœades fell in action with the Syracuſans. Laches nevertheleſs conducting the allied forces againſt Meſſena, took that city by capitulation, and then ſailing to the Epizephyrian Locrian coaſt, ravaged the country, defeated the Locrians who came out to protect it, and took the ſmall town of Peripolium.

B. C. 426. Ol. 88. 2. P. W. 6. Thucyd. l. 3. c. 90. c. 90.

c. 103. In the next winter an attempt was made by land againſt the citadel of Neſſa in Sicily, held by a Syracuſan garriſon; but the allies were compelled to retire with loſs. The Syracuſans then, decidedly ſuperior by land, but excluded by a ſquadron of only twenty triremes from their own ſeas, where they had long been accuſtomed to command, reſolved to reſtore their marine, of late neglected, and give battle to the enemy's fleet. Intelligence of this, coming to Laches, was forwarded to Athens, with a requeſt for reïnforcement; and, the ſucceſs already obtained incouraging the Athenian government, it was determined to ſend ſuch a fleet as ſhould at once give ſuperiority beyond competition at ſea, and, it was hoped, command ſpeedy ſucceſs in the final object of the war. Pythodorus ſon of Iſolochus was forwarded immediately with a ſmall ſquadron to ſuperſede Laches in the command in chief, while triremes were preparing in the

port of Peiræus, to follow in ſpring, under Eurymedon ſon of Theocles and Sophocles ſon of Soſtratidas, which ſhould make the number of the relieving fleet ſixty. SECT. I.

This change in the command ſeems not to have been advantageous. The conduct of Laches in Italy and Sicily had been apparently judicious and vigorous, and, for the force he commanded, ſucceſsful; and the ſituations in which we afterward find him, prove that his eſtimation was not mean in Athens or in Greece. He was the perſon to whom, together with Nicias, the Lacedæmonian government always applied, when buſineſs was to be tranſacted with the government of Athens: when the truce for fifty years was made with Lacedæmon, he was the perſon appointed to the dignified office of pronouncing the prayer, that the event might be fortunate for the commonwealth; when the war broke between Argos and Lacedæmon, he commanded the Athenian auxiliary forces in the army of the Argian confederacy; and he loſt his life, as we have ſeen, in conducting the gallant, and, for the circumſtances, ſucceſsful retreat of thoſe troops from the unfortunate field of Mantineia. His ſucceſſor in the Sicilian command began his operations inauſpiciouſly: debarking his forces on the Locrian coaſt, near the town of Peripolium, which Laches had taken, he was attacked by the Locrians, and compelled to retire with loſs. Thucyd. l. 3. c. 103.

The following ſpring was rendered remarkable by an eruption of mount Ætna, the third c. 106.

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remembered among the Greeks, from their firſt eſtabliſhment in Sicily. The boiling matter overflowed a part of the Catanian territory, but did not affect the town. In the beginning of ſummer, faction diſabling the Rhegian government, and the Athenian general being either weak or remiſs in his command, the Syracuſans, through intelligence in Meſſena, recovered that important place. It was about this time that Demoſthenes ingaged in his extraordinary attempt at Pylus, which ended ſo advantageouſly for Athens. Intelligence arrived at Syracuſe, that the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles, deſtined to reïnforce Pythodorus, inſtead of advancing from Corcyra, was returned to the Peloponneſian coaſt, and likely to be detained there. The opportunity ſeemed favorable for the Syracuſans to try a naval action. Thirty triremes were however the utmoſt force they could aſſemble in the harbour of Meſſena. Pythodorus had only ſixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian ſhips of war, with which he ingaged them in that ſtrait ſo celebrated for the poetical terrors of Charybdis and Scylla. Inferior as he was in force, he gained the advantage in action, but it was not deciſive.

B. C. 426. P. W. 6. Thucyd. l. 4. c. 1.

Thucyd. l. 5. c. 25.

His departure with his fleet for Camarina, to obviate the effects of a ſedition which was upon the point of putting that city into the hands of the Syracuſans, produced a more important blow againſt the Syracuſan intereſt. The opportunity of his abſence was taken for invading by land the territory of Naxus, a Chalcidian city,

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city, of the Ionian alliance, not far from Meſſena. The Naxians had cloſe alliance with the Sicel barbarians of their neighbourhood. Theſe no ſooner heard of the diſtreſs of their friends than they came, in large force, to relieve them. In the moment of their attack the Naxians ſallied: more than a thouſand Meſſenians and others, of the Dorian army, were killed upon the ſpot, and of the reſt only a ſmall proportion eſcaped the hands of the purſuing barbarians. The immediate conſequence of this action, which the more requires notice as it tends to explain the antient ſyſtem of naval war, was that the Syracuſan fleet, deprived of a landforce on which it could depend for protection, dared no longer wait the return of the Athenian fleet to Meſſena. The Leontines (for the blockade of their town by land, we find, had been already given up) then marched to coöperate with the Athenian fleet in an attack upon Meſſena; but the attempt failed. After this, hoſtilities were continued, without important conſequences, among the Sicilian Greeks, the Athenian armament remaining inactive during the reſt of the ſummer and all the following winter.

Meanwhile the fame of the various ſucceſſes of Athens, and of the general turn in the fortune of the war, contrary to the expectation of all Greece, in favor of that ambitious and reſtleſs republic, raiſed alarm among thinking men; and this was increaſed by the arrival of the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles in the Sicilian ſeas. During the winter, Camarina and Gela,

Thucyd. l. 5. c. 52, & ſeq.

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neighbour-cities of Sicily, not actuated by any extenſive view, but meerly conſidering the ſeparate convenience of their own communities, concluded a peace between themſelves, for themſelves only; each city holding itſelf bound to the conditions of its former confederacy, for all purpoſes of war againſt other ſtates. But the ſuperior political importance of Syracuſe gave larger views to its leaders; among whom Hermocrates ſon of Hermon was riſing to eminence, for abilities, courage, activity, and, above all, for a diſpoſition truly patriotic. The ſmall beginning of peaceful meaſures made by the Camarinæans and Geloäns, appeared to Hermocrates a favorable opening for propoſals for a general peace. He firſt prevailed with his own city, and then procured a congreſs of miniſters at Gela from all the cities of the iland. A variety of claſhing intereſts, among ſo many little ſtates, made accommodation difficult; but the eloquence of Hermocrates diſplayed ſo forcibly the danger of forein interference, and particularly of Athenian interference, and urged ſo plauſibly the evident diſintereſtedneſs of Syracuſe, decidedly ſuperior in the war, and no way preſſed to promote peace but by the deſire of benefits and the apprehenſion of evils which would involve all Sicily, that he finally prevailed, and a general peace was eſtabliſhed; every city holding what it poſſeſſed at the time; except that the Syracuſans, for a ſtipulated ſum, reſtored Morgantina to the Camarinæans.

The ſucceſs of Hermocrates in this negotiation

tion effectually checked the ambitious views of the Athenians upon Sicily. The commanders of the fleet, ſeeing no opportunity of farther ſervice to their country, ſailed home. Indignation however met them from their ſoverein the people, for permitting their allies to make peace: Pythodorus and Sophocles were puniſhed with baniſhment. The ſervices of Eurymedon, at Corcyra and at Pylus, apparently ſaved him from ſo ſevere a ſentence, but he was condemned in a fine. SECT. II.

SECTION II.

New troubles in Sicily: New interference of Athens; ſtopped by the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. Aſſiſtance ſolicited from Athens by Egeſta againſt Selinus. Contention of parties at Athens: Baniſhment of Hyperbolus. Aſſiſtance to Egeſta voted by the Athenian aſſembly: Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to command. Mutilation of the terms of Mercury: Completion of the preparations for the Sicilian expedition, and departure of the fleet.

HERMOCRATES, it appears, had no idea, and, indeed, Thucydides ſeems to have had no idea, of the poſſibility of molding all the Sicilian Greek municipal governments into one commonwealth, or even of eſtabliſhing among them an effective federal union. The Sicilian patriot is repreſented, by the ſtateſman-hiſto- Thucyd. l. 5. c. 4.

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rian, admoniſhing the congreſs only to exclude forein interference, and ſuch wars as might ariſe among themſelves would have no very important ill conſequences. Through ſuch extreme deficiency in Grecian politics new troubles quickly aroſe in Sicily. Time and various circumſtances had greatly altered the ſtate of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, ſince that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands, which had been made on the general eſtabliſhment of democratical government, after the expulſion of the family of Gelon. In the other cities the poor reſted under their lot; but in Leontium they were warm in project for a freſh and equal partition; and, to ſtrengthen themſelves againſt the party of the wealthy, they carried in the general aſſembly a decree for aſſociating a number of new citizens. The landowners, thus, not only upon the point of being deprived of their patrimonies, but apprehending every kind and degree of oppreſſion from democratical deſpotiſm, applied to Syracuſe for protection; and, with aſſiſtance thence, expelled all the lower people. But the wealthy ſoon found themſelves uneaſy in a city where they were to divide offices only with their ſlaves, and where the buſineſs and the burden of arms muſt be theirs alone, in a ſituation requiring the moſt watchful attention of a garriſon. For not only the worſt evils that man can inflict on man were conſtantly to be apprehended from the vengeance of the expelled, but the produce of their fields

fields could not be vindicated, and their ſubſiſtence inſured, without, if not conſtant exertion, yet conſtant readineſs for exertion againſt plunderers. The Syracuſans therefore carried their liberal kindneſs ſo far as to aſſociate all the Leontine landowners into the number of Syracuſan citizens; all migrated to Syracuſe, and Leontium was totally deſerted. SECT. II.

What, in their new ſituation, offended or alarmed theſe men, apparently ſo generouſly relieved, we are not informed; but there ſeems ground for conjecture, that it was ſome violence committed or threatened by the democratical party in Syracuſe. A number of them quitted that city in diſguſt, and ſeizing a part of the town of Leontium, called Phoceæ, and a fort in the Leontine territory named Bricinniæ, they invited their own expelled lower people to join them. Many of theſe, who had been wandering about Sicily, moſtly in ſufficient diſtreſs, accepted the invitation; and predatory war againſt the Leontine and Syracuſan territories became the reſource of all for ſubſiſtence.

Intelligence of the expulſion of all the commonalty from the principal Ionic city of Sicily would not be received with ſatisfaction at Athens. It was quickly followed by information of the revival, in ſome degree, of the democracy of Leontium through the eſtabliſhments made in Phoceæ and Bricinniæ. The reſolution was then taken to ſend miniſters to Sicily, to diſcover the ſtrength of the Athenian intereſt

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B. C. 422. Ol. 89 3. P. W. 10.

intereſt throughout the iland, and to promote a league hoſtile to Syracuſe. Phæax ſon of Eraſiſtratus was ſent, with two others, to manage this buſineſs; and he ſeems to have conducted himſelf ably in it. Urging, both in public harangue and in colloquial communication, the notorious oppreſſion of the Leontine people, and the evident diſpoſition of Syracuſe to aſſume tyrannical ſovereinty over all Sicily, he ſucceeded with the powerful ſtates of Agrigentum and Camarina; but he failed at Gela; and finding no promiſing proſpect in any other city, he paſſed through the country of the Sicels to Bricinniæ. With information of the alliances he had procured for them in Sicily, and aſſurances of aſſiſtance from Athens, he greatly incouraged the garriſon there. From Bricinniæ he proceeded by ſea to the Italian coaſt, made an advantageous treaty with the Epizephyrian Locrians, and then returned home.

This proſperous beginning toward a reſtoration of the Athenian intereſt in Sicily, through a revival of troubles among the Grecian colonies there, was early checked by the event of the battle of Amphipolis, which happened in the ſummer of the ſame year. The negotiations for peace between Athens and Lacedæmon, begun in autumn, were brought to a concluſion in the following ſpring. The party of Nicias then predominated: the maxims of Pericles again ſwayed the Athenian councils; views of farther acquiſition to the dominion of the commonwealth

monwealth were rejected, and all interference in the affairs of Sicily dropped. SECT. II.

The intereſt of the principal ſtates of Greece in Sicilian affairs thus ceaſing, for near ſix years we have little information concerning them. But in that interval two ſmall republics, Selinus and Egeſta, became ingaged in that kind of domeſtic war, which, according to the political doctrine maintained by Hermocrates, in his ſpeeches to the Sicilian congreſs, could have no important ill conſequences, were forein interference only excluded. The Selinuntines obtained aſſiſtance from Syracuſe; which was within the propoſal of Hermocrates for inſuring general ſafety and happineſs to Sicily. But the Egeſtans found themſelves thus effectually deprived of their portion of ſafety and happineſs among the Sicilian people; for they were preſently blockaded by ſea and land. It behoved them to find, if poſſible, aſſiſtance equally powerful with that of Syracuſe; but within Sicily it did not exiſt. Preſſed therefore by the apprehenſion of what uſually befell a captured town from a Grecian enemy, they determined to ſeek forein aid; and none appeared ſo likely to be obtained and to be effectual as that of Athens. Miniſters were accordingly ſent, who urged arguments which might not unreaſonably have weight with the Athenian people. 'The Syracuſans,' they obſerved, 'had already 'exterminated the Leontines, a people con-'nected with the Athenians, not only by an-'tient alliance, but by blood. If this paſſed 'with

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 6.

B. C. 416. Ol. 90. 4. P. W. 16.

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'with impunity, and not this only, but that 'domineering people were permitted to go on 'oppreſſing all the allies of Athens in Sicily, 'let it be conſidered what a force might accrue 'to the Peloponneſian confederacy, in a future, 'nay, a now impending war.' To theſe arguments aſſurances were added, that the Egeſtans wanted only troops, their wealth being ample.

Athens was at this time more than uſually agitated by faction. Alcibiades, checked in his ambitious views by the event of the ſedition of Argos, which nearly annihilated the extraordinary influence he had acquired in Peloponneſus, had been looking around for new opportunity of enterprize, and it was notoriouſly his purpoſe to ingage the commonwealth in a war. The party of Nicias dreaded a war on its own account, but ſtill more on account of the increaſe of influence and authority which it would probably bring to Alcibiades, and they vigilantly oppoſed all his meaſures. This conteſt was favorable to Hyperbolus, who had ſtill great weight, through the ſupport of that body of the citizens which had raiſed Cleon to greatneſs. Hyperbolus had nearly overborne Nicias by vehemence of railing, and by threatening proſecutions; but he could not ſo overbear Alcibiades. Againſt him therefore he directed another kind of policy. The vaſt ambition of Alcibiades, his ſplendid manner of living, and the ſuperiority he affected in everything, gave occaſion for the ſuggeſtion, which

Plut. vit. Nic. & Alcib.

was

was ſedulouſly circulated among the people, that his power and influence were greater than could be ſafe in a democracy, and that the oſtraciſm was neceſſary to bring men to a juſt level. Alcibiades and his friends were alarmed at this idea, and the readineſs with which the people appeared to receive it. They endeavoured at firſt to counterwork it by urging, that not Alcibiades, whoſe power reſted intirely on the favor of the people, but Nicias and the ariſtocratical party, were the perſons really to be feared; and the baniſhment of the head of that party would beſt reſtore a juſt equilibrium in the commonwealth. Hyperbolus uſed all his art to inflame the diſpute, and at the ſame time to ſet the people equally againſt both the leaders. His influence was ſuch, that it was evidently in his power to decide which of the two ſhould be baniſhed. But he had a politician to incounter, ſuch as Cleon never met with. Alcibiades communicated with Nicias: an aſſembly of the people was held; both collected their ſtrength; and Hyperbolus was named as a perſon, by his weight, influence, and ſeditious deſigns, dangerous to the commonwealth. The people were ſurprized; for no man of his mean condition was ever before propoſed as a ſubject for the oſtraciſm. But the Athenian people loved a joke; and this appeared a good one: they would honor him by ranking him with Miltiades, Ariſteides, Themiſtocles, and Cimon. To the whim of a thoughtleſs multitude was added all the weight of

SECT. II.

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of intereſt of Alcibiades and Nicias, and the baniſhment of Hyperbolus was decided.

The coalition of parties, however, laſted no longer than to ſtrike this blow againſt a man whom both feared. One was ſtill as earneſt for war as the other anxious to maintain peace. The embaſſy from Egeſta afforded an opportunity ſuch as Alcibiades wiſhed. As general of the commonwealth, for he ſtill held that office, he received the miniſters in the moſt favorable manner, and warmly recommended their cauſe to the people. None of his meaſures ſeem to have been oppoſed with more effort by the party of Nicias. For a time they prevented any deciſion in favor of the Egeſtans. But at length the various arguments and repeated ſupplications which the authority and influence of the general gave opportunity to urge, in ſome degree prevailed with the people. In the autumn of the ſixteenth year of the war, while the Melians were ſtill reſiſting the Athenian forces, and about the time that the Lacedæmonians were ſo inefficiently employed in eſtabliſhing their Argian friends in Ornea, commiſſioners were ſent into Sicily to gain information of the ſtate of things, and particularly to inquire whether the Egeſtans really poſſeſſed thoſe funds for ſupporting a large armament, which their miniſters pretended.

B. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. P. W. 17. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 8.

In the following ſpring, the commiſſioners returned, accompanied by new miniſters from Egeſta; who brought with them ſixty talents in ſilver, about fifteen thouſand pounds ſterling,

ling, as a month's pay in advance for ſixty triremes which they were directed to requeſt. With this ſpecious voucher in their hands, they were introduced into the Athenian aſſembly. The commiſſioners, devoted to the party of Alcibiades, concurred with them in every repreſentation, true or falſe, that might induce the people to vote the aſſiſtance deſired; and did not ſcruple to add their teſtimony to the aſſertion, that the ſum produced bore but a ſmall proportion to the reſources of the treaſury of Egeſta and the wealth of its temples; which was found afterward to be a groſs impoſition. The aſſembly however was perſuaded, and the decree paſſed for ſending the ſixty triremes. SECT. II.

The policy of Alcibiades upon this occaſion, unnoticed by Plutarch and all the later writers, is however not very defectively unfolded in the ſimple and conciſe ſtatement of facts by Thucydides. Tho Nicias ſo vehemently oppoſed the favorite meaſure of Alcibiades, yet Alcibiades would not appear the opponent of Nicias: on the contrary, he would uſe the weight and influence of Nicias againſt Nicias himſelf. The decree for ſending a force to Sicily being carried, the commanders were to be named. The partizans of Alcibiades were ſtill the propoſers of all meaſures, yet Nicias was named firſt in command; Alcibiades ſecond; and for a third Lamachus was choſen, a man of birth, who, tho yet in the prime of life, had ſeen much ſervice, but a ſoldier of fortune, of a diſ-

Ariſtoph. Acharn. v. 597, 601, 615, et Pax, v. 604.

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a diſſipated turn, and of no great weight by either abilities or property. Inſtructions were then voted; that the generals ſhould uſe the force committed to them, firſt, to give ſecurity to Egeſta againſt the Selinuntines; then to reſtore the commonwealth of Leontium; and afterward to take any meaſures they might judge proper for promoting the Athenian intereſt in Sicily; and that, for carrying into effect theſe purpoſes, they ſhould have diſcretionary powers.

Such rapid deciſion could not but be hazardous, where the meaſures of executive government were directed by a whole people. But it was the object of Alcibiades and his party not to let popular paſſion cool. Four days only were allowed before a ſecond aſſembly was held, to decide upon the detail of the armament, and to grant any requiſition of the generals for which a vote of the people might be neceſſary. Nicias, unprepared before to oppoſe a decree which had appointed him to a great command unſought, and whoſe purpoſe, which he knew to be really the conqueſt of Sicily, he diſapproved, now ſtepped forward to admoniſh the multitude his ſoverein.

Thucyd. l. 6.

'To urge to Athenian tempers,' he ſaid, 'that 'in reaſon they ſhould rather endeavour to ſe-'cure what they already poſſeſs, than ingage in 'wild projects for farther acquiſition, I fear 'will be vain; yet I think it my duty to endea-'vour to ſhow you how raſh and unadviſed your 'preſent purpoſe is. Within Greece you ſeem to

'to imagine yourſelves at peace: yet ſome of SECT. II.
'the moſt powerful ſtates of the confederacy
'with which you have been at war, have not
'yet acceded to the treaty, and ſome of the ar-
'ticles are ſtill controverted by all. In ſhort,
'it is not a peace, but meerly a dubious ſuſ-
'penſion of hoſtilities, prolonged by ten-day
'truces, which will hold only till ſome miſ-
'fortune befall us, or till Lacedæmon give the
'word for war. At the ſame time your antient
'ſubjects, the Chalcidians of Thrace, have been
'years in a rebellion which they are ſtill main-
'taining; and ſome others, whom you eſteem
'dependent ſtates, pay you but a precarious
'obedience. Is it not then extreme impolicy
'to incur unneceſſarily new and great dangers,
'with the view to increaſe a dominion already
'ſo inſecure?

'With regard to the dominion which Syra-
'cuſe may acquire in Sicily, with whoſe con-
'ſequences you are threatened, ſo far from an
'object of apprehenſion, it will rather give us
'ſecurity. For while Sicily is divided, each
'ſtate will court the favor of the Lacedæmo-
'nians, who profeſs themſelves the protectors
'of independency; but when once the Syracu-
'ſans are maſters of all, they will be leſs for-
'ward in connection with Lacedæmon, and
'more cautious of oppoſing the Athenians;
'whoſe cauſe is ſimilar to theirs, and whoſe in-
'tereſt congenial.

'For myſelf,' continued Nicias, 'at my years,
'and after the long courſe of ſervices in which

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'my fellowcitizens have been witneſſes of my 'conduct, I may venture to ſay that no man is 'leſs anxious for his perſonal ſafety. I have 'large property, through which my welfare is 'intimately connected with that of the com- 'monwealth. But we owe both life and fortune 'to our country; and I hold that man to be a 'good citizen who is duly careful of both. If 'then there is among you a young man, born 'to great wealth and ſplendid ſituation, whoſe 'paſſion for diſtinction has nevertheleſs led him 'far to exceed in magnificence both what ſuited 'his means and what became his ſituation; if 'he is now appointed to a command above his 'years, but with which, at his years eſpecially, 'a man is likely to be delighted; above all, if 'repairs are wanting to a waſted fortune, which 'may make ſuch a command deſirable to him, 'tho ruinous to his country, it behoves you to 'beware how you accede to the advice of ſuch 'a counſellor. I dread indeed the warm paſ- 'ſions of that crowd of youths, the followers 'and ſupporters of the perſon of whom I ſpeak: 'but all men of ſober judgement ought yet to 'interfere, notwithſtanding the decree of the 'laſt aſſembly, and prevent raſh undertakings, 'of a magnitude that may involve, with their 'failure, the downfal of the commonwealth. 'If therefore, honored as I am by the voice of 'my country with appointment to the chief 'command of the intended expedition, I may 'preſume to adviſe, it ſhall be, that the expe- 'dition be not undertaken; that the Sicilians

'be

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'be left ſtill divided by their ſeas from Athens; 'that the Egeſtans, as without communication 'with Athens they ingaged in war with the Se- 'linuntines, ſo, without our interference they 'accommodate their differences; and that, in 'future, the Athenians ingage in no alliances 'with ſtates which, in their own diſtreſs, will 'claim aſſiſtance, but, in the diſtreſs of Athens, 'could afford none.'

Alcibiades, thus particularly called upon, mounted the bema to reply. He began with inſiſting upon his juſt pretenſion to the high command to which he was raiſed, and with glorying in the extravagances of which he was accuſed. 'My anceſtors before me,' he ſaid, 'have been honored for that very conduct which 'is now imputed to me as criminal. I own, 'and it is my boaſt, that I have exceeded them 'all in magnificence, and I claim merit with 'my country for it. The ſuppoſition had gain- 'ed through Greece that Athens was ruined by 'the war. I have ſhown that an individual of 'Athens could yet outdo what any prince or 'ſtate had ever done. I ſent ſeven chariots to 'the Olympian feſtival, and gained the firſt, 'the ſecond, and the fourth prizes: and the 'figure I maintained throughout, at that meet- 'ing of the whole Greek nation, did not diſ- 'parage the ſplendor of my victory. Is this a 'crime? On the contrary, it is held honorable 'by the cuſtoms of Greece, and reflects honor 'and renown even on the country of thoſe who 'exhibit ſuch magnificence. With regard then

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'to my extravagance, as it has been called, at 'home, whether in public entertainments or in 'whatever elſe, perhaps I may have drawn on 'me the envy of ſome of our own citizens: 'but ſtrangers are more juſt; and in my libe-'rality and hoſpitality they admire the greatneſs 'of the commonwealth.

'If then even in theſe things, comparatively 'meer private concerns, I have deſerved well 'of my country, let it be inquired what my 'public conduct has been. Glory, I will own, 'I ardently deſire; but how have I ſought to 'acquire it, and what has been my ſucceſs? 'Have I promoted raſh enterprize? Have I 'been forward, as it is ſaid youth is apt to be, 'to ingage the commonwealth, wildly and with-'out foreſight, in hazardous war? or was it I 'who, by negotiation, without either danger or 'expence to yourſelves, brought all Peloponne-'neſus to fight your battles for you againſt 'Lacedæmon, and reduced that long-dreaded 'rival ſtate to riſk its exiſtence at Mantineia, 'in arms againſt its own antient allies? If ſuch 'then have been my ſervices on firſt entering 'upon public buſineſs, you need not, I hope, 'fear but my greater experience will now be 'advantageous to you.

'With regard then to Nicias, who has long 'and honorably ſerved you in the high ſitua-'tion of general of the commonwealth, tho he 'has been expreſſing himſelf acrimoniouſly 'againſt me, I readily acknowlege his merit, 'and have no objection to ſerve with him: on

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'the contrary, I think it would become your 'wiſdom to employ us together. Nicias has 'the reputation of cautious prudence, and ſin-'gular good fortune; I am ſaid to be more than 'prudently enterprizing. For want of enter-'prize his wiſdom, and the good fortune with 'which the gods have been accuſtomed to bleſs 'it, will be unavailing to the commonwealth: 'checked by his prudence, my diſpoſition to 'enterprize cannot be dangerous.

'To come then to the queſtion more imme-'diately before the aſſembly, the opportunity 'now offered to the commonwealth, for acqui-'ſition in Sicily, ought not to be neglected. 'The power of the Sicilians, which ſome would 'teach you to fear, has been much exaggerated. 'They are a mixed people, little attached to 'one another, little attached to a country which 'they conſider as ſcarcely theirs, and little diſ-'poſed to riſk either perſon or fortune for it; 'but always ready for any change, whether of 'political connection, or of local eſtabliſhment, 'that may offer any advantage, or relieve from 'any diſtreſs. Nor is their military force ſuch 'as ſome have pretended; ſeveral Grecian 'ſtates and all the barbarians of the iland, will 'be immediately in your intereſt. Diſtracted 'then by faction, as it is well known the reſt 'are, negotiation, well managed, may ſoon bring 'more to your party.

'But it is endeavoured to alarm you with ap-'prehenſions of invaſion from Peloponneſus. 'With regard to this, late experience has de-

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'monſtrated what may ſuffice us to know. The 'Peloponneſians are always able to overrun the 'open country of Attica, even when none of 'our force is abſent on forein ſervice; and, 'ſhould the expedition now propoſed take 'place, they can do no more. Ought we then 'to abandon allies, whom treaties ratified by 'oath bind us to protect? Is it a juſt reaſon for 'ſo failing in our ingagements, that thoſe allies 'are unable to afford us mutual protection? It 'was ſurely not to obtain Egeſtan forces for the 'defence of Attica that the treaty was made; 'but to prevent our enemies in Sicily from in-'juring Attica, by finding them employment 'within their own iland. It has been by rea-'dineſs to ASSIST ALL, whether Greeks or bar-'barians, that OUR empire, and ALL empire, 'has been acquired. Nor, let me add, is it 'now in our choice how far we will ſtretch our 'command; for, poſſeſſing empire, we muſt 'maintain it, and rather extend than permit 'any diminution of it, or we ſhall, more even 'than weaker ſtates, riſk our own ſubjection to 'a forein dominion. I will then detain you no 'longer than to obſerve, that the command 'which we poſſeſs of the ſea, and the party of 'which we are aſſured in Sicily, will ſufficiently 'inable us to keep what we may acquire, and 'ſufficiently inſure means of retreat if we 'ſhould fail of our purpoſe; ſo that, with much 'to hope, we have, from any event of the pro-'poſed expedition, little to fear. I am there-

'fore

'fore firmly of opinion that your decree for it 'ought not to be reſcinded.' SECT. II.

This ſpeech of Alcibiades was received with loud and extenſive applauſe. It was followed by ſpeeches of the Egeſtan and Leontine miniſters, imploring pity and urging the faith of treaties, which alſo had their effect; and at length the diſpoſition of a large majority of the people to favor the purpoſe of Alcibiades became ſo evident, that Nicias would not any longer directly oppoſe it. But, as firſt of the generals elect, it was his privilege to name the force that he judged requiſite for the enterprize; and he thought to damp the preſent ardor, and excite a little reflection, by naming what he expected, for the Athenian commonwealth to ſend on diſtant ſervice, would be deemed extravagantly great. While therefore he appeared to accede to the general wiſh, he endeavoured to divert it from its object by reciting the difficulties that would oppoſe its accompliſhment. 'We have, at preſent,' he ſaid, 'for allies in 'Sicily, the Egeſtans, ſemibarbarians, and the 'Leontines, who ſcarcely exiſt as a people. It 'is to be hoped that Naxus and Catana, on account of their connection by blood with the 'Leontines and with Athens, may be induced 'to join us; but there are, beſide theſe, ſeven 'independent Grecian cities in Sicily, on whoſe 'oppoſition we may rely[1]; all of them poſſeſſing regular forces of land and ſea, with

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 19.

c. 20.

[1] Syracuſe, Selinus, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Himera, Meſſena.

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'funds to maintain them; and eſpecially Selinus and Syracuſe, the firſt objects of the war. 'The Syracuſans, in addition to conſiderable 'wealth of their own, command tribute from 'the barbarians of the iland. But the two 'points in which they will principally have advantage over us, are the poſſeſſion of a numerous cavalry, and of the ſtores which a plentiful country affords; while we muſt depend 'upon precarious ſupplies by ſea. In addition 'therefore to a powerful fleet, an army, ſuch as 'we have been accuſtomed to ſend on forein 'ſervice, will be very unequal to the object. 'Unleſs we obtain other allies than the Egeſtans, ſuch a force could not ſtir, in Sicily, 'for the cavalry alone of the enemy. It muſt 'then be conſidered that we ſhall not only be 'far from home, but far alſo from any territory 'under our command. Supplies will therefore 'reach us, not without riſk and difficulty at all 'times; but during the four winter months, 'ſcarcely an advice-boat can paſs to us. Theſe 'things conſidered, it appears that, beſide a 'large force of regular heavy-armed of our 'allies and ſubjects, in addition to what it may 'be adviſable to ſend of our own, if we can 'obtain any for hire in Peloponneſus, it ſhould 'be done. Since moreover to tranſport ſo far 'a body of cavalry capable of oppoſing the cavalry of the country is impoſſible, we muſt 'add a large force of bowmen and ſlingers, who 'may at leaſt relieve our heavy-armed againſt 'the annoyance of the enemy's horſe. Our 'fleet

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 22.

'fleet muſt be ſuperior beyond competition; SECT. II.
'otherwiſe we can have no certainty even of
'ſubſiſtence; and it will be proper to provide
'abundantly beforehand for ſo numerous an ar-
'mament, to prevent the diſtreſs that might
'otherwiſe ariſe from accidents of winds and
'ſeas. Beyond all things, however, we muſt
'be amply ſupplied with money; becauſe what
'the Egeſtans talk of, I am confident they only
'talk of. In a word, to begin our buſineſs
'with any proſpect of ſucceſs, we muſt, from
'the moment we land, be in every point ſupe-
'rior to the enemy. This is what the welfare
'of the commonwealth, I am fully perſuaded,
'requires. If any man can convince you that
'my opinion is unfounded, I am ready to reſign
'my command to him.'

The ſimple prudence of the experienced Ni- Thucyd. l. 6. c. 24.
cias was no match for the verſatile ſagacity of
the young politician with whom he had to con-
end. The friends of Alcibiades received this
peech with the higheſt approbation; affecting
o conſider it not at all as diſſuading or diſcou-
aging the undertaking, but, on the contrary,
iſely and providently recommending what
ould inſure ſucceſs. The whole people were
atuated with the ſpirit of enterprize. Love
novelty and change, with certainty of pre-
ſet pay, and hope of they knew not what future
acuiſition, influenced the more thoughtleſs of
all anks; while the paſt ſucceſſes of Athens,
and he evident weakneſs and inefficiency of the
Lacdæmonian adminiſtration, incouraged even
the

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the more experienced and prudent; insomuch that if any deeper thinkers disapproved, a declaration of their sentiments might have subjected them to the danger of being deemed disaffected to the commonwealth, and fined, banished, or even capitally condemned, according to the momentary caprice of the despotic soverein.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 25.

Such being the disposition of the people, Nicias was called upon to declare what precisely was the force that he thought necessary. He would have declined in the moment, urging that he wished to consult his collegues; but popular impatience would admit no delay, and, overcome with importunity, he at length said, that less than a hundred triremes and five thousand heavy-armed, with a due proportion of bowmen and slingers (making, in the whole, at least thirty thousand men, those in the sea-service included) would be insufficient; and that stores and all necessaries should be plentifully provided to accompany the fleet; which ought not to be left dependent upon precarious supplies. Popular zeal did not confine itself to the meer grant of what was thus demanded; but a vote was immediately passed, impowering the generals to command, for the expedition, whatever they should judge expedient for the prosperity and glory of the commonwealth. The ravage made by the pestilence, at the beginning of the war, was now in a great degree repaired: the loss in battle had never been great; and the revenue, far exceeding the ordinary expences of the commonwealth, which in

SECT. II.

peace were trifling, incouraged ambition. Preparation therefore, thus amply ſupplied, was made with a celerity proportioned to the zeal of the people.

During the equipment, and while the popular mind was bent with a ſingular degree of paſſion upon the propoſed conqueſt, injoying already in idea large acquiſition of ſovereinty, whence tribute would accrue, ſuch as might give every Athenian citizen to be forever exempt from labor and from poverty, without occupation or profeſſion but that of arms, everything was ſuddenly diſturbed by a ſtrange circumſtance, to which Grecian ſuperſtition alone gave any importance. It was a cuſtom among the Athenians, derived from very early times, when art was rude, to place an imperfect ſtatue of Mercury, the head completely carved, the reſt generally a block meerly ſquared, in front of every reſidence, whether of gods or men: this cuſtom was ſtill held ſacred, and neither temple nor houſe at Athens was without one of thoſe formleſs guardians. In one night the greateſt part of them had the face mulitated by perſons unknown. Alarm and indignation immediately filled the city: the matter was taken up moſt ſeriouſly by magiſtrates and people: however the act of ill-deſigning men, it was very generally conſidered as an omen foreboding ill to the propoſed expedition; and great rewards were publicly offered to any, free or ſlave, who would diſcover the perpetrators. With regard to the offence in queſtion, inquiry and temptation

Thucyd. Andoc. de myſt. p. 20. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 28.

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temptation were equally ineffectual; not the leaſt diſcovery was made; but indication was obtained concerning the mutilation of ſome ſtatues, ſome time before, by young men heated with wine, and alſo of a profanation of the ſacred myſteries, by a mock celebration of them in private houſes; and in this accuſation Alcibiades was involved.

Thucyd. Iſocrat. pro Alcib. vel de bigis. p. 138. t. 3.

Of the party in oppoſition to Alcibiades were all who leaned to oligarchy, and moſt of the moſt powerful men of the commonwealth; who indignantly bore the ſuperiority aſſumed by that young man, by whoſe abilities, aſſiſted by the ſplendor of his birth, and the greatneſs of his fortune, and ſupported by the favor of the people, they found themſelves ſo overwhelmed that they had for ſome time paſt ſubmitted in ſilence. But the preſent was an opportunity not to be neglected; they ſet themſelves inſtantly to take advantage from it to ruin him in the favor of the people, that foundation of ſand on which all power in Athens muſt reſt, and then the reins of the commonwealth would of courſe paſs into their own hands. The report was ſedulouſly propagated, that Alcibiades was the principal author of all the late outrages. Facts known, it was ſaid, afforded ſufficient preſumption of what could not be directly proved; and the meer ſtyle of living of Alcibiades, ſo unbecoming the citizen of a commonwealth, and notorious to all, ſince it was oſtentatiouſly diſplayed, demonſtrated that he had no moderate purpoſes,

and

and that nothing leſs than the tyranny of Athens was the ultimate object of his ambition. SECT. II.

Comparing the cautious account of Thucydides with the known circumſtances of the times, the temper of party at Athens, and events preceding and following, we find ſtrong reaſon to ſuſpect, tho we cannot be certain, that, not Alcibiades, but the enemies of Alcibiades, were the authors of the profanation whence the diſturbance aroſe. Alcibiades was known, in his revels, to have committed irregularities, which would give color to ſuſpicion againſt him. But the mutilation of the Mercuries was no affair of a revel; it was evidently a concerted buſineſs, conducted with the moſt cautious ſecreſy. Nothing could be more injurious, nothing more neceſſarily ruinous in its conſequences to all the warmeſt wiſhes of Alcibiades, than ſuch an event at ſuch a time, and nothing could equally favor the purpoſes of his opponents: nothing therefore more without temptation for him, while the ſtrongeſt motives might urge them to commit the deed in ſecret, with the hope of fixing upon him the ſuſpicion. Accordingly, in no one circumſtance of his public life does Alcibiades ſeem to have conducted himſelf more unexceptionably than under this accuſation. He neither avoided inquiry, nor attempted to overbear it; but coming forward, with the decent confidence of innocence, he earneſtly deſired immediate trial, and deprecated only accuſation in his abſence. 'If guilty,' he ſaid, 'he was to ready to ſubmit

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'mit to the death which he ſhould deſerve: if 'innocent, he ought to be cleared of the ſhock-'ing imputation; and as it would be unjuſt, 'ſo would it be in the higheſt degree impru-'dent to keep ſuch a charge hanging over a 'man veſted with ſo great a command.' But, as uſual with all factions, what prudence would dictate for the benefit of the commonwealth was, with his opponents, but an inferior conſideration; what would advance the power of their party was the firſt. Dreading, therefore, his popularity with the army, fearing particularly the alienation of the Argian and Mantineian auxiliaries, whom his influence principally had obtained for the expedition, and apprehenſive that blame thus might fall upon themſelves, they determined neither immediately to accuſe, nor wholly to give up accuſation; and they prevailed with the people to decree ſimply, that Alcibiades ſhould hold his command, and proceed on the expedition [2].

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 30.

This being determined, popular zeal returned to its former object, and by midſummer the preparations were completed. So great and ſo ſplendid an armament was never before ſent by

c. 31.

any Grecian ſtate on forein ſervice. The importance of the armament itſelf, the importance

[2] This is Thucydides' account. According to an oration remaining from Iſocrates, the accuſers of Alcibiades were puniſhed, which would imply an acquittal of himſelf. This however being not ſaid by Iſocrates in his own name, but in that of a client, who had a purpoſe to anſwer, the teſtimony can hardly be put in competition with that of the hiſtorian. Iſocrat. de bigis, p. 133, 134. v. 3.

and

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and diſtance of its object, and the popular predilection with which it was favored, occaſioned extraordinary allowance for the equipment. Private zeal contended with public; the commanders of triremes not ſparing their own purſes, every one to have both his crew and his veſſel completeſt, equally for ſhow and for ſervice. The daily pay of a drachma, tenpence ſterling, was given by the public to every private ſailor; and the captains added extraordinary pay to able ſeamen, and to all the rowers of the upper bench, diſtinguiſhed by the name of Thranites, whoſe ſituation was more expoſed, and whoſe office both required more ſkill and was more laborious than that of the rowers of the lower benches. The heavy infantry, all choſen men, who, as uſual in the Greek ſervice, provided their own arms and appointments, vied with each other in the excellence and good appearance of both.

On the day named for imbarkation, the Athenian citizens inrolled for the expedition appeared on the parade at daybreak, together with thoſe of the allied forces which were then at Athens. The whole city accompanied their march to Peiræus; the natives, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, divided between hope and fear, on ſeeing ſo great a proportion of the ſtrength of the commonwealth, with ſome relations or friends of every family in it, committed to the rage of elements and the chance of war, at a diſtance which, for antient navigation,

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 30. B. C. Ol. 91. 1. P. W. 17. After 8 June.

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tion, was ſo great [3]; while the numerous foreiners more calmly gratified their curioſity with ſo ſplendid and ſo intereſting a ſpectacle. As ſoon as the imbarkation was completed, and everything prepared for getting under way, trumpets ſounded for ſignal of ſilence, and prayers for ſucceſs were put up to the gods with more than uſual formality, heralds directing, and the whole armament uniting their voices. Goblets of wine were then produced in every ſhip, and officers and privates together, out of gold and ſilver cups, poured libations and drank to the proſperity of the armament and of the commonwealth, the citizens and ſtrangers on the beach joining in the ejaculation. This ceremony being performed, the pæan was ſung, and the whole fleet moved for Ægina, thence to take its departure for Corcyra.

[3] Thucydides calls it the moſt diſtant as well as the greateſt expedition ever made by any Grecian ſtate. The coaſting navigation of the antients therefore made Sicily, in his opinion, more diſtant than Egypt.

SECT-

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SECTION III.

Defects of the Syracuſan conſtitution. Force of the Athenian armament. Meaſures of the Athenian armament. Able conduct of Alcibiades. Intrigues, tumult, popular panic, and their conſequences at Athens.

INTELLIGENCE of the extraordinary magnitude of the Athenian preparations paſſed from various quarters to Syracuſe; and the deſtination, in a democratical government, could not remain a ſecret. Nevertheleſs it was long before the news gained ſuch credit among the Syracuſan people, as to produce any meaſure for obviating the threatened evil. It is not ſpecified by hiſtorians, but the account of Thucydides makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuſe, or at leaſt a great change in the adminiſtration, ſince the oligarchal Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracuſan citizens. The democratical party now bore the ſway; and ſome jealouſy toward the nobles, leſt preparation for war ſhould throw an increaſe of power into their hands, appears to have influenced the leaders of the day. At the ſame time the circumſtances of Syracuſe, conſiderably altered ſince the former interference of Athens in the affairs of Sicily, were ſuch as would inflame the uſual preſumption

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 32.

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tion of a democratical government. The Ionian intereſt, formerly with the aſſiſtance of Camarina nearly balancing the Dorian, was now ſuppreſſed; Syracuſe was the acknowleged head of the Grecian name in Sicily; and the Syracuſan people truſted that, excepting the ſemi-barbarian Egeſtans and the Leontine banditti, the Athenians would not find a friend in the iland who would dare to own himſelf.

At length, however, accumulated accounts arriving, each more alarming than the former, it was thought proper to convene the general aſſembly. The patriotic and able Hermocrates, the peacemaker of Sicily when harraſſed by internal war, was among the foremoſt to propoſe vigorous meaſures againſt forein attack. Repreſenting the Athenian armament as really great and formidable, but dangerous to the Syracuſans only in proportion to the deficiency of their own exertion, he propoſed to ſtrengthen the Syracuſan confederacy by conciliating the barbarians of the iland, and by extending alliance among the Italian Greeks: he would even make overtures to Carthage, the richeſt commonwealth upon earth, and therefore ableſt to give that kind of aſſiſtance which was moſt deſirable, as being moſt efficacious with leaſt danger; and it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe, he ſaid, that apprehenſion of the growing power and extravagant ambition of Athens would diſpoſe the Carthaginians to the connection. Application ought alſo to be made to Corinth and Lacedæmon, whoſe diſpoſition to aſſiſt them could not be

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 33.

be doubted. Such in general was the negotiation which, in his opinion, their circumſtances required. With regard then to military operation, he was clear that they ought to meet invaſion before it reached them: and high as the reputation of the Athenian navy was, yet local circumſtances gave them ſuch advantages, that a proper exertion of the naval force which the Sicilian ſtates were able to raiſe, might make it impoſſible for the Athenians ever even to reach the Sicilian coaſt. This idea was founded on the deficiencies of the antient marine: 'The 'Tarentines,' he ſaid, 'are our allies; and the 'Athenian fleet, to go from Corcyra, their 'known place of aſſembling, to Sicily, muſt 'firſt make the Iapygian coaſt, and cannot 'avoid paſſing Tarentum. The harbour of Ta-'rentum therefore ſhould be the ſtation for the 'greateſt naval force that can be collected. So 'numerous a fleet as that of the enemy cannot 'keep exact order, in the long paſſage (for ſo, in 'Thucydides's narrative, Hermocrates terms it) 'acroſs the Ionian gulph. From the harbour of 'Tarentum, therefore, we may chuſe our moment 'of attack with certain advantage. We ſhall 'go into action with our crews refreſhed in a 'friendly port, and our galleys light; the Athe-'nians fatigued with rowing and incumbered 'with ſtores; or ſhould they, at the expence of 'theſe, prepare for action, we may, if prudence 'ſhould require it, retire into our port, and 'wait for freſh advantages, which cannot fail 'to offer. For the enemy muſt then again in-

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'cumber their gallies with ſtores, or riſk to 'ſuffer from want, in their paſſage along a hoſ-'tile coaſt. Such being the inconveniences and 'the hazards which they muſt have to incoun-'ter, I think, if the meaſure I propoſe were 'taken, they would ſcarcely venture at all to 'croſs the gulph.'

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 35.

This able advice, to a whole people in aſſembly directing executive government, did not meet with the attention it merited. Many would not yet believe that the Athenians meant to invade Sicily with views of conqueſt: ſome even ridiculed the idea: various contradictory opinions were warmly maintained; and Athenagoras, chief of the democratical party, endevored to uſe the opportunity for carrying a point againſt the nobles: 'It was rather 'to be wiſhed than feared,' he ſaid, 'that the 'Athenians would be ſo mad as to invade Si-'cily. For himſelf, he thought them wiſer. 'Peloponneſus itſelf was not better able to reſiſt 'them; and the force of Syracuſe alone was 'ſuperior to double the armament whoſe ap-'proach was repreſented as ſo alarming. No 'cavalry, he well knew, was imbarked: with-'in Sicily the Athenians could obtain none, 'except an inconſiderable force from Egeſta; 'and even their heavy-armed were inferior in 'number to the Syracuſan. Such being their 'deficiency, if, inſtead of commencing opera-'tions, as they muſt, from their naval camp, 'with ſcarcely a friend within the iland, they 'poſſeſſed a neighbouring city equal to Syra-'cuſe,

'cuſe, even ſo their army, inſtead of conqueſt, 'would ſcarcely eſcape deſtruction.' Having declared his ſentiments againſt the meaſures propoſed by Hermocrates, he proceeded to invey againſt him and the whole body of the nobles. 'The ambition of young men,' he ſaid, 'panted for military command; but the city 'would not ſo impoſe a yoke upon itſelf. On 'the contrary, proſecution ſhould prevent the 'ſeditious purpoſes of thoſe who would ſpread 'alarm; and puniſhment ſhould not fail for 'ſuch offences againſt the common welfare.' He was proceeding thus in the endevor to excite popular paſſion, when one of the generals (for the Syracuſan conſtitution at this time divided the chief military command between a board of fifteen) interfered with the authority of office. He ſtrongly reprobated the attempt to check the freedom of debate, and deter individuals from declaring their opinion on public affairs. 'When hoſtilities were threatened,' he ſaid, 'the welfare of the commonwealth un-'queſtionably required preparation in due pro-'portion to the danger. It ſhould therefore be 'the care of the generals to acquire more certain 'intelligence than ſeemed yet to have been ob-'tained, and in the mean time to communicate 'with the allies of the commonwealth, and take 'all other proper precaution.' Without putting any queſtion to the vote, he then diſmiſſed the aſſembly.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 38, 39, 40.

c. 41.

While ſuch, through the defects in the conſtitution of the government, was the unprepared

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 42. c. 43. ſtate of Syracuſe, the whole of the Athenian forces were already aſſembled at Corcyra. The fleet conſiſted of a hundred and thirty-four triremes, and two Rhodian penteconters. Of the triremes, a hundred were Athenian; and of theſe, ſixty were light for action, forty carried ſoldiers. The other thirty-four triremes were of the allied ſtates, principally Chian. The heavy-armed were, in all, five thouſand one hundred; of whom two thouſand two hundred were Athenian citizens; and of theſe only ſeven hundred, appointed to the inferior ſervice of marines [4], were of the Thetes, the other fifteen hundred being of the higher orders. The Argian auxiliary heavy-armed were five hundred; the Mantineian, including a few Peloponneſian mercenaries, two hundred and fifty; the remainder of the heavy-armed were from the ſubject-ſtates. The regular light-armed were four hundred Athenian and eighty Cretan bowmen, ſeven hundred Rhodian ſlingers, and a hundred and twenty Megarian refugees. A ſingle horſe-tranſport carried thirty horſe. The ſtoreſhips provided by the Athenian government, which carried alſo both ſutlers and artificers, were thirty of large burden of the kind called holcads, and a hundred ſmaller [5]: but many other veſſels of various burden, belonging to individuals, followed, for the ſake of profit from the market of ſo large an armament.

It was yet unknown to the generals, which

[4] Ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν. [5] Πλοῖα

of

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of the Italian or Sicilian cities would receive them. Three triremes were therefore diſpatched to inquire and to negotiate, with orders to meet the fleet as ſoon as poſſible with information. The whole then moved from Corcyra, in three diviſions; each of which ſeparately might more readily find, in the Italian ports, thoſe ſupplies which the antient ſhips of war could ſo ſcantily carry, and that ſhelter which they were ſo extremely liable to want. All however together croſſed the gulph, and made the Iapygian promontory without misfortune. Then they diſperſed to ſeek ſupplies around the bay of Tarentum; but not a ſingle town would admit them within its walls, or even make a market for them. Tarentum and Locri alone denied them water and the ſhelter of their ports. At length the whole fleet reaſſembled, without diſaſter, at Rhegium, the firſt allied city in their courſe. But even the Rhegians cautiouſly refuſed to admit them within their walls; allotting them however commodious ground for incampment, and providing for them a plentiful market.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 42.

The Syracuſans, at length, ſatisfied of the neceſſity of giving up private eaſe for public ſervice, and no longer heſitating between party intereſt and general welfare, permitted their leaders to make ſerious preparation for meeting the coming evil: miniſters were ſent to conciliate ſome of the Sicel tribes; garriſons were placed in ſituations to control others; arms and horſes were examined: and troops marched

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to occupy ſome of the moſt critical poſts for defending the Syracuſan territory.

Meanwhile the three Athenian ſhips, diſpatched from Corcyra, had been as far as the Egeſtan territory, and did not rejoin the fleet till it was arrived in the harbour of Rhegium. They brought information, that the repreſentations made by the Egeſtan miniſters at Athens, of the wealth of their ſtate, had been utterly falſe, and that the commiſſioners, ſent by the Athenian government to inquire concerning it, had been groſsly deceived. The richeſt temple of the Egeſtan territory was that of Venus at Eryx; where indeed the collection of cups, flagons, cenſers, and other veſſels of ſilver, was conſiderable. After being conducted to a diſplay of theſe ſacred riches, the commiſſioners had been variouſly invited and entertained by the principal Egeſtans; and, wherever they went, not only all the gold and ſilver plate of the place was ſtudiouſly collected, but whatever beſides could be borrowed from neighbouring towns, Phenician as well as Greek. Theſe commiſſioners had been appointed by the influence of Alcibiades and his party. Whether they were choſen for their ability or their folly may be difficult to gueſs; but they had either believed, or affected to believe, and reported to the Athenian people accordingly, that they could not ſufficiently admire the wealth of Egeſta. The commiſſioners ſent from Corcyra were, on the contrary, ſuch as Nicias, the firſt in command, would approve; and they went very

very differently diſpoſed. Having made ſtrict ſcrutiny, they reported on their return, that the Egeſtans could only ſhow thirty talents, between ſeven and eight thouſand pounds ſterling, in their treaſury, and that, for the reſt, their wealth was quite problematical. The generals had, probably none of them, any great dependence upon the wealth of Egeſta; yet as it had been ſeriouſly propoſed as the fund which was to afford means for the firſt conqueſts, they were diſtreſſed by its deficiency; for it was not probable the Athenian people would receive very favorably an immediate application for a ſupply. The diſappointment however did not come ſingle. The Rhegians had been upon the point of yielding to the ſolicitations and remonſtrances of the Athenian generals, who urged them to join their arms to thoſe of their antient allies, for the purpoſe of reſtoring their common kinſmen the oppreſſed Leontines; but they now gave for their deciſive anſwer, 'That 'they would do every office of friendſhip to the 'Athenians, within the limits of an exact neu-'trality; but they would ingage in no hoſti-'lities, unleſs in concurrence with the Italian 'ſtates of their alliance.'

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This determination of the Rhegians was a diſappointment, leſs on account of the force of land and ſea, tho not inconſiderable, which they could have furniſhed, than for the check it would give to negotiation among the Sicilian towns, where the example of Rhegium would be of weight. The Athenian generals found

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themſelves in conſequence much at a loſs. The diviſions among the leading men of Athens, and the haſte of thoſe who promoted the Sicilian expedition to profit from the popular favor which they in the moment injoyed, had occaſioned a total neglect of due preparation for ſo great and hazardous an enterprize, by previous negotiation. Several of the Sicilian and Italian ſtates had been, and ſome might be induced again to become, warm in the Athenian alliance: but, as matters ſtood, the ſemibarbarian Egeſtans, upon the verge of ruin through their war with Selinus, and the miſerable Leontines, ejected from their city and territory, were the only confederates of Athens beyond the Ionian ſea. When therefore it came to be debated what ſhould be the firſt meaſures of the armament, the three generals differed, nearly as might be expected from their difference of character; and each had plauſible ground for his opinion. Nicias, experienced, prudent, from the firſt little ſatisfied with his command, and now in ill health, propoſed to relieve Egeſta, which was the primary object of their inſtructions; and, unleſs the Egeſtans could fulfil their ingagement to furniſh pay for the whole armament, or readier means ſhould occur, than yet appeared, for reſtoring the Leontines, not farther to riſk the forces or waſte the treaſures of the commonwealth. The diſpoſition to aſſiſt its allies would be ſhown in the relief of Egeſta; its power would be manifeſted by the meer circumſtance of ſending ſo great an armament

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 44.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 47.

ment to such a distance, and, satisfied with this, he would return immediately home. SECT. III.

Alcibiades, whose temper was impetuous, but his mind capacious, and his abilities universal, elated with the extraordinary effects which his first essay in political intrigue had produced in Peloponnesus, and not dejected by disappointments for which he was more prepared than his collegues, had formed his own plan for laying the foundation of extensive conquest, and persevered in it. 'Such a force,' he said, 'as they commanded, ought not to re-'turn home without atchievement, and without 'honor. Yet he would not disapprove prudent, 'or even cautious measures. He would there-'fore propose that negotiation should be tried 'with all the Grecian cities, except Syracuse 'and Selinus, and all the barbarian tribes of 'the island without exception. In some places, 'perhaps, zeal in the Syracusan interest might 'be meerly slackened; in others, defection from 'it might be procured: in some, supplies of 'provisions only might be obtained; in others, 'auxiliary troops. The beginning should be 'made with Messena, the most commodious 'city and port of the island for their prin-'cipal station, whence to carry on the war. 'When it had been duly tried what might be 'done by negotiation, when they were fully as-'sured who were determined enemies, and who 'were, or might probably be made, friends, 'then they should have a clearer view of the 'business before them, and Selinus and Syracuse 'must,

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'muſt, undoubtedly, be the firſt objects of their 'arms.'

Lamachus, much a ſoldier and little a politician, but experienced in the captious and greedy temper of the people his ſoverein, differed from both his collegues: 'Their whole 'force,' he ſaid, 'ought immediately to be directed againſt Syracuſe, while yet in a ſtate of 'unreadineſs and ſurprize. If the city could 'not be taken by a briſk effort, which he 'thought not impoſſible, the other towns of 'the territory would however fall into their 'hands, before the effects in them could be removed, and the produce of the country would 'of courſe be theirs. Thus they ſhould acquire 'means to proſecute the war, without the invidious meaſure of applying to Athens for 'ſupplies. But poſſibly, what of all things was 'moſt deſirable, the Syracuſans might thus be 'provoked to riſk a battle; and a victory would 'inſtantly do more toward procuring alliance 'among the Sicilian cities, than negotiation for 'twenty years. Should the enemy, on the contrary, yield their country without an effort, 'beſide the profit from plunder, ſo deciſive an 'acknowlegement of the ſuperiority of the 'Athenian forces would be highly favorable to 'any negotiation that might be deemed expedient. With regard to Meſſena, he thought 'it not of ſo much conſequence. The deſerted 'port of Megara, commodiouſly near to Syracuſe, and their own whenever they would take 'poſſeſ-

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 49.

'poſſeſſion of it, would be far preferable for 'their naval ſtation.' SECT. III.

It appears, from what follows in Thucydides, that the opinion of Lamachus, if conqueſt was to be ſought and the diſpleaſure of the Athenian people avoided, was not the leaſt judicious; but, being overruled, that general choſe to concur with the opinion of Alcibiades, to which Nicias was thus compelled to yield. Alcibiades then undertook himſelf the buſineſs of negotiation with Meſſena. He could not however prevail ſo far as to bring the Meſſenians to join in the war againſt Syracuſe; but he obtained, what was of ſome importance, permiſſion for the Athenian armament to contract for proviſions with their people, throughout their territory. He then went with ſixty triremes, Lamachus accompanying, to Naxus; and he found the people of that city, who were purely Ionian and from of old adverſe to Syracuſe, ſo much more favorable to his views, that he ingaged them to join in league defenſive and offenſive with Athens. Thence he proceeded to Catana; but the prevalence of the Syracuſan party there procured a refuſal even to treat. Still therefore coaſting ſouthward, he ſent forward ten triremes to Syracuſe. Approaching to the mouth of the port, a herald from the deck of one of them proclaimed the intention of the Athenian commonwealth 'to reſtore the oppreſſed Leontines 'to their juſt rights, a meaſure to which it was 'bound both by ties of blood and terms of al-'liance;' adding, 'that any Leontines would 'be

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 50.

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'be received as friends by the Athenian armament.' This ceremony being performed, and ſuch obſervation made as circumſtances permitted, on the ports, the city, and the circumjacent ground, they rejoined the fleet, and all together went once more to Catana.

Meanwhile apprehenſion, either of the Athenian armament, or of a party among their own people, had ſo far wrought a change in the minds of the Catanian leaders, that they conſented to admit the Athenian generals to declare their propoſals to the general aſſembly. The forces being debarked, waited without the walls, while the generals went into the town, and Alcibiades undertook to addreſs the Catanian people. While he was ſpeaking, and the Catanians, collected in the agora, were univerſally intent upon the harangue, ſome of the Athenian ſoldiers obſerved a ſmall ill-conſtructed gateway unguarded, through which, in meer wantonneſs, they made their way into the town; and finding no oppoſition, joined the aſſembly in the agora. The ſight ſtruck inſtant alarm into the Syracuſan party, who imagined the city betrayed by their opponents. Some of them haſtily, but ſilently, withdrew; and the reſt, awed by the apprehenſion of the dreadful calamities uſually brought on the weaker party by ſedition in Grecian cities, concurred in a decree, which was preſently propoſed, for an alliance offenſive and defenſive with Athens. Shortly after, the whole fleet moved from Rhegium

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 51.

gium to Catana, which was to be now the principal naval ſtation. SECT. III.

It ſoon appeared that the project of Alcibiades to ſtrengthen the Athenian intereſt by negotiation, and proportionally, of courſe, to weaken the Syracuſan, had been extenſively founded. A party in Camarina, incouraged by what had paſſed at Naxus and Catana, as well as by the reported ſtrength of the Athenian armament, ſent to requeſt ſupport in attempting a revolution. The fleet moved thither; but it was found that the innovators had been overhaſty in their meaſures, and the project could not be immediately carried into execution; yet an Athenian party ſtill ſubſiſted in Camarina. In returning, the Athenian commanders debarked a body of forces near Syracuſe, and collected conſiderable booty; but the Syracuſan cavalry quickly checked this mode of warfare, cut off ſome ſtragglers, and compelled the reſt of the maroding troops to ſeek their ſhips. The fleet proceeding then to Catana, found there the Salaminian, the ſhip appropriated to purpoſes of ſacred and ſolemn office, bearing an order from the Athenian people for the immediate return of Alcibiades and ſome other officers to Athens, to anſwer accuſations preferred againſt them for mutilating the ſtatues and profaning the myſteries. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 52.

Since the armament ſailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing the worſt evils of democratical frenzy. The oligarchal party, unequal to open contention with the democratical, had reſolved

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reſolved upon the hazardous meaſure of exciting popular paſſion, with the hope of directing it to the promotion of their own intereſt. Inſtantly after the departure of the fleet they became ſedulous in diffuſing rumors and obſervations, that might excite ſuſpicion and alarm. The power and influence of Alcibiades, his magnificence, his ambition, his unprincipled conduct, and his various extravagances, were made conſtant ſubjects of public converſation. His abilities, at the ſame time, and even his virtues, were compared to thoſe by which the Peiſiſtratids had acquired the tyranny. The ſeverities which had occaſioned the expulſion of thoſe celebrated tyrants were then magnified tenfold; the execration to which their memory had been condemned was alledged in proof of their enormities; and the circumſtance that the Athenians, unable to effect their own deliverance, had owed it to the Lacedæmonians, was preſſed upon public recollection. In a ſhort time every occurrence was made, by ſome conſtruction to import a plot for eſtabliſhing tyranny. Fear, ſuſpicion, and their certain concomitant, a diſpoſition to ſeverity, thus gained complete poſſeſſion of the public mind. Every one was bent to diſcover, by any means, the plot and its authors. Officers were appointed, intitled Examiners [6], with full authority for every ſearch and inquiry; and great rewards were offered for any who would indicate anything.

Iſocrat. proAlcib. p.138.t.3.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 53.

Thucyd. ut ſup. & Andoc. de Myſt.

[6] Ζητηταὶ.

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thing. The moſt ſuſpicious and incoherent evidence only was obtained, from ſlaves and men of the vileſt characters. But public alarm, once ſo excited, was not to be readily quieted. It was deemed better, ſays Thucydides, that juſt men ſhould ſuffer, than that the conſtitution ſhould be indangered. Many of principal rank and moſt reſpectable character were in conſequence impriſoned. It appears indeed difficult to diſcover for whoſe benefit the Athenian conſtitution was calculated. The lower people at leaſt ſhould have had ſome confidence in protection for innocence from that government for which they were ſo anxious. But, on the contrary, Peiſander and Charicles, two of the examiners, having declared their opinion that a plot for overthrowing the democracy was in agitation, and farther inquiry therefore neceſſary, at the ſignal for aſſembling the council all the people fled from the agora, every one fearful of accuſation and impriſonment. Nor was this indiſcriminating jealouſy a humor that had its hour and paſſed: it held, and grew daily more ſevere. Suſpicion extended; more perſons were impriſoned; and there was no foreſeeing where popular rage would ſtop.

Andoc. de Myſt. p. 19

Thucyd. ut ſup.

It happened that while ſuſpicion was moſt rife, yet what or whom to ſuſpect was moſt uncertain, ſome movements in Bœotia occaſioned the march of a ſmall body of Lacedæmonians to the Corinthian iſthmus. This circumſtance increaſed ſuſpicion into imagined certainty, and redoubled every former fear: the buſineſs of Bœotia was thought a feint; intrigue with

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 61.

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the obnoxious party in Athens, it was ſuppoſed, muſt be the real cauſe of the movement; and, for one night, the whole people watched in arms. The panic ſpred to Argos: deſigns againſt the democracy were ſuſpected there; and, tho Alcibiades himſelf had conducted the removal of the principal Argians who favored oligarchy, and placed them in ſecure cuſtody, divided among the ilands under the Athenian dominion, yet now the Athenian people gave up thoſe unfortunate men to be put to death by the democratical party in Argos, as if connected in plot with the friends of Alcibiades.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 60. Andoc. de Myſt. Plut. vit. Alcib.

Alarm and the ſeverities of an alarmed deſpot were ſtill continuing to extend, when one of the moſt obnoxious of the impriſoned (Thucydides has avoided to name him, but we learn from his own extant oration, as well as from Plutarch's account, that it was Andocides) in converſation with one of his fellow-priſoners on their preſent ſufferings and farther danger, yielded to the argument that, guilty or not guilty, it were better to confeſs ſomething: 'The popular mind,' it was urged to Andocides, 'would evidently not otherwiſe be appeaſed; and a confeſſion would not only be more likely, than perſeverance in aſſerting innocence, to procure his own ſafety, but would reſtore quiet to the city; and tho ſome muſt be ſacrificed, yet numbers might ſo be ſaved from that mad vengeance, excited by fear, which now threatened ſo indiſcriminately and unboundedly.' Information, thus extorted by the pains of a priſon and the fear of

of death, againſt ſeveral perſons as concerned in the mutilation of the Mercuries, was received among the people with a childiſh joy. The dark plot was ſuppoſed completely diſcovered; the informers were ſet at liberty, with all whom they did not accuſe; of thoſe whom they did accuſe, tho proof of the facts alledged was utterly defective, yet none eſcaped capital condemnation: all who were in priſon, or could be taken, ſuffered death immediately, and public rewards were offered for killing thoſe who fled from this democratical juſtice. SECT. III.

To carry the buſineſs thus far, little or no deliberation was thought neceſſary. The difficulty was to bring within reach of the democratical dagger thoſe of the accuſed who were with the army in Sicily; and eſpecially Alcibiades himſelf, now become ſupremely the object of terror, as he had before been of favor with the people. His death, as Thucydides aſſures, was determined; but it was feared to apprehend, in the army, the favorite ſtill of the army. It was farther feared leſt the whole armament might be indangered by any tumult which ſhould come to the knowlege of the enemy and incourage attack; and the defection of the Argian and Mantineian auxiliaries, whom the influence of Alcibiades had obtained for the ſervice, was looked upon as a certain conſequence of any ſeverity againſt him. It was therefore reſolved to ſend heralds in the ſacred trireme called the Salaminian, not to arreſt him or any other accuſed perſons in the army, but ſimply, Thucyd. l. 6. c. 61.

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in the name of the people, to command their return to Athens. Immediate obedience was paid to this order: Alcibiades followed the Salaminian in his own trireme. In the uſual courſe of the antient navigation, making the Italian coaſt, they ſtopped at the friendly town of Thurium, and there Alcibiades, and all the other accuſed, abſconded together. The heralds and officers of the Salaminian, having made ſearch and inquiry for ſome time to no purpoſe, returned without their priſoners; and the Athenian people pronounced ſentence of death againſt them, in what was called a deſerted judgement [1].

SECTION IV.

Feeble conduct of Nicias: Oppreſſion of the Sicels. Firſt meaſures againſt Syracuſe. Preparations on both ſides in winter. Intrigues among the Sicilian cities. Tranſactions of the winter in Greece. Reception of Alcibiades at Sparta. Reſolution to renew the war with Athens.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 62.

THE ſoul of political intrigue and extenſive enterprize being thus taken from the armament deſtined for the conqueſt of Sicily, it remained for Nicias, with Lamachus, to decide on meaſures. The plans of Alcibiades were immediately abandoned; probably indeed nobody

[1] Ἔρημη Δίκη.

remained

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remained capable of profecuting them; and, according to the original propoſal of Nicias, not likely nor indeed intended to lead to extenſive conqueſt, it was determined to conduct the armament immediately toward Egeſta and Selinus. In proceeding weſtward, they in vain attempted negotiation with Himera, the only Grecian city on the northern coaſt of the iland; but they ſucceeded in an aſſault upon Hyccara, a Sicanian town, whoſe inhabitants they made their own property as ſlaves, and then gave the place to the Egeſtans. Little zealous for the objects of his command, and thence apparently wavering about meaſures, Nicias went with a ſmall eſcort only to Egeſta, to demand the ſupplies promiſed, or ſuch ſupplies as the Egeſtan people were able to furniſh; and all he could obtain was thirty talents, between ſeven and eight thouſand pounds ſterling. The concluding meaſures of the campaign do him no honor: the priſoners, already acquired, were diſtributed aboard the fleet, which returned by the ſtraits of Meſſena to its former ſtation at Catana. The army marched for the ſame place by an inland road, through the country of the Sicels; and the unhappy barbarians ſuffered for the falſe promiſes of the Egeſtans. They were ſeized in ſuch numbers that, a market being opened for the ſale of them at Catana, they produced a hundred and twenty talents, about thirty thouſand pounds ſterling. The celebrated courtezan Laïs is ſaid to have been a Sicel girl, ſold on this occaſion to a Corinthian merchant. Plut. vit. Nic.

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merchant. An unſucceſsful attempt upon the Geloan Hybla was the laſt operation of the campaign.

Perhaps ſome peeviſhneſs, in a command which he originally diſliked, in the courſe of which he met with little but diſappointment, and which nevertheleſs he could not reſign, co-operated with the neceſſity of his ſituation, in dictating a meaſure to which the mild temper of Nicias, and his generally ſcrupulous regard for juſtice, would otherwiſe have been averſe; tho, among the antients, even the philoſophers, to drag barbarians, wherever met with, into ſlavery, was not commonly deemed a breach of either juſtice or humanity. But apparently Nicias found himſelf compelled to follow the opinions and gratify the wiſhes of others, in ſtill proſecuting the ſcheme of conqueſt. Money was abſolutely neceſſary: the expectations of the Athenian people had met with the diſappointment at Egeſta which he had always foreſeen and foretold, and yet probably he dared not aſk to have it made good by remittances from Athens.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 63.

It was however determined, now after a campaign nearly waſted, to carry war next againſt Syracuſe; and with the beginning of winter preparation was begun for the purpoſe. Notwithſtanding the vaunts of the democratical leaders, the firſt certain news that the Athenian armament had croſſed the Ionian gulph, excited alarm among the Syracuſans that went far to juſtify the advice of Lamachus. With every day's delay

lay afterward, terror abated and confidence grew. But when, after the recall of Alcibiades, the armament moved away to the farther corner of Sicily, it began to be held even in contempt and deriſion; and when, on its return, ſtill no movement was made toward Syracuſe, the lower people, according to the manner of the multitude, as Thucydides remarks, growing in boldneſs, demanded of their chiefs to lead them to Catana. The chiefs were wiſer than to comply; but the parties of horſe, ſent out to obſerve, would ſometimes approach the Athenian camp, give ill language, and aſk, 'if, inſtead 'of reſtoring the Leontines, the Athenians in-'tended to ſettle themſelves in Sicily?' SECT. IV.

The Athenian army was ſo deficient in cavalry that it would have been hazardous, or however troubleſome, to have marched through the open country toward Syracuſe, in face of the Syracuſan horſe. The generals therefore propoſed to profit from the preſent temper of the Syracuſan people; which, in ſpite of any prudence in their leaders, would be likely to lead them to indiſcretion. As in moſt of the Sicilian towns in the Syracuſan intereſt there was an Athenian party, ſo in Catana there was ſtill a Syracuſan party. A Catanian was gained, who had uſually communicated with Syracuſe. Through him the Syracuſans were told that the Athenian camp was negligently guarded; that many, both officers and private ſoldiers, commonly ſlept in the town; that if the Syracuſans with their whole force would attack at day- Thucyd. l. 6. c. 64.

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break, their friends in Catana would riſe, and they could not fail of ſucceſs. A day was appointed for the attempt, which was accordingly made. Nicias and Lamachus, meanwhile, accurately informed of every circumſtance, imbarking in the night all their Grecian forces, with ſome auxiliary Sicels, ſailed for Syracuſe; and debarking totally unoppoſed, they ſeized a ſituation opportune for operation againſt the city and for communication with their fleet, and at the ſame time ſecure againſt the Syracuſan horſe: on one ſide it was defended by walls, houſes, trees, and a pool of water; on the other by precipices; and felled trees, arranged from the camp to the ſea and to the village of Daſcon, gave ſecurity to the naval ſtation: works were haſtily thrown up where the ground was leſs ſtrong by nature or accident, and the bridge over the Anapus was broken.

November. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 65.

The firſt intelligence of this movement filled the Syracuſans with equal alarm and ſurprize. They haſtily returned to Syracuſe, looked at the Athenian camp, and finding it too ſtrong to be attacked, incamped themſelves for the night. Next morning, the generals, little experienced, and the people, little practiſed, in military diſcipline, all imagined that to aſſault, not to be aſſaulted, would be theirs, and many went into the town, which was near. Meanwhile the Athenian generals, having ground now before them on which the enemy's horſe would not be formidable, drew out of their camp in order of battle.

battle. The Syracuſans then alſo haſtily formed; and, however deficient in diſcipline and ſkill, Thucydides bears them teſtimony that they were not deficient in courage or in patriotic zeal. A ſharp action inſued: but a thunderſtorm, with heavy rain, alarmed and diſturbed the more inexperienced ſoldiers, and the Syracuſan infantry at length everywhere gave way. Their horſe, however, tho unable to take any conſiderable part in the battle, protected their flight, ſo that little execution was done in purſuit, and they retired within the city-walls. SECT. IV.

This expedition appears to have been in itſelf very ably conducted by the Athenian generals, but it was little connected with any extenſive plan of operation. On the morrow after the battle, having, in conſequence of the uſual application from the vanquiſhed, reſtored the enemy's dead, to the number of only two hundred and ſixty, they reïmbarked the whole of their forces, and returned to Catana. This flaſh of victory, however, had its advantageous conſequences. It reſtored the ſullied reputation of the Athenian arms, confirmed the allies, and opened means for farther negotiation within Sicily: it aſſiſted moreover to ſave, if not to gain credit at home, and tended to prepare the Athenian people for receiving more favorably any application for ſupplies and reïnforcement. The want of cavalry had been experienced as the great deficiency of the armament. It was therefore determined to collect, during the winter, the greateſt force of horſe that could by any means be Thucyd. l. 6. c. 71.

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be obtained within the iland, and alſo to apply for a body from home. A large ſupply of money was moreover indiſpenſable; and it behoved the generals to exert themſelves, in ſolicitation among allies, in rapine againſt enemies, that they might ſpare the Athenian treaſury; upon which, nevertheleſs, ſome demand was unavoidable. The ſiege of Syracuſe was reſolved upon for the firſt object of the inſuing campaign: for the interval, the fleet was laid up, and the army diſpoſed in quarters, at Naxus and Catana.

Meanwhile among the Syracuſans, tho much uneaſineſs aroſe from the late event, which ſo diſappointed the opinion fondly entertained of their ſuperiority to the Athenians, yet the misfortune was not without ſalutary conſequences. The depreſſion of the public mind impoſed ſilence upon faction, repreſſed forward ignorance, and gave ſcope for abilities and patriotiſm to come forward. The general aſſembly met, and the people liſtened with anxious attention while Hermocrates ſon of Hermon ſpoke. 'Their 'late defeat,' he ſaid, 'was no cauſe for dejec-'tion ſuch as he ſaw prevailing. Meer people, 'as they comparatively were, and not formed 'ſoldiers, it was much for them to have ſhown 'themſelves ſo nearly equal to ſelect troops, of 'the firſt reputation in Greece. Beſides, the 'very circumſtances of the action pointed out 'the means of future ſucceſs. It was not in 'ſtrength, but in order and diſcipline; not in 'bravery, but in ſyſtem of command and ſub-

'ordina-

'ordination, that they were inferior. The al- SECT. IV.
'teration neceſſary was obvious; the chief
'commanders ſhould be few, but they ſhould be
'experienced; they ſhould be truſtworthy, and
'they ſhould be truſted. The winter ſhould
'then be diligently employed in improving diſ-
'cipline; the force of heavy-armed ſhould be
'increaſed, by giving arms at the public ex-
'pence to the poor but able-bodied citizens.
'Courage and confidence,' he continued, 'will
'of courſe revive, with improved ſyſtem, im-
'proved ſkill, and increaſed force; and, in
'ſpring, I doubt not but we may meet the
'enemy upon equal terms.'

It were indeed difficult to imagine anything more inconvenient, or more adverſe to effectual exertion, than the ſyſtem of military command which democratical jealouſy, inforced by frequent ſedition, had eſtabliſhed at Syracuſe. The ſupreme military authority was divided among no leſs than fifteen officers; and even this numerous board, if the term may be allowed, was, upon all momentous occaſions, to take its orders from the people. But the preſent alarm, and the preſſure of evident neceſſity, gave force to the advice of Hermocrates. The command in chief was committed to Hermocrates himſelf, with only two collegues, and they were veſted with diſcretionary powers. Meaſures equally vigorous and judicious immediately followed. The great object, for a town expecting a ſiege, was to obviate contravallation. On the ſide therefore of the quarters called Temenites, Thucyd. l. 6. c. 75.

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menites and Epipolæ, the new generals extended the fortifications of the city; and they occupied with garriſons two critical poſts in the neighbourhood, the precinct of the temple of Olympieium, to the ſouthward of the city on the farther bank of the river Anapus, and a fort named Megara. Having thus provided for immediate ſecurity, they extended their views. A watchful eye was kept upon the negotiations of the Athenians among the Sicilian ſtates; and information being received that the whole Athenian armament was aſſembled, for the remainder of the winter, at Naxus, an expedition was made, apparently more with a view to revive the drooping ſpirits of the people, than with the expectation of any other important advantage, to deſtroy the huts, which the Athenians had left ſtanding, on the ground they had quitted near Catana.

Among the cities in alliance with Syracuſe, the fidelity of Camarina, not the leaſt powerful among them, was the moſt doubted. Tho a Dorian people, the Camarinæans had been from of old adverſe: they were the only Sicilian Dorians who had conſtantly refuſed to put themſelves under the degrading and oppreſſive protection of the Syracuſan commonwealth. To ſtrengthen themſelves in independency, while Laches commanded the Athenian forces in Sicily, they had ingaged in alliance with Athens; but by the general peace among the Sicilian cities, which Hermocrates had procured, without renouncing the Athenian alliance, they became

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 75.

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came allies alſo to Syracuſe. When the armament under Nicias arrived in Sicily, the Syracuſan government required aſſiſtance from Camarina; and, the dilatory conduct of the Athenian generals bringing their force into contempt, the Camarinæans, fearful of the reſentment of a powerful neighbour, ſent a body of auxiliary horſe. The late demonſtration of the ſuperiority of the Athenian arms would be likely to make a change in ſentiment at Camarina, not favorable to the Syracuſan intereſt; and it was known that the Athenian generals were actually carrying on negotiation there. To counterwork this, and win the Camarinæans to the Syracuſan cauſe, Hermocrates thought important enough to require that he ſhould go himſelf at the head of an embaſſy to Camarina.

As far as the connection with Athens only was to be diſſuaded, the buſineſs undertaken by Hermocrates was eaſy. The notorious conduct, and even the avowed principles of the Athenian government were ſuch as could not but give alarm, wherever the Athenian power could be extended. Being admitted to audience by the Camarinæan people, Hermocrates juſtly urged, 'that the reſtoration of the Leontines, 'which the Athenians held out as their object 'in the invaſion of Sicily, was a ſhallow pre-'tence. The Leontines indeed were Ionians, 'kinſmen of the Athenians; but what were 'the Eubœic Chalcidians, the very people from 'whom the Leontines derived their immediate 'origin? Equally kinſmen of the Athenians, 'they

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 76. & ſeq.

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'they were held in ſtrict ſubjection and denied 'the uſe of arms[a]. Protection to the ſemibar-'barian Egeſtans could, ſtill leſs than the re-'ſtoration of the Leontines, be the real motive 'for ſending ſo expenſive an armament ſo far. 'It was in ſhort not dubious that the ſubjuga-'tion equally of all the Sicilians was the object 'of Athenian ambition.' So far the arguments of Hermocrates were unanſwerable. But when he was to juſtify the paſt conduct of Syracuſe, and perſuade the Camarinæans to aſſiſt the Syracuſan cauſe, whatever fear the power of Athens might excite, the nearer and more obvious danger preponderated, of ſervitude to a people of their own iland, their fellow-coloniſts; a ſervitude probably more ſevere, and certainly more grating. All therefore that could be obtained by ſolicitation or remonſtrance, urged with all the ability and ſupported by the reſpectable character of Hermocrates, was a declaration, 'that, being ingaged in alliance with 'both Athens and Syracuſe, the Camarinæans 'could take no part, conſiſtently with their 'oaths, but that of an exact neutrality.'

While the Syracuſan leaders were thus ſedulous, tho not always ſucceſsful, in negotiation within Sicily, they directed their attention alſo to thoſe ſtates in Greece itſelf, in which they might reaſonably expect a diſpoſition friendly to themſelves, and were ſure of a diſpoſition hoſtile to Athens. An embaſſy was ſent firſt to Corinth,

[a] So Smith tranſlates Ἀναρράσιτος, and I believe properly.

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rinth, the parent ſtate of Syracuſe. The leading men there were found warmly diſpoſed to the Syracuſan cauſe. Miniſters were immediately appointed, on the part of the Corinthian commonwealth, to accompany the Syracuſan miniſters to Lacedæmon, to aſſiſt in rouſing the uſually ſluggiſh counſels of that ſtate. On their arrival, they found the ephors and other men in power very ready to incourage by words, or aſſiſt by negotiation, but backward to give that more efficacious aſſiſtance which the neceſſities of Syracuſe were likely to require.

But an Athenian was now become the moſt formidable foe to Athens. Alcibiades had paſſed in a merchant-ſhip, from the Thurian territory to the Eleian port of Cyllenë, whence he proceeded to Argos, where his intereſt, as we have ſeen, had been powerful. The eſtabliſhment of his credit now with the democratical party there, would afford the faireſt ground for its reſtoration with the democratical party in Athens; but the diligence of his opponents diſappointed him. They procured a decree of the Athenian people for his baniſhment from Greece, and the miſſion of miniſters to Argos to demand his perſon. He had hitherto heſitated to accept an invitation from Lacedæmon. A party there favored him: his connection by the claim of hereditary hoſpitality with the republic, and his ſervices to many individuals when priſoners in Athens, would recommend him. But he feared the body of the people, who might be apt to recollect, with no

Thucyd. ut ſup. Iſocr. pro Alcib. p. 140. t. 3.

c. 17. ſ. 3. of this hiſt.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 89.

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friendly mind, the evils which had been ſuffered, and the greater evils apprehended and riſked, from the war excited in Peloponneſus by his ambition and his talents and influence; and he feared not leſs the prejudice, which could ſcarcely fail to be entertained againſt him, on account of his conſtant connection with the democratical, and oppoſition to the oligarchal intereſt in his own country. The leading men, however, in general, even thoſe otherwiſe leſs well diſpoſed to him, aware that he was capable of being no leſs a uſeful friend than a pernicious enemy, were in the moment willing to forget every objection to him. He judged it unſafe to remain longer in Argos; he was therefore ready to go wherever circumſtances might afford any proſpect of advantage, and, a ſafe conduct being ſent to him, he went to Sparta.

On his arrival he found a general diſpoſition in his favor, rather ſuch as he might have wiſhed than ſuch as could reaſonably be expected. The ſenate aſſembled, and the people being ſummoned to give him audience, all liſtened with anxious attention while he communicated information and advice. 'The views of conqueſt entertained at Athens,' he ſaid, 'were extenſive. It was propoſed firſt to reduce all Sicily; then the Grecian poſſeſſions in Italy. With the inexhauſtible ſupply of ſhip-timber which Italy afforded, it was intended ſo to increaſe the fleet, that the conqueſt of Carthage might be undertaken. Spain and all the weſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean would

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 90.

'would then be open; whence mercenary troops 'might be obtained, in any numbers, and the 'beſt of their kind. Theſe would be employed 'againſt Peloponneſus by land, while the fleet 'ſhould blockade it by ſea; and thus it was 'propoſed to complete the ſubjugation of 'Greece. The conquered countries, it was ex-'pected, each as it was reduced, would furniſh 'ſupplies for farther conqueſt, without bur-'thening Athens. SECT. IV.

'And however wild and viſionary,' continued 'Alcibiades, theſe vaſt projects may on firſt 'view appear, I, who have long meditated 'upon them, who know the reſources of 'Athens, who have ſeen the deficiencies of 'the ill-conſtituted and unconnected common-'wealths againſt which its arms are now direct-'ed, am confident that ſucceſs is not impoſſi-'ble. The Sicilian Greeks have little military 'diſcipline or ſkill. Syracuſe, having already 'ſuffered a defeat by land, will preſently be 'blockaded by land and ſea; and, unaſſiſted, 'muſt unavoidably fall. Sicily may then be 'conſidered as conquered, and Italy will not 'hold long. Thus not Sicily only, but Pelo-'ponneſus itſelf, is deeply intereſted in the 'event.' Thucyd. l. 6. c. 91.

Having by this repreſentation ſufficiently alarmed the Lacedæmonians, he proceeded to inform them how the threatened danger might be averted. 'A fleet,' he ſaid, 'you have not, 'equal to oppoſe the Athenian; but troops may 'be ſent to Sicily, making them work their

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'own paſſage, in ſufficient number to form, 'with the Sicilians, a competent force of regu-'lar heavy-armed. But, what I hold of more 'importance than any troops you can ſend, let 'a Spartan general go to Sicily; who may eſta-'bliſh diſcipline among the Sicilians already 'firm in the cauſe, and whoſe authority may 'bring over, and hold united under one com-'mand, thoſe not diſpoſed to obey the Syracu-'ſans. Thus, more than by any other meaſure, 'your decided friends will be incouraged, and 'thoſe dubiouſly affected will be confirmed in 'your intereſt.

'But it will be neceſſary, for the incourage-'ment of the Syracuſans and the diſtraction of 'the Athenians, without reſerve to begin hoſti-'lities in Greece. Nothing can be ſo efficacious, 'and nothing the Athenians ſo much dread, as 'your occupying and fortifying a poſt within 'Attica; and for this purpoſe the town of De-'celeia is to be preferred. Thus their country 'will no longer be theirs but yours; no reve-'nue will accrue to them from it; even that 'from the ſilver-mines of Laureium may be 'ſtopped: but, what is ſtill more important, 'nothing will equally ſuperinduce the revolt of 'thoſe diſtant poſſeſſions whence their principal 'revenue is derived, as the knowlege that they 'are preſſed at home.'

After having thus indicated and adviſed whatever would moſt contribute to the down-fal of his country, Alcibiades thought, for his character's ſake, however perſecuted by that

that country, ſome apology neceſſary for ſuch conduct. 'I hold that,' he ſaid, 'no longer my country, which is governed by a ſet 'of men who have ſo injuriouſly driven me 'from it. Nor ought I to be conſidered as 'perſuading war againſt my country; but rather as endevoring to reſtore myſelf to the 'country which was once mine, and to reſtore 'that country to its due government within 'itſelf, and its juſt ſituation among the Grecian republics. I account him a true patriot, 'not who, being unjuſtly expelled, reſts in 'baniſhment, but who, ſtill animated by love 'of his country, does his utmoſt to reſtore 'himſelf. Upon you, Lacedæmonians, I depend for the greateſt benefits, to my country 'not leſs than myſelf. You may truſt me 'therefore that there is no danger, no hardſhip, 'which I am not ready to undergo in your ſervice, and that I ſhall have every ſatisfaction 'in coöperating with you, to pull down the 'tyrannical power now uſurped by Athens, 'and reſtoring Greece to that happy ſituation, 'in which you, by common conſent, and not 'by violence, preſided over it.' Thucyd. l. 6. c. 92.

The eloquence of Alcibiades, his advice, but ſtill more the expectation of advantage from the important information which he was unqueſtionably able to give concerning every circumſtance of Athenian affairs, decided the Lacedæmonians, and it was reſolved to aſſiſt Syracuſe, and to renew the war with Athens. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 93.

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SECTION V.

Meaſures of the Peloponneſians to relieve Syracuſe. Meaſures of the Athenian armament in Sicily: Reinforcement to the Athenian armament in Sicily: Siege of Syracuſe: Capitulation propoſed: Arrival of Gylippus and Pythen to the relief of Syracuſe. Official letter of Nicias to the Athenian people.

THE reſolution for war being taken at Lacedæmon, the buſineſs of Sicily required the firſt attention. To command the force to be employed there, Gylippus was appointed; ſon of Cleändridas, who had been baniſhed, when tutor to the young king Pleiſtoanax, for miſconduct in a former war with Athens, and on ſuſpicion of taking bribes from Pericles. Gylippus was directed to conſult with the leading men of Corinth and Syracuſe about the readieſt and beſt means for tranſporting troops to Sicily; but thoſe troops were to be collected as they might among the allied ſtates, Lacedæmon furniſhing none. A man, however, more qualified than Gylippus for the buſineſs committed to him, could hardly have been ſelected; and, ſparing as Lacedæmon was of troops and treaſure, the authority and influence with which he was largely veſted, were, as we find by their effects, of extraordinary power. Ordering two Corinthian triremes to attend him immediately

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 93.

Ch. 13. ſ. 5. of this hiſt.

diately at Aſinë, he urged the diligent preparation of the reſt of the force to be employed under his command. SECT. V.

The reſolution taken for renewing war with Athens, might give to expect ſome reſtored vigor in the Lacedæmonian councils; but the firſt operations of the Lacedæmonian arms indicated none. In ſpring the force of Laconia was aſſembled, and marched againſt the Argian territory. On its arrival at Cleonæ, an earthquake, a common circumſtance in moſt parts of Greece and particularly in Laconia, without doing any conſiderable miſchief, threw all into conſternation: ſuperſtition ſaw in it the anger of the gods declared; the army immediately retreated, and the expedition was given up. Such conduct incouraged and invited the Argians to revenge. Entering the Lacedæmonian territory of Thyreatis, they collected plunder that ſold for twenty-five talents, about ſix thouſand pounds ſterling, which was eſteemed a large booty, well rewarding the enterprize. B. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. P. W. 18. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 95.

A conſpiracy, which about the ſame time broke out in the little city of Theſpiæ in Bœotia, requires mention, as it tends to illuſtrate the ſtate of Greece. The democratical party roſe againſt their oligarchal magiſtrates; the Athenians marched a body of troops to ſupport them. The inſurgents were nevertheleſs overpowered; ſome were apprehended (what they ſuffered we are not informed) and the reſt fled to Athens. Thucyd. ibid.

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During winter, the Athenian generals in Sicily had not neglected ſuch meaſures, for promoting their buſineſs, as the ſeaſon would permit. Soon after diſpoſing their troops in quarters they marched with their whole force to Meſſena, in hope of gaining that city, through intelligence long maintained with a party there: but Alcibiades, who, before his flight, had been privy to the negotiation, gave warning of the danger. The Athenian armament therefore, after ſuffering in a winter camp for thirteen days, was obliged to return, without effecting anything, but the deſtruction of ſome of the principal Meſſenians of their own party, who were ſeized by their opponents, condemned as traitors, and executed.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 74.

c. 88. Some negotiations among the Sicel tribes had a more fortunate iſſue. Thoſe of the plains, indeed, habituated to ſubjection under the Syracuſan government, and ready objects of Syracuſan reſentment, could few of them be perſuaded to revolt: but the midland mountaineers, who had always preſerved independency, and conſidered the Syracuſans as their natural enemies, were prediſpoſed to the Athenian cauſe. Moſt of them readily furniſhed proviſions, and ſome even paid contributions in money. A ſmall force brought to terms a few who were found adverſe, and relieved ſome others, more favorably inclined, from the reſtraint in which they had been held by Syracuſan garriſons.

Toward the approach of ſpring the whole Athenian armament moved from Naxus to Catana, to be nearer its principal object; and negotiation was extended as far as Tuſcany and Carthage. Overtures had been received from Tuſcany, yet the reſult ſeems to have been little important, and it does not appear that the negotiation with Carthage produced anything. The generals however ſucceeded in collecting, within Sicily, horſes for a body of cavalry. Iron, bricks, and other materials, neceſſary for the propoſed contravallation, were prepared, and every diſpoſition was made for undertaking the ſiege of Syracuſe. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 88.

Early in ſpring the army marched. The lands of Megara, which, ſince the depopulation of the city by Gelon, had been Syracuſan property, were ravaged. An attempt upon a fort held by a Syracuſan garriſon failed; but the vale of the river Tereas was plundered unoppoſed, the ſtanding corn burnt, and, a ſmall body of Syracuſans interfering to check the ravage, ſome were killed, the reſt fled. For this little ſucceſs a trophy was erected, and the army returned to Catana. Having allowed their troops a ſhort time for refreſhment, the generals moved again, gained the Sicel town of Centoripa by capitulation, and burnt the corn of the adverſe Sicel tribes of Ineſſa and Hybla. Returning then to Catana, they found the ſupplies and reïnforcements from Athens arrived; for the paſſion of the Athenian people for conqueſt in Sicily had not abated: the applica- B. C. 414. P. W. 18. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 94.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 93. tion of the generals had met with favor far beyond their expectation; and all their requeſts were granted without demur. No addition of infantry had been deſired: there were ſent two hundred and fifty horſe-ſoldiers, with complete accoutrements, but without horſes; three hundred talents in ſilver, amounting to about ſeventy-five thouſand pounds ſterling; and ſtores of all neceſſary kinds in abundance.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 96. The generals reſolved then immediately to lay ſiege to Syracuſe. Nature, art, and a numerous population concurred to make Syracuſe ſtrong; and to reduce a place of but moderate ſtrength, we have ſeen, in the art of attack of that age, a contravallation always neceſſary. Here two difficulties oppoſed; the extent of the town, and the form of a hill, over the ſkirt of which a ſuburb extended. The hill, ſloping toward the town, was precipitous toward the country; and the ſuburb, from its ſituation, overlooking the town, was called Epipolæ [a]. The Syracuſan generals were apprized of the intention of the enemy; they were not uninformed of the uſual mode of conducting ſieges; and they were aware how important it would be to occupy the hill of Epipolæ. But they were new in command; diſcipline remained yet to be eſtabliſhed among their troops; and, till danger became preſſing, notwithſtanding the vote conferring on them diſcretionary power, the attempt would be hazardous to inforce diſ-

[a] Nearly ſynonymous with the Engliſh name OVERTON.

cipline

cipline among thoſe who, by a ſimple vote, might take away the power they had given. Not therefore till it was known that the Athenians had collected a conſiderable body of cavalry, and were already prepared to march for Syracuſe, Hermocrates and his collegues ventured to take meaſures for appointing guards and diſtributing duty. At daybreak they led all the Syracuſan citizens, within the age for ſervice, into a meadow on the bank of the Anapus. After a review of arms, they appointed a ſelect body of ſeven hundred men to be ſtationed in Epipolæ, as a kind of picket-guard to give aſſiſtance wherever danger might preſs, but to be particularly a protection for that very important poſt. An Andrian refugee, named Diomilus, verſed, as a ſubject of Athens, in the Athenian diſcipline, was appointed to the command of the body ſelected for ſo critical a ſervice; a circumſtance ſtrongly indicating how conſcious the Syracuſan generals were of the inferior ſkill and experience of their own officers. SECT. V.

On the very night preceding theſe meaſures of the Syracuſans, the Athenian generals, imbarking their whole army, had paſſed, undiſcovered, to a place near Syracuſe, called Leon, where a body of infantry was haſtily debarked, which proceeded immediately to Epipolæ, leſs than a mile diſtant, and by a paſs called Euryelus, mounted the hill unoppoſed. Information of this ſurprize being next morning carried to the Syracuſans, occupied in the meadow of the Anapus at the diſtance of three miles, excited great Thucyd. l. 6. c. 97.

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great conſternation. Courage however did not fail them. With much zeal, but much diſorder, all haſtened to repel the invaders. A fierce conflict inſued: but tumultuous valor was little efficacious againſt ſteddy diſcipline. The Syracuſans were compelled to retreat with the loſs of three hundred heavy-armed, among whom fell Diomilus, the newly appointed commander of the ſelect band. The near refuge of their walls prevented great ſlaughter.

Next morning the Athenians drew out into the plain to offer battle: but the temper of the Syracuſan people, chaſtiſed by the event of the preceding day, no longer diſpoſed them to put violence upon the prudence of their generals, and they did not ſtir. The Athenians, returning to Epipolæ, applied themſelves to conſtruct a fort at Labdalum, among the higheſt precipices, as a citidel, in which to depoſit their military cheſt and other valuables[10]. While thus employed they were joined by three hundred Egeſtans, and one hundred Naxian and Sicel cavalry; and, the Athenian troopers being mounted, the cavalry of the army all together, excluſive of the horſe-bowmen, were now ſix hundred and fifty. The fort being quickly completed, the army deſcended into the plain, and the work of contravallation was immediately begun.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 98.

Syracuſe was built between two inlets of the ſea, called the great port, and the Trogilian

[10] Τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.

port;

port; and it nearly incloſed a third, called the little, or the Ortygian port, which was ſeparated from the great port only by the little iland of Ortygia, the ſite of the original city. On the inland ſide of the town roſe the hill of Epipolæ [11]. It was the buſineſs of the Athenians to carry their works of contravallation SECT. V.

[11] The ſite of Syracuſe is thus deſcribed by a modern traveller: 'The antient city of Syracuſe was of a triangular form, 'and conſiſted of five parts or towns; Ortygia, or the iland; 'Achradina, that faced the ſea; Tychë, joined to Achradina 'on the eaſt; Neapolis, which lay along the ſide of the great 'port; and, at the weſtern extremity, Epipolæ. Some lofty 'rocks, crowned with ramparts, formed a ſtrong defence all 'around, except in Neapolis, where the walls croſſed the low-'grounds. The circuit, according to Strabo, amounted to a 'hundred and eight ſtadia, twenty-two Engliſh miles and a 'half; an account I once ſuſpected of exaggeration; but after 'ſpending two days in tracing the ruins, and making reaſonable 'allowances for incroachments of the ſea, I was convinced of 'the exactneſs of the meaſurement.' Swinburne's travels in the Two Sicilies, p. 327, v. 2.

It will be obſerved that this writer ſpeaks of Syracuſe when it had acquired its greateſt extent, ſome time after the age of the Peloponneſian war. His account of the extenſive circle of proſpect from the ſummit of Euryelus may deſerve notice here: 'Toward the north,' he ſays, 'the eye wanders over vaſt 'plains along a line of coaſt, to the foot of Etna, whoſe mighty 'cone ſhuts up the horizon with unſpeakable majeſty. The 'mountains of Italy riſe like clouds, on each ſide of it. South-'ward the city of Syracuſe, now reduced to its original ſpot, 'Ortygia, once an iland, but now a peninſula, ſtill containing 'eighteen thouſand inhabitants, ſeems to float on the boſom of 'the waters, guarding the entrance of its noble harbour. The 'Plemmyrian peninſula locks it on the oppoſite ſhore, beyond 'which an expanſe of ſea is ſeen, ſtretching away to Cape Paſ-'faro. The hills of Noto bound the view to the ſouthward, 'and the foreground is every where an expanſe of rich level 'plains, thickly planted, and watered by the winding ſtream of 'the Anapus,' p. 336.

from

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from Epipolæ to the ſea on each ſide; to the Trogilian port on the north, to the great port on the ſouth. They began on the northern ſide, and through their ſuperior practice and ſkill, every poſſible preparation having been made during winter, the buſineſs advanced ſo rapidly as to aſtoniſh not leſs than it alarmed the Syracuſans. At a loſs for meaſures to oppoſe to it, their generals reſolved to venture a battle rather than quietly permit the proſecution of works, which threatened, in their completion, the inevitable capture of the city. They accordingly led out their forces; but, in approaching the enemy, their order of battle became deranged, and deficient diſcipline among the troops baffled their endeavors to reſtore it. They had the prudence immediately to command haſty retreat, and were fortunate enough, under the protection of their horſe, to get within their walls again with little loſs.

This check was ſalutary to the Syracuſans, as it tended to repreſs that intemperate ardor, which very inconveniently interfered with the authority of the generals; and the genius of Hermocrates ſoon led him to the meaſures moſt proper in the exiſting circumſtances. The Athenian works would be effectual only if the contravallation were completed. They were yet confined to the northern ſide of the town: on the ſouthern ſide therefore, between Epipolæ and the great port, Hermocrates carried out a work from the town-wall, cutting the propoſed line of the enemy's contravallation.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 99.

tion. He expected that his work would be interrupted, and perhaps deſtroyed; but even thus he foreſaw a conſiderable advantage from it. If the enemy aſſailed it with the whole of their forces, he would retire, and he had his end in the interruption of their works; if with a part, he would oppoſe with his whole force, and ſo would probably be ſuperior. The Athenian generals however knew their buſineſs: they permitted him to complete his work without diſturbance: a guard was placed in it, and the reſt of the forces withdrew into the city. Tho circumſtances had occurred powerfully to repreſs forward raſhneſs among the Syracuſans, yet Hermocrates had not yet been able to eſtabliſh due ſubordination among thoſe who, having choſen him their commander, retained nevertheleſs, by the conſtitution of Syracuſe, legal power ſtill to command him. The Athenians, from the heights of Epipolæ, obſerved the diſorderly negligence of the Syracuſan guard; and, in the heat of mid-day, when part were ſtrayed into the city, and the reſt moſtly repoſing in their huts, a choſen detachment, ſupported by a ſtrong body, aſſaulted the fort, while the reſt of the army diſtracted the enemy's attention by a falſe attack in another quarter. The guard of the fort immediately fled. The Athenians and Argians purſuing, entered that quarter of Syracuſe called Temenites. They were however quickly overpowered, and compelled to retire out of the city with ſome loſs; but they demoliſhed the counterwork, carried off

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Thucyd. l. 6. c. 100.

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off many of the piles, and, in claim of victory, erected their trophy.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 101.

On the very next morning they began the contravallation on the ſouthern ſide, from Epipolæ toward the great port. The Syracuſans, urged by their evidently growing danger, notwithſtanding their late ill ſucceſs, began a freſh counterwork, acroſs a marſh lying between the town and the river Anapus, and nearer the ſea than their former work. The Athenian generals, upon this, ordered their fleet from Thapſus, where it had hitherto lain, into the great harbour. Nicias was at this time confined by illneſs. Under the command of Lamachus, therefore, the Athenian forces iſſued at daybreak from Epipolæ, and making their way acroſs the ſoft ground of the marſh upon planks, ſtormed the new work of the Syracuſans, and routed the forces which came out of the town for its protection. The right of thoſe forces eaſily reached the town again; but the left made for a bridge over the Anapus. The Athenians endeavored to intercept them; but the Syracuſan horſe, of which the greater part was in that wing, facing about unexpectedly, charged the more advanced of the Athenian troops, repulſed them, and ſpred confuſion through their right wing. Lamachus, who was in the left, going, attended by a ſmall body of bowmen, to reſtore order in the right, and imprudently paſſing a deep ditch, cut off from aſſiſtance, was overpowered and killed, with five or ſix of thoſe about him. The Athenian left however

however approaching, the Syracuſans retreated again haſtily, but carried off with them the body of the Athenian general, and croſſing the river, were there ſecure. The momentary ſucceſs of their comrades, meanwhile, incouraging the Syracuſans who had fled into the city, their leaders conceived the bold idea of aſſaulting Epipolæ, which they rightly judged would, upon the preſent occaſion, be left with a ſmall guard. Accordingly they took and demoliſhed an outwork, and might have taken the whole, ſo weak was it left, but for the orders judiciouſly given by Nicias to the numerous ſlaves attending the army, to ſet fire to the wood, not ſparing the machines, which lay before the wall. A flame was thus quickly raiſed, which checked the aſſailants; and, the Athenian army haſtening to the relief of their principal poſt, while their fleet was ſeen entering the great harbour, the Syracuſans retreated within their walls. SECT. V. Thucyd. l. 6. c. 102.

All hope of intercepting the contravallation, or by any means preventing its completion, was now given up by the beſieged; and deſponcency, and its conſequence, diſcord, began to gain among them. This became quickly known among the neighbouring ſtates; and a general diſpoſition to abandon the Syracuſans, and to fear and flatter the Athenians, followed. This temper ſpred as far as the Italian cities: apprehenſions aroſe that their refuſal to furniſh ſupplies might draw on them the vengeance of the conquering commonwealth; and ſupplies flowed to the Athenian armament from all quarters. c. 103

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quarters. Thoſe of the Sicel tribes alſo, who had before ſupercilioufly rejected invitation from the Athenians, now ſolicited their alliance; and from Tuſcany three penteconters joined the fleet. Meanwhile the Syracuſan multitude, impotent againſt their enemies, vented their diſcontent againſt their generals, and Hermocrates and his collegues were removed from their office. One of them, however, Heracleides (unleſs it was another perſon of the ſame name) was reſtored, and Eucles and Tellias were aſſociated with him in the command. At the ſame time ſuſpicion of treachery between party and party, the univerſal bane of the Grecian commonwealths, eſpecially in adverſe circumſtances, gained ground. The lower people were far from being equally apprehenſive with their ſuperiors, of the conſequences of yielding to the Athenians; capitulation became the ſubject of frequent debate in the general aſſembly, and even meſſages paſſed to Nicias on the ſubject: but the terms propoſed were not ſuch as that cautious ſervant of the Athenian people could ſuppoſe would ſatisfy his greedy maſters. Thus nearly was a great point, and perhaps the moſt important, carried toward realizing the magnificent viſions of the ambition of Alcibiades; and ſo near was Nicias to gaining, almoſt againſt his will, the glory of conqueror of Syracuſe and of Sicily, and adding to the dominion of Athens the greateſt acquiſition ever yet made by Grecian arms.

Gylippus

Gylippus was arrived at Leucas with only two Lacedæmonian and two Corinthian ſhips, the reſt of the ſquadron to be furniſhed by Corinth being not yet ready, when intelligence reached him of the ill ſituation of Syracuſe, ſo exaggerated, that he gave up Sicily for loſt, and thought he ſhould do much if he could ſave the Italian ſtates to the Peloponneſian confederacy. To this object therefore he determined to direct his efforts. Taking Pythen, the Corinthian admiral, with him in his ſmall ſquadron, he went firſt to Tarentum; where, as a Lacedæmonian colony, he was well received. He had ſome hopes of gaining Thurium through family intereſt there; his father, Cleandridas, having paſſed his exile at that place, where he was admitted to the rights of citizenſhip. Means were thus open for attempting negotiation; but the Athenian intereſt, ſupported by the preſent reputation of the Athenian arms, was not to be overborne, and he could obtain nothing. In proceeding along the coaſt, to try negotiation with other towns, a violent ſtorm interrupted his courſe, and, having narrowly eſcaped ſhipwreck, he returned to Tarentum.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 104.

Thucyd. ibid. Diod. l. 13. c. 93. Plut. vit. Peric. & Nic.

Some days were neceſſary for refitting his ſhattered galleys, and then he proceeded with Pythen to Locri, from whoſe people, through local intereſt always adverſe to the Athenians, they found a favorable reception. There they gained the firſt authentic intelligence of the real ſtate of things at Syracuſe. They learnt

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 1.

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that, tho the circumvallation was really extended from Epipolæ to the ſea on each ſide, and ſo far completed that any attempt upon it, without a very ſuperior force, would be raſh, yet over the crags themſelves of Epipolæ it might be poſſible to introduce troops into the city. Learning farther that the ſtrait of Meſſena was unguarded, they proceeded by ſea, along the northern coaſt of Sicily, to Himera; and with the people of that place they ſucceeded to their hopes. Gylippus then immediately determined to lay up his triremes in the port of Himera, and march acroſs the country to Syracuſe with ſuch force as he could collect. He ingaged the Himeræans to ſend with him a thouſand foot, heavy and light, and a hundred horſe; and obtaining from them regular armour for thoſe of his crews who were unprovided, he thus made his Peloponneſian heavy-armed ſeven hundred. He depended upon zealous aſſiſtance from the Selinuntines, in whoſe cauſe the Syracuſans had drawn on themſelves the arms of Athens; he had promiſes from Gela; and an opening offered for negotiation with ſome of the Sicels, through the recent death of a chief named Archonidas, whoſe influence principally had decided them to the Athenian intereſt. In all theſe negotiations the very name of Lacedæmon, as Thucydides aſſures us, powerfully ſeconded the activity and abilities of Gylippus. The Selinuntines indeed, who beyond others owed zeal to the cauſe, deceived his juſt expectation, ſending only a ſmall body of light-armed:

armed: the Geloans alſo ſent only a ſmall body, but it was cavalry; the Sicels joined him with a thouſand men. His force all together, with attending ſlaves, might be about five thouſand. SECT. V.

During theſe tranſactions in Sicily, the ſquadron, aſſembled at Leucas, ſailed for the Italian coaſt, leaving behind Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who happened not to be ready. This accidental circumſtance had moſt important conſequences. Gongylus, as ſoon as himſelf and his trireme were prepared, puſhing acroſs the gulf, without making the uſual circuit of the Italian ſhore, arrived on the Sicilian coaſt before the ſquadron, and entered the harbour of Syracuſe unoppoſed. For Nicias, thinking ſucceſs now aſſured, and holding in contempt the force which he heard was approaching, kept little watch; and tho he had not diſdained to ſend four triremes to prevent the paſſage of Gylippus through the ſtrait of Meſſena, yet he ſent them too late. The arrival of Gongylus was moſt critical. Summons had been iſſued for a general aſſembly to meet for the declared purpoſe of debating concerning terms of capitulation. Uncertain hope, raiſed by the arrival of the Corinthian admiral, gave ſtrength to the party adverſe to the ſurrender: the queſtion of capitulation was poſtponed: Gongylus was allowed to addreſs the people; and the warm aſſurances he gave of ſpeedy and effectual ſuccour, not from Corinth only, but from Lacedæmon (for the authority of the Lacedæmonian name, ſays again Thucydides, was of principal Thucyd. l. 7. c. 2.

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weight) wrought ſuch a turn in the popular mind, that the chiefs ventured to propoſe to march out and meet Gylippus, who, from communication which had paſſed, was known to be approaching.

It could not be without groſs neglect in Nicias, that, with a force of ſcarcely two thouſand heavy-armed, and thoſe for the moſt part but inferior troops, Gylippus ſhortly after aſcended Epipolæ unoppoſed, by the ſame way of Euryelus, by which the Athenians had firſt obtained poſſeſſion of that important poſt. The Syracuſan forces actually went out to meet him; and to the aſtoniſhment of the Athenian general and army, buſied in the works on the ſouth of the city, the combined forces made their appearance as if offering battle. Gylippus however had the precaution to halt while retreat was ſtill at his option, and he ſent forward a herald with the propoſal, 'That if the Athe-
'nians would quit Sicily in five days with their
'arms and baggage, he was willing to make a
'truce for the purpoſe.' The meſſage was of courſe received with diſdain amid their aſtoment, by thoſe who thought themſelves on the point of becoming conquerors of Syracuſe and of Sicily. Nicias, however, continued motionleſs, while the herald was ſimply ordered to withdraw. Meantime the able Gylippus had had ſufficient opportunity to obſerve that the Syracuſan forces were deficient in diſcipline to a degree beyond what he had imagined; that they were utterly unable to form on uneven and confined

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 3.

confined ground; and that the firſt thing neceſſary for him was to retreat for more ſpace. Nicias made no attempt to profit from any of theſe circumſtances, but remained behind his works. Gylippus, thus allowed to retire at leiſure, choſe his camp for the night on the high ground of Temenites. SECT. V.

Next morning the combined forces appeared again in order of battle in front of the Athenian works, and by their poſition intercluded the communication of the Athenian general with his fort of Labdalum, and with his northern lines. Nicias continued ſtill unaccountably motionleſs, while Gylippus ſent a ſtrong detachment which ſtormed the fort, and put the garriſon to the ſword. A ſmaller occurrence on the ſame day contributed to raiſe the ſpirits of the Syracuſans; an Athenian trireme was taken at the harbour's mouth.

Gylippus, having by this ſucceſſion of daring but well concerted meaſures in his outſet wholly changed the face of affairs, inſomuch that not only the city was very effectually relieved, but the Athenian army was now rather in a ſituation of ſome danger, prudently checked the ſpirit of enterprize, that he might give ſtability to the advantage obtained. Maſter of Epipolæ through his ſucceſs againſt Labdalum, he began immediately to carry out works to interſect the Athenian works, uſing the materials which the Athenians themſelves had collected. Meanwhile Nicias, aware that the moment of opportunity for that great ſucceſs with which he had Thucyd. l. 7. c. 4.

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lately had reaſon to flatter himſelf, was gone by, and that, however he might ſtill be ſuperior in the field, to take Syracuſe was beyond his preſent ſtrength, continued nevertheleſs to proſecute his ſouthern work toward the ſea. In a country where all was inimical, to keep his communication open with his fleet, would be neceſſary to the ſubſiſtence of his army, and might become neceſſary even to its ſafety. Occupying therefore the headland of Plemmyrium, on the ſouthern ſide of the entrance of the great harbour, he raiſed there three redoubts, in which he placed the greater part of the baggage and ſtores of his army, and near them he ſtationed his ſhips of burden and ſmall craft. This meaſure, well conceived in regard to the objects particularly in view, was, however, attended with great inconveniences. The ſoil was ſwampy and unwholeſome; the water brackiſh; the Syracuſan fort of Olympieium was near, and a body of horſe ſtationed there by Gylippus gave unceaſing annoyance, watching the wood and water parties, cutting off ſtragglers, and making it dangerous to ſtir from the camp but in powerful bodies.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 5.

It was not long before Gylippus again drew out his forces and offered battle, and Nicias now, at length, did not refuſe to meet him. The field was very narrow, confined between the contravallation and the city-wall. The Syracuſan horſe had not ſpace for action, and the infantry, preſſed by the ſuperior diſcipline of the Athenians, ſoon retreated within their fortifications.

SECT. V.

tifications. It ſeems to have been the purpoſe of Gylippus to give practice to the Syracuſans with the leaſt poſſible riſk, and make them experience the neceſſity of ſubmitting to the ſeverity of Spartan diſcipline, if they would hope for the ſucceſs for which the Spartan arms were renowned. Addreſſing them in aſſembly, he took all the blame of the late failure to himſelf; condemned his miſapplication of their cavalry; praiſed the valor ſhown by their infantry; and flattered them with remarking that, being of the ſame Dorian origin with the Lacedæmonians, they ought to hold themſelves ſuperior to Ionians and ilanders of the Ægean; and he doubted not but they would quickly ſhow it, by driving thoſe intruding adventurers out of their country.

He ſoon gave them opportunity of trial. Nicias would rather have avoided action, but that the Syracuſan counterwork from Epipolæ alarmed him. Already it barely did not interſect the line of the Athenian contravallation; and if completed would, according to Thucydides, not only prevent the completion of the contravallation, but give to the Syracuſans both the choice when they would ingage, and certain advantage in action. Gylippus ſo choſe his ground that his cavalry could attack the Athenian left in flank. The wing was thus thrown into a confuſion which ſpred in ſome degree through the line, and Nicias haſtily withdrew behind his works. Having thus eſtabliſhed in his own army the opinion that they were ſu-

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 6.

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perior in the field, Gylippus profecuted aſſiduouſly his projecting work, and it was quickly carried beyond the Athenian line. This being effected, ſays Thucydides, if the Syracuſans ſhould now have the misfortune to be defeated in battle, and reduced to confine themſelves within their walls, it would nevertheleſs be ſcarcely poſſible for the Athenians to complete their contravallation.

But adverſity began to pour upon the Athenians. Nicias had ſent twenty triremes to the Italian coaſt to intercept the ſquadron from Leucas. His army had ſcarcely recovered from the conſternation of their late defeat, when they ſaw the enemy's ſquadron, conſiſting of twelve triremes, enter the little harbour of Syracuſe. The ſtrength thus added gave the city, for the preſent, complete ſecurity. It was therefore reſolved to act upon the offenſive againſt the Athenians; and with this view it was propoſed to collect a ſtill greater ſtrength, for which the credit of proſperous circumſtances and recent ſucceſs would beſt give means. Miniſters were ſent to Lacedæmon and Corinth; and the active Gylippus went himſelf round the Sicilian cities, to excite the lukewarm, and win the adverſe, to exert themſelves in the cauſe of Lacedæmon and of Syracuſe, which, he contended, was the cauſe of liberty, of juſtice, and of the general intereſt of Sicily.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 4. & 7.

What opinion the Athenian general now held of his own ſituation, we learn from his own account, tranſmitted by Thucydides. Writing

Writing was but beginning to come into common uſe for ordinary purpoſes. The diſpatches of generals were moſtly, or, it rather appears, univerſally, committed to truſty meſſengers, who delivered them verbally. Thucydides ſpeaks of Nicias as the firſt general who made it his practice to tranſmit his reports home conſtantly in writing. He had obſerved, ſays the hiſtorian, that meſſengers, in delivering verbally to the ſoverein people in aſſembly the reports committed to them, ſometimes through inability to expreſs themſelves clearly, ſometimes through fear of relating the whole of unpleaſant truths, ſometimes through hope of conciliating favor by exaggerating agreeable circumſtances, generally gave an impreſſion wide of the reality. From his firſt appointment therefore to a command with which he had always been little ſatisfied, and in which complex operations were to be conducted at a greater diſtance from home than had been uſual for the Athenian arms, he had uſed the precaution of frequently ſending diſpatches in writing, with an exact account of every tranſaction, which were always formally red to the aſſembled people by the ſecretary of the commonwealth [12]. He had now determined, in conſequence of his ill ſucceſs in the late battle, to remain upon the defenſive for the reſt of the ſummer. For this he thought it neceſſary to apologize very particularly in his diſpatches to Athens. He

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 8.

[12] Ο γραμματεὺς τῆς πόλεως. c. 19.

therefore

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therefore committed them to officers whom he ſelected as moſt competent to anſwer any queſtions that might be put to them, yet he ſcrupulouſly proteſted that his written diſpatches only ſhould be conſidered as having his authority.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 11.

In theſe he repreſented, 'That after having 'nearly attained the object of the expedition, 'when Syracuſe was already reduced to extre-'mity, the arrival of Gylippus, with a conſi-'derable reïnforcement, partly Peloponneſian 'and partly collected in Sicily, had changed 'the face of affairs: that he had nevertheleſs 'been victorious in the firſt action, but the ſu-'periority of the enemy in cavalry and troops 'of miſſile weapons, was, under able conduct, 'too much for him to reſiſt; and, in a ſecond 'action, he had been conſtrained to retreat: 'that it was in conſequence now become neceſ-'ſary to confine himſelf within his lines, to 'forego offenſive operations, and to conſult 'principally how he might beſt inſure the ſafety 'of his army againſt ſuperior numbers; for, 'inſtead of beſieging, it was rather reduced to 'the condition of a camp beſieged: that the 'ſuperiority of the Syracuſan cavalry rendered 'any communication with the country highly 'dangerous: that, for increaſe of evil, he not 'only apprehended a ſtrong alliance within Si-

c. 12.

'cily againſt the Athenian intereſt, but was 'aſſured that additional forces would arrive 'from Peloponneſus; and that, finally, he was 'threatened with attack, not by land only, but

'by

SECT. V.

'by ſea. The fleet,' he proceeded to obſerve, 'had unavoidably gone faſt to decay; the ſhips 'were become leaky; the crews diminiſhed; 'the enemy not only had more ſhips, but, ſe-'cure againſt attack, they could chuſe when 'they would attack him: it was therefore ne-'ceſſary for his fleet to be unremittingly watch-'ful: the guard of the naval camp and convoys Thucyd. l. 7. c. 13. 'for the introduction of proviſions and ſtores 'kept the whole on conſtant duty: the crews, 'forced to go far for wood and water, were 'continually ſuffering from the Syracuſan horſe. 'Meanwhile not only the ſlaves deſerted in 'numbers to the enemy, but the auxiliaries and 'mercenaries, who had hoped that plunder 'more than fighting would be their buſineſs in 'Sicily, now they ſaw the Athenian armament 'declining and the enemy growing in vigor, 'went home without leave. Sicily,' continued the unfortunate general, 'is wide; and, wholly 'to prevent theſe deſertions, is impoſſible; 'even to check them is difficult; and of all c. 14. 'loſſes to an armament, that of able ſea-'men is leaſt eaſily repaired. Nor are theſe 'the only evils that preſs us: what is to me 'moſt diſtreſſing, both to feel and to complain 'of, remains yet to be mentioned. Your tem-'per, Athenians, is adverſe to ſubordination. 'The army is a part of you; a part of that 'ſoverein people on whom my power wholly 'depends; and I find my authority inſufficient 'to control the perverſe diſpoſition, and reſtrain 'the pernicious conduct, of ſome under my 'com-

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'command. Meanwhile the enemy abound in 'reſources, and we are deſtitute; for Naxus 'and Catana, our only allies in this part of the 'world, are little able to aſſiſt us. If then, in 'addition to exiſting evils, the Italian cities, 'whence our ſupplies of proviſions have been 'principally drawn, ſhould be induced, by 'the ill ſtate of our affairs and your neglect 'of us, to refuſe farther aſſiſtance, we ſhould 'be at once undone, and the enemy would 'have a complete triumph without the riſk of 'a blow.

'I could have ſent a more pleaſing account, 'but I could not ſend intelligence which it 'more imports you to receive. I know your 'diſpoſition to be gratified by favorable reports 'of your affairs; but then I know too the 'change that follows in your temper, when the 'event diſappoints expectation; and I have 'therefore thought it beſt to explain to you, 'without reſerve, the real ſtate of things.

Thucyd. L. 7. c. 15.

'Since, then, I can affirm that neither your 'generals nor your army have deſerved blame 'for their conduct in your ſervice here, ſince 'Sicily is now united againſt us, and reïnforce-'ments are expected from Peloponneſus, I will 'venture to declare that it is become abſolutely 'neceſſary for you to determine on one of two 'meaſures: either your forces now here muſt 'be immediately recalled; or an additional ar-'mament, not inferior in either land or naval 'force to the former, muſt be ſent hither: it 'muſt be here early in ſpring, and a large ſum

'of money for its uſe will be indiſpenſable. SECT. V.
'For myſelf, I requeſt that I may be ſuper-
'ſeded in the command, for which ill health
'diſqualifies me; and I hope I may be allowed
'to claim this as an honorable indulgence due
'for my paſt ſervices.'

The Athenians were not yet practiſed enough in misfortune to liſten to wiſe advice thwarting a favorite purpoſe. They would not give up their views of conqueſt in Sicily: they would not even allow their infirm and deſerving general to retire. An additional force was immediately voted; Nicias was required to remain with the command in chief; Menander and Euthydemus, officers now in Sicily, were appointed his preſent aſſiſtants in the duty: Demoſthenes ſon of Alciſthenes, who had already ſo much diſtinguiſhed himſelf by important ſervices, and Eurymedon ſon of Theucles, who had commanded at Corcyra, at Pylus, and in Sicily, were named to lead the reïnforcement. As an earneſt of the reſolution of the Athenian people to give the utmoſt ſupport to their friends in Sicily, Eurymedon was ſent forward about midwinter, with ten triremes and twenty talents of ſilver, while Demoſthenes remained to ſuperintend the equipment of the reſt of the armament. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 16.

SEC-

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SECTION VI.

Deceleia in Attica occupied by the Lacedæmonians. Freſh reïnforcements for the Athenian armament in Sicily. Naval action in the harbour of Syracuſe. Diſtreſs of Athens. Tax upon the ſtates ſubject to Athens. Maſſacre in Bœotia. Naval action in the Corinthian gulph.

WHILE the Athenians were thus madly intent upon diſtant conqueſt, a more ſerious attack than they had yet experienced, was preparing againſt their own country. The ſucceſs of Gylippus, the proſpect of aſſiſtance from the whole force of Sicily, the evident embarraſſment of Athens, the exhortations of Corinth, the advice of Alcibiades, and the important information and aſſiſtance which he was capable of giving, now all together determined the Lacedæmonians to recommence hoſtilities immediately againſt Athens. They were farther incouraged, ſays the hiſtorian, by the conſideration that juſtice (not ſimple juſtice, or a due conſideration of the rights of men, which Grecian religion little taught to regard, but juſtice ratified by a ſolemn appeal to the gods) was now on their ſide. Their misfortunes in the latter years of hoſtility had led them to reflect that the beginning of the war had, on their part, teemed with injuſtice, and breach of ſolemnly plighted faith. Such were the refuſal

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 18.

to ſubmit their diſputes with Athens to a judicial determination; the ſupport of the violence committed by the Thebans againſt Platæa; and the firſt invaſion of Attica. On the contrary, ſince the truce, the Athenians had always refuſed to ſubmit matters in diſpute to judicial inquiry, which the Lacedæmonians had frequently demanded. The ſame tranſgreſſion, therefore, which, they thought, had already brought the vengeance of the gods on themſelves, they concluded would now bring it on the Athenians. The war thus became popular, and to proſecute hoſtilities with vigor was determined with alacrity. During the winter all neceſſary materials, particularly iron, were collected for fortifying Deceleia, and preparation was made to give effectual aſſiſtance to Sicily. SECT. VI.

In the beginning of next ſpring, at a very early ſeaſon for military operations, the Lacedæmonians with their allies, under Agis ſon of Archidamus, entered Attica; and after extending ravage over the plain, which had been abandoned to them, applied themſelves to fortify Deceleia; a town in ſight of Athens at the diſtance of about fifteen miles, nearly equally diſtant from the border of Bœotia, and critically ſituated for commanding the richeſt part of Attica. About the ſame time ſome ſmall reïnforcements were ſent to Sicily; ſix hundred infranchiſed Helots, under Eccritus, a Spartan; three hundred Bœotians; and Corinthians, Sicyonians and Arcadians all together ſeven hundred. The Lacedæmonian reïnforcement had no

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 19. Ol. 91. 3. B. C. 413. P. W. 19. About 18 March.

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no difficulty in its paſſage from the Laconian coaſt, tho a ſquadron of twenty triremes had been ſent from Athens to intercept ſuccours. To favor the paſſage of the others out of the Corinthian gulph, the Corinthians had prepared a ſquadron of twenty-five triremes, which took a ſtation over againſt the Attic ſquadron at Naupactus, conſiſting of only twenty.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 17.

c. 20. Summer was already begun, and the works at Deceleia were advancing, without any attempt at oppoſition from Athens, when Demoſthenes ſailed for Sicily; having under his command ſixty Athenian and five Chian triremes, twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, and a greater force of infantry collected from the ſubject-ſtates. At Ægina he met a ſquadron of thirty Attic triremes, under Charicles, who, in the circumnavigation of Peloponneſus, was to coöperate with him in deſcents on the coaſt.

c. 21. Meantime Gylippus was uſing his wonted activity and ſkill againſt the infirm and deſponding Nicias. From the ſeveral Sicilian cities, who were inclined, or whom he had perſuaded, to favor the Syracuſan cauſe, he had collected a conſiderable force, with which, about the time that Demoſthenes ſailed from Athens, he entered Syracuſe. The Athenians kept their land-force within their fortifications, which he thought himſelf not ſtrong enough to attack, unleſs he could divide their ſtrength. He propoſed therefore another meaſure, which, to ſome, might appear ſtill bolder: he would man the ſhips and attack the enemy's fleet. The reputa-

SECT. VI.

reputation of the Athenians for naval ſuperiority was ſo eſtabliſhed by their various ſucceſſes againſt the Peloponneſians in the beginning of the war, that the Syracuſans were ſtartled with the firſt idea of ingaging them on water. But the influence of Hermocrates powerfully ſeconded the authority of Gylippus. Together they incouraged the Syracuſans, by repreſenting to them, that nothing ſo daunted an enterprizing people as daring and unexpected enterprize againſt them. 'The 'Athenians themſelves,' they added, 'had not 'always been a ſeafaring people: the invading 'Perſians had firſt forced them to become ſuch; 'nor was there any reaſon why the Syracuſans, 'more prepared for it now than the Athenians 'then, ſhould not quickly even excel them.' Late good fortune had prepared the Syracuſans for incouragement. Having already, under the conduct of Gylippus, ſucceeded ſo much beyond their hopes, they were diſpoſed now to carry their hopes high. Accordingly they ſubmitted themſelves to his command: thirty-five triremes fit for ſervice lay in the great port, and forty-five in the little port: all were manned by night, while Gylippus led the whole force of infantry toward the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 22.

At daybreak the ſtir in the Syracuſan fleet became viſible to the Athenians, who haſtily manned ſixty triremes; of which twenty-five were oppoſed to the thirty-five of the enemy already within the great port, and thirty-five

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to the forty-five which were advancing to enter it. On the land-ſide, the watch was ſo negligent, that the approach of an enemy was neither obſerved nor looked for, but the whole army made toward the ſhore to aſſiſt the fleet. Gylippus meanwhile, haſtening his march, carried the largeſt of the three forts at the firſt aſſault; upon which the other two were immediately abandoned by their garriſons. By this time the fleets were ingaged. Within the great port, the Syracuſans had at firſt the advantage; but their larger diviſion, breaking their order in advancing to the attack, were defeated; and then the conquering Athenians, haſtening to the relief of their preſſed ſhips, quickly compelled the other diviſion of the Syracuſan fleet to fly. Eleven Syracuſan ſhips were ſunk; the crews of three were made priſoners; thoſe of the others, moſtly periſhed. Three Athenian ſhips were deſtroyed. The Athenians erected a trophy for their naval victory: the Syracuſans erected three trophies for the three forts taken.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 24.

More important tokens of ſucceſs, however, than any trophies, remained to the Syracuſans. The killed and priſoners in the forts, notwithſtanding the numbers that fled, were many: the military cheſt was taken, together with moſt of the ſtores of both army and fleet, all the moſt valuable effects of the principal officers, large magazines of proviſions, maſts for forty triremes, and three complete triremes laid up aſhore. One of the forts was immediately demoliſhed;

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moliſhed: garriſons were placed in the other two, and a ſquadron of triremes was ſtationed under their protection, to intercept ſupplies by ſea to the Athenian camp; whither, thenceforward, no veſſel could arrive, but by ſtealth, or by fighting its way. Notwithſtanding therefore their naval victory, the conſequences of the late complex action was very ſeriouſly diſadvantageous to the Athenians; and while their general, never remarkable for activity, was oppreſſed with ſickneſs, alarm and deſpondency began to pervade the armament.

Meanwhile the conduct of the Syracuſans, under the able direction of Gylippus and Hermocrates, was all energy. Twelve triremes, under Agatharchus, a Syracuſan, puſhing to ſea, one went to Peloponneſus with diſpatches. Agatharchus, with the remaining eleven, made the Italian coaſt, to intercept a fleet of Athenian tranſports and ſtoreſhips, of which intelligence had been received, and moſt of them fell into his hands. He proceeded then to Caulonia on the Bruttian ſhore, where he burnt a quantity of navy timber which had been collected for the Athenians. In his return, meeting at Locri the Theſpian auxiliaries deſtined for Syracuſe, he took them aboard his ſquadron and made homeward. One of his triremes was taken by an Athenian ſquadron ſtationed at Megara; the reſt arrived ſafe in the harbour of Syracuſe. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 25.

Notwithſtanding their late naval defeat, Gylippus and Hermocrates reſolved not to give up their purpoſe of diſputing with the Athe-

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nians the command of the ſea. Accordingly, to ſecure their ſtation in the great port, whence they might beſt annoy the Athenian fleet, they formed before it a kind of rampart of piles. To prevent the completion of this, and to deſtroy what was already done, became an important object for the Athenians. The merchantſhips of the antients, capacious, deep, and firm in the water, like modern veſſels for ocean navigation, were much fitter for ſome purpoſes of ſtationary fight than their galleys of war. A merchantſhip of the largeſt ſize[13], being fitted with turrets and parapets, was conducted cloſe to the Syracuſan rampart; a body of troops aboard annoyed the Syracuſan workmen, and drew the attention of the troops appointed to protect them: meanwhile a party in boats faſtened ropes about the piles, divers went down and ſawed them at the bottom, and thus moſt of them were hauled up or broken. To fortify and defend their naval ſtation on one ſide, and to deſtroy it on the other, was then for ſome time the principal object of the two adverſe parties; in which, on the ſide of the Athenians, the ſkill, activity, and boldneſs of the people were more obſervable than the ſcience or vigor of the general. The Syracuſans continued to drive piles, and ſome in ſuch a manner that, not appearing above water, they were extremely dangerous to the Athenian boats; yet divers were found, for large rewards,

[13] Ναῦς μυριοφόρος.

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to ſaw and faſten ropes to even theſe, ſo that the labor of the enemy was continually to be renewed; and as the preſent view of the Athenian general was defence, and to gain time for the arrival of the reïnforcement which he expected, his purpoſe was in a great degree accompliſhed.

While the Athenian affairs were thus waning in Sicily, Athens itſelf began to feel ſeverely the conſequence of having a Peloponneſian garriſon eſtabliſhed in the heart of its territory. In the former invaſions a conſiderable part of the harveſt had been conſumed or carried off, and the vineyards, orchards, and olive plantations had been deſtroyed or greatly damaged. The injury however had not extended over the whole country. The Lacedæmonian army, for want of magazines, could not ſtay long; and when it was gone, no apprehenſion remained, during the reſt of the year, for what had eſcaped its ravages: the herds and flocks returned to their paſtures, and the owners of the lands might make any uſe of them that the interval till the next ſummer would admit. But the garriſon of Deceleia kept the whole country, and the city itſelf, in conſtant alarm. Its very wants compelled it to exertion: for the troops, little ſupplied by their cities, were to ſubſiſt chiefly by plunder; and the aſſiſtance which they received occaſionally from home, was leſs in money or ſtores, than in reïnforcements to aſſiſt in rapine. The Spartan king Agis, who had led the expedition, and ſuperintended the con-

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 27.

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ſtruction of the works, remained, after the departure of the reſt of the army, as governor of the garriſon, and aſſiduouſly and ably directed its meaſures. Not only all produce and revenue from the lands of Attica, with all the herds and flocks which they had maintained, were loſt to the Athenians, but more than twenty thouſand ſlaves deſerted, the greater part mechanics and manufacturers. The Athenian cavalry were to little purpoſe employed in the endeavour to check the ravage and deſertion. Many of the horſes, the art of ſhooing that animal being yet unknown, were lamed by unremitted ſervice on rough and rocky ground, ſome were diſabled by wounds, and the reſt ſoon worn down.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 28.

Among the inconveniencies inſuing from the eſtabliſhment of the enemy in Deceleia, one is mentioned by Thucydides, which marks to a ſurprizing degree the imperfection of antient navigation. The large and fruitful iland of Eubœa was at all times the principal reſource to the Athenians for ſupplying the deficiencies of the ſcanty and arid ſoil of Attica. The produce was moſtly brought to the port of Oropus, and thence conveyed by land, along a hilly road of about forty-four miles, to Athens. The neareſt, the leaſt hilly, and almoſt the only practicable road for heavy burdens, paſſed through Deceleia. The occupying of that poſt by the enemy therefore made it neceſſary to carry everything by ſea. With the advantages of modern navigation, this would be incompa-

Chandler's Journey in Greece, and Antonin. Itin.

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rably the preferable method; but the cotemporary author aſſures us that, in that age, the expence of the tranſport all the way by ſea far exceeded that of the old practice[14]. For the reſt, we may readily conceive the force and the truth of the conciſe phraſe which Thucydides has uſed to expreſs the diſtreſs of a great city: Inſtead of a commonwealth, he ſays, Athens was reduced to the condition of a garriſon. Without a territory, it depended upon ſupplies by ſea for ſubſiſtence. The whole people were harraſſed with military duty, ſo inceſſant as to admit little other employment. By day they mounted guard by reliefs; but for the night duty, excepting the higher orders who compoſed the cavalry, none were at any time excuſed; thoſe not immediately wanted for the duty of the ramparts being required to be in conſtant readineſs with their arms[15]: and this continued

[14] Thoſe leſs acquainted with the advantages which the arts of modern navigation give to tranſport by ſea, may form ſome eſtimate of them from the following circumſtances. Much of the trade between London and Canterbury is carried on by water; and Whitſtable, ſix miles from Canterbury, is the port of that city for its communication with the Thames. The paſſage from London to Whitſtable is perhaps eighty miles: but the general charge of carriage is the ſame for the ſix miles by land, between Whitſtable and Canterbury, as for the eighty by water, between Whitſtable and London. Allowance muſt however be made for the benefit of tides in our narrow ſeas, which, in the Mediterranean, is little known.

[15] Οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους. The exact ſenſe of ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιούμενοι, apparently a military phraſe of the day, is ſcarcely now to be aſcertained. The explanations attempted by the commentators and tranſlators are very unſatisfactory. For diſcovering the meaning of Thucydides upon this

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continued through all ſeaſons, during the remainder of the war.

Preſſed thus by every inconvenience of a ſiege at home, ſuch continued to be the zeal of the Athenian people for forein conqueſt, ſuch the ardor with which they inſiſted on the proſecution of the ſiege of Syracuſe, a city ſcarcely inferior to Athens in ſize or population, that unleſs it was ſeen, ſays the hiſtorian, nobody would believe it. Thus indeed, he continues, the expectation of all Greece was ſtrangely diſappointed, and the opinion generally entertained, both of the power and of the perſeverance of Athens, proved miſtaken. The preſſure of new evils ſerved but to bring forward new reſources. All revenue from Attica, public and private, ceaſing, it was neceſſary to look abroad for augmentation of ſupplies. A total change was made in the collection of revenue from the ſubject-ſtates; the antient tribute was aboliſhed, and, inſtead of it, a tax was impoſed, the firſt of its kind known in hiſtory, in the nature of the modern cuſtoms; being a twentieth of the value of all imports and exports [16]. Thus light, in

occaſion, the curious reader may however conſult another paſſage of Thucydides, nearly to the ſame purpoſe, in the 69th chapter of his eighth book.

[16] Thucydides, not in the moment aware of the explanation neceſſary to make this intereſting paſſage clearly intelligible to poſterity, for whom profeſſedly he wrote, has expreſſed himſelf in his uſual cloſe manner, with no other words than theſe: Τὴν εἰκοστὴν ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἀντὶ τοῦ φόρου τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐποίησαν, πλείω νομίζοντες ἂν σφίσι χρήματα ἔτω προσιέναι. In Duker's edition, the paſſage is cautiouſly pointed as it is here given, and neither ſcholiaſt nor annotators take any notice of it, farther than to inform of ſome different readings, which

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in compariſon of what we have laid upon ourſelves, was the heavieſt tax, as far as we learn from hiſtory, at that time known in the world. Yet it cauſed much diſcontent among the dependant commonwealths, the arbitrary power by which it was impoſed being indeed reaſonably execrated, tho the burden itſelf was comparatively a nothing.

While the Athenians were ſuffering from the Peloponneſians eſtabliſhed in Deceleia, a cruel ſtroke fell upon their neighbour enemies of Bœotia. The circumſtances are indeed little materially connected with the great events of the war, but they aſſiſt conſiderably toward a portraiture of the times. Thirteen hundred middle-armed Thracians, hired for the Sicilian expedition, did not arrive till after the fleet under Demoſthenes was gone. Means to forward them were not ready, and their pay was burdenſome, being an Attic drachma, nearly tenpence ſterling a-head, daily. It was reſolved therefore to ſend them home and diſcharge them; but by the way to make any uſe of them againſt the enemies of the commonwealth for which opportunity might offer. The command was committed to Diïtrephes, an Athenian, who, paſſing through the Euripus, debarked his barbarians on the firſt hoſtile ſhore that lay in his

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 29.

which are evidently and groſsly bad. The Latin tranſlation runs thus: Per id tempus tributi loco viceſſimam mercium, quæ mari vehebantur, populis imperio ſuo ſubjectis imperârunt, ſperantes ſe majorem pecuniæ vim hac ratione confecturos. Smith, with whom it is by no means a common fault to be overbold, has ventured, upon this occaſion, I think ſucceſsfully; and tho his authority is not very great, I have been glad to find his ſupport.

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way, that of the Tanagræan territory. Having collected ſome booty, he haſtened to depoſit it in the neighbouring friendly town of Chalcis in Eubœa, and in the evening again croſſed the Euripus for farther plunder. During the night he directed his march toward Mycaleſſus, a large and populous town, in perfect amity with Thebes, and at ſuch a diſtance from the Attic border and from the ſea, that the inhabitants, unaccuſtomed to fear ſurprizes, ſpared themſelves the expence and fatigue both of maintaining complete fortifications, and keeping a regular watch. Diïtrephes, halting toward midnight under the ſhelter of a temple of Mercury, recommenced his march ſo as to reach Mycaleſſus, only two miles off, about daybreak. Finding a gate open and unguarded, his barbarians ruſhed inſtantly to pillage, and maſſacred as they went, ſparing neither ſex nor age: for the Thracians, like moſt barbarians, ſays Thucydides, who knew them from living among them, are commonly bloody-minded in ſucceſs; inſomuch that for ſport they would kill even the beaſts that fell in their way. There was a very large ſchool, in which the boys were juſt aſſembled, when the Thracians broke in, and put every one to death. Deſtruction ſo unexpected and ſo complete, continues the cotemporary hiſtorian, ſcarcely ever fell upon any town.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 30.

News of this ſcene of bloodſhed being quickly carried to Thebes, a body of forces inſtantly marched; too late to give any relief to the Mycaleſſians, but in time to overtake the Thracians.

cians. Thoſe barbarians, who in courage were inferior to none, and in diſcipline not deſpicable, frequently turned in their retreat, and checked the Theban cavalry; and Skirphondas, one of the Bœotarchs, was killed. They were, however, compelled to abandon all their booty; and when they arrived on the beach, in the confuſion of imbarkation, they ſuffered greatly; thoſe unpractiſed in ſwimming being indeed without reſource; for the Athenian ſeamen, little ſolicitous about ſuch allies, took care to keep themſelves and their veſſels out of the reach of the juſtly inraged enemy. About two hundred and fifty Thracians were killed: the reſt were conducted by Diïtrephes to their own country. SECT. VI.

Meanwhile Demoſthenes, having joined Charicles, was meditating meaſures for revenging againſt Lacedæmon the evils ſuffered by Athens from the garriſon of Deceleia. At Nauplia, he took aboard a body of Argian infantry. Turning back then upon the Epidaurian coaſt, he made a deſcent and collected ſome booty. Having thus ingaged the enemy's attention toward the northern parts of Peloponneſus, he reïmbarked his forces, and proceeding to the Laconian coaſt, debarked again overagainſt Cythera, as the hiſtorian marks the place, where the temple of Apollo ſtands. The firſt buſineſs was ſtill plunder, as far as it could be conveniently extended. A neck of land was then occupied on which to erect a fort. It was propoſed that this ſhould be, on the eaſtern ſide of the country, like Pylus on the weſtern, a place of Thucyd. l. 7. c. 26.

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of refuge for runaway Helots, or any others who might be diſpoſed to live by rapine on the Laconian lands. Matters being ſo far ſettled, Demoſthenes proceeded on his voyage. Charicles remained till works were raiſed adequate to the protection of a garriſon, and then, with the Argian auxiliaries, returned home.

Demoſthenes, arriving at Corcyra, added his perſonal influence to the public authority with which he was veſted, in collecting reïnforcements among the allies of Athens in weſtern Greece. Naupactus, Cephallenia, Zacynthus, Alyzia, Anactorium, contributed to ſtrengthen the armament. At Anactorium Eurymedon met him, bringing proviſions from Sicily [17], together with the unwelcome news that Plemmyrium was in the hands of the enemy. Nearly at the ſame time arrived Conon, now for the firſt time mentioned in hiſtory, who had the command at Naupactus, and came to requeſt a reïnforcement to his ſquadron of eighteen triremes, to inable him to oppoſe the Corinthian ſquadron of twenty-five. The ſervice was thought ſo important that ten of the ſwifteſt triremes of the fleet were ſelected for it, to make his ſuperiority deciſive. Such a requeſt, made by ſuch an officer as Conon, and granted by

[17] Τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ. Thucyd. Ἤτοι τα πρὸς τροφὴν χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ συντείνοντα ἀνθρώποις. Schol. This is not the only occaſion on which Thucydides uſes the term χρήματα for neceſſaries in general. Smith has tranſlated accordingly; but the Latin has *pecuniam*, which does not expreſs the ſenſe intended here.

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ſuch a commander as Demoſthenes, ſhows that the Athenians had already continued the war too long. Both thoſe officers were certainly aware that the enemy had improved their naval practice, and that the ſuperiority of the Athenians, experienced in the actions under Phormion, would be experienced no more.

Demoſthenes and Eurymedon, having prepared everything for the proſecution of their voyage, croſſed the Ionian gulph to the Iapygian promontory. There they ſtopped to renew the antient alliance of Athens with Artas, a powerful chief of the Iapygian barbarians, through whom they obtained a ſmall reïnforcement of dartmen of the Meſſapian tribe. From Metapontium, a Grecian town in the neighbourhood, three hundred dartmen and two triremes joined them. Proceeding then to Thurium, they found a revolution had taken place there, favorable to their cauſe: the party friendly to Athens were in poſſeſſion of the government, and thoſe of their opponents, who had eſcaped with life, were in baniſhment. After making ſuch arrangements as they judged moſt advantageous to the Athenian intereſt, and obtaining a reïnforment of ſeven hundred heavy-armed with three hundred dartmen, they proceeded to the Rhegian port of Petra. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 33.

As ſoon as the Athenian fleet under Demoſthenes had clearly quitted the Grecian coaſt, the Corinthian admiral Polyanthes reſolved upon the bold meaſure of offering battle, tho with inferior numbers, to the Athenian ſquadron at Naupactus. He choſe his ſtation for the purpoſe c. 34.

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poſe judiciouſly. It was oppoſite to Naupactus, in a ſmall bay, on each point of which a body of Peloponneſian infantry was incamped. Thus, in caſe of being overpowered, his retreat would be ſhort, and protection ready. Nor was this all: Experience had led the Corinthians to improve the conſtruction of their galleys, by ſtrengthening the bows with an addition of timber and metal, which might inable them to reſiſt the deſtructive ſhock of the enemy's beak. In the accidental abſence, apparently, of Conon, Diphilus commanded the Athenian ſquadron, and, confident in ſuperior numbers, accepted, perhaps imprudently, the offer of battle thus made by the enemy, on their own coaſt. After a ſharp conteſt, three Corinthian ſhips were ſunk, but ſeven Athenian were diſabled through the ſuperior ſtrength of the Corinthian bows. The Corinthians retired, but the Athenians were not in condition for effectual purſuit. The Corinthians therefore erected a trophy; thinking it much, ſays the hiſtorian, not to have been more deciſively defeated. The Athenians, on the contrary, tho they remained maſters of the wreck, the common criterion of victory, would erect no trophy; dejected, as by a defeat, not to have been, with ſuperior numbers, more completely victorious. The enemy's fleet, however, retiring ſoon after into the harbour of Erineum, and the army alſo withdrawing, the Athenians then landed on the Peloponneſian ſhore near the place of action, and erected their trophy.

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SECTION VII.

Affairs in Sicily. Second naval action in the harbour of Syracuſe: third naval action. Arrival of reïnforcement under Demoſthenes and Eurymedon: Attack of Epipolæ: Retreat propoſed by Demoſthenes, oppoſed by Nicias: Secret negotiation in Syracuſe. Retreat reſolved: Conſequences of an eclipſe of the moon: Fourth naval action: Diſtreſs of the Athenians: Fifth naval action.

DURING theſe tranſactions in Greece and on the Grecian ſhores, the natural conſequences of recovered proſperity attended the negotiations which Gylippus and Hermocrates were proſecuting in Sicily. Of the Grecian cities none remained attached to Athens: Agrigentum alone perſevered in neutrality: even Camarina ſent a conſiderable auxiliary force to the Syracuſans, five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred dartmen, and three hundred bowmen: Gela at the ſame time furniſhed two hundred horſe, four hundred dartmen, and two triremes. Nothing impeded the march of troops from Camarina and Gela to Syracuſe; but, from the other friendly cities, either the Agrigentine territory muſt be traverſed, or that of the hoſtile Sicels; ſufferers, or likely to ſuffer, on all hands, but readieſt in enmity to thoſe with whoſe diſpoſition to tyrannize they were

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 32, 33.

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were moſt acquainted. The Agrigentines reſiſted all ſolicitation to allow the paſſage through their territory; it was thought unadviſable to exaſperate ſo powerful a people by any attempt to force the way, and the road through the Sicel country was therefore taken. Nicias, informed of what was going forward, and rouſed by miſfortune and danger, took, upon this occaſion, the meaſures which policy would dictate. At his inſtance the Sicels, forming an ambuſcade, attacked the auxiliaries on their march and killed eight hundred: fifteen hundred nevertheleſs reached Syracuſe.

Intelligence arriving of the formidable reïnforcement coming from Athens, under an experienced, enterprizing and ſucceſsful general, Gylippus and Hermocrates determined to uſe the opportunity yet remaining, for attempting a deciſive blow againſt the decayed, diſpirited, and already half-conquered armament of Nicias. They, like the Corinthians, had learned from experience the deficiencies of their triremes and of their manner of naval action, and they adopted nearly the ſame idea of improvement. Confined within the great port, five or ſix Engliſh miles only in circuit[18], the Athenians could profit little from the ſwiftneſs of their

[18] Strabo, according to our copies, makes it eighty ſtadia; perhaps an error of tranſcribers. Swinburne calls it rather more than five miles. Trav. in Sic. p. 343. v. 2. And another Engliſh and a Swiſs traveller, both habituated to accurate obſervation, being ſeparately aſked, told me they reckoned it, by recollection, between four and ſix Engliſh miles.

galleys,

galleys, and their ſkill in evolution. They could not eaſily find room to attack with the tranſverſe or oblique ſtroke, with which they had heretofore been ſo formidable[19], but, under neceſſity of meeting prow to prow, the ſtrengthened bows of the Syracuſan veſſels would have the advantage. They could not preſs out to ſea through the narrow mouth of the harbour, without expoſing a part of their fleet to certain deſtruction; and the ſhore would afford them but ſcanty refuge, being moſtly occupied by the enemy. The Syracuſans, incouraged by theſe conſiderations, which were explained by their able commanders, prepared with new confidence for action. All being ready, before the fleet moved, Gylippus drew out the land-forces. Thoſe in the city and thoſe in Olympieium marched at the ſame time toward oppoſite ſides of the Athenian camp, and ingaged the whole attention of the commanders with a falſe attack. This feint taking full effect, the fleet, conſiſting of eighty triremes, advanced toward the Athenian naval ſtation. The Athenians, in alarm and confuſion, haſtily manned ſeventy-five triremes and met them. The conteſt was long: two Athenian triremes were ſunk; but the fleets parted without any great advantage gained on either ſide.

SECT. VII.

After 16 July.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 37.

Next day the Syracuſans did not move. But c. 38.

[19] —— Ἀπιὸν τὰ πρῶρόθεν ἰσχύσας (τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς) διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνθιπρώρους μᾶλλον ἀυτὰς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 36.

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no incouragement aroſe hence to the Athenians. They felt that they had loſt the ſuperiority by ſea as well as by land; and they concluded that the enemy would not long reſt ſatisfied with the progreſs already made. Nicias therefore directed his principal attention to the ſecurity of his fleet. He had already formed a ſtockade in the water, for the defence of his naval ſtation. In front of this, at convenient diſtances, he now moored large merchant ſhips, of the kind called holcades, much loftier as well as deeper than the galleys of war. In theſe were placed machines bearing inſtruments of vaſt weight, called dolphins, ſo ſuſpended over the ſea that they might be dropped on any veſſel paſſing near, and with ſuch violence as to ſink it. Behind theſe floating fortreſſes, any of his ſhips, preſſed in action, might find ſhelter, with means to return with advantage againſt an enemy bold enough to purſue them ſo far.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 39, 40, 41.

The Syracuſans did not diſappoint the expectation of the Athenian general. The very next morning their land and ſea-forces moved at once toward his camp and naval ſtation; but the ſerious attack, as before, was on the fleet. As before, alſo, much of the day was conſumed in fruitleſs conteſt. At length Ariſton, a Corinthian, eſteemed the beſt ſeaman[20] in the Syracuſan fleet, conferring with his collegues in command, adviſed a meaſure, judicious in their circumſtances, tho, in the authentic deſcription

[20] Ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης.

of

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of Thucydides, it marks great deficiency, both in the ſhips of war of the Greeks, and in their military and naval economy. We have heretofore obſerved a Corinthian fleet, when going to ſeek an enemy, taking three days proviſion aboard. But it appears that when immediate action was expected, as on the preſent occaſion, the general practice was to leave everything but their arms in their naval camp; not incumbering themſelves aſhipboard with a ſingle meal. Toward midday, in purſuance of the advice of Ariſton, the Syracuſans retreated, but in perfect order, toward their naval ſtation. The Athenians, fatigued with unavailing conteſt, did not purſue. The Syracuſans, on reaching the ſhore, found a market of eatables provided. The magiſtrates, in conſequence of notice from the naval commanders, had compelled all perſons in the city to ſend whatever proviſions they had ready, and the crews debarking, took haſty refreſhment.

Ch. 13. ſ. 3. of this hiſt.

Meanwhile the Athenians, retreating to their naval camp, had diſperſed, expecting no interruption of leiſure for their meal; when ſuddenly they perceived the Syracuſan fleet approaching again in order of battle. With much tumult, and moſtly without refreſhment, they haſtened aboard, and the action was renewed. But it was no longer equally maintained, as before. The ſtrengthened bows of the Syracuſan galleys, through management improved by experience, damaged ſeveral of the Athenian: the numerous dartmen on the Syracuſan decks plyed their weapons efficaciouſly; and

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practice in that manner of naval ingagement which the confinement of the port required, had given the Syracuſan leaders to imagine a new mode of annoying an enemy, who, like the Athenians, depended chiefly on the ſkill of their rowers and the ſhock of the beak. Dartmen in boats, venturing under the quarters, and even under the lateral galleries of the Athenian galleys, gave more annoyance to their ſeamen than even the dartmen on the decks[21]. Seven Athenian ſhips being ſunk, ſeveral others much damaged, and the crews of all weakened

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 40.

[21] Πολὺ δ' ἔτι μάλιζω οἱ ἐν τοῖς λεπτοῖς πλοίοις περιπλέοντες τῶν Συρακουσίων, καὶ ἐς τε τὰς παρσὰς ὑποπίπτοντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν, καὶ ἐς τὰ πλάγια παραπλέοντες, καὶ ἐξ ἀυλῶν ἐς τὰς ναῦτας ακοντίζοντες. This is a paſſage for which little aſſiſtance is to be expected from tranſlators and commentators. An attentive examination of an antique piece of ſculpture in the Vatican muſeum at Rome (ſee note 24. ſ. 4. ch. 8. of this Hiſt.), aſſiſting the idea furniſhed by general Melville, firſt gave me to imagine I underſtood it. I doubt however if the verſion given in the text may carry with it ſufficiently its own explanation. I ſuppoſe the lateral galleries of the galleys to have been open at bottom, or at moſt to have had only gratings; their purpoſe having been, as I imagine, only to give projection and purchaſe to the upper oars. A parapet, raiſed on them, protected the rowers in a great degree againſt miſſile weapons from the decks of the enemy's galleys, but the open or grated bottom gave paſſage for weapons from boats underneath.

I am ſorry to have to ſay that Winkelman's deſcription of the piece of ſculpture in queſtion, and the ingraving he has given of it, are both very erroneous. Equally the antiquarian and the artiſt have been ignorant of what a ſhip or a boat ſhould be or could be. But Winkelman, launching beyond his proper province, has flattered himſelf with the imagination that he has diſcovered in this monument, or perhaps in the incorrect drawing of it, which he has contemplated in his cloſet, a ſolution of that difficulty, which the antients, in all their accounts, have left for us, how their ſhips of war were rowed. A man who never himſelf pulled an oar, in ſuch an attempt, will hardly avoid abſurdity.

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with faſting, fatigue, and wounds, the whole fleet ſought the ſhelter of their floating fortreſſes. So far the Syracuſans purſued, and three of their ſhips, elate with ſucceſs, puſhed within them; but two were ſunk, and the other was taken with her whole crew. The reſt retired, ſatisfied with the ſucceſs of the day, and confirmed in opinion that they were now ſuperior, by ſea as well as by land, to that enemy from whom they had ſo lately apprehended ſubjugation. It was therefore unanimouſly reſolved, at the earlieſt opportunity, to renew the attack on both elements.

It was in the ſhort and critical interval between the reſolution taken and the propoſed execution, that Demoſthenes and Eurymedon arrived, with a fleet of ſeventy-three triremes, five thouſand regular heavy-armed infantry, and a greater number of bowmen, dartmen, and ſlingers; ſo that, including the attending ſlaves, the landforce alone would approach twenty thouſand men. Alarm and aſtoniſhment now returned with double force upon the Syracuſans. They were aſſured that Attica itſelf was in the poſſeſſion of an enemy; and it appeared an unaccountable paradox, that, ſo preſſed at home, the Athenians ſhould ſend out ſuch a force to make forein conqueſt; a force in all points equal to that which Nicias had firſt led to Sicily. The power of Athens, ſays the hiſtorian, thus appeared ſtupendous, its reſources beyond calculation, and their own danger conſequently endleſs. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 42. End of July.

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Demoſthenes, having landed his forces, viewed his ground, and received the information that Nicias and his officers could give, both formed his opinion of the buſineſs before him, and decided on the meaſures proper to be taken, with that cool and juſt judgement which might be expected from an officer who to conſiderable talents joined his extenſive experience. Powerful as the junction with Nicias made the armament under their command, and much as it ſtruck ſudden terror into the enemy, Demoſthenes did not flatter himſelf with certain ſucceſs. In his younger days he had been enterprizing, even to raſhneſs. Now, in mature age, undazzled by the near view of glorious conqueſt, unawed by the apprehenſion of popular rage, neither the hope of profit, nor the proſpect of fame, nor the fear of a tyrannical multitude could move him from what he thought the welfare of his country required. The ſafety of the Sicilian army was not to be ſtaked againſt any hope of conqueſt: the gain would be a precarious advantage to the commonwealth, the loſs almoſt certain ruin. His firſt reſolution therefore was to avoid the error of Nicias, loſing opportunity by delay: his next, to fix upon ſome one undertaking, in which ſucceſs might be in ſome degree deciſive, and failure not fatal: and finally he determined, that ſhould ſuch a firſt attempt be defeated, it would be improper to riſk farther ſo large a portion of the ſtrength of the commonwealth, and, whatever indignation he might incur from

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the Athenian people, he would lead the armament home. SECT. VII.

Upon this occaſion Thucydides ſufficiently declares his opinion, that, with able and ſpirited conduct in the outſet, the conqueſt of Syracuſe might have been effected by the Athenian arms. Had Nicias, he ſays, inſtead of waſting almoſt a year in little enterprize, gone at once againſt that city, he might have completed his contravallation. The Syracuſans, at firſt, confident in their own numbers, did not even think of deſiring aſſiſtance from Peloponneſus; and they might have been put beyond means of relief, before any effectual aſſiſtance could arrive. Circumſtances were now very different; but to accompliſh the purpoſe of the expedition ſeemed not yet beyond hope. The Athenian force was clearly ſuperior in the field. The principal obſtacles to the progreſs of the ſiege were the enemy's counterwork interſecting the line of the contravallation, and their poſſeſſion of Epipolæ. Demoſthenes obſerved that the counterwork was only a ſingle wall, without defence behind; ſo that poſſeſſion of Epipolæ would give him poſſeſſion of the counterwork. He therefore judged that the aſſault of Epipolæ would be the beſt criterion, its ſucceſs or its failure would beſt determine, whether the ſiege of Syracuſe ſhould be vigorouſly proſecuted, or abandoned without delay.

The account of Thucydides may give to ſuppoſe, tho it does not directly expreſs, that the ideas of Demoſthenes did not exactly meet

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thoſe of Nicias. The firſt meaſure after the arrival of the reïnforcement, which reſtored ſuperiority in the field, was to ravage the country beyond the Anapus. In this, apparently, a double object was propoſed. Poſſibly the enemy might be provoked to riſk a battle; of all things, perhaps, for the Athenians, the moſt deſirable. Should they avoid it, the Athenian army, beſide being gratified with booty, would derive incouragement from the experienced acknowlegement of their ſuperiority. Nothing oppoſed them: the cavalry and light troops from Olympieium only attempted ſome deſultory annoyance, with little effect. The next attempt was againſt the counterwork; and this was not fortunate. The machines were burned by the enemy, and every attack repelled. Demoſthenes then inſiſted that his propoſed aſſault of Epipolæ ſhould be no longer delayed, and Nicias and the other principal officers acceded to the meaſure.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 43.

Apparently Nicias was at this time too infirm to take any active part in a buſineſs which might require great exertion. Under the command therefore of Demoſthenes, Eurymedon and Menander, the whole army, except a ſmall guard for the works, was ordered for the duty: proviſions for five days were carried, and the engineers and artificers attended, to form defences in the inſtant of getting poſſeſſion of the ground. To attack, however, otherwiſe than by ſurprize, ſo great a force, in a poſt ſo ſtrong by nature and by art, was deemed unadviſable.

Night

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Night was therefore choſen for the purpoſe: the army moved, as Thucydides deſcribes the hour, about the firſt ſleep. Aſcending by the way of Euryelus, they paſſed the firſt Syracuſan poſt unperceived. Surprizing then a ſmall outwork, they put part of the guard to the ſword: but the greater part, eſcaping, alarmed the camps in Epipolæ. Theſe were three: the Sicilian allies formed one; the allies from Greece another; and a third was compoſed of Syracuſans: Gylippus himſelf commanded. All was quickly in motion to oppoſe the aſſailants: but the Athenian van, led by Demoſthenes, repulſed the firſt troops they met, and continued mounting the hill, while thoſe who followed demoliſhed the fort taken. Attacks were renewed by Gylippus, but ſtill unſucceſsfully: the Athenians puſhed forward, but, in confidence now of ſucceſs, haſtening to complete the acquiſition of the enemy's works, they grew more careleſs of their order. In this ſtate the Bœotians, who were among the allies of Syracuſe, met, and checked them. Among a large body of men, confined within narrow ſpace, on rough ground, and by night, confuſion once ariſing, ſpred rapidly. To communicate commands was difficult; and tho the moon ſhone bright, yet when eſtabliſhed arrangements were once diſturbed, it was no longer eaſy to diſtinguiſh friends from foes. The repulſed Athenians, meeting thoſe yet advancing, were received with pointed ſpears. This occaſioned frequent and clamorous paſſing of the word; which thus became known

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known to the enemy, and of courſe uſeleſs or even prejudicial to themſelves. But beyond all things the pæaniſm, the ſong or ſhout of battle, which the Greeks always uſed in the moment previous to attack, increaſed the confuſion: for that of the allies of Athens of Doric race, Argians, Corcyræans, and others, being the ſame with the Syracuſan, alarmed the Athenians wherever they heard it; and as diſorder extended, the Athenian troops in ſeveral parts fought one another. At length all took to flight. The only road for retreat was narrow; the fugitives were numerous, and haſtening to avoid the purſuers ſwords, many fell down precipices, and thus periſhed. Of the more fortunate who gained the plain, thoſe who had ſerved under Nicias, acquainted with the country, eaſily reached their camp or lines; but ſome of the newly arrived, miſſing their way, were next day cut off by the Syracuſan horſe.

The morrow was a day of mourning to the Athenians, as of triumph to the Syracuſans. The dead were reſtored to the defeated through the uſual ceremonies. Thucydides does not ſpecify the number [22]: he ſays it was conſiderable, but not ſo great as the number of ſhields taken would have given to ſuppoſe; becauſe thoſe who fled over the precipices diſin-

[22] Plutarch ſtates it at the round ſum of two thouſand. Diodorus, always ſtruggling to give celebrity to the deeds of his fellowcountrymen, calls it two thouſand five hundred. Later writers however are not likely to have had information which Thucydides could not obtain.

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cumbered themſelves of their armour; and, tho many periſhed, ſome eſcaped. The Syracuſans erected two trophies; one at the beginning of the aſcent of Epipolæ; the other, on the ſpot where the Bœotians made the firſt effectual reſiſtance.

Every circumſtance appeared now to require that the Athenian generals ſhould quickly enter upon ſome new plan. The armament was ſickly, partly from the ſeaſon, partly from the marſhy and unwholeſome ground on which it was incamped; and the hope of ſoon reducing Syracuſe, or indeed of at all reducing it, ſeemed fruſtrated. Demoſthenes therefore warmly urged his opinion before given, that due experiment having been made and having failed, all purpoſe of conqueſt in Sicily ſhould be at once abandoned, and the armament conducted home. Not the neceſſities of their own ſituation, he ſaid, more than the wants and diſtreſſes of the commonwealth required the meaſure; inſomuch that it would be inexcuſable farther to riſk ſo great a portion of the public ſtrength, and continue ſuch waſte of the public revenue, on what was comparatively an unimportant object. Thucydides very ſeldom declares, in direct terms, an opinion by which the character of his cotemporary might be affected. It is however eaſy to perceive that he approved, upon the whole, both the advice and the conduct of Demoſthenes, as, for his country's welfare judicious, for himſelf diſintereſted and manly. It is not equally eaſy to diſcover his opinion of

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 47.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 48.

the conduct of Nicias: perhaps he was unable to determine his own judgement of it. Nicias poſitively refuſed to lead the armament home. 'The temper of the Athenian people, he ſaid, 'is well known to me: warm in expectation, 'and jealous of their authority, they will highly 'reſent a meaſure ſo diſappointing to their 'hopes, unauthorized by their decree. Our 'conduct, then, let it be recollected, muſt be 'ſubmitted to the judgement, and our fate muſt 'be decided by the vote, not of thoſe who have 'ſeen and who know what we know, but of 'thoſe who will be perſuaded of anything by 'any eloquent accuſer. Even of thoſe now 'under our command, of thoſe now loudeſt in 'complaint of the evils they are ſuffering, ſome, 'nay many, will unſay their aſſertions, blame 'the abandoning of the expedition, impute cor-'ruption to their generals, and perhaps become 'our accuſers, or at leaſt join in the vote for 'our condemnation. I therefore, if I am brought 'to the alternative, will not riſk a ſhameful 'death from the injuſtice of my fellowcitizens, 'to avoid an honorable death from the valor of 'the enemy. But I think we are not yet ſo 'ſtraitened. Ill as the face of our affairs ap-'pears, I well know the condition of the Syra-'cuſans is worſe. In ſome points, they are 'under great difficulties; in others, reduced to 'abſolute inability. They are ruined by their 'expences. Two thouſand talents, already con-'ſumed upon their auxiliary forces and their 'fleet, have not ſufficed: they have beſides in-

'curred

'curred a large debt. Their fleet therefore they SECT. VII.
'cannot long maintain; and on the leaſt failure
'of payment, their auxiliaries will abandon
'them. We are under no equal difficulty; and
'on theſe conſiderations I hold it utterly im-
'proper to give up the enterprize.'

Such were the ſentiments of Nicias, delivered in the council of war. But he had reaſons for his perſeverance which he did not communicate. There were among the Syracuſans ſome who, as their fellowcitizens of the oppoſite party were to them the moſt odious and moſt dreadful of enemies, wiſhed well to the Athenian arms. Theſe communicated ſecretly with Nicias; they informed him accurately of the Thucyd. l. 7. c. 48. & 49.
ſtate of things in the city; they urged him to perſevere in the ſiege; and they incouraged him to hope, that the very diſtreſs of the enemy and the zeal of his ſecret friends, with little exertion on his part, would give him ſtill to return home conqueror of Syracuſe.

Demoſthenes, uninformed of this negotiation, c. 49.
was unable to comprehend the conduct of Nicias; and he ſtrenuouſly inſiſted that, if they muſt wait for a decree of the people to authorize their return home, yet the army ought immediately to move from ground ſo unhealthy, and ſtill more the fleet from that confined ſituation, in which it could not come to action but under the groſſeſt diſadvantage. Eurymedon concurred with him; but Nicias ſtill oppoſing, deference to his rank, together with the ſuppoſition that he might have intelligence unknown

to

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to them, occaſioned a ſuſpenſion of meaſures, and the armament remained in its ſtation.

Unexpected ſucceſs had now prepared the Syracuſans for any exertion. But Gylippus and Hermocrates would not omit to profit from that credit which grows with proſperity. Information arrived that factions were violent in Agrigentum; and it was hoped that aſſiſtance critically given might put the party friendly to them in poſſeſſion of the government. Accordingly Sicanus was ſent thither with fifteen triremes; but on his arrival he found matters accommodated between the contending parties, and the moment of opportunity loſt. Gylippus himſelf was in the mean time more ſucceſsful in a journey which he undertook into the Sicel country. Beſide collecting a conſiderable force among the barbarians, he was joined by a body of Peloponneſians, who, to avoid the Athenian fleet, had made the coaſt of Africa, and thence croſſed to Selinus; and he led the whole, without oppoſition, into Syracuſe.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 46.

c. 50.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament, diſpirited by diſappointment, was alſo weakening daily by ſickneſs. Intelligence that Gylippus had introduced a powerful reinforcement within the Syracuſan lines, excited new apprehenſion, and Demoſthenes and Eurymedon regretted their conceſſion to their elder collegue. Nicias at length was perſuaded, yet ſcarcely perſuaded, to give the ſanction of his conſent to the retreat of the armament. He deprecated any public deciſion of ſuch a meaſure by that open manner of

of voting which, in purſuance of the democratical principle, was the general practice of the Athenian military [23]; and orders were given, with cautious privacy, for the fleet and army to prepare for quitting their ſtation. All was accordingly ready when the full moon was ſuddenly darkened. None had then ſcience to foreſee the regular return of that phenomenon; few could be perſuaded that the cauſe was in the order of nature. It ſtruck the armament with terror, as a portent boding ill to their purpoſe: application was made to the generals, deprecating the intended march: the augurs and ſoothſayers declared that to bring the heavenly powers again to a friendly aſpect, required a delay of thrice nine days; and Nicias, more ſuperſtitious than the reſt, affirmed that, till that period was completed, he would not even conſult about removal. SECT. VII. 27 Aug.

There ſeems to have been nothing in the nature of this omen to perſuade the Athenians more than the Syracuſans that the illboding regarded them. On the contrary, Plutarch gravely imputes to the augurs ignorance in their profeſſion; they ought, he ſays, to have known that an eclipſe portended rather the favor of the gods to thoſe whoſe purpoſe was retreat. But omens of undecided import, ſuch is the nature Plut. vit. Nic.

[23] Μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι. We want explanation of this phraſe, which the commentators and tranſlators do not give. Thucydides has written for thoſe who knew the common forms of proceeding on ſuch occaſions in his age, without thinking of the explanation that might become neceſſary for poſterity.

of

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of ſuperſtitious fear, were commonly taken as unfavorable by thoſe in adverſe circumſtances; and the knowlege that the Athenians held themſelves to be the objects of the divine diſpleaſure portended, ſufficed for the Syracuſans to derive incouragement from the portent. They were confident of ſuperiority by land; they conſidered the intention of ſecret retreat as proof of fear to ſtand a battle. They reſolved therefore not to allow the enemy to eſtabliſh themſelves anywhere in Sicily, by which the war might be drawn into length, but to attack them by ſea and land in their preſent ſituation, and by their total deſtruction to deter future invaſion.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 51.

Such being the object, the able leaders directed their attention for ſome days to exerciſe their people in whatever they judged moſt neceſſary to ſucceſs in naval action. Giving then the ſeamen a day of reſt, they led out the infantry, and they gained ſome ſmall advantage over a body of Athenians, horſe and foot, who advanced againſt them [24]. On the next day they propoſed their great attack. Accordingly ſeventy-ſix triremes moved from the naval ſtation, and the whole landforce advanced toward the

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 52.

[24] Dodwell has been, I think, not ſucceſsful in the calculation of days from the eclipſe forward, and the endevor to aſſign to each its circumſtances. He has not paid due attention, or however not due credit, to the narrative of Thucydides, which, without ſuch minute accuracy, is conſiſtent and clear. With regard to the delay required by the augurs, whether there has or has not been the corruption of the text of Thucydides ſuppoſed by Dodwell, is little important, but Plutarch's account agrees with the common reading.

Athenian

Athenian lines. The Athenians, ſuperior by ten triremes, met their fleet. Eurymedon, who commanded the right, to uſe that advantage which ſuperiority of numbers gave, ſtretched away with a view to ſurround the left of the enemy. The center ſpreading, to obviate the danger of too great an interval between the diviſions, weakened itſelf by making the intervals too great between ſhip and ſhip. In this ſtate it was attacked by the enemy in cloſe order, and preſently defeated. The Syracuſans then directing their principal effort againſt the diviſion of Eurymedon, now cut off from the reſt of the fleet, took, deſtroyed, or drove aground every ſhip, and Eurymedon himſelf was killed. The left wing then fled, purſued, to the ſhore. Such is the brief account which Thucydides gives of this important action, as if feeling too much to relate in detail a defeat for its conſequences ſo deplorable, and the firſt, of any importance, which his country ever ſuffered at ſea from an inferior force. With his uſual tenderneſs for characters, he names neither Nicias nor Demoſthenes; and expreſſes no ſentiment, nor imputes any blame, otherwiſe than by omiſſion. SECT. VII.

Gylippus, while no part of the landforces were yet ingaged, obſerved from the ſhore the diſtreſs of the Athenian fleet, and many of the ſhips forced aground beyond the protection of their ſtockade and their camp. Immediately he detached a body of infantry to intercept any of the crews that might fly, and to overpower Thucyd. l. 7. c. 53.

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thoſe who might attempt to defend their ſtranded veſſels againſt the victorious Syracuſans. The Tuſcan allies were the neareſt troops of the Athenian line. The Syracuſan detachment, elate with the ſucceſs of their fleet, approached in diſorderly haſte. The Tuſcans, by a vigorous aſſault conducted with regularity, put them to flight. Gylippus ſent reïnforcement; but aſſiſtance coming alſo from the Athenian camp, the Athenians finally prevailed, with ſome ſlaughter of the enemy's heavy-armed, and they ſaved moſt of the ſtranded ſhips. The Syracuſans however took eighteen, and of theſe the whole crews periſhed. An attempt was made to deſtroy the Athenian fleet, within its ſtockade, by a fireſhip. The wind favored the deſign, but the practiſed ſkill of the Athenian ſeamen rendered it ineffectual. The Syracuſan fleet then retired, and each party erected its trophy; the Syracuſans for their naval victory, the Athenians for their ſucceſs by land.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 54.

The event of the naval action, ſo contrary to all hope founded on former experience, was a diſaſter ſo momentous, and ſo little balanced by the better fortune of the landforces, that the deepeſt dejection pervaded the Athenian armament. On the other hand, the Syracuſans began to conſider themſelves no longer as an oppreſſed people, ſtruggling in the almoſt hopeleſs defence of everything dear to them; they looked forward to ſucceſs that might intitle them vanquiſhers of Athens, and vindicators of the liberties of Greece. Accordingly they applied

plied themſelves immediately to blockade the port; deſirous now to prevent the departure of that force from which they had expected the worſt evils of ſubjugation; and propoſing no leſs than to deſtroy, or reduce to the dreadful condition of priſoners at diſcretion, the whole of that formidable fleet and army. Thucyd. c. 56, & 59.

Meanwhile not dejection only, from a ſenſe of diſgrace and apprehenſion of the ſwords of their enemies, but the moſt urgent of wants preſſed the Athenians. In conſequence of the reſolution taken to raiſe the ſiege (no ſuſpicion being entertained that the enemy could prevent their departure by ſea) they had forbidden farther ſupplies of proviſions from Catana. Naval ſuperiority loſt, the means of intercourſe with Catana were gone; and thus the deſire to depart was inforced, as the means were rendered precarious. A council of war was called to conſider of theſe untoward circumſtances; and the taxiarchs, officers nearly of the rank of colonels in our ſervice, were ſummoned to aſſiſt the generals with their advice. The reſult of the deliberation was a reſolution to withdraw the whole armament by ſea. This being determined, the ſubordinate reſolutions followed, to uſe all poſſible means for ſtrengthening the fleet; and, with this view, to abandon immediately their extenſive line of contravallation, and reduce their works to a ſingle fort near the naval ſtation, large enough only to contain the baggage and ſick, with a competent garriſon. But naval action now, far different from that in open ſea, Thucyd. l. 7. c. 60.

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where they had been long accuſtomed to a deciſive ſuperiority, muſt be unavoidably ſimilar to that in which they had already yielded to inferior numbers. Thus late therefore, taught by ſevere experience, they propoſed to prepare accordingly. Upon this ſubject the advice of the maſters[25] of the triremes was required. The lightneſs of the veſſel, a quality neceſſary to ſwift-rowing, and of ineſtimable advantage in open ſea, within the harbour of Syracuſe would little avail. On the contrary, to be able to maintain a ſtationary fight, as between infantry aſhore, was of principal importance. It was therefore reſolved that every man capable of bearing arms, beyond the neceſſary garriſon of the fort, ſhould be taken aboard; that numerous bowmen, with the ableſt dartmen, particularly the Acarnanian, ſhould be ſtationed on the decks; and that on the prows grappling-irons ſhould be fixed, which might at once obviate the ſhock of the enemy's ſtronger bows, and, preventing their retreat, give opportunity for their own numerous heavy-armed to act. Purſuant to theſe reſolutions, about a hundred and ten triremes were equipped and manned.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 62.

c. 65. The buſtle of preparation in the Athenian naval camp was obſerved by the Syracuſans, and intelligence reached them of the grappling-irons with which the Athenian prows were armed. Gylippus and Hermocrates, tho they could not equip eighty triremes, nevertheleſs deter-

[25] Κυβερνήται.

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determined to purſue the conteſt, ſo far ſucceſsful, for naval ſuperiority. Againſt the new mode of action propoſed by the Athenians, they thought it neceſſary to prepare; but for this it was held ſufficient to cover the forecaſtles of their triremes with bull-hides, on which the grappling-irons would not readily take any firm hold.

While the animation of the Syracuſans and their confederates ſeconded the ſpirit of their leaders, among the Athenians, notwithſtanding the great ſuperiority of their naval force, a general dejection prevailed. The diſcouragement ariſing from the late naval defeats was proportioned to the former confidence in the opinion, ſupported by long experience, of their decided ſuperiority. But as the ſpirits of thoſe under his command ſunk, the animation, and indeed the whole character of Nicias ſeemed to riſe. His behavior on the occaſion was truly great. Little ambitious, under favoring fortune rather deficient in exertion, and ſometimes culpably remiſs in his command, his activity and animation increaſed as evils preſſed and dangers threatened. None was now ſo warm in exhortation that might reſtore the drooping courage of the ſoldiers and ſeamen. The ſtate of his health did not permit him to take the command aſhipboard: but he was ſedulous in attending the neceſſary preparation, and directing every arrangement. When all was ready for the propoſed attempt, thinking, ſays the hiſtorian, he had not yet ſaid ſo much for the incouragement

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 69.

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of his officers and people as the ſingular importance of the occaſion demanded, he went round the whole armament; and ſpeaking to each trierarch ſeparately, after mentioning their ſuperiority in numbers, and the meaſures taken for reſiſting the enemy's novel mode of attack, he exhorted every one, by his own glory, and by that inherited from his anceſtors, to exert himſelf in the battle to inſue. Leading then the whole to the ſhore, he there committed them to Demoſthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, under whoſe orders they imbarked, and moved immediately to the harbour's mouth to force the egreſs.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 70.

The enemy, who carefully watched their motions, quickly made toward them, under the Corinthian Pythen, and Sicanus and Agatharchus, Syracuſans; the Corinthian commanding the center, the Syracuſans the wings. With the firſt ſhock the Athenians made themſelves maſters of the veſſels that blockaded the mouth of the port, and were haſtening to unmoor them and clear the paſſage, when the Syracuſans approached, and a moſt obſtinate battle inſued.

Meanwhile the Athenian army ſtood on the ſhore, obſerving with the moſt anxious attention what paſſed, within ſuch a diſtance that they could ſee and hear almoſt everything. When therefore after a long conteſt, with various fortune at times in various parts, the advantage of the Syracuſans became deciſive, and the whole Athenian fleet fled purſued, then grief, indig-

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indignation and diſmay (ſays the eloquent hiſtorian, at a loſs for words equal to the deſcription) roſe to the utmoſt pitch that any circumſtances could produce in the human mind, ſince none could be more hopeleſs.

Entering little into detail, and not at all accounting for the event of this diſaſtrous battle, Thucydides proceeds to deſcribe the conſequences. The dejection that pervaded the defeated armament was ſo extreme, and the danger impending ſo urgent, that the ſacred dues of the dead, objects commonly of ſuch anxious attention, were totally neglected; no herald was ſent to requeſt the reſtitution of the bodies, no care was taken about their burial, but every thought was abſorbed in the evils that preſſed and the perils that threatened the living. Amid the general deſpair, however, Demoſthenes did not loſe his uſual energy of mind. Going to Nicias, he propoſed what might ſtill have ſaved the greater part of the forces. Sixty triremes remained to the Athenians: thoſe of the enemy, tho victorious, were reduced to fifty. He thought it therefore very poſſible ſtill to force the paſſage out to ſea, if, imbarking that very night, they made the attempt at daybreak. Nicias approved, but the crews abſolutely refuſed. 'To retreat,' they peeviſhly remonſtrated, 'was all the generals wanted; they would go 'anywhere by land, and fight their way, if 'neceſſary; but by ſea the experience of the 'paſt ſufficiently proved that they could expect

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 72.

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'nothing but deſtruction.' The execution of the ſalutary meaſure was thus prevented by exceſs of diſcouragement.

SECTION VIII.

Retreat of the Athenians from Syracuſe.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 73.

GYLIPPUS and the Syracuſan chiefs, on conſidering the advantages which their laſt ſucceſs gave them, became more than ever deſirous to prevent the departure of the enemy: the Syracuſans, by the complete deſtruction of the invading armament, would deter future invaſion, and Gylippus hoped, in effect, to conquer Athens itſelf in Sicily. The opinion was general among them, and it juſtified the propoſal of Demoſthenes, that the Athenians would now think only of retreat by land, and it was ſuppoſed they would move that very night. But the Syracuſan people, wearied with the labor of the day and exhilarated with its ſucceſs, were more eager to injoy the leiſure which they had ſo well earned, than ſolicitous about any future events. It happened too that the morrow was the feſtival of Hercules. Among ſuch an aſſemblage of people of Dorian race, and in ſuch circumſtances, the deſire of duly celebrating the day of a hero-god, with whom they eſteemed themſelves ſo connected, became irreſiſtible; and nothing could perſuade them to quit the religious revel for a nocturnal military enter-

enterprize. Hermocrates, who had been at firſt moſt urgent for the meaſure, knew his fellow-citizens and mankind too well to attempt on ſuch an occaſion to force inclination: but his fruitful genius provided ſtill a reſource for the attainment of his purpoſe. In the evening, ſome perſons under his direction went on horſe-back to the Athenian camp; and approaching enough to be heard, when they could be little diſtinctly ſeen, pretended they were of the party which had been accuſtomed to communicate with Nicias. Finding credit ſo far, they charged thoſe whom they had ingaged in converſation, to go and tell the general, 'that the 'paſſes were already occupied by the Syracuſans, and that he would therefore do well not 'to move that night, but wait and concert his 'meaſures.' The fatal bait was taken, and the next day was ſpent by the Athenians in various preparation for the march. SECT. VIII. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 74.

But Gylippus and Hermocrates, having yielded in the moment to the wiſhes of their people, found means, before the morrow ended, to ingage them in their own views. Their victorious fleet went to the Athenian naval ſtation, and no oppoſition being attempted, they carried off, or burnt on the ſpot, every ſhip there. The army at the ſame time marched out, under the conduct of Gylippus, and occupied all the principal paſſes round the Athenian camp, and in that line of country which the Athenians would probably propoſe to traverſe.

On

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 75.

On the next day[26], every thing being prepared, as far as circumſtances would permit, orders were iſſued by the Athenian generals for marching. The pen of Thucydides and the language of Athens are wanting to deſcribe adequately the ſcene preſenting itſelf upon that occaſion; when, in the bitterneſs of antient warfare, every horror offered itſelf to expectation, that the human body can ſuffer or the human mind conceive. No light diſtreſs aroſe from the reflection, that, inſtead of fulfilling the lofty hopes of their enterprize, the whole of ſo powerful a fleet was deſtroyed; that, through their failure, ruin threatened their country; and that, inſtead of returning, as they had ſo lately with reaſon expected, conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only, and that almoſt a hopeleſs reſource for avoiding ſlavery or death. But in the circumſtances of that flight, a thouſand dreadful conſiderations, a thouſand lamentable objects preſented themſelves, ſtriking home to the feelings of every individual. The dead lay yet unburied; and the recollection, or, in many inſtances, the ſight of a relation or a friend ſo neglected, ſtruck not only with grief but with horror. Yet the voices and the actions of the many living, whom wounds or ſickneſs diſabled for the march, their complaints, their expoſtulations, their

[26] The third from the naval action, according to the phraſe of Thucydides, and the uſual manner of reckoning of the Greeks; who counted the day itſelf of an action firſt, the next day as ſecond, and ſo forth.

prayers,

prayers, their embraces, and the painful, yet fruitleſs endeavours of ſome to follow their friends, were ſtill more diſtreſſing than the compunction which aroſe from the neglect, impious as it was deemed, but ſo far excuſable as it was unavoidable, of the ſtill and ſilent dead. Mutual reproach then, and ſelf-reproach, for that ſhare which any had had in ſuperinducing or inhancing the public calamity, whether by promoting the enterprize, or by obſtructing the retreat, occaſionally aggravated the bitterneſs of woe. Such, in ſhort, ſays the hiſtorian, was the accumulated weight of preſent miſery, that it threw the whole multitude into tears; and, abſorbing the apprehenſion of farther danger, took away almoſt the deſire, and even the power to move. SECT. VIII.

At length the march commencing, reſembled that of a whole city flying from a beſieging army. This alſo is the remark of the cotemporary hiſtorian, drawing a compariſon from among thoſe circumſtances which diſtinguiſh antient from modern times. For the numbers, he continues, including attendants, were not leſs than forty thouſand. Attendants however were of little importance: moſtly ſlaves, they deſerted openly; and in the inſtant of the army's moving, the greater part diſappeared. Thus even the cavalry and the heavy-armed were reduced to carry their own proviſions and neceſſaries; ſome being without attendants, ſome miſtruſting thoſe who remained to them: and the ſmall portion of proviſions they poſ-

ſeſſed

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ſeſſed demanded every care, ſince it was far from being equal to their probable wants.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 76.

Amid the extreme dejection and anguiſh, not without reaſon pervading the armament, Nicias wonderfully ſupported the dignity of his character and ſituation. Individually the diſtreſs of the exiſting circumſtances appeared not to affect him; his only anxiety ſeemed to be to relieve that of others, and to diffuſe incouragement among all. What authority the hiſtorian may have had for the remarkable words he attributes to him on the occaſion, we cannot know; but whether we conſider them as conveying the ſentiments of Nicias or of Thucydides, they are highly intereſting, as they mark the opinion entertained of the divine providence, by a man of exalted rank, of extenſive information and experience, juſt and religiouſly diſpoſed, but never taught to conſider this life as a ſtate of probation, and to expect in futurity the reward of good or the puniſhment of evil deeds. From the head of the line, Thucydides informs us, exerting his voice to the utmoſt, that he might be heard as extenſively as poſſible, Nicias, with an unruffled countenance, deſired

c. 77. the troops to advert to his own caſe: 'I,' he ſaid, 'am in body (you may ſee indeed the 'ſtate to which ſickneſs has reduced me) 'very far from being the ſtrongeſt among you. 'In the bleſſings of high fortune I was once 'inferior to none: but now I muſt bear every 'preſent evil, I have to apprehend every threat-'ened danger, in common with the loweſt under

'my

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'my command. Such is my lot; who have al-
'ways been regular and zealous in every duty to
'the gods; and not only, as far as depended
'ſimply on myſelf, ſcrupulouſly juſt, but libe-
'rally charitable among men. Hence I have
'hope and confidence that our fortune will
'change for the better. The affliction we now
'ſuffer is ſurely beyond our deſert; the enemy
'have already been ſufficiently fortunate; and
'if our enterprize againſt this country has of-
'fended any of the gods, it cannot be but our
'preſent evils are adequate puniſhment. For
'we are not the firſt who have drawn our ſwords
'in the attempt, unjuſtifiable be it confeſſed,
'to ſubjugate and reduce to ſlavery our fellow-
'creatures, and ſeize to ourſelves their poſ-
'ſeſſions. In doing thus, doing only what is
'ordinary among men, others have ſuffered for
'it only what men may bear. We therefore
'have ſurely reaſon to hope that the gods will
'at length moderate their apparent exceſs of
'vengeance againſt us; objects as we are already
'become, of pity rather than of indignation.

'Confiding thus far then in the divine mercy,
'let us look to what, meer human things con-
'ſidered, our circumſtances are, and ſurely we
'ought not to deſpond. Such a force as we
'poſſeſs, with ſo large a proportion of regular
'troops, wherever we eſtabliſh our abode, we
'are not only a formidable army, we are a com-
'monwealth. Certainly no Sicilian ſtate, Sy-
'racuſe excepted, will eaſily drive us from any
'ſituation we may occupy; or even prevent us

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'from occupying any we may deſire. To be 'ſafe, indeed, we have only to reach the Sicel 'territory; for their fear of the Syracuſans in- 'ſures to us the friendſhip of the barbarians. 'Firm minds and orderly conduct then are the 'things principally neceſſary to your welfare; 'and not to yours only, but that of the Athe- 'nian commonwealth; which, however lament- 'ably fallen through our misfortune, it may 'not be beyond our ability to reſtore; ſince the 'ſtrength of a ſtate conſiſts, not in towns, not in 'territory, not in ſhips, but in men.'

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 78.

Having thus ſpoken, Nicias led the march, the army being diſpoſed in two diviſions, with the baggage between them; himſelf commanding the van, Demoſthenes the rear. The road choſen was not toward their Grecian friends of Naxus and Catana, but that by which they hoped moſt readily to reach the Sicel country; where ſooneſt they might find food and ſafety, with leiſure to concert farther meaſures. At the ford of the Anapus, very little diſtant from their camp, they found a body of Syracuſans poſted to oppoſe the paſſage. Theſe they ſoon forced to retire; but the enemy's horſe and light infantry, hanging on their flanks and rear, gave ſuch continued annoyance, that, after a march of only five miles, finding a riſing ground commodious for the purpoſe, they incamped for the night. On the next day they made ſtill leſs progreſs. Want of proviſions induced them to halt, after a march of only two miles and a half, in a plain where, beſide collecting cattle among the

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the farms and villages, they could ſupply themſelves with water for their progreſs over the hilly and dry country which lay next in their way. But on the third day the Syracuſan horſe and light-armed, in larger force than before, gave ſo much greater annoyance, that after many hours waſted in unavailing attempts to repreſs them, the diſtreſſed Athenians returned to the camp they had laſt occupied. Nor could they profit, as on the preceding day, from their ſituation: even to obtain water, ſuch was the enemy's ſuperiority in cavalry, was difficult and hazardous.

Errors in conduct, evidently in the opinion of Thucydides, had occurred, tho he avoids as uſual the expreſs declaration of any opinion. Either change of plan, or ſome greater effort than had yet been made, was clearly indiſpenſable. On the next morning, therefore, they moved earlier than uſual, and preſſed their march with the view to occupy the Acræon-lepas, the firſt narrow at the entrance of the highlands. But the opportunity loſt was not ſo eaſily recoverable: their ſlowneſs had given the enemy time, both to diſcover their intended courſe, and to profit from the knowlege; and on their arrival at the Acræon-lepas, they found not only an armed force to oppoſe them, but the natural difficulties of the paſs increaſed by a fortification. An aſſault was immediately attempted, which was not in the moment ſucceſsful. Meanwhile a ſtorm came on; ſuch, ſays the

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 79.

4 Sept. acc. to Chron. Thu. but rather about 12 or 14 Sep.

the hiſtorian, as in the autumnal ſeaſon is common; but, in the preſent wane of the Athenian affairs, and the deſpondency its conſequence, everything was conſtrued as an ill omen, and the generals could not perſuade their troops to renew the attack. As conſtant exertion tends to maintain the animation which ſucceſs has raiſed, ſo new and unexpected oppoſition commonly inhances the depreſſion of the unfortunate. Gylippus, attentive to every opportunity, and obſerving the heſitation of the Athenians after their repulſe, ſent a body of men to raiſe a fort in their rear, ſo as to intercept their retreat. The Athenian generals, however, found no difficulty in checking this purpoſe. Their force was indeed yet ſuch as to deter the enemy from giving them battle; and accordingly they again choſe their camp for the night within the plain.

But on the morrow, when they moved again, ſtill with the view to force the paſſage of the mountains, they had no ſooner quitted their camp than the Syracuſan horſe and light-armed were upon their flanks and rear. If they halted to repel the annoyance, the enemy inſtantly retreated; but the moment they reſumed their march, the attack was renewed; and this ſo repeatedly and efficaciouſly, that after advancing only one mile through the plain they incamped again. Then the Syracuſans alſo retired to their camp.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 80.

The diſtreſs of the Athenians was now become very great: while numbers were ſuffering from wounds received in the many ſkirmiſhes, all were

were in almoſt total want of proviſions and of all neceſſaries. The generals therefore came to a ſudden reſolution to break up their camp by night, and take the road toward the ſea, the direct contrary to that which they had been hitherto following, and on which the enemy waited to intercept them. For, purſuing along the coaſt the way to Camarina and Gela, they might ſtill reach the Sicel territory, by a more circuitous courſe indeed, but through a more level and open country. The uſual fires were lighted, to obviate ſuſpicion in the enemy, and then the army was ſilently aſſembled and the march begun. Nicias led, with a haſty pace, yet preſerving due regularity. Through ſome unknown fatality, alarm and tumult aroſe in the diviſion commanded by Demoſthenes. Order was after ſome time reſtored; but the two diviſions were completely ſeparated. SECT. VIII.

The Syracuſans, as ſoon as day broke, perceiving the Athenian camp deſerted, in the uſual temper of democratical jealouſy, began to criminate Gylippus, as if he had traiterouſly permitted the enemy to eſcape. To diſcover which way ſo large a body had directed its march, was however not difficult, and ſhortly all joined in zealous purſuit. Demoſthenes, notwithſtanding the misfortune which had retarded him, had before daybreak reached the road leading from Syracuſe to Elorus. A little farther he found a body of Syracuſans raiſing works to obſtruct his paſſage acroſs the gully through which flows the brook Cacyparis. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 81.

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Theſe he ſoon diſperſed. According to the plan concerted with Nicias, he ſhould then have turned up the courſe of the Cacyparis, to gain the interior country; but by the advice of his guides he proceeded, ſtill near the coaſt, to the brook Erineus; and there the cavalry of the Syracuſan army overtook him.

From the firſt there ſeems to have been ſome difference of opinion between the Athenian generals concerning the manner of conducting the retreat. Nicias, who has evidently the approbation of Thucydides, thought the ſafety of the army depended, beyond all things, upon the rapidity of its march: the inſult of aſſault ſhould therefore be borne, and halts made to repel attacks only when they threatened very important injury. Demoſthenes, on the contrary, was more diſpoſed, on every occaſion, to revenge with the view to deter annoyance. No ſooner therefore were the Syracuſan horſe now preſſing upon his rear, than he changed that line of march by which he could beſt gain ground, to form his troops ſo as to act moſt efficaciouſly againſt the enemy. The Syracuſans ſaw their opportunity, and puſhed by him while he halted. Their infantry quickly came up, and Demoſthenes was ſurrounded. Too late diſcovering his error, he took the beſt meaſure that circumſtances would then admit, occupying a walled incloſure near at hand, where the enemy's horſe could not reach him, and where he could defy even their heavy-armed infantry. But repeated ſufferings in the courſe of this long

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long war, and especially the affair of Pylus, had taught the Lacedæmonians the value of light troops and missile weapons. Gylippus, employing the heavy-armed only in false or in desultory attacks, made principal use of his bowmen, darters, and slingers; and from these, through the remainder of the day, the Athenians had no rest. In the evening, when many were thus wounded, and all worn with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, he sent a herald with a proclamation, promising liberty to any of the islanders who would come to the Syracusan camp and surrender their arms. Not many, even in so hopeless a situation, when all the evils that the barbarity of antient warfare could inflict were impending, would forsake their general and their comrades; an instance of fidelity deserving notice the more, as the common conduct of the Athenian government would not seem to merit such attachment from its subjects; and while it does honor to themselves and to Demosthenes, it certainly reflects some credit on the government of Athens. So desperate indeed were the circumstances, that on the same evening Demosthenes capitulated for the rest of his troops, surrendering himself and them prisoners of war, with no other stipulation than that none should suffer death, either through violence or for want of sustenance. With their arms they gave up all their money, throwing it into the hollow of shields held to receive it, and four shields were thus filled with silver. The prisoners, in num-

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 85.

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ber about six thousand, were immediately conducted to Syracuse.

Meanwhile Nicias, having ascended some way by the course of the Cacyparis, crossed to the Erineus [27], passed that stream, considerably above the scene of Demosthenes's fate, and incamped on some high ground near the farther bank. Early next morning the Syracusan army hastened in pursuit, and the horse quickly overtaking him, gave information of the capitulation made by Demosthenes, and summoned him to surrender himself and the forces under his command. Refusing credit to such intelligence so transmitted, he asked a safe-conduct for a horseman of his own to make the inquiry, which was granted. The return of his messenger assuring him of the fact, he then sent to propose, in the name of the Athenian commonwealth, reimbursement to Syracuse of all the expences of the war, upon condition only that the troops under his command might depart in safety, and for security he would leave Athenian citizens as hostages, one for every talent that would thus become due. The proposal was rejected, and the Athenian army was quickly surrounded by the multitude of the enemy; who would however neither make nor sustain any regular attack, but continued, till evening, unceasing annoyance with missile weapons.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 83. 7 Sep. Chron. Thu. but rather a week later.

Among the distresses of the Athenians, not the least was the want of provisions. Could

[27] This appears from a comparison of the 80th chapter of Thucydides with the 83d.

they

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they have ſupported the enemy's aſſaults on their preſent ground, they could not have ſubſiſted there. Nicias therefore about midnight called to arms as ſilently as poſſible, with intention to purſue his march: but the watchful enemy perceived his motions, and immediately ſang the Pæan. Upon this he gave up the deſign, and remained in his camp; but a body of about three hundred, without his orders, made a ſucceſsful puſh at the enemy's line, broke through, and, under favor of the obſcurity, quickly got beyond immediate purſuit. Nicias waited for the dawn and then continued his march. Even then the enemy, under the able conduct of Gylippus and Hermocrates, would come to no regular action, but only infeſted, as before, with miſſile weapons and deſultory charges of cavalry. Sicily, through the greateſt part of its extent, is high land, interſected with numerous valleys, whoſe ſides are commonly ſteep, and the banks of the ſtreams flowing through them often craggy. At no great diſtance from the camp which the Athenians had quitted, the river Aſſinarus has a deep and rocky channel. While extreme thirſt urged their ſteps to its ſtream, they hoped that, if they could once reach its further bank, they ſhould gain ſome reſpite from the annoyance of the enemy's cavalry; and the light-armed would be leſs formidable when unſupported by the heavy-armed and horſe. But notwithſtanding all the exertion which ſuch motives inforced, when they reached the bank the enemy's heavy-

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 84. Sept. 8. or rather about 15.

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armed were close upon them. Discipline then yielded to the pressure of evil felt and danger threatening. Without any order they hurried down the steep, pushing and trampling on one another; and, in the tumult, some were destroyed by the spears of their comrades. The first object of most was to assuage intolerable thirst. Meanwhile the enemy's light-armed, acquainted with all the ways, reached the opposite bank before them, and the whole Athenian army, inclosed in the hollow, was exposed, helpless, to missile weapons on both sides. The Peloponnesians at length led the way for the Syracusans down into the bottom, to complete the slaughter; while the Athenians, still resisting to the utmost, were so pressed by extreme thirst, that, in the midst of action, many of them would drink the turbid and bloody water, and even fight for it.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 85.

Already they were lying dead in heaps in the river, while the horse pursued and cut off any who could escape up the banks, when Nicias, whom nothing could induce to submit to the Syracusans, found opportunity to surrender himself to Gylippus. That general then commanded to give quarter, and was obeyed. Among the rocks and in the windings of the stream a large number of the Athenians found opportunity for either concealment or flight: the rest were made prisoners. No capitulation was made, as for the division under Demosthenes: and, prisoners being valuable as slaves, the Syracusan soldiers were diligent in

embeziling them as their private property. In this they were ſo ſucceſsful, that the public priſoners of the Syracuſan ſtate remained comparatively few. A detachment was ſent after the three hundred who broke through the Syracuſan line in the night, and took them all. The public priſoners, with what ſpoil could be collected, were conducted to Syracuſe. SECT. VIII. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 86.

It would have been a glorious and a ſingular triumph for Gylippus to have carried priſoners to Sparta the two Athenian generals, the moſt illuſtrious men of their time; one particularly diſtinguiſhed for his friendly diſpoſition to the Lacedæmonian people, the other for his ſucceſſes againſt them. But the jealous, cruel, and faithleſs temper of democratical deſpotiſm diſappointed his juſt expectation. A decree of the Syracuſan people condemned both the Athenian generals to death, and they were executed. In the antient democracies, the moſt worthleſs individual, touching at any time a chord in conſonance with popular paſſion, could procure the ſanction of ſoverein authority for any villainy. For where neither one perſon nor a ſelect body was reſponſible, but the whole people, truly deſpotic, were the common authors of every public act, the ſhame of flagitious actions was ſo divided that it was diſregarded. No perſon, it appears, would own himſelf author of the black decree againſt Nicias and Demoſthenes; the one intitled to the protection of the Spartan general, the other under that of a capitulation ſolemnly granted in the name of

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the Syracuſan people. When, in the uſual tide of popular paſſion, ſhame began to ſuperſede rage, it became the policy of the democratical leaders to inſinuate that Gylippus himſelf had promoted the decree; and report was circulated, which the Sicilian hiſtorian Timæus choſe to adopt as truth, that Hermocrates, whoſe noble patriotiſm we find ſo many occaſions to admire, was the inſidious villain to procure, in defiance of legal authority, the death of the illuſtrious priſoners. Theſe reports deſerve notice, as they tend to characterize the politics of the times; but neither bears the leaſt appearance of probability. The cotemporary hiſtorian aſſures us, that the circumſtances immediately leading to the decree were not in his time known with certainty at Athens; but ſome circumſtances connected with the meaſure were not ſecret. The fears of thoſe who had carried on treaſonable correſpondence with Nicias induced them, if not to promote, yet to concur in it: the Corinthians had particular enmity to that general, and, for ſome cauſe not explained to us, were apprehenſive that his reſtoration to power in Athens would be injurious to their intereſt. Theſe are what Thucydides mentions as the only ſprings known to him; but he affirms it to have been a public and ſolemn decree of the Syracuſan people that conſigned the Athenian generals to the executioner [28].

Plut. vit. Nic.

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[28] Plutarch, in his life of Nicias, profeſſes to have taken particular pains to collect and collate whatever remained to his time ſatisfactory

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Meanwhile the miſerable remnant of their once flouriſhing army, the greateſt ever ſent out by any one Grecian ſtate, was reſerved for a ſtill ſeverer lot. A vaſt quarry in the hill of Epipolæ, from which the ſtone had been principally taken for building the city, was judged the moſt ſecure and commodious place for the confinement of ſuch a multitude of men, ſo verſed in the uſe of arms. Into this the freemen were conducted, to the number of about ſeven thouſand: the ſlaves were ſold by public auction. But the faith of the Syracuſan people, ſo ſhamefully broken with the generals, was not very religiouſly kept with thoſe of inferior rank. On the contrary, their whole conduct was marked with a ſpirit of deliberate cruelty, the general vice, it muſt be confeſſed, of the faireſt days of Greece; which yet ought not to be attributed to the diſpoſition of the people, ſince it was the unavoidable reſult of the political ſtate of the country. The Syracuſans ſaw in the Athenian priſoners, not generous enemies, but oppreſſors who would have reduced them to the deepeſt miſery. Tho food therefore was not denied, yet it was given in quantity barely ſufficient to ſupport life; and cruelty was ſtill more ſhown in the ſcanty allowance of water. No ſhelter was afforded from the inclemency of the ſky; and while the reflected heat of the midday ſun was ſcarcely tolerable,

concerning the expedition againſt Syracuſe; but his account is ſatisfactory chiefly as it tends to confirm that of Thucydides, without adding ſcarcely anything of any importance.

the

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the chill of autumnal night made an alternacy very injurious to health. No means were given to avoid their own filth; no care was taken of thoſe who ſickened; and when any died, as many did, ſome of unattended wounds, ſome of ſickneſs cauſed by various hardſhip, the bodies remained to putrefy among their living companions; and the eloquent hiſtorian, here as on another occaſion, unable to ſatisfy himſelf with deſcription of the extreme miſery, ſums up all with ſaying, that no ſuffering could poſſibly reſult from ſo wretched a ſituation which was not experienced by the Athenian priſoners. Toward the end of November, after a confinement of about ſeventy days, the ilanders, and others who were not citizens of Athens or of ſome Grecian town of Sicily or Italy, were taken out for the milder lot of being ſold for ſlaves. The Athenians, with the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, remained; and we are not informed that they were ever releaſed.

Thucyd. l. 7. c. 85.

Meanwhile thoſe of the army under Nicias, who, inſtead of public priſoners of the Syracuſan ſtate, had been made the private property of individuals, ſuffered variouſly, according to the condition or temper of the maſters under whom they fell; and, of thoſe who had eſcaped by flight, few fared better, for, unable to find ſubſiſtence, they were moſtly reduced to the hard reſource of offering themſelves, in any town they could reach, to voluntary ſlavery. Thus, ſays the hiſtorian, all the towns of Sicily abounded with Grecian ſlaves. A few only had

had the good fortune to make their way immediately from the field of action to the friendly city of Catana, whence they got their paſſage to Athens. Afterward others found means to fly from bondage to the ſame aſylum. Thucyd. l. 7. c. 86.

In the miſerable ſtate of ſervile dependency to which ſuch numbers of Athenians were reduced, the ſcience, literature, fine taſte, and polite manners of Athens are ſaid to have been beneficial to many. Some, who were fortunate enough to meet with maſters of liberal diſpoſition, were treated with the reſpect due to ſuperior accompliſhments; ſome were even preſented with their freedom. Since the days of Hieron the literature of Greece or Ionia had little made its way to Sicily; and, through defect of materials, copies of books were not yet readily multiplied. But many of the Athenians retained by memory much of the works of Euripides, whoſe moral and pathetic ſtrains, which they uſed to ſing as the ſolace of their bondage, ſingularly touched the Sicilians. Euripides lived to receive in perſon the grateful acknowlegements of ſome who returned to Athens, and related what kindneſs they had received in ſervitude, or what relief in beggary, for the pleaſure they gave by ſpeaking, ſinging, or teaching, his verſes. Plut. vit. Nic.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

CHAP.

CHAPTER XIX.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Concluſion of the SICILIAN Expedition till the Return of ALCIBIADES to ATHENS, in the twenty-fourth Year of the PELOPONNESIAN War.

SECTION I.

Effects at Athens of the news of the overthrow in Sicily: Effects through Greece of the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. Change in the political ſyſtem of Lacedæmon. Meaſures of the Peloponneſian confederacy for raiſing a fleet. Propoſals from Eubœa and Leſbos to revolt from the Athenian to the Peloponneſian confederacy.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 1.

THE news of the total deſtruction of the moſt powerful armament ever ſent out by any Grecian ſtate, ſuppoſed ſo far from the danger of ſuch a cataſtrophe that it was capable of accompliſhing almoſt any conqueſt, being firſt brought to Athens by no official meſſenger, but communicated accidentally in the uncertain way of reports, did not immediately find credit. Plutarch relates that a foreiner landing

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at Peiræus, went into a barber's ſhop, which, like the modern coffee-houſe, was the uſual reſort of idle newſmongers in the Grecian cities (as, we find, afterward in Rome) and ſpoke of the event as what he ſuppoſed would of courſe be well known there. The barber, with more zeal than diſcretion, went immediately into the city and communicated the intelligence to the archons; who, with the natural anxiety of magiſtrates under the tyranny of a deſpotic multitude, ſummoned an aſſembly of the people, and produced the barber to declare his news. The people, in extreme agitation, demanded his authority. The incautious man could produce none: he had no previous acquaintance with the perſon from whom he received the information, and knew not where to find him. The indignant multitude immediately ordered the barber to the torture of the wheel (a mode of puniſhment nowhere exactly deſcribed to us, but which it ſeems might be borne long [1]) and he was not releaſed till ſome of the more fortunate few, who had eſcaped from the ſcene of woe, arriving, confirmed the uncertain intelligence. Even theſe, however, were not at firſt credited for the full extent of the misfortune. Multiplied concurring teſtimonies at length removing every doubt of the magnitude of the calamity, then public anguiſh became extreme. Popular rage began with

Plut. vit. Nic.

Thucyd. l. 6. c. 1.

B. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. P. W. 19. October.

[1] Ἐς τὸν τρόχον καταδυθείς, ὑφ' ἑλκόντων πολλῶν χρόνον, κ. τ. ε. Plut. vit. Nic.

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venting contumely againſt the orators who had adviſed the expedition; as if, ſays the hiſtorian, the people themſelves had not directed it; and, in fact, the people in aſſembly holding the executive as well as the legiſlative government, every one being free to propoſe, and ſometimes a majority with tumultuous clamor commanding meaſures, there could be no duly reſponſible miniſter. From the orators then the public anger extended to the ſoothſayers, augurs, interpreters, any who had contributed to eſtabliſh the belief that the gods would favor the project of conqueſt in Sicily. But in this exceſſive irritation of the public mind, fear ſoon became the prevailing paſſion. Private loſſes of friends or relations, which ſtimulated the firſt movements, gave way to the conſideration, that the commonwealth had not ſuch another body of citizens in the prime of life as that which had been ſo raſhly committed to deſtruction, nor ſuch a fleet, nor naval ſtores to fit ſuch another, nor funds to ſupply the accumulated wants which the conjuncture created: and then it followed, that nothing leſs was to be expected than the appearance of the enemy's victorious navy before Peiræus, and the blockade of Athens by land and ſea.

In this general conſternation, however, there were not wanting either able heads or magnanimous minds among the Athenians, and the criſis itſelf gave them the power to take the lead. Wiſe meaſures and the moſt vigorous that circumſtances admitted, were accordingly reſolved

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ſolved on; to reſtore the navy, to collect ſtores, to raiſe money, and to ſave it, by abridging, not private luxury, which was yet moderate, but public luxury, which was already immoderate in Athens [2], and, above all things, to obviate the defection of the allied and ſubject-ſtates, particularly of Eubœa, the moſt valuable dependency of the commonwealth, and without which the city of Athens could not eaſily ſubſiſt. But the depth of misfortune into which their own folly had precipitated them, induced among the Athenian people a conſciouſneſs that a multitude is unfit to direct executive government. To obviate therefore the extravagancies of unbalanced democracy, a new council of elders was created, whoſe office was to deliberate on all public meaſures, previouſly to their being propoſed to the general aſſembly. This indeed was providing for the prudence of executive government, but not for vigor, not for ſecrecy, not for diſpatch; qualities which could meet in the Athenian adminiſtration only when a Themiſtocles or a Pericles, general at the ſame time and demagogue, controuled by no council, could firſt direct meaſures, and then command the approbation of the general aſſembly. Never however were the Athenian people ſo diſpoſed to moderation, order, and attention to wiſe advice as

[2] Duker has a judicious note upon the paſſage of Thucydides which I have thus paraphraſed. The ſcholiaſt has undertaken to explain what, for want of better inquiry into the ſtate of Athens at the time, he evidently did not underſtand.

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in the preſent criſis. 'It was ſo reſolved there-'fore,' ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian emphatically, 'and it was done; and the ſummer 'ended.'

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 2.

Meanwhile the attention of all Greece was excited, and the politics of every republic put in motion by the blow which Athens had received in Sicily. Apprehenſion of the conſequence of ſo great an addition to the power of that ambitious and reſtleſs republic, as the conqueſt of Sicily might have given, had been very general and very ſerious. No evil that could befall the ariſtocracies which compoſed the Lacedæmonian confederacy, was ſo dreadful and ſo odious as ſubjugation under the tyrannous rule of the Athenian multitude. Nor was Lacedæmon itſelf without alarm; for tho the conqueſt of Sparta was not likely ſoon to be accompliſhed by the Athenian arms, yet there was no inferior evil which might not be expected, and quickly. Already the Lacedæmonians ſaw, not only many of their dependencies wreſted from them, but two garriſons eſtabliſhed within their own country, infeſting a large part of it with devaſtation, to which they could neither preſcribe bounds nor foreſee an end. At the ſame time the Athenian fleets ſo decidedly commanded the ſeas, that no proſpect appeared of means for competition with them on that element; ſo that not only the Lacedæmonians were unable to extend protection to any allies beyond the ready reach of their landforce, but the extenſive line of the Laconian coaſt muſt be continually open

open to inſult. In all theſe things the cataſtrophë at Syracuſe made a change, that nothing but the mad ambition or madder jealouſy of a deſpotic multitude could have produced; and that change was immediate and almoſt total. The navy of Athens was no longer formidable; the Peloponneſian fleets now commanded the ſeas. The allies of Lacedæmon, therefore, no longer fearing anything from the enemy, became only anxious for exertion, that they might ſpeedily, as they truſted they could eaſily, complete the purpoſe of the war, and relieve themſelves from burdens under which they had been long uneaſy. The neutral republics at the ſame time thought the moment come for deciding their party, before it was yet too late to claim merit for the deciſion. But the principal effect was ſeen among the ſubject-ſtates of Athens; who, with unadviſed eagerneſs, preſſed forward in revolt, taking it for certain that the Athenians would be unable to maintain the war through the inſuing ſummer. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, with the characteriſtical coolneſs of their government, injoyed the view of this various ferment, and prepared to profit from it to the eſtabliſhment of their own permanent ſuperiority over all Greece, to which they now looked as an acquiſition completely within their power.

SECT. I.

Among the circumſtances of theſe times, a change in the Lacedæmonian ſyſtem, which conſiderably affected the general politics of Greece, muſt not be paſſed unnoticed. The

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Lacedæmonian kings, who in Lacedæmon, except when preſiding at ſome religious ceremony, were ſcarcely diſtinguiſhed from the maſs of citizens, being obliged in all political buſineſs to yield to the tyrannical authority of the ephors, injoyed in the command of armies abroad, a more truly royal ſtate as well as a more efficacious royal authority. The intereſt which they thus had in leading their country into long and diſtant wars, had been reſtrained by the law of Lycurgus forbidding ſuch wars; and that law, inforced ſometimes by the oppoſite intereſt of the ephors, had been much more effectually and conſtantly inforced by the poverty of the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. Nevertheleſs, before the Perſian war, Cleomenes, by ingaging the ſtate in frequent hoſtilities, appears to have acquired great power; and afterward, in the new and vaſt ſcene of action which the Perſian war opened, Pauſanias, tho not king but meerly regent and general of the republic, was able to proſecute his views of ambition to a great length. His own imprudence indeed, more than any other obſtacle, ſeems to have ruined his purpoſe: and the inſuing downfall of the power of Sparta checked, for a time, the ambition of its generals and kings. When the Peloponneſian war broke out, Archidamus, a prince advanced in years and of a character ſingularly amiable, prudent at the ſame time and philanthropic, ſeems to have had no object, in command, but the good of his country and of all Greece. His ſon Agis, a man of moderate ta-

lents, would perhaps not have attempted innovation, if circumſtances had not led to it. He ſucceeded to the throne in an early ſtage of a moſt complicated and laſting war. Error in conduct, apparently the conſequence of error in judgement, produced, as we have ſeen, very ſevere cenſure upon him from thoſe who, in Lacedæmon, had legal authority to cenſure and even to puniſh kings. Afterward, by his ſucceſs at Mantineia, he acquired ſome reputation. He was ſtill in the vigor of his age, but of large experience, when the eſtabliſhment of a ſtanding force in Deceleia gave him, what none of his precedeſſors ever injoyed, a perennial military command. Here he found himſelf really king: here he was free from the vexatious and degrading controul of the ephors: here he might not only uſe at diſcretion the troops immediately under his orders, but he had authority to levy forces, raiſe contributions, exerciſe command among the allies of the commonwealth, and treat with forein ſtates. Thus veſted with independent power, he was of courſe reſpected, and could make himſelf feared; ſo that much more deference was paid by the ſtates of the confederacy to Agis in his garriſon at Deceleia, than to any Spartan king at home, or even to the Spartan government itſelf. The reſidence of his garriſon therefore was not unlikely to be preferred to that of his capital. Theſe were conſequences apparently not in the view of the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, when the advice of the Athenian refugee was taken for the permanent

SECT. I.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 5.

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manent occupying of a poſt in Attica; yet the circumſtances of the Lacedæmonian government prevented any effectual effort to check them.

The eſtabliſhment of a public revenue in Sparta ſeems to have been a departure from the ſpirit, at leaſt, of Lycurgus's ſyſtem. When ſuch an eſtabliſhment was firſt made, we are not informed; but we find Archidamus, in the debates preceding the Peloponneſian war, ſpeaking of it not as a new thing. The length of that war, and the extent of the ſcene of action, would make attention to the revenue more than ever neceſſary; and thus again a new intereſt was created, intimately connected with that which led the kings to deſire always war rather than peace, and any reſidence rather than that of Sparta. Through the buſineſs of the revenue, the leading men at home might have an intereſt in yielding to the king's wiſh for forein command; and hence the influence of the king, tho at a diſtance, might keep together a party in Lacedæmon. Agis in his command at Deceleia did not neglect this policy.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 3.

c. 3. The Lacedæmonian government now with ſerious earneſtneſs applied themſelves to, what had been their profeſſed purpoſe at the beginning of the war, the acquiſition of a fleet which might rival that of Athens. The project, then wild, was become at length practicable. Inſtead of five hundred triremes, originally propoſed, one hundred were now required of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians themſelves under-

undertook for twenty-five. An equal number was apportioned to Bœotia, fifteen only to Corinth, fifteen to Locris and Phocis, ten to Arcadia with Pallenë and Sicyon, and ten to Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermione. Agis was directed to collect the contributions for the purpoſe from the northern ſtates. Accordingly, with ſuch an eſcort as he judged ſufficient, he marched from Deceleia about the beginning of November; and after receiving what had been aſſeſſed upon the friendly, he proceeded to increaſe the ſum by taking from the hoſtile. Turning toward the Malian bay, he carried off conſiderable booty from the Œtæan vallies; and then, advancing ſtill northward, he compelled the Phthiot Achaians, with ſome other tribes ſubject to the Theſſalians, in defiance of the reſentment of that people, to deliver hoſtages and pay contributions. SECT. I.

Meanwhile the Athenians, recovered in ſome degree from the firſt emotions of grief and alarm, and ſubmitting themſelves to able direction, were taking meaſures, ſuited to their reduced circumſtances, for reſiſting the impending ſtorm. Their firſt diligence was directed to the collection of naval ſtores, and the building of ſhips; for on the poſſeſſion of a powerful fleet everything depended. Their next care was to increaſe the ſecurity for veſſels paſſing between Eubœa and Athens; for without free communication with Eubœa, the city could not eaſily be ſubſiſted. With this view therefore a fort was erected on the promontory of Thucyd. l. 8. c. 4.

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Sunium. Thus, but eſpecially in the renovation of the fleet, a large but indiſpenſable expence would be incurred, which would inforce the neceſſity of parſimony in matters of inferior moment. The garriſon was therefore withdrawn from that poſt in Laconia which had been occupied by Demoſthenes in his way to Sicily, and meaſures were taken to reduce unneceſſary expences, and eſtabliſh an exact economy in public affairs. Thus, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, in the cloſe of the nineteenth year of the war, preparations were making on both ſides, as if war was juſt then beginning.

Thucyd. l. 8. c 5.

But it was not poſſible for any prudence among the Athenians to prevent that conſequence of their late misfortune, which they moſt apprehended and their enemies moſt hoped, the defection of their allies and the revolt of their ſubjects. The Eubœans, whoſe country was ſo important to Athens, that a better government would never have left it in the ſituation of a ſubject-ſtate, but would have given its people one intereſt with themſelves, were foremoſt to take meaſures for breaking their dependency. The reſidence of the Lacedæmonian king in their neighbourhood offered new opportunity for the intrigues of the diſcontented: the conſideration of the force that he could command from the ſurrounding ſtates, in addition to that conſtantly under his orders, gave large incouragement; and accordingly, ſoon after the arrival of the news of the Sicilian defeat, a propoſal was communicated to Agis from a ſtrong

a ſtrong party in Eubœa, to bring over the whole iland to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Agis not only gave aſſurances that the force under his command ſhould be employed in their favor, but in communicating the project to the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, he uſed his intereſt to promote their cauſe. The cautious government of Lacedæmon, however, unwilling to reject ſo advantageous a propoſal as that of the revolt of Eubœa, was nevertheleſs not diſpoſed to any ſpirited exertion for aſſiſting it. Three hundred only of thoſe called neodamodes, newly-admitted citizens, were granted for the ſervice; who, under the command of Alcamenes, marched into Attica. SECT. I.

Agis was taking meaſures for tranſporting this body into Eubœa, when a deputation from Leſbos, alſo propoſing revolt, reduced him to difficulty. His deſire coïncided with the wiſhes both of the Eubœans and the Leſbians; but neither people could effect their purpoſe without aſſiſtance, and he was unable to give it at the ſame time to both. He was already ingaged to the Eubœans; and their extenſive country, almoſt adjoining to the coaſt of Bœotia, whether as loſs to Athens, or gain to the Peloponneſian confederacy, was far more important than the ſmaller iland of Leſbos, on the other ſide of the Ægean. But the Bœotians, the moſt powerful of the allies of Lacedæmon, had a ſtrong partiality for the Leſbians, whom, as of Æolian race, they conſidered as kinſmen; while the Leſbians, tho connected by no poli-

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tical intereſt, revered the Bœotians as the chiefs of their blood. Agis, whether conſidering the intereſt of Lacedæmon or his own intereſt, deſirous of gratifying the Bœotians, reſolved to poſtpone the buſineſs of Eubœa to that of Leſbos. Accordingly, without any communication with Lacedæmon, he ordered Alcamenes to conduct to Leſbos that very force, which had been ſent by the Lacedæmonian government for the expreſs purpoſe of aſſiſting the revolt in Eubœa.

SECTION II.

New implication of Grecian and Perſian intereſts. Death of Artaxerxes and ſucceſſion of Darius II. to the Perſian throne. Effect of the terrors of an earthquake. Congreſs of the Peloponneſian confederacy at Corinth. Iſthmian games. Naval ſucceſs of the Athenians in the Saronic gulph. Influence of Alcibiades in the Spartan councils. A Peloponneſian fleet ſent under Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, to coöperate with the ſatrap of Caria and the revolted Ionians. Increaſed diſtreſs of Athens. Treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and Perſia.

NOT all the ſounding vaunts and ingenious panegyrics of later writers mark ſo ſtrongly the aſcendancy which the little commonwealth of Athens had acquired in the politics of the civilized world, and the degree to which it had repreſſed

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preſſed the force, or at leaſt the ſpirit of the vaſt empire of the eaſt, or diſplay ſo clearly the ſuperiority which a few conſenting thouſands, well directed, may acquire over ill-governed millions, as the cotemporary hiſtorian's ſimple narrative of the conſequences of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. That event in the weſt preſently ſet the eaſt in motion, and the affairs of Greece became in a new way implicated with thoſe of Perſia. Darius had ſucceeded his father Artaxerxes in the throne. Artaxerxes, tho an able prince, and interrupted by no conſiderable forein wars, had exerted himſelf, through a long reign, with very incomplete ſucceſs, to reſtore vigor to the unwieldy maſs of the empire. While his cares were employed in compoſing the diſorders, which the troubles, preceding his acceſſion, had produced in the central parts, the connexion with the diſtant provinces remained looſe and imperfect; inſomuch that, without any effort of the ſatraps for the purpoſe, a more independent power accrued to them, than could conſiſt with the good government of the whole. Thus, upon the appointment of Tiſſaphernes to the ſatraphy of Caria, Amorges, natural ſon of the late ſatrap Piſſuthnes, was incouraged to revolt; not perhaps in profeſſed oppoſition to the ſoverein of the empire, but to the new ſatrap only. Regardleſs, however, of the mandates of the prince, and in defiance of the arms of his officers, he maintained himſelf in the Carian mountains.

But

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But the wants of the Perſian government preſſed upon thoſe to whom its powers were delegated, in proportion as its weakneſs incouraged oppoſition to them. The ſatraps were required to remit from their provinces, not only the accruing tributes, but the arrears. From the time of the victories of Cimon, moſt of the Grecian towns in Aſia had been tributary to Athens, and many of them ſince thoſe of Xanthippus and Leotychidas. The jealouſy of the Athenian government allowed few to remain fortified; yet the terror of the Athenian name kept them ſecure, as far as hiſtory informs us, againſt any attempts from the Perſians, except in one inſtance, when ſedition at Colophon afforded an opportunity, the advantage of which, however, was of ſhort duration. Nevertheleſs the Perſian court affected to conſider all thoſe towns as ſtill appendages of the empire, and a tribute aſſeſſed upon them was required from the ſatraps [3]. The wretched policy of Athens in the government of its dependencies, ſo far promoted the views of the Perſians, that there was in every Aſiatic city a party, compoſed moſtly of the higher ranks, who were ready to prefer the more liberal ſupremacy of a Perſian ſatrap to the oppreſſive and inſulting tyranny of

Chap. 15. ſect 3. of this Hiſt.

[3] What we find from Thucydides upon this ſubject in the fifth and ſixth chapters of his eighth book, ſeems alone ſufficient to refute the report tranſmitted by writers who lived ſome centuries later, of a treaty of peace, by which the court of Perſia gave up all claim upon the Grecian towns in Aſia, and ingaged that no Perſian troops ſhould come within three days march of the weſtern coaſt. See note 11, ſect. 3. ch. 11. of this hiſtory.

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the Athenian people. Under theſe circumſtances it appears difficult to ſay which was moſt wonderful, the ſtrength of the little commonwealth of Athens, which could hold ſuch a command, or the weakneſs of the vaſt empire of Perſia, which could not recover its dominion. The plea of inability from the ſatraps had at length been allowed at the Perſian court, and the arrears of tribute due from Tiſſaphernes, for the Grecian towns within his ſatrapy, were no longer demanded [4]. But at the ſame time that this indulgence was granted, it was with reaſon required that a Perſian ſubject ſhould not be allowed to maintain himſelf in rebellion: Tiſſaphernes was commanded to ſend Amorges, alive or dead, to Suſa. To effect even this, however, either means were deficient, or conduct, and Amorges continued to defy the Perſian power.

SECT. II.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 5.

c. 6.

It was very generally ſuppoſed that, by the defeat in Sicily, the command of the ſea was completely loſt to Athens; and throughout the Aſiatic Grecian cities, the ariſtocratical party were immediately looking out for means of mending their condition by revolt. The Leſbians had begun: the Chians and Erythræans followed: but, diffident of their own ſtrength, their firſt meaſure was to communicate with

[4] We are little exactly informed of the extent of the ſeveral ſatrapies, or of the powers, privileges, and duties of the ſatraps. We learn however from Xenophon (Hel. l. 3. c. 1. ſ. 5. & ſeq. & c. 2. ſ. 10.) that Caria was the proper ſatrapy of Tiſſaphernes, and (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 6.) that Ionia was added to his command by the king's particular favor; but his authority, at leaſt in the abſence of other officers, was often extended over Sardis and great part of Lydia.

Tiſſa-

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Tiſſaphernes. The ſatrap, however, did not think himſelf able, with his own force, to give them protection; but he gladly united his intereſt with theirs, and together they ſent miniſters to Lacedæmon. At the ſame time Pharnabazus, ſatrap of the provinces bordering on the Helleſpont and the Euxine, with the ſame view of acquiring revenue from the Grecian cities within his ſatrapy, was alſo deſirous of forming an alliance with the Lacedæmonians; who would probably rather ſee thoſe cities tributary to Perſia, than ſources of revenue to Athens. He employed, for his miniſters on this occaſion, two refugee Greeks, Calligeitus, a Megarian, and Timagoras, a Cyzicene, who arrived at Lacedæmon about the ſame time with the miniſters from Tiſſaphernes and from Chios and Erythræ; and thoſe Leſbian miniſters, who had been negotiating with Agis at Deceleia, alſo met them there.

The conteſt which inſued, for preference in the Lacedæmonian alliance, gave opportunity for intrigue, in which Alcibiades was likely to enter and likely to be ſucceſsful. Endius, ephor of the year, was of that Spartan family with which principally his family had had antient hoſpitality, and Endius was now his particular friend. With Agis he was not upon good terms: it was therefore his purpoſe to make Endius alſo the enemy of Agis; and the oppoſition of intereſts among thoſe who were contending for the Lacedæmonian alliance, afforded means. Agis favored the pretenſions of the

Leſbians, whoſe cauſe he had already adopted. Alcibiades perſuaded Endius to favor the Chians; and grounds were not wanting for giving them the preference: they poſſeſſed no leſs than ſixty ſhips of war; in every circumſtance of military ſtrength they were ſuperior to any among the Aſian Greeks; and what was perhaps a ſtill more important conſideration, their alliance would carry with it that of the powerful ſatrap who commanded the ſouth-weſtern provinces of Leſſer Aſia. Theſe motives, urged by the ability of Alcibiades, perſuaded Endius, and, with him, a majority of thoſe who directed the councils of Lacedæmon. A treaty was accordingly at once concluded with the Chians and Erythræans, and forty ſhips of war were voted to ſupport them in their propoſed revolt. Ten, under Melanchridas, were ordered to ſail while it was yet winter; but the ſuperſtitious terror which an earthquake inſpired, gave ſome check to the meaſure. The earthquake apparently was ſuppoſed to portend that the command of Melanchridas would be inauſpicious; for the Lacedæmonian government immediately appointed Chalcideus to ſuperſede him, and they reduced the ſquadron to five ſhips. SECT. II.

The part of Sparta being thus taken, and almoſt in the ſame inſtant the uſual want of energy in her councils demonſtrated, the Chians became apprehenſive that intelligence of their negotiation would reach Athens, and they might be attacked before ſuccour ſufficient for their protection would arrive. Toward ſpring therefore Thucyd. l. 8. c. 7.

B. C. 412. Ol. 92. 4. P. W. 20.

fore they ſent again to Lacedæmon, urging the neceſſity of early aſſiſtance; and the ability of Alcibiades and the power of Endius being united to promote their cauſe, it was reſolved that the whole fleet in the Corinthian gulph, including the ſquadron prepared by Agis for the expedition to Leſbos, ſhould be dragged acroſs the iſthmus, and proceed for Chios.

Before this was carried into execution, however, it was thought proper to hold a congreſs of the confederacy, and Corinth was the place appointed for the meeting. Agis attended from Deceleia. He had the prudence not to mark any reſentment at the interference with his command, or any way to irritate an adminiſtration ill diſpoſed to him, by oppoſing meaſures on which they had a conſtitutional right to decide; and yielding thus in part, he carried alſo a part of his purpoſe. In conformity to the propoſition from Lacedæmon, the congreſs reſolved, that the whole fleet ſhould go firſt to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was then ſuperintending the equipment of a ſquadron on the Laconic coaſt; that when the Chians were put in a ſtate of ſecurity, Alcamenes, the officer named by Agis, ſhould take the command and proceed to Leſbos; that when the buſineſs there alſo was completed, the command ſhould paſs to Clearchus, who ſhould conduct the fleet to the Helleſpont, and act with Pharnabazus.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 8.

The fleet in the gulph conſiſted of thirty-nine triremes. Twenty-one were in all haſte hauled acroſs

acroſs the iſthmus; and it was the wiſh of the congreſs that theſe ſhould ſail without delay. Thus, it was hoped, the Athenians, having their attention divided between the diviſion ſailing and that remaining to ſail, would act effectually againſt neither. But it happened that the ſeaſon of the Iſthmian games was at hand; and ſuch was the inviolable ſanctity of the armiſtice upon that occaſion, that even the Athenians might come and go and ſtay in ſafety. The preparations therefore would become unavoidably notorious; and even the negotiations, in which ſo many perſons, with various intereſts, had communicated, would probably not remain long ſecret. But the very circumſtance of the games, which increaſed the anxiety of the other confederates for the inſtant departure of the ſquadron, determined the Corinthians not to ſtir. The force of Athens, they ſaid, was already broken; and nothing to be apprehended from any diſcovery of the purpoſes of the confederacy, nor any obſtacle that could ariſe from a little delay, was of importance enough to prevent a large portion of their citizens from partaking in that magnificent and ſacred feſtival, whoſe period would recur only in the revolution of four years.

SECT. II.

Thucyd. l. 3. c. 9.

The negotiation had indeed been conducted with ſuch care that nothing tranſpired: but the movements of the fleet excited ſuſpicion; the perſons diſcovered to be coming and going directed ſuſpicion to its object; and Ariſtocrates, one of the generals of Athens, was ſent to

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to Chios. His inſtructions directed him to inform himſelf of the ſtate of things in the iland, and, as a precaution, to require that the ſhips, which, according to the terms of the confederacy, the Chians were bound to furniſh for the Athenian fleet, ſhould be immediately ſent to Peiræus. The propoſed revolt was a meaſure intirely of the ariſtocratical party, and not yet communicated to the general aſſembly, or to any in the democratical intereſt. The leaders therefore, thus taken unprepared, denied any intention to break their antient connection with Athens, and in conformity to the requiſition, they ſent ſeven ſhips to join the Athenian fleet.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 10.

At the celebration of the Iſthmian games many Athenians attended: the preparations were ſeen, the purpoſe ſuſpected, and meaſures were taken at Athens accordingly. The feſtival was no ſooner concluded than the twenty-one triremes, already tranſported acroſs the iſthmus, ſailed under the command of Alcamenes. The Athenians attacked them with ſuperior force: the Peloponneſians were defeated; Alcamenes was killed; one trireme was taken; the others reached a deſert port of the Corinthian territory on the confines of Epidauria, called Peiræus.

§. 11.

The Athenians followed, but did not think proper to attack them there. According to the uſual mode of naval operation in that age, leaving a few triremes to watch them, they withdrew with the reſt to a ſmall iland near the coaſt, where they incamped.

Intelli-

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Intelligence of this action occaſioned much alarm in Corinth. The neighbouring allies were ſummoned, and with ſuch force as could be haſtily aſſembled, the Corinthians marched to protect the defeated armament. Where ſoldiers were citizens, not under any regular military command, but having every one a vote in the deciſion of all public meaſures, it was often more difficult for the adminiſtration to get a ſervice of tedious inconvenience performed, than one of great momentary danger. Accordingly the firſt propoſal concerning the ſhips in the deſert harbour of Peiræus, was to burn rather than undertake a laſting guard upon them, in ſuch a ſituation. After ſome deliberation, however, the conſideration of the expence and difficulty of repairing the loſs, induced the reſolution not to ſubmit to it without a ſtruggle. The ſhips were therefore hauled aſhore, and a conſiderable body of infantry incamped there for their protection. Information of the defeat and death of Alcamenes being in the mean time carried to Lacedæmon, not only the departure of the ſquadron under Chalcideus was ſtopped, but it was propoſed at once to give up all the great views of advantage that had been opened on the other ſide of the Ægean.

The aſcendancy of Athenian genius ſhowed itſelf, even in thoſe circumſtances which contributed moſt to the downfal of the Athenian empire. What the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration had neither foreſight to plan nor ſpirit to execute, the illuſtrious but unprincipled Athe-

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nian refugee, participating, through the ephor his friend, in their cloſeſt councils, planned and executed for them. He urged that, if the ſmall ſquadron under Chalcideus haſtened to Chios, before the news of the diſaſter on the coaſt of Peloponneſus arrived there, the acquiſition of that iland might yet be effected. He would himſelf accompany the ſquadron; he would repreſent, in proper terms, the weakneſs of Athens, and the power and zeal of Lacedæmon; and he doubted not of accompliſhing the revolt, not only of Chios, but of all Ionia. Such were the inducements which he held out generally to the adminiſtration. In private he farther ſtimulated Endius with a diſplay of the credit which ſuch an acquiſition to the Lacedæmonian confederacy would bring to his adminiſtration, and of the ſtill more important advantages of an alliance between Lacedæmon and the court of Perſia, which would be the ready conſequence. In the circumſtances of the moment, all was in his own power: if he neglected the opportunity, everything would paſs from him to his rival Agis.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 12.

Thus incited, Endius became earneſt in proſecution of the plans of Alcibiades: they were adopted by the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration, and Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, ſailed for Ionia. In their paſſage, to prevent communication of intelligence, they ſtopped all merchant-ſhips they fell in with, compelled them to follow as far as Corycus on the Aſiatic coaſt, and there diſmiſſed them. Deputies from

c. 14.

the

the leaders of the Chian revolt ſhortly came to Corycus, and the fleet then proceeded for Chios. Its arrival occaſioned univerſal aſtoniſhment and alarm, except among the ariſtocratical leaders, who were completely prepared. The council, according to previous concert, was ſitting; and Alcibiades and Chalcideus were received by it to make their propoſals. They boldly aſſerted that a large fleet was on its way from Peloponneſus; fortunately for them not a rumor of the defeat on the Corinthian coaſt had reached Chios; a decree was propoſed for renouncing the Athenian and ingaging in the Peloponneſian confederacy; and, without any material oppoſition from the democratical party, it was carried. The Erythræans immediately followed the example; and three ſhips only being ſent to Clazomenæ, that city alſo joined in the meaſure. Thus, with the ſmall force of only five triremes, Alcibiades ſtruck a greater blow againſt his country, than the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, after all the great advantage gained in Sicily, had almoſt dared to meditate. SECT. II.

The affairs of Athens were now in ſuch a ſituation, that it was judged lawful and neceſſary to recur to the depoſit of a thouſand talents, ſet apart in the beginning of the war for caſes of extremeſt neceſſity. No enemy's fleet yet blocked the harbour of Peiræus (the emergency ſpecified as the requiſite juſtification) yet, on the arrival of intelligence of the revolt of Chios, the danger was thought ſcarcely leſs preſſing Thucyd. l. 8. c. 15.

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than if Athens were actually inveſted. For the moſt powerful ally of the commonwealth having ſet the example of revolt, it was concluded that the other allies and ſubjects would follow; and thus there would be an end of thoſe reſources without which the war could not be ſupported. The prohibitory decree was therefore repealed, and a kind of confidential vote paſſed, directing that every effort ſhould be made for raiſing a fleet the moſt powerful that circumſtances would allow, and that the ſpeedieſt exertion ſhould be uſed for ſaving the dependencies yet remaining to the commonwealth, and recovering, if opportunity ſhould occur, thoſe which had already revolted.

The directors of executive government, thus veſted with diſcretionary powers, ſent inſtant orders for arreſting the crews of the Chian ſhips acting with the fleet on the Corinthian coaſt. This was ſucceſsfully executed: the free were impriſoned, the ſlaves declared free, and the ſhips were replaced by an equal number of Athenian ſhips. Eight triremes remained equipped in the harbour of Peiræus: they were diſpatched for Aſia under the command of Strombichides: twelve, nearly ready, were ordered to follow under Thraſycles; and thirty were put in preparation to be ſent after them as ſoon as poſſible.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 15.

Strombichides haſtening to Samos, obtained one Samian ſhip only to reïnforce his ſmall ſquadron, and proceeded to Teos on the Aſiatic main; called thither by intelligence of a propoſed

SECT. II.

poſed revolt. He arrived juſt in time to prevent the immediate effect of a negotiation with Tiſſaphernes and the revolted cities of Clazomenæ and Erythræ, ſupported by a body of troops from each; but he had ſcarcely compoſed matters, when information reached him that Chalcideus was approaching with his ſquadron, now increaſed, by reïnforcement from Chios, to twenty-three triremes. Totally unequal to reſiſt ſuch a force, aſſiſted by coöperation of the combined army at hand, he withdrew haſtily to Samos. The Clazomenians and Erythræans were then admitted into Teos, which became a member of the Peloponneſian confederacy; but the Athenian intereſt being ſuppoſed ſtill prevalent among the lower people, the fortifications on the inland ſide of the town were demoliſhed.

Alcibiades had old and hereditary intereſt at Miletus, and he propoſed next to ingage that, the richeſt and moſt important of the Aſiatic Grecian cities, in revolt againſt Athens. In thus promoting the Peloponneſian cauſe, however, it was not poſſible that he ſhould have the Peloponneſian intereſt at heart. The ſucceſs of the operations which had been carried on under his direction, had been ſo rapid, ſo uninterrupted, ſo important, and ſo little expected, that he could not but have great preſent credit for it; but he knew that the moment his ſervices ceaſed to be neceſſary, he ſhould be an object of jealouſy more than of gratitude; and that even already he was ſo to a powerful party in

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 17.

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Lacedæmon. With the inſuing annual change of magiſtrates there, the ephor his friend would go out of office, and a new commander in chief would ſuperſede Chalcideus; whom his friend's intereſt, and perhaps his own recommendation, had raiſed to the command, and who ſeems to have acted in it conſtantly under his influence. His next meaſure accordingly ſeems to ſhow a purpoſe adverſe to the intereſt of thoſe in whoſe ſervice he was ingaged. Having together with Chalcideus purſued Strombichides as far as Samos, they proceeded to Chios, where they completely changed their crews, putting the Peloponneſians aſhore to act as heavy-armed infantry in the guard of the iland, and taking Chian ſeamen in their room. The pretended purpoſe was to give ſecurity to the ariſtocratical party in Chios, againſt the democratical, who were leſs ſatisfied with the late change. But Alcibiades had evidently other views. In perſuading the Ionian cities to revolt from Athens, it was his purpoſe to attach them as much as poſſible to himſelf, and as little as poſſible to Lacedæmon: an Ionian force would be more manageable in his hands than a Peloponneſian; and with an Ionian force he might accompliſh what a Peloponneſian would even prevent. Oſtenſibly, however, he was ſtill the moſt zealous as well as the ableſt promoter of the Lacedæmonian intereſt. Thraſycles, with his ſquadron of twelve triremes from Attica, had joined Strombichides at Samos. Apprehenſive for Miletus, they haſtened their courſe thither.

But

But Alcibiades was ſo ſecret and ſo rapid in his meaſures, that, when they anchored off the iland of Ladë, at the mouth of the harbour, he was already received into the city, and his friends were in poſſeſſion of the government. SECT. II.

A new event in Grecian politics followed; a treaty of alliance between Tiſſaphernes, in the name of the Perſian monarch, and Chalcideus, in that of the Lacedæmonian republic. The terms of this treaty were perfectly accommodated to promote the purpoſes of Alcibiades, but not at all honorable to Lacedæmon or to Chalcideus. By the firſt article a moſt dangerous conceſſion was made to Perſia; for it was declared in general terms, 'that all the country and all 'the cities which had belonged to the prede- 'ceſſors of the king ſhould belong to the king.' It was then added, 'that the king, with the 'Lacedæmonians and their allies, ſhould in 'common prevent the accruing of any revenue, 'and of any advantage whatſoever, from thoſe 'cities to the Athenians; that the king, with 'the Lacedæmonians and their allies, ſhould 'carry on war againſt the Athenians in com- 'mon; that neither party ſhould make peace 'without the other; that if any ſubjects of the 'king ſhould revolt, they ſhould be held as 'enemies by the Lacedæmonians; and that 'equally if any allies of the Lacedæmonians 'ſhould revolt,' (for by that term the renunciation of alliance with the leading ſtate was deſcribed) 'they ſhould be held as enemies by the 'king.' Thucyd. l. 8. c. 18.

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SECTION III.

Progreſs of revolt againſt Athens: Exertions of Athens. Siege of Chios. Battle of Miletus. Service of the Peloponneſian armament to the ſatrap of Caria. Diſſatisfaction of the Peloponneſians with the ſatrap. Operations of the adverſe armaments, and intrigues among the Aſiatic cities. Change in the adminiſtration of Sparta. Commiſſioners, ſent from Sparta to Ionia, refuſe to confirm the treaty with the ſatrap. Revolt of Rhodes to the Peloponneſian confederacy.

B. C. 412. P. W. 20.

THE riches of Perſia being thus by treaty ingaged to aſſiſt the military force of the Peloponneſian confederacy, the power collected againſt the tottering dominion of Athens might ſeem more than ſufficient to inſure its almoſt inſtant downfall. But party diviſions and conſtitutional ſluggiſhneſs prevailed in Lacedæmon, and the oppoſite intereſts of different commonwealths impeded every meaſure of the confederacy; while, the preſſure of extreme danger inforcing unanimity in the Athenian councils, ſuch was the energy of the adminiſtration, and ſuch ſtill the reſources of the commonwealth, that Athens was already again approaching to a ſuperiority at ſea.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 19.

Diomedon conducting from Attica a reinforcement of ſixteen ſhips to the fleet on the Aſiatic ſtation, took four Chian triremes, from which

SECT. III.

which however the crews escaped. The Peloponnesians and their allies meanwhile obtained the more important advantage of ingaging in revolt the towns of Lebedus and Eræ on the continent, and afterward the city of Methymnë in Lesbos, the only one of the iland remaining to Athens. But that wretched system of Grecian policy, which, equally under Lacedæmonian as under Athenian supremacy, kept the higher and the lower people everywhere at perpetual enmity, afforded opportunity for the Athenians, the moment they could show a force at sea, to give a turn, in all maritime cities, in favor of the democratical interest. Diomedon therefore, proceeding to Teos, where the democratical interest was strong, recovered that city to the Athenian alliance. Meanwhile the body of the higher people of Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer, through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, for mending their condition. The lower people, having intelligence of the design, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian triremes then at Samos, overpowered them, put to death two hundred, and banishing about four hundred more, shared among themselves their property. Nothing equally with this measure, which humanity shudders at, could insure to Athens the dominion of that valuable iland. Accordingly the massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the per-

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 23.

c. 21.

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perpetrators the independent adminiſtration of the affairs of their iland, which, ſince the laſt rebellion, had been kept under the immediate controul of the Athenian government.

While ſucceſs was thus beginning to ſhine again upon the Athenians on the eaſtern ſide of the Ægean, they met with an unexpected reverſe nearer home. The Peloponneſian ſhips in the Corinthian Peiræus, to the number of twenty, making a ſudden attack upon an Athenian ſquadron of equal force watching them, gained the victory and took four ſhips. Aſtyochus was then ſent from Lacedæmon to conduct the victorious ſquadron to Aſia, there to aſſume the command in chief of the fleet.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 20.

The exertions of the Athenian government nevertheleſs continued to have their effect. Leon, bringing from Attica a freſh reïnforcement of ten ſhips, proceeded with Diomedon to Leſbos; and, tho Aſtyochus arrived in time to interfere, the coöperation of the democratical party inabled them to recover the whole of that important iland. They proceeded to Clazomenæ on the continent, and that city alſo renewed its connection with Athens. Such, in ſhort, had been the energy of the Athenian adminiſtration, and ſuch the ſupineneſs of the Peloponneſians, that the Athenian fleet in the Aſiatic ſeas could now be divided and yet everywhere ſuperior. The ſquadron of twenty triremes under Thraſycles and Strombichides had not moved from Ladë, but watched there for an opportunity of advantage. Making a deſcent

c. 24.

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on the Mileſian lands, they defeated the troops which under Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander in chief, marched out againſt them, and Chalcideus himſelf was killed; but their force was inſufficient for any attempt againſt the town of Miletus.

Naval ſuperiority being however recovered, it was determined to carry on operations againſt Chios with a view to the reduction of the iland. Then at length the Chians had the mortification to find, contrary not only to their own expectation but that of all Greece, that their revolt had been determined on miſtaken grounds, and without due precaution and juſt foreſight. Till the preſent conjuncture, the affairs of Chios had long been managed with a ſteddy prudence, not common among the Grecian cities. Moderate in proſperity, blameleſs toward their neighbours, and uſing their increaſing wealth and power for no purpoſe of ambition, but directing their politics meerly to ſecure the happineſs they injoyed, their iland, from the time of the Perſian war, had never ſeen an enemy within its bounds. The Athenians now prepared to attack it on all ſides. They occupied the forts of Siduſſa and Pteleus, in the Erythræan territory, and the little ilands Œnuſſæ, between Chios and the main, as naval ſtations whence to infeſt the Chian coaſts. Debarking troops then in three ſeveral places they defeated at each the forces which oppoſed them; and with ſuch ſlaughter that the Chians attempted action in the field no more, but, giving

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giving up the whole of their rich territory for ravage, ſhut themſelves within their walls. Under ſuch circumſtances it was likely that the democratical party would be looking for means of accommodation with the Athenians. The leading men, aware of this, ſent to Aſtyochus, who in conſequence came from Erythræ with four ſhips.

B. C. 412. P. W. 20. After 3 Sept. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 25.

It was now toward the end of ſummer when a freſh and powerful reïnforcement arrived at Samos from Attica; fifteen hundred Athenian heavy-armed, a thouſand Argian, and a thouſand of the various other allies of Athens, Phrynichus, Onomacles and Scironidas commanding. From Samos they croſſed to the Mileſian territory, and debarked there. Eight hundred heavy-armed Mileſians under Alcibiades, with the Peloponneſians who had been commanded by Chalcideus, and a force of Aſiatic infantry and cavalry led by the ſatrap Tiſſaphernes in perſon, oppoſed them. The circumſtances of the action which inſued were much noticed at the time, as they contradicted eſtabliſhed opinions of the Greeks. The Argians in the Athenian army, holding in contempt the Ionians, advanced before their main body haſtily and with no good order, as againſt an enemy who would avoid their onſet. The Mileſians, led by Alcibiades, preſently routed them, and killed near three hundred. The Athenians meanwhile, oppoſed to the Peloponneſians and Aſiatics, attacking the former firſt, defeated them, and the others immediately fled. Thus the Dorians, in each

each army, were overcome by Ionians. Alcibiades with the Mileſians, on perceiving the defeat of the Peloponneſians, haſtily retreated. SECT. III.

The Athenians having erected their trophy, the generals proceeded immediately to take meaſures for an aſſault upon Miletus; but late in the evening of the ſame day on which the battle was fought, intelligence arrived of the approach of a fleet from Peloponneſus, of fifty-five triremes. Onomacles and Scironidas, anxious to reſtore the naval reputation of Athens, and perhaps too fearful of the temper of the people their ſoverein to uſe their judgement with due calmneſs, propoſed to wait the enemy's attack. But Phrynichus declared that he would neither be allured by a falſe opinion of glory, nor yield to unmanly ſhame. Whatever his country's welfare moſt required, was in his opinion moſt honorable; and in the preſent ſtate of the commonwealth, it did not become them to riſk unneceſſarily its naval force. Either his arguments or his authority prevailed, and the fleet returned to Samos. The Argians, vexed, as Thucydides ſays, with the diſgrace of their defeat, ſailed home. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 26.

The exertions of Peloponneſus alone, had not ſent out the formidable fleet which thus relieved Miletus. Twenty of the triremes were Syracuſan, under the command of Hermocrates ſon of Hermon; at whoſe inſtigation principally, the Dorian Sicilians had now reſolved to take an active part in the war; but two ſhips only, from Selinus, had ſailed with the Syracuſan.

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cuſan. The Lacedæmonian Theramenes commanded the fleet in chief. On its reaching the coaſt of Aſia, the Athenian armament being gone, it was to be conſidered what ſhould be undertaken; and the commanders reſolved to gratify their new ally the ſatrap, by directing their firſt meaſures againſt Iaſus, the reſidence of the rebel Perſian chief Amorges. The fleet, in its approaeh to that place, was miſtaken for an Attic fleet: the firſt aſſault in conſequence ſucceeded, and Amorges being made priſoner, was a grateful preſent to Tiſſaphernes, who was thus inabled to obey his ſoverein's commands, which required him to ſend the rebel, or at leaſt his head, to Suſa. Some Greek troops which Amorges had entertained in his ſervice, being moſtly Peloponneſian, were taken as a reïnforcement to the army. The other priſoners formed a valuable part of the booty, being made over to Tiſſaphernes equally free and ſlaves, at a certain price [5] a head, and the capture all together was among the richeſt made in the war. The place being put into the poſſeſſion of the ſatrap's officers, the armament returned to Miletus, there to paſs the winter, which was approaching. Philippus a Lacedæmonian was made governor of Miletus, and Pædaritus, having been ſent from Sparta to aſſume the government or preſidency of Chios, was eſcorted

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 28.

[5] The price mentioned by the hiſtorian is a Daric ſtater, the value of which, at the time of the Peloponneſian war, is very uncertainly known.

by

by land to Erythræ, whence he found means to croſs to his iland. SECT. III.

Early in the winter Tiſſaphernes viſited the Peloponneſian fleet, and according to the agreement made with the Lacedæmonians, diſtributed a month's pay to it, at the rate of an Attic drachma, about tenpence ſterling, daily, for each man. He then apologized for propoſing to give in future only half a drachma, till he had conſulted the king's pleaſure; declaring himſelf deſirous, if he could obtain authority for it, to continue the full pay before given. Theramenes, having only a temporary command, for the purpoſe of conducting the fleet to Aſtyochus under whoſe orders it was to remain, was little diſpoſed to exert himſelf about its pecuniary intereſts; but the Syracuſan Hermocrates remonſtrated warmly; and Tiſſaphernes thought it ſo far of importance to keep his new allies in good-humour, that he at length made an addition to the half drachma, but would not allow the whole. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 29. After 2d Oct.

In the courſe of the winter an additional force of thirty-five triremes under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, joined the Athenian fleet at Samos, which thus acquired again a decided ſuperiority in the Aſiatic ſeas. It was in conſequence reſolved to puſh the ſiege of Chios, and at the ſame time to block the port of Miletus. For the former purpoſe the greateſt part of the landforce was aſſigned, with a ſquadron of thirty triremes; for the other, the reſt of the fleet, conſiſting of ſeventy-four triremes. The com- c. 30.

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commanders drew lots for the ſervices. It fell to Strombichides Onomacles and Euctemon, with thirty triremes and a part of the heavy-armed, to act againſt Chios: the others with ſeventy-four triremes commanded the ſeas about Samos, and prepared for an expedition againſt Miletus.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 31.

Meanwhile Aſtyochus, who had gone to Chios to obviate expected revolt, hearing of the reinforcement brought by Theramenes from Peloponneſus, but uninformed of the great addition arrived to the enemy's fleet, thought the Peloponneſian intereſt in the iland ſufficiently ſecure, and croſſed to the oppoſite continent, where opportunity of farther acquiſition appeared to invite him. Having however in vain attempted Pteleum and Clazomenæ, he was compelled by tempeſtuous weather to take refuge in the port of Cuma.

But in all the Grecian towns, through the oppoſition of intereſts, and the almoſt univerſal attachment of the democratical party to the Athenian cauſe, and the ariſtocratical to the Lacedæmonian, intrigues were endleſs. While c. 32. Aſtyochus lay with his fleet at Cuma, the ariſtocratical party in Leſbos ſent propoſals for bringing that iland again to the Lacedæmonian alliance. Aſtyochus favored the meaſure, but the Corinthians were diſinclined to it; and the Chians, more apprehenſive of their fellowcitizens of the Athenian party than of any other enemy, were extremely averſe to any diminution of the friendly force within their own iland.

iland. Pædaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor, concurring with them in ſentiment, refuſed to let any Chian veſſels go on the ſervice. Aſtyochus, highly diſpleaſed with this oppoſition to his purpoſe, declared that the Chians ſhould in vain ſolicit from him that aſſiſtance which they might ſoon want; and with this threat he departed, to aſſume his naval command at Miletus. SECT. III. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 33.

The Peloponneſian cauſe had continued to gain among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, and a freſh reïnforcement of ten Thurian triremes, with one Syracuſan, had paſſed to Peloponneſus. The Lacedæmonians, adding one of their own, appointed Hippocrates, a Lacedæmonian, to command the ſquadron, which they ſent to join the fleet at Miletus. Cnidus having lately revolted from Tiſſaphernes, Hippocrates was ſent thither, with orders for himſelf, with ſix of his ſhips, to watch the city, while the other ſix took their ſtation at Triopium, a promontory of the iland, for the purpoſe of intercepting the enemy's merchant-ſhips from Egypt. Information of this diſpoſition being communicated to the Athenian fleet, a ſquadron was detached, which took the ſix ſhips at Triopium, but the crews eſcaped aſhore. c. 35.

The loſs of ſix ſhips to the Peloponneſian confederacy, ſupported only by its own means, might have been of ſome conſequence, but, with the advantage of the Perſian alliance, it was little regarded. Aſtyochus, on his arrival at Miletus, found the Mileſians zealous in the c. 36.

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cauſe, and the armament in high ſpirits, notwithſtanding the reduction of pay which had occaſioned ſo many murmurs. The pay ſtill given by Tiſſaphernes was more than the Peloponneſian governments ever had given or were able to give, and the booty acquired at Iaſus was a great gratification. Nevertheleſs the leading men could not reſt ſatisfied with the terms of a treaty, which they could ſo little juſtify to their people at home, as that made by Chalcideus, and at length Tiſſaphernes was perſuaded to allow the objectionable articles to be reconſidered. Theramenes had now the conduct of the buſineſs on the part of Lacedæmon, and a new treaty was concluded; in which the ſovereinty of the Perſian king over the Grecian cities in Aſia was rather leſs explicitly acknowleged, and yet was acknowleged.

The uſe at this time made by the Peloponneſians, of the advantages of Perſian pay and Aſiatic plunder, ſeems to have been to indulge themſelves at eaſe, in the large and wealthy city of Miletus, under the fine ſky of Ionia, while their new allies, the Chians, were preſſed with danger of the united evils which faction within, and an enemy without, may bring. Before the winter ended, the Athenians occupied the port and town of Delphinium, not far from the city. The democratical party among the Chians, in itſelf ſtrong, ſeeing the Athenian fleets again ſuperior in the Aſiatic ſeas, ſhowed its diſpoſition to the Athenian cauſe ſo openly, that Pædaritus and the oligarchal party were in great alarm.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 38.

alarm. They applied to Aſtyochus at Miletus for ſuccour; but, in conformity to his threat, he refuſed to give any. Pædaritus ſent complaints againſt him to Lacedæmon; but diſtreſs and danger meanwhile continued to preſs the Chians. SECT. III.

When, among the various applications for the Lacedæmonian alliance, the preference had been given to Tiſſaphernes and the Ionians, it had not been intended, even by Endius and Alcibiades, to ſlight the overtures of Pharnabazus. Twenty-ſeven ſhips were therefore prepared for the ſervice in which that ſatrap deſired aſſiſtance. But, in the beginning of winter, the year of magiſtracy of Endius had expired, and with it expired, in a great degree, the influence of Alcibiades in the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration. A conſiderable change of counſels inſued. The men in command, and the meaſures purſuing, on the Aſiatic coaſt, were looked upon with a jealous eye. Antiſthenes, who was appointed to the command of the newly-prepared ſquadron, was ordered to conduct it, not to the Helleſpont or any port of the ſatrapy of Pharnabazus, but to Miletus, to join the fleet already there; and eleven commiſſioners were ſent with him, to inquire concerning men and things, and to aſſume in a great degree the direction of affairs on the Aſiatic ſtation. They were particularly authorized to appoint, if they ſhould think proper, Antiſthenes to ſuperſede Aſtyochus in the command in chief; and alſo, at their diſcretion, to ſend Thucyd. l. 8. c. 39.

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any number of ships, with Clearchus for the commander, or not to send any, to coöperate with Pharnabazus.

Antisthenes, with the Eleven, making Melos, in their way to the Ionian coast, fell in with ten Athenian triremes. They took three, but the crews escaped, and the other seven got clear away. This adventure gave them more alarm than satisfaction. They feared that information of their approach would be communicated to the Athenian fleet at Samos, and a superior force sent to intercept them. Instead therefore of making farther their direct course for Ionia, they bore away southward for Crete, and so on to Caunus in Caria, whence they sent to Miletus intelligence of their arrival.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 41.

Meanwhile Astyochus, notwithstanding his anger against the Chians, was preparing to attempt their relief, before it should be too late to save allies so valuable to the confederacy.

c. 40.

They were already severely pressed: a contravallation was nearly completed against the city: their lands were totally at the enemy's mercy; and their numerous slaves were deserting fast. Astyochus however, upon receiving the advice from Antisthenes, thought it his first duty to give convoy to the council, and his first interest to take care of the reïnforcement; and he accordingly moved with his whole fleet to Caunus. The Athenian admiral meanwhile had actually sent a squadron under Charminus, but of twenty ships only, to watch the squadron coming from Peloponnesus. Missing this, Charminus

minus fell in with the grand fleet under Aſtyochus, diſperſed in a fog, and took three ſhips; but, when the fog cleared, the fleet collecting, he found it neceſſary to fly for Halicarnaſſus, and reached that place, not without loſing ſix ſhips. Intelligence of this being carried to the Athenian admirals, they went with their whole force to offer battle to the Peloponneſians; but theſe ſhowing no diſpoſition to ſtir from the port of Cnidus, the Athenians returned to Samos. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 42. c. 43.

As ſoon as the Athenian fleet was gone, the eleven commiſſioners from Sparta began the more peculiar buſineſs of their miſſion, the conſideration of the Perſian treaty; and Tiſſaphernes thought the occaſion important enough to require his preſence at Cnidus. The commiſſioners, of whom Lichas was the chief, appear to have been friends of Agis; but, whatever party views they may have had, they conducted themſelves in this buſineſs with a ſtern dignity, and with the appearance at leaſt of an inflexible integrity, becoming the antient reputation of Sparta. The treaties were certainly very exceptionable. The words of the firſt, yielding to the king of Perſia the ſovereinty of all the countries his predeceſſors had ever commanded; thoſe of the other, forbidding the Lacedæmonians and their allies from carrying arms againſt any of thoſe countries; were an acknowlegement, on the part of Lacedæmon, of the claim of Perſia, not only to all the Aſiatic and Thracian cities, and all the ilands of

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the Ægean, but to Macedonia, Theſſaly, Locris, and almoſt the whole north of Greece, including Attica: ſo that the Lacedæmonians, inſtead of ſupporting their pretenſions to be vindicators of Grecian liberty, thus admitted the ſubjection of near half the nation to the Perſian dominion. The Lacedæmonians did not indeed bind themſelves to put Perſia in poſſeſſion of the countries ſo in general terms ceded; and, had their leaders been wily politicians, they might perhaps, after profiting from Perſian aſſiſtance to ſerve their own purpoſes againſt Athens, have eaſily prevented Perſia from making any advantage of thoſe articles which ſeemed ſo to militate with the common cauſe of Greece. But Lichas and his collegues would not, for any temporary intereſt of their country, ſurrender its honor. They condemned the treaties, both that concluded by Chalcideus, and that by Theramenes, in the ſtrongeſt manner; they declared that they would on no account ratify them; and they inſiſted that the troops ſhould receive no more pay from the ſatrap, unleſs he would enter into a new treaty upon other terms. Tiſſaphernes, diſguſted with their authoritative tone and unbending manner, went away without concluding anything.

How far the conduct of the commiſſioners would be approved by the troops, to whom Perſian pay had been no ſmall gratification, may be doubted; but a circumſtance occurred of a nature to obviate preſent diſſatisfaction. Overtures came to the Peloponneſian commanders

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 44.

ders from ſome leading men of the wealthy iland of Rhodes. The fleet, conſiſting of ninety-four triremes, went thither; Cameirus, one of the principal towns, but unfortified, was taken without reſiſtance; the chief men of the iland were ſummoned to an aſſembly, and all the towns were peaceably brought over to the Peloponneſian intereſt. Intelligence of the motion of the Peloponneſian fleet being conveyed to the Athenian commanders at Samos, they ſailed in all haſte for Rhodes, but arrived too late for any effectual interpoſition. The Peloponneſians obtained thirty-two talents from the Rhodians, toward the expences of the war, and, the winter being already advanced, they laid up their fleet in the harbours of the iland. SECT. III. B. C. 411. January.

SECTION IV.

Alcibiades, perſecuted by the new Spartan adminiſtration; favored by the ſatrap of Caria; communicates with the Athenian armament at Samos. Plot for changing the conſtitution of Athens: Synomoſies, or Political Clubs at Athens: Breach between Alcibiades and the managers of the plot. New treaty between Lacedæmon and Perſia. Continuation of the ſiege of Chios, and tranſactions of the fleets.

WHILE an important acquiſition was thus made to the Peloponneſian confederacy, intrigue had been proſecuting, with no inconſiderable

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effect, in oppoſition to it. Since the expiration of the magiſtracy of Endius, the party of Agis had been gaining ſtrength in Lacedæmon; and not only Alcibiades could no longer lead meaſures as before on the coaſt of Aſia, but his deſigns became more and more ſuſpected in Peloponneſus. In thwarting Alcibiades, however, the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration feared him. What preciſely to expect they knew not; but they apprehended ſome great ſtroke in politics to their diſadvantage; and according to the concurrent teſtimony of hiſtorians, too unqueſtionable when Thucydides is in the liſt, private inſtructions were ſent to Aſtyochus, to have Alcibiades aſſaſſinated. This meaſure has been attributed by ſome to the vengeance of Agis; whoſe bed, it is ſaid, Alcibiades had diſhonored, and whoſe queen is reported to have been ſo ſhameleſs, as to boaſt of her connection with the greateſt and handſomeſt man of the age. Others have aſcribed it to the revenge of the queen herſelf, for a ſilly declaration of Alcibiades, if he really made it, that no inclination for her perſon, but meerly the vanity of giving a king to Sparta and an heir to the race of Hercules, induced him to pay her any attention. The cotemporary hiſtorian mentions upon the occaſion neither Agis nor the queen: his expreſſion rather goes to fix the crime upon the Spartan adminiſtration. Alcibiades however, whether informed of the deſign, or only ſuſpicious of the Lacedæmonians, from acquaintance with their principles and

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 45.

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conſciouſneſs of deſerving their enmity, withdrew from their armament and took his reſidence with Tiſſaphernes. SECT. IV.

He was not unprepared for the change. Uneaſy, notwithſtanding the favor he found and the attention paid him, in the dependent character of a ſtranger and a fugitive, it was his object to reſtore himſelf to his country, before that country was reduced ſo low as to be not worth returning to. With this view he had aſſiduouſly and ſucceſsfully courted the ſatrap. Neither the intereſt of the Perſian empire, nor that of the ſatrap, were, any more than his own intereſt, the ſame with that of Lacedæmon or the Peloponneſian confederacy. An opening therefore was not wanting, firſt for inſinuations, and then for advice, that might ſet the ſatrap at variance with the Peloponneſians, and render Alcibiades not only agreeable but neceſſary to him. Tiſſaphernes, preſſed for money both by his court and by the expences of his government, and at the ſame time deſirous of amaſſing for himſelf, liſtened with ready attention to any ſuggeſtion of means to ſpare his treaſury. Alcibiades told him, 'that the allowance of pay 'to the Peloponneſian forces was extravagant. 'The Athenians,' he ſaid, 'long verſed in na-'val affairs, and highly attentive to them, gave 'no more than half a drachma for daily pay to 'their ſeamen; not,' as he pretended, 'from 'economical motives, or from any inability to 'afford more, but becauſe they eſteemed a lar-'ger pay diſadvantageous to their ſervice.'

Tiſſa-

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Tiſſaphernes approved the propoſal for a reduction, but dreaded the diſcontent that would inſue. Alcibiades aſſured him, 'that he need 'not apprehend it: a ſum of money, judiciouſly 'diſtributed among the commanders, would 'quiet all outcry; or, if there was a man among 'them not to be bought, it was only the Syracuſan Hermocrates. Repreſentations and 'remonſtrances would probably be made; but 'they might eaſily be refuted; nor need the 'ſatrap give himſelf any trouble about them: 'he would undertake to anſwer every argument 'and ſilence every clamor. The pretenſions 'indeed of moſt of the Grecian ſtates were extravagant: that of the Chians, he would not 'ſcruple to tell them, was even impudent. 'The richeſt people of Greece, they were not 'contented with gaining independency at the 'expence of the blood and treaſure of others, 'but expected to be paid for defending it. Nor 'were the ſtates which had been tributary to 'Athens, tho leſs wealthy, leſs unreaſonable. 'Delivered from the burden of tribute, they 'now grudged an unbought ſervice, to preſerve 'the independency and immunity which had 'been freely given them.' Having thus perſuaded the ſatrap that he could obviate clamor, Alcibiades undertook to conciliate favor to him, and excite zeal in his ſervice: 'He would aſſert,' he ſaid, 'that the pay hitherto given was 'from the private income of the ſatrapy; that 'Tiſſaphernes was laboring to obtain an allowance from the royal revenue; and ſhould it be 'granted,

'granted, whatever it might be, the whole 'ſhould be diſtributed to the forces without 'reſerve.' Tiſſaphernes approved the propoſal, and through the dexterity of Alcibiades the matter was compromiſed, as we have ſeen. SECT. IV. P. 207.

Having thus gained the ſatrap's ear, and recommended himſelf to his confidence, Alcibiades proceeded to promote his own views at the expence of the moſt important intereſts of the Peloponneſian confederacy. He urged, Thucyd. l. 8. c. 46. 'that both the public intereſt of the Perſian 'empire, and the private intereſt of the ſatrap, 'required, not ſpeedy nor complete ſucceſs to 'the Peloponneſian cauſe, but a protraction of 'the war: that the Phenician ſquadron, which 'had been promiſed, ought not to be allowed 'to join the Peloponneſian fleet: that, for the 'ſame reaſon, to incourage reïnforcement from 'Greece, by holding out the lure of Perſian 'pay, was impolitic: that the king's intereſt 'clearly required a partition of power among 'the Greeks: the ſame ſtate ſhould not preponderate by land at the ſame time and by ſea; 'but rather the Athenians ſhould be ſupported 'in their wonted ſuperiority on one element, 'and the Lacedæmonians on the other. Thus 'it would always be in the king's power to hold 'the balance between them, or to employ one 'againſt the other, as he pleaſed. Theſe being 'the principles that ſhould regulate the politics 'of Perſia toward Greece, it followed that the 'Athenians were the more commodious allies 'for the king: they had no land-force capable

'of

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'of coping with his land-force: they were powerful and rich only by holding other ſtates in 'ſubjection; and, through their fear of revolts 'and of forein interference, they might be kept 'always in ſome degree dependent. At any 'rate, they would always be glad to ſhare with 'the king and his ſatraps the tributary cities of 'Aſia. But, on the contrary, it was the profeſ-'ſed purpoſe and the known policy of the La-'cedæmonians, to emancipate all Grecian ſtates 'from ſubjection to other Greeks; and they 'would certainly not reſt long, while any re-'mained under a forein dominion. It was 'therefore the obvious intereſt of Tiſſaphernes, 'after having taken from the Athenians what-'ever he could readily acquire, to break with 'the Lacedæmonians, and drive them out of 'Aſia.'

The conduct of the Lacedæmonian commiſſioners, in the congreſs of Cnidus, contributed not a little to give force to theſe plauſible ſuggeſtions. Whether acting with more honor than policy, or whether meerly judging ill their time, they confirmed the prediction of Alcibiades, that, when once the Lacedæmonians had obtained a ſuperiority at ſea, they would not be contented to leave any Grecian cities ſubject to Perſia. Having once manifeſted their diſpoſition, what followed, on the part of the ſatrap, was to be expected: the pay to the armament was, not indeed immediately ſtopped, but irregularly iſſued; and when the Peloponneſian commanders propoſed any exertion with the

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the fleet, Tiſſaphernes always objected, 'that 'the Phenician ſquadron,' which he never intended ſhould arrive, 'ought in prudence to be 'waited for.' Aſtyochus, whether through weakneſs or corruption, appears to have deferred to him upon all occaſions; and thus, as the hiſtorian remarks, the moſt powerful fleet ever ſent from Peloponneſus, waſted in inaction.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 47.

Alcibiades, having thus far worked upon the ſatrap, ſaw the criſis approaching that might probably inable him, not only to return to his country, but to acquire the glory of reſtoring his country to ſafety, and perhaps even to ſplendor. The Athenians, in their diſtreſs, had been making great and even wonderful exertions; but thoſe very exertions had nearly exhauſted them; and it was evident to all the more informed among them, that tho they might ſtill maintain themſelves, and perhaps even proſper, againſt the meer force of the Peloponneſian confederacy, which they knew could not with its own means ſupport its late exertions at ſea, yet againſt that confederacy, ſupplied by the wealth of Perſia, it would be impoſſible for them long to hold. Alcibiades, well aware both of the weakneſs of the commonwealth, and of the opinions and diſpoſitions of the people, knew that nothing would give him ſo much importance as the notoriety of his favor with Tiſſaphernes. He was, however, unwilling to truſt himſelf under the authority of that populace which had expelled him; and he thought things ſo much in his power, that he reſolved to require a change

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change of government and the eſtabliſhment of oligarchy, as the condition upon which he would reſtore his own ſervices to his country, and at the ſame time bring to it the advantage, in its preſent circumſtances the ineſtimable advantage, of the alliance of Tiſſaphernes.

The idea appears bold, even to extravagance; but it was in character for Alcibiades, and the times were ſingularly favorable. Moſt of the better ſort of people, worn with the capricious tyranny of the multitude, and dreading ſuch other dictators as Cleon and Hyperbolus, deſired the change. There were few trierarchs in the fleet who did not deſire it, and with theſe Alcibiades found ready means to communicate. His overtures excited attention: Theramenes, Eratoſthenes, Ariſtocrates, names which will recur to notice, are mentioned among thoſe who went from Samos to confer with him; and the aſſurances he gave that he would ingage Tiſſaphernes in the Athenian intereſt, and through him lead the king himſelf to an alliance with Athens, were very gladly received by the more powerful and richer men, who ſuffered moſt from the war, who were moſt preſſed in conſequence of the late public misfortunes, and whoſe property was principally called upon to ſupply the increaſed exigencies of an exhauſted treaſury. The propoſal held out to them the proſpect, at the ſame time, of an advantageous concluſion of the war, and of a change of government, favorable both to the power of thoſe who were ambitious of power, and to the eaſe of

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 48. Lyſ. or. con. Eratoſth.

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of thoſe who only deſired eaſe. Immediately therefore on their return to Samos, communicating with their friends, and finding thoſe diſpoſed to the cauſe numerous and zealous, they ſettled the form of an oath, for all who ſhould be admitted to their councils (a precaution common among the factions of the antient republics) by which they bound themſelves to mutual ſupport and protection.

Body and ſyſtem being thus given to the party, the leaders ventured to declare openly their knowlege that the king would become the ally of Athens, and furniſh money for the expences of the war, provided Alcibiades were reſtored, and the government changed to an oligarchy. Some alarm and indignation at firſt aroſe; but the hope of profiting from Perſian pay ſoftened the murmur, and the multitude acquieſced under the idea of loſs of power, when the recompence was to be increaſe of both ſecurity and profit. Phrynichus however, the commander in chief, known to be vehemently adverſe to Alcibiades, was ſuppoſed alſo firm in the democratical intereſt, and the innovators had therefore avoided communication with him. But their meaſures could not be intirely concealed from him, and with ſuch power as he poſſeſſed, he warmly oppoſed them. Calling together the Athenian citizens of the armament, he urged the falſehood or futility of the arguments which had been uſed to promote the projected change. 'Alcibiades,' he ſaid, (and Thucydides affirms that he ſaid truly) 'cared

'no

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'no more for oligarchy than democracy, or for 'anything but for means of his own reſtoration 'to his country and to power. Nor was it to 'be believed that the Perſian king would pre-'fer the Athenian alliance to the Peloponne-'ſian; ſince the Athenians claimed command 'over ſo many cities within his country, while 'the Peloponneſians, whoſe naval ſtrength now 'balanced that of Athens, formed no ſuch in-'vidious pretenſion. It was equally vain to 'ſuppoſe the promiſe of oligarchal government 'would allure either the ſubject-cities which 'had revolted, or thoſe which ſtill remained in 'obedience. The purpoſe of thoſe cities was, 'not to be inſlaved with an oligarchal rather 'than a democratical conſtitution, but, under 'whatſoever government, to be independent of 'forein dominion. Neither was the ſuppoſi-'tion leſs unfounded, that perſon and property 'would be more ſecure under the rule of thoſe 'called the better people; for thoſe better peo-'ple, in the exerciſe of power, commonly ſought 'their own in preference to the public benefit. 'Nowhere indeed were men in public ſervice 'ſo liable to oppreſſion of every kind, even to 'capital puniſhment without trial, as where 'the power of the people, the refuge of the in-'nocent, and the moderator of the exceſſes of 'the great, was done away. That ſuch was 'the opinion, the well-founded opinion, pre-'vailing in moſt of the allied ſtates, he well 'knew; and, for himſelf, he could not be ſa-'tisfied with any of the meaſures now propoſed, 'whether

'whether for the return of Alcibiades, or what-'ever beſides.' SECT. IV.

But in a buſineſs of this kind, a political and not a military affair, the authority of the commander in chief availed little. The aſſociated party, having a decided majority in the army, reſolved immediately to ſend a deputation to Athens, to puſh their purpoſe there. Peiſander was appointed chief of the deputation, and, notwithſtanding any oppoſition from the commander in chief, they ſailed for Attica. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 49.

Tho all had thus far been conducted peaceably, yet Phrynichus ſtood in the ſituation of a man who, in a rebellion or civil war, has taken his party. However he might be inclined to ſheath the ſword, he apprehended his opponents would not; he expected they would prevail at Athens; he feared the conſequences to himſelf, and, to obviate them, he had recourſe to a meaſure extremely hazardous, but ſtill more unjuſtifiable. Thucydides, on occaſion of the retreat from Miletus, gives Phrynichus the character of an able and prudent man. We can hardly give him credit for prudence upon this occaſion. He informed the Lacedæmonian commander, Aſtyochus, of the diviſions in the armament under his command. Aſtyochus, who ſeems to have been a weak man, went to Magneſia, and communicated both to the ſatrap and to Alcibiades the intelligence he had received. Alcibiades immediately ſent information to the principal Athenians in Samos, of the treachery of their general; inſiſting that the puniſhment c. 50.

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which ought to be inflicted for such a crime was death. Phrynichus, in high alarm, and indeed in great peril, wrote again to Astyochus, complaining, 'that due secrecy had not been 'observed about what he had before communi-'cated: that the danger insuing to himself was 'most pressing; the danger of what he most 'abhorred and deprecated, perishing by the 'hands of his detested domestic foes: that to 'avoid this there was nothing he was not ready 'to undertake, even to the betraying of the 'whole armament under his command to de-'struction.' Nor was this a difficult undertaking, for Samos was without fortifications; and to give means of executing it, he added every necessary description and direction. Astyochus communicated this also to Alcibiades.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 51.

From the dangerous situation in which Phrynichus was thus involved, he extricated himself with singular boldness and dexterity. Having taken his measures so as to know that Astyochus was still betraying him, and that fresh communication was upon the point of arriving from Alcibiades, he called together the army, and told them he had learnt, by private intelligence, the intention of the enemy to attack them. The consideration that Samos was unfortified, and the observation that part of the fleet was stationed without the port, he said, induced them to the measure; and he therefore issued immediate orders for works to be in all haste thrown up around the city, and for every other precaution to be used against the expected

attack. It had before been intended to fortify Samos; preparations had been made in conſequence; and the buſineſs, ſo as to ſerve the preſent need, was quickly accompliſhed. Meanwhile the expected letters arrived from Alcibiades, indicating that the armament was betrayed by its general, and that the enemy were preparing to attack it. The intelligence now only appeared to confirm that communicated by Phrynichus, and to juſtify his meaſures; ſo that the accuſation accompanying it was wholly ineffectual, being conſidered meerly as the ſcheme of a man, enough known to be little ſcrupulous, to ruin a political enemy. SECT. IV.

It was a bold undertaking in which Peiſander and his collegues were meanwhile ingaged at Athens; to propoſe to a ſoverein people to ſurrender their power, and ſubmit to be governed by their principal men, over whom they had ſo long been accuſtomed to tyrannize. But apprehenſion of the prevalence of the Peloponneſian arms, ſupported by the wealth of Perſia, and of the dreadful vengeance commonly to be expected in that age from a conquering enemy, lowered their haughtineſs, and, inſtead of power and wealth, made them anxiouſly look for means of ſecure exiſtence in humbler freedom. Peiſander therefore, incouraged by the viſible effect of popular fear, declared his purpoſe without reſerve: he told the aſſembled people, 'that 'they might have the aſſiſtance of the king, 'and thus be not only delivered from their ap- 'prehenſions, but aſſured of regaining a deci- 'ſive Thucyd. l. 8. c. 53.

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'ſive ſuperiority over their enemies, upon two 'conditions; the reſtoration of Alcibiades, and 'a change in the form of government.' Indignant clamor from ſome, ſullen murmurs from others, were excited by this propoſal. The particular enemies of Alcibiades were vociferous: and they were ſupported by the ſacred families of the Eumolpids and Ceryces, who urged religion and divine wrath as obſtacles to his return. Thoſe who feared no perſonal ill from the reſtoration of Alcibiades were leſs violent. Peiſander bore patiently the reproaches of all; and when opportunity was at length given for him to ſpeak, addreſſing himſelf to the moſt angry, he obſerved, 'that the Pelo-'ponneſians, always more powerful by land, 'now equal at ſea, and ſuperior in the number 'and ſtrength of their allies, were ſupported in 'the expences of the war by the wealth of Per-'ſia;' and he then put the queſtion, 'What 'were the means of the commonwealth to reſiſt 'ſuch a combination, or what the hope to eſcape 'impending deſtruction?' To this queſtion no anſwer, or none in any degree ſatisfactory to the aſſembly, was or could be given. 'In ſuch 'circumſtances then,' continued Peiſander, 'the 'object for conſideration muſt be, not what 'form of government you would prefer, but 'under what form the commonwealth can exiſt. 'And here no choice remains: it muſt be a go-'vernment placed in ſuch hands, armed with 'ſuch authority, that the king may confide in 'it ſo as to be induced to become your ally,'

To

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To ſoften the zealous partizans of democracy, he then added, 'Some among you, I know, 'think this a great evil. But can you heſitate 'to chuſe between certain ruin, and what will 'at worſt be a paſſing evil? ſince, when peace 'and ſafety are reſtored, nothing can prevent 'the people from reſtoring, when they pleaſe, 'the antient form of government.'

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 54.

Thus exciting at the ſame time fear and hope, and indeed proving to the people that they had ſcarcely another chance for ſafety, notwithſtanding the averſion which had ſo long obtained among them, almoſt to an abhorrence, of oligarchy, Peiſander prevailed; and, by a decree of the general aſſembly, eleven commiſſioners were appointed, of which himſelf was chief, to treat with Tiſſaphernes and Alcibiades, with full power to conclude whatever they ſhould judge expedient for the commonwealth. Orders were then iſſued for the recall of Phrynichus and his collegue Scironides; and Diomedon and Leon were appointed to ſuperſede them in the command of the armament on the Aſiatic ſtation.

There were at Athens ſocieties called Synomoſies, which bore conſiderable reſemblance to our political clubs; with this difference principally, that as property, liberty, and life itſelf were incomparably leſs ſecure there than under the mild firmneſs of our mixed government, the intereſt of individuals, which bound them to thoſe ſocieties, were much more preſ-

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ſing than what commonly lead to any ſimilar eſtabliſhments among us. The ſanction of a ſolemn oath to their ingagements was therefore always required of the members; whence the ſocieties obtained their name, ſignifying ſworn brotherhoods [c]. The objects propoſed were principally two; private ſecurity, and political power; and for the ſake of one or both of theſe, moſt men of rank or ſubſtance in Athens were members of ſome Synomoſy. Againſt the oppreſſion of democratical deſpotiſm, which was often, as we ſhall ſee more particularly hereafter, very ſeverely exerciſed againſt the rich, the collected influence of a body of noble and wealthy citizens might give protection, when the moſt reſpectable individual, ſtanding ſingle on his merits, would be overwhelmed; and the ſame union of influence which could provide ſecurity againſt oppreſſion, with a little increaſe

[c] Συνωμοσίας ἅπιϛε ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. Societates & collegia, quæ prius in urbe erant, & quæ judiciis & magiſtratibus præerant. Verſ. Duker. — *Juntos of the accomplices already formed in the city, with the view to thruſt themſelves into the ſeats of judicature and the great offices of ſtate.* Smith's Tranſl. If the word *accomplices*, for which there is no ſufficient authority in the original, were omitted, I ſhould prefer the Engliſh tranſlation to the Latin, which is indeed clearly bad. The other, however, is far from ſatisfactory, and I know not that this intereſting paſſage, in which Thucydides ſpeaks of what was familiar in his time, without ſufficiently explaining himſelf for poſterity, has been anywhere duly diſcuſſed. The explanation which I have ventured to give, is founded on a compariſon of that paſſage with whatever has occurred to my notice, anyway bearing a relation to the ſubject, in the various authors whom I have had occaſion to conſult, and in whoſe authority I have confidence.

of

of force, would diſpoſe of the principal offices of the ſtate. Peiſander addreſſed himſelf ſeverally to all theſe ſocieties, and he ſeems to have had conſiderable ſucceſs in perſuading them to concur in his meaſures. Everything being thus prepared, as well as time and circumſtances would permit (for very important intereſts required his preſence on the other ſide of the Ægean) he haſtened his departure with his ten collegues. SECT. IV.

Arriving at Samos, they found their cauſe ſo proſpering that any ſtay there appeared needleſs. They proceeded therefore to the Aſiatic main, to negotiate with Alcibiades and Tiſſaphernes; and they were admitted to a conference, at which the ſatrap attended in perſon, but which was managed for him by Alcibiades. The conduct of that wily politician, upon this occaſion, is not completely accounted for by the cotemporary hiſtorian, who has evidently not put his finiſhing hand to this concluding part of his hiſtory. Alcibiades, we find, had not that degree of influence over the ſatrap, which he had given thoſe Athenians, with whom he had communicated, to expect; but it appears probable he already foreſaw that the ariſtocratical party in Athens would not be diſpoſed to him as he had expected, or perhaps he was aware that they meant to deceive him. It was evidently now his purpoſe to render the conference abortive, by making demands for the ſatrap, to which the Athenian commiſſioners could not conſent. Finding them however diſ- Thucyd. l. 8. c. 56.

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poſed to yield much, he required the ceſſion of all Ionia, with the adjacent ilands, to the Perſian monarch: and, fearing the urgency of their ſituation would induce them to admit this, he raiſed new difficulties; a ſecond and third conference were held, and at length he added the requiſition, that, along all the coaſts of the Athenian dominion, the navigation ſhould be free for the king's ſhips, at all times and in any number. Such a demand convincing the commiſſioners that Alcibiades meant nothing friendly to them or their party, they broke up the conference in ſome anger, and returned to Samos.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 57.

Peiſander and his collegues were no ſooner gone, than Tiſſaphernes went to Caunus, in Caria, a ſituation commodious for communicating with the Peloponneſian commanders, with whom he renewed negotiation. He was now in alarm for the conſequences of his refuſal of pay to their fleet, which, of three diſagreeable things, he foreſaw would probably produce one: either the Peloponneſians muſt fight the Athenians, and would be defeated; or their crews would deſert, and thus the Athenians, without obligation to him and without riſk to themſelves, would become deciſively ſuperior; or, what he dreaded more than either of theſe, to ſupply their preſſing neceſſities they would plunder the territories under his command, and thus weaken the ſources of his revenue. In purſuance therefore of his original purpoſe, to keep the Greeks balanced againſt one another, he invited the Peloponn-

Peloponnesian chiefs to a conference at Miletus, which was not refused; and having then directed the issue of pay as formerly, a new treaty was quickly concluded, which ran thus: SECT. IV.

'In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephoralty of Alexippidas in Lacedæmon, a treaty was concluded in the plain of the Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their allies on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king and those of the Lacedæmonians and their allies.

'Whatever the king possesses in Asia shall be the king's, and the king shall direct the affairs of his own country according to his will and pleasure. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not injure any place within the king's dominion; and if any among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall attempt such injury, the Lacedæmonians and their allies in common shall prevent it. So also if any of the king's subjects shall attempt any injury to the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall prevent it.

'Tissaphernes shall continue to pay the fleet in the manner heretofore agreed, until the king's fleet shall arrive. After that it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians and their allies to pay their own fleet, or to receive the pay still from Tissaphernes, upon condition of repaying him when the war shall be concluded. The fleets, when combined, shall

'carry

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'carry on operations under the joint direction 'of Tiſſaphernes, and of the Lacedæmonians 'and their allies.

'No treaty ſhall be entered into with the 'Athenians but by mutual conſent of the con-'tracting parties.'

Thus the alliance of Lacedæmon with Perſia, or at leaſt with the ſatrap, was apparently confirmed.

B. C. 411. End of Jan. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 55.

During theſe negotiations, Leon and Diomedon, having taken the command of the Athenian armament from Phrynichus and Scironiadas, had moved to Rhodes with intention to offer battle; but on their arrival they found the Peloponneſian fleet laid up for the winter. After gratifying their crews therefore, with ſome revenge againſt the Rhodians and ſome profit to themſelves, by ravage of a part of the iland, they took their ſtation at the neighboring iland of Cos to watch the enemy's motions.

c. 61.

While the Peloponneſians were thus inactive, their allies of Chios were reduced nearly to extremity. In an unſucceſsful ſally, Pædaritus, the Lacedæmonian ſuperintendant of Chios, had been killed, the blockade was completed, and famine began to preſs the inhabitants and garriſon. In this ſituation of things opportunity was found to ſend an officer to Rhodes, who urged to the Peloponneſian commanders there, that, as the city was effectually blockaded, its diſtreſs was become preſſing, and nothing leſs than a ſtrong effort with the whole fleet could ſave it.

SECT. IV.

Twelve triremes had been left as guardships at Miletus, four of which were Syracusan, five Thurian, and only one Lacedæmonian; but the Lacedæmonian commander, Leon, was a man of enterprize. While Astyochus hesitated, Leon, taking advantage of the absence of the Athenian fleet from the neighbourhood, conducted his squadron to Chios. The Chians, informed of his approach, manned twenty-four triremes and went out to meet him, while their infantry made a diversion by an attack upon the Athenian works. Thirty-two Athenian ships had been left as a guard upon Chios. With these an obstinate action insued, in which the Chians were so far successful as to conduct the twelve Peloponnesian ships into their harbour, and Leon was received as commander, in the room of the slain superintendant Pædaritus.

The reinforcement thus acquired was important: it inabled the Chians to obtain some supplies by sea; and occurrences soon after afforded farther opportunity. The renewal of connection with the satrap of Caria did not prevent the Peloponnesians from prosecuting their purpose of extending their alliance to Pharnabazus satrap of the Hellespont. Early in spring, the twenty-first of the war, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent to him. He went by land, with only a small escort; yet on his arrival before Abydus, the efficacy of the Spartan name sufficed to induce that city immediately to revolt from the Athenians; and, two days after, Lampsacus followed the example.

B. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1/2. P. W. 21. Mar. 28. c. 62.

Strom-

End of April. Strombichides, who commanded the Athenian squadron at Chios, being informed of these circumstances, hastened to the Hellespont with twenty-four triremes. The sea thus was left open for the Chians to receive any relief.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 63.

The cautious Astyochus, receiving intelligence that a strong squadron of the enemy was thus called far from the Ionian coast, thought the opportunity favorable for seeking an action with their principal fleet. Upon his moving from Rhodes, Leon and Diomedon quitted Cos, and resumed their station at Samos. Astyochus led his fleet first to Chios, and strengthening himself with the whole naval force there, went to Samos, and offered battle. The Athenians, however, would not stir; and indeed their affairs were in a state, both at Samos and at home, that might have afforded to a more able and active commander than Astyochus, other advantage than that from which he had proposed to profit.

SECT.

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SECTION V.

Progreſs of the plot for a revolution at Athens: Violences of the oligarchal party: Propoſed new form of government: Eſtabliſhment of the new council of adminiſtration: Negotiation of the new government for peace with Lacedæmon.

PEISANDER and his collegues, returning to Samos from their unſucceſsful negotiation with Tiſſaphernes and Alcibiades, had the gratification to find, not only that their cauſe had been gaining in the army, but that the oligarchal party among the Samians themſelves were both diſpoſed and able to effect a change in the government of their iland. Thus incouraged they determined to pay no more attention to Alcibiades, but in proceeding in their original purpoſe of a change of government in Athens, to rely upon their own ſtrength for the conduct, both of the domeſtic affairs of the commonwealth, and, the buſineſs of the war. A large ſubſcription, for ſupporting meaſures upon which, not only their intereſt, but their perſonal ſafety now depended, was raiſed by the party. B. C. 411. February. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 63.

Having eſtabliſhed this groundwork for future proceedings, it was then determined, that Peiſander, with five of the other commiſſioners, ſhould return to Athens to manage the concerns of the party there, and that the other five ſhould go through the allied and ſubject-ſtates, and endeavor c. 64.

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endeavor to bring all under an oligarchal form of government. Diotrephes was appointed to the ſuperintendancy of the affairs of Thrace. In his way thither he ſtopped at Thaſus, and ſucceeded in at once aboliſhing the ſovereinty of the people there. The conſequence, however, was not what Peiſander and his collegues intended. Some principal Thaſians of the oligarchal party, who had been baniſhed by the Athenians, had taken refuge with the Peloponneſian armament on the Aſiatic coaſt. They maintained a correſpondence with their friends remaining in the iland, and had been importunately urging revolt. Diotrephes did for them the moſt difficult part of their buſineſs, much better than they could have done it for themſelves. Oligarchy being eſtabliſhed, the Thaſians in poſſeſſion made no longer any difficulty of preferring the Lacedæmonian to the Athenian connection; the exiles were reſtored, and Thaſus became a member of the Peloponneſian confederacy. Meanwhile Peiſander and the five who accompanied him, wherever they touched in their way to Athens, ſeem to have found as little difficulty in effecting the change of government they deſired, as Diotrephes at Thaſus: but the conſequence in moſt of the towns (ſo Thucydides ſays, without naming them) was the ſame; they revolted to Lacedæmon.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 65.

c. 64.

We are not informed by what means a few citizens of Athens, with ſelf-aſſumed authority, thus almoſt inſtantaneouſly overturned the conſtitutions of ſo many Grecian republics. The means

means by which the oligarchal party at Athens itſelf had in the meantime advanced far in their purpoſe, do no honor either to the Athenian government or the Athenian character. The principal was aſſaſſination, and it ſeems to have been chiefly managed by youths of the beſt families. Androcles, a man of mean origin, who had acquired ſuch influence with the lower people that the condemnation of Alcibiades had been not a little owing to him, and who had ever ſince been the moſt forward champion of democracy, was among the firſt taken off. Others of the moſt obnoxious to the friends of Alcibiades and of oligarchy ſhared the ſame fate: for, at Athens, the cauſes of Alcibiades and of oligarchy were not yet diſtinguiſhed. Inquiry concerning theſe murders was ſmothered or deterred, and the friends of democracy became afraid to ſhow themſelves: for ſome, who had been thought among the firmeſt in the democratical intereſt, being diſcovered to have joined the other party, ſuſpicion ſpred, ſo that no man dared truſt his neighbour. Thucyd. l. 8 c. 66.

The oligarchal party thus finding themſelves ſtrong, ventured to declare openly the kind of change which they propoſed to make in the conſtitution, in which ſome conſideration was had for the antient prejudices of the Athenian people, as well as for an appearance of public virtue. There was to be ſtill an aſſembly of the people, but in ſome degree ſelect: it was to be confined to a body of five thouſand, to be choſen among thoſe moſt qualified by property and c. 65.

perſonal

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perſonal ability to ſerve the commonwealth; and public pay was to be allowed to none but thoſe actually ſerving in the fleet or army. This, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, was ſomething ſpecious and alluring; being not only congenial to the ſpirit of the antient conſtitution, but even to modern practice; ſince ſo large a number as five thouſand citizens ſcarcely ever met in one aſſembly; and at the ſame time it held out to everyone the hope that, if he would concur in the meaſures propoſed, he might be a member of the ſoverein body.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 66.

Meanwhile the general aſſemblies were regularly held according to antient form, and the council of five hundred retained its functions: but aſſaſſination was continued; and with ſo little reſerve, and ſuch impoſſibility of obtaining juſtice againſt the perpetrators, that political oppoſition was deterred. None ſpoke, either in the aſſembly or council, but thoſe of the party, and they not without previous communication with the chiefs. The friends of democracy, without equal union among themſelves, ignorant of the numbers of the oligarchal party, and ſuppoſing them much greater than they really were, ſcarcely dared complain of enormities practiſed; every one thinking himſelf fortunate if, with the utmoſt caution to avoid offending, he avoided ſuffering. To this depreſſion of the democratical party nothing ſo much contributed as the treachery among its reputed friends; for ſome of thoſe fartheſt from previous ſuſpicion having joined the oligarchal party,

party, no one knew any longer in whom he might confide. Thus aſſaſſinations continued to paſs without inquiry; and even where proof could be obtained againſt the perpetrator, nobody ventured to proſecute. SECT. V.

Already things were in this ſituation when Peiſander returned to Athens. Before his departure a decree had been made, declaring, in general terms, that the government ſhould be changed: it remained to be decided how. An aſſembly of the people was convened to determine that important queſtion. The oligarchal party had ſuch a ſuperiority, that they might propoſe, with a certainty of carrying, in the moment, almoſt anything: but it was not what might be in the moment carried in the aſſembly at Athens, that would decide the future conſtitution of the commonwealth, or their own future fate. Not only turns in the popular mind muſt be provided againſt, but great conſideration muſt be had for that large portion of the commonwealth, ſerving in the armament, on the other ſide of the Ægean. It was therefore moved, that the conſideration of the buſineſs ſhould be referred to a committee of ten men, who ſhould make their report on an appointed day; and a decree paſſed to that effect. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 67.

The day being come, the people were ſummoned to aſſemble on the hill of Colonus, a little more than a mile from the city. The ten then came forward with the ſimple propoſal of a law, whoſe aim was nothing more than to obviate illegality in the future meaſures of the

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party. It ſtated, that every Athenian ſhould be free to declare any opinion in the aſſembly upon political topics; and it inflicted heavy penalties upon thoſe who ſhould endeavor to abridge this liberty, whether by legal proſecution according to the antient law, or in any other manner. This being carried, and what before would have been treaſon thus made legal, ſome of the party declared their opinion, that the form of adminiſtration of the commonwealth ought to be changed, and that pay and remuneration ſhould no more be iſſued from the treaſury, for any but thoſe employed for the commonwealth on forein ſervice. This alſo being patiently heard, Peiſander then ventured to propoſe the form of government to be eſtabliſhed: 'That five preſidents ſhould be choſen 'by the people: that theſe ſhould elect a hun-'dred, and that each of the hundred ſhould 'elect three: that the council of four hundred 'thus formed, ſhould be veſted with full power 'to direct the executive government[7]: that 'the ſupreme authority in laſt reſort ſhould 'reſide in a body of five thouſand citizens, 'to be aſſembled at the diſcretion of the 'council.[8].'

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 68.

In this manner it was endeavored, by the

[7] Ἄρχειν ὅπη ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν ἀυτοκράτορες. Thucyd. 7. 67.

[8] The diſtinction of the legiſlative and executive powers appears in ſome degree implied, but is not expreſſed by the hiſtorian, nor indeed does it ſeem to have been fully and clearly conceived by any of the antient politicians.

ableſt

ableſt politician, in the judgement of Thucydides, at that time in Greece, to remedy the evils of the Athenian democracy: for Peiſander, tho himſelf able, was but an inſtrument in the hands of Antiphon; a man, ſays the hiſtorian, in virtue inferior to no Athenian of his age, and in abilities, whether for the cloſet or the aſſembly, ſuperior to all. This very ſuperiority, exciting jealouſy among the people, had prevented the exertion of his talents for the public benefit; a circumſtance not uncommon among the antient democracies, and which probably contributed to inhance the averſion of Antiphon to that form of government: but in any private cauſe, whether in the inferior courts of judicature, or before the aſſembled people, no man was equally capable of ſerving his friends, either by his advice or by his eloquence. The ſecond place among the opponents of democracy ſeems to have been held by Theramenes ſon of Agnon; a man alſo of ſuperior powers, both of thought and elocution, and moreover of conſiderable military experience. But, beſide thoſe originally of the oligarchal party, there were ſome eminent men who had paſſed over to it from the democratical; and, of theſe, Phrynichus, the late commander on the Aſiatic coaſt, was the chief. Of a fearleſs temper, but an unprincipled mind, Phrynichus dreaded, beyond any perſonal danger, the reſtoration of Alcibiades to the commonwealth and to power. As ſoon therefore as the oligarchal party broke with Alcibiades,

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Phrynichus joined the oligarchal party; and, after the common manner of renegades, exceeded in zeal the moſt zealous of the original members. A number of ſuperior men, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, being thus united in the conduct of the buſineſs, it is no great wonder that it ſucceeded; tho to deprive the Athenian people of liberty, for that is his expreſſion, a hundred years after the recovery of it by the expulſion of the tyrants, during above fifty of which they had been accuſtomed, not only to obey none, but to command many, was indeed an arduous undertaking,

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 69.

The decree, directing the new conſtitution, having paſſed the aſſembly of the people, the party managed among themſelves the appointment of the new council. But the council of Five-hundred, in whom the old conſtitution veſted the executive power, had not been conſulted concerning any of the meaſures taken or propoſed: they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of the prytaneium or ſtate-houſe, in which a part of them, the prytanes, uſually reſided, and it was apprehended they might not peaceably reſign it. Meaſures were therefore with much forethought taken to obviate oppoſition, which might poſſibly give riſe to a dangerous tumult, when the new council were to be introduced. Since the eſtabliſhment of a hoſtile garriſon in Deceleia, conſtant readineſs for military duty had been required of the whole people: all appeared in the morning in arms; and the magiſtrates and officers diſtributed the duty of the

the day among them. Some were appointed to the guard of the works, others were to hold themſelves in readineſs for the field; all who could be ſpared were then diſmiſſed, with directions only to repair to the general parade at a certain ſignal. On the day fixed for ejecting the old council, it was provided that all the citizens of the democratical intereſt ſhould be diſmiſſed, and thoſe only retained in arms for the duty of the day, in whom the party could beſt confide. Among theſe were a number of Andrian, Tenian and Caryſtian auxiliaries, with ſome coloniſts from Ægina, all brought to Athens for the purpoſe. SECT. V.

Matters being thus prepared, the Four-hundred went to the prytaneium, armed each with a concealed dagger, and attended by a hundred and twenty youths, who had been accuſtomed to perform for them the buſineſs equally of guards and aſſaſſins [9]. They carried with them the arrear of ſalary due to the counſellors of the bean, as the Five-hundred were called, and making a tender of it, required all to withdraw. The old council, quietly taking their ſalaries, obeyed the requiſition, and no ſtir was made in the city on the occaſion. The Four-hundred then proceeded to elect prytanes from their own body by lot, and, with the ſame ceremo-

[9] This ſeems to be the import of the hiſtorian's phraſe, ὡς ἐχρῶντο ἔστι που δέοι χειρουργεῖν. Thucydides calls them Ἕλληνες σκυθικοί, thus marking that they were different people from the ordinary armed attendants of the Athenian magiſtracy, who were always barbarians, generally Scythians.

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nies of prayer and ſacrifice, which were preſcribed by cuſtom for the antient council, they commenced the execution of their office.

Thus was apparently completed this extraordinary revolution. Athens, and whatever of Attica was not held by the enemy, yielded obedience to the new council, become the ſupreme power of the commonwealth, through a law made, with all due form, by the aſſembly of the people, which before held that power. In the general conduct of the buſineſs, we ſee ſomething very different from the tumultuous revolutions ſo numerous among the inferior Grecian republics. Nowhere elſe, in the accounts remaining to us, can we diſcover ſuch a regard for all the forms of an eſtabliſhed conſtitution: yet, even in this revolution at Athens, we find ſtrong relics of barbariſm, I muſt riſk the expreſſion, and very defective notions of policy. None of thoſe public maſſacres took place, which were ſo uſual in Grecian revolutions: public executions, with the pretence of law or popular judgement, were alſo avoided: a few perſons were impriſoned; and, were this all, the duty of the ruling powers to preſerve public tranquility might perhaps have juſtified it: ſome were baniſhed, which might be effected without any active meaſure, the dread of conſequences being ſufficient to drive thoſe who knew themſelves obnoxious, or who were meerly told they were ſo, to ſeek their ſafety by flight: for the horrid and baſe practice of ſecret aſſaſſination was continued, againſt thoſe whom

whom the party ſuppoſed moſt adverſe and moſt formidable. SECT. V.

Many were living in baniſhment, to which they had been condemned by the aſſembled people, or by the popular tribunals, whom the party now prevailing would gladly have reſtored; and among them the hiſtorian Thucydides would probably have returned to his country. But the return of Alcibiades, tho he had been the firſt mover of the revolution, was now looked to by moſt of the party with no friendly eye. Some, as Phrynichus, were eſſentially intereſted in his excluſion; and all would be jealous of the talents, the fame, the popularity of one who had ſo long been the active and ſucceſsful opponent of the oligarchal intereſt. Confident that they no longer needed his aſſiſtance, they were no longer willing to admit that ſuperiority which muſt have been yielded to him; and therefore to avoid giving opportunity for any meaſures in his favor, they made a merit of ſupporting the decrees and judgements of the people, and reſolved that none ſhould be reſtored whom the people had baniſhed.

In other points they did not preſerve the ſame reſpect for the decrees of the people, or the forms of the antient conſtitution, or even for their own declarations concerning the new one. The appointment of a ſupreme aſſembly of five thouſand had been held out only as a lure, to ingage readier acquieſcence under the other changes; for ſuch a body would have been Thucyd. l. 8. c. 92.

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perhaps even more difficult to manage, by the Few, who propoſed to hold all power in their own hands, than the aſſembly open to every citizen. But they declared, and they found no ſmall advantage in ſo doing, not only that the ſupreme power in laſt reſort was to be veſted in ſuch a ſelect, yet numerous body of citizens, but that the ſelection, though not publiſhed, was already made; for thus they kept every man in hopes for himſelf, and in fear of his neighbour.

The party, being thus completely maſters within the city, turned their attention to things without. It was a moſt important object for them to make peace with Lacedæmon, and they had warm hope of ſucceſs. Accordingly they ſent to Agis, then in Deceleia, repreſenting to him, that he would no longer have a fickle, faithleſs and arrogant multitude to deal with, but a government more reſembling that of Sparta, and which might deſerve his confidence. But Agis, after conſidering the probable ferment of men's minds immediately after ſuch a revolution, thought he might poſſibly find means to command terms inſtead of treating for them. Declining therefore any negotiation, he ſent for a large force from Peloponneſus, with which, added to his troops in Deceleia, he marched to the walls of Athens. The Athenian people, he concluded, would not yet be diſpoſed to pay regular and quiet obedience to their new leaders: the ſudden appearance of an enemy in large force would excite

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cite alarm; difference of opinion would probably ariſe; contention would follow, and perhaps mutiny; and, in the confuſion, poſſibly a well-timed aſſault might carry the city.

The event juſtifies the character of ability which Thucydides gives to the leaders of the oligarchal party in Athens. Nothing happened of what Agis expected. The whole of the Athenian cavalry went out of the city in good order, accompanied by ſome light-armed and bowmen, with a body of heavy-armed to ſupport them. The Peloponneſian army had not a force of cavalry equal to oppoſe the Athenian. A detachment, advancing very near the walls, was attacked and overpowered, and the Athenians carried off the dead. Agis finding himſelf thus diſappointed, prudently withdrew to Deceleia, and ſent back the troops lately arrived from Peloponneſus. The Athenian miniſtry were thus incouraged to try again a negotiation, and, freſh overtures to Agis being now favorably received, they made no delay in ſending miniſters to Lacedæmon. End of March.

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SECTION VI.

Oppoſition of the fleet and army at Samos to the new government of Athens: Thraſybulus. Diſſatisfaction of the Peloponneſian armament with its general. Aſſiſtance ſent from the Peloponneſian armament to Pharnabazus ſatrap of the Helleſpont. The reſtoration of Alcibiades decreed by the Athenian armament: Alcibiades elected general by the armament. Freſh diſcontent of the Peloponneſian armament: Mindarus ſucceeds Aſtyochus in the command. Commiſſioners from the new government of Athens to the armament at Samos: Able and beneficial conduct of Alcibiades.

B. C. 411. P. W. 21. March.

THUS ſucceſsful in their adminiſtration at home, and in train to put an end to war within Greece, difficulties were ariſing for the oligarchal leaders, which no wiſdom on their part probably could have prevented. Peiſander, before he left Samos, had exerted himſelf among the people of that iland, ſo far as to perſuade many of the democratical party to join the oligarchal; and a ſociety was formed of three hundred friends of oligarchy, who, according to uſual practice, bound themſelves to one another by ſolemn oaths to ſupport their common meaſures. Peiſander thought the oligarchal intereſt thus ſecure among the Samian people, as he hoped it was in the armament.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 73.

But,

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But, after his departure, tumults aroſe among the Samians: the Athenians of courſe interfered; and, together with ſome others, Charminus, one of the generals, was unfortunately killed. In theſe conteſts the oligarchal party had the advantage; they depended upon ſupport from the Athenians, among whom they ſuppoſed the oligarchal to be now the prevailing intereſt; and they were proceeding to take farther meaſures againſt the ſupporters of democracy.

But in Athens the democratical party had never been without ſupport from ſome of the firſt families of the commonwealth: for there were always ſome who could more readily riſe to power through the democratical than the oligarchal intereſt; and indeed ſome were conſidered in a manner hereditary chiefs of the democratical cauſe. The preſent generals, Leon and Diomedon, connected as they were with the leaders of the oligarchal party, yet having themſelves great intereſt among the people, were averſe to the propoſed change of government; and, the democratical Samians ſoliciting their protection againſt the oppreſſion of the oligarchal, they readily gave it.

Leon and Diomedon, however, appear to have been moderate in party, and not men of commanding characters. There were two younger officers, of inferior rank, Thraſybulus ſon of Lycus, captain of a trireme, and Thraſyllus, an officer of the heavy-armed, who by their reputation for ability, courage, activity and integrity,

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integrity, were of principal conſideration. Theſe were zealous in the democratical cauſe: they inſtigated the generals, by whom they were well received; and they were ſedulous in argument and perſuaſion among the ſoldiers and ſeamen, by whom they were loved and reſpected; and thus, while the revolution took place at Athens in favor of oligarchy, in the armament at Samos the preponderance of the democratical cauſe was reſtored. The democratical Samians then, obtaining ſupport from the Athenians, prevailed againſt their opponents. Thirty of the ſociety of three hundred were put to death: three were baniſhed; and the reſt, with a humanity not common in Greek ſedition, on ſubmitting to democracy, received a free pardon [10].

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 74.

Intelligence of the revolution at Athens not having yet reached Samos, Chæreas ſon of Archeſtratus, a man of eminence in the Athenian armament, was diſpatched in the herald-ſhip Paralus to report theſe tranſactions; not without expectation that he would be the meſſenger of grateful news to the ruling powers at home. Information of the extraordinary change that had taken place meeting him on his arrival, he inſtantly ſecreted himſelf; and the event juſtified the ſuſpicion which directed that conduct. Two or three of his officers were thrown into

[10] The phraſe of Thucydides, ſingularly conciſe and ſingularly expreſſive, is ſcarcely to be tranſlated: Τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ὁμηνσικακοῦνλες, δημοκρατούμενοι τὸλοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

priſon:

priſon: his crew were moved into an ordinary trireme on the Eubœan ſtation; and the ſacred ſhip was committed to perſons more devoted to the ruling party. Chæreas, waiting only to acquire information in his concealment of the circumſtances of the revolution, returned in haſte to Samos, and reported there with the uſual, or even more than the uſual exaggeration of party-ſpirit, the violences of thoſe who held the powers of government at home. Regardleſs of truth, he dwelt upon whatever would be likely moſt to irritate the paſſions of thoſe ſerving in the armament. A few aſſaſſinations, if we may judge from the omiſſion of all mention of them upon this occaſion by the hiſtorian, ſeem not to have been conſidered as what would make much impreſſion: the ſufferers were probably little connected with the armament, or little eſteemed in it: but, 'that the Four-hundred inflicted ſtripes without reſerve; that deſpotic reſtriction was put upon diſcourſe; that complaint was held criminal, and that it was dangerous to open the lip againſt the ruling powers: that even the wives and children of thoſe on forein ſervice were not ſecure from inſult: that it was propoſed to confine as hoſtages the neareſt friends of all thoſe in the armament at Samos, who were ſuppoſed friends of democracy:' theſe were the topics on which Chæreas principally inſiſted. SECT. VI.

Such information from a man of rank juſt arrived from Athens, when the armament was already in a ferment, raiſed an inſtant flame.

In

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In the firſt moment of alarm and paſſion, the zealots for democracy were going to turn their ſwords againſt thoſe of their comrades who had ſhown a diſpoſition to favor oligarchy; and nothing prevented ſo raſh a meaſure, but the conſideration, warmly urged by ſome of the more prudent among them, that the Peloponneſian armament was near enough to take advantage of ſuch a circumſtance for the deſtruction of both parties.

Bloodſhed being thus prevented, and the commanders in chief, as far as appears, paſſive, Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus took the lead: for it was not now a military buſineſs, but the civil intereſts of the commonwealth, which it behoved the armament, a large and almoſt a preponderant portion of the commonwealth, to take into conſideration. The firſt meaſure was to require an oath from all, with particular attention to thoſe ſuppoſed to favor oligarchy, binding them, in the moſt ſolemn manner, to ſupport democracy, to perſevere in the war againſt the Peloponneſians, to maintain concord among themſelves, to hold the Four-hundred for enemies, and to admit no treaty with them. This oath, having been univerſally taken by the Athenians, was tendered to the Samians, who alſo took it univerſally. Henceforward the Samians were admitted to all councils, as men ingaged in the ſame cauſe with the Athenians and bound by the ſame intereſt, whoſe aſſiſtance was neceſſary to their welfare, and whoſe welfare depended upon their ſucceſs.

Matters

Matters being thus far ſettled, the armament would no longer conſider the commonwealth as exiſting at Athens, but took upon themſelves to be the commonwealth. The generals Leon and Diomedon, notwithſtanding the degree of concurrence they had thus far given, were eſteemed not ſufficiently zealous in the cauſe. As the general aſſembly of Athenian citizens, therefore, the armament aſſumed authority to depoſe thoſe, together with every commander of a trireme whom they thought adverſe to democracy; and Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus were, by the ſame authority, raiſed to the command in chief. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 76.

Theſe meaſures, in fact declaring a civil war, put both the armament and the city, both watched by a forein enemy already too powerful, in a moſt perilous ſituation. The armament, however, ſays the hiſtorian, comforted themſelves with the conſiderations, that they were the ſtrength of the commonwealth; that the oligarchal party, tho in poſſeſſion of the city, were comparatively weak: that, the whole fleet being theirs, the ſubject-ſtates muſt alſo be theirs, together with the revenue thence ariſing; the collection of which they poſſeſſed means to inforce, which the oligarchal party were totally without: that even for ſubſiſtence, thoſe who held Athens were more dependent upon them than they upon thoſe who were maſters of Athens; for not only they could more command the ſea, but they could even more command the entrance of the harbour of

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Peiræus. With regard to a home, Samos, a fine iland with a conſiderable city, was no contemptible home. Such then being their means, not only of ſubſiſtence and ſecurity, but even of wealth and power, it was little to be doubted but Alcibiades, ill-treated as he had been by the oligarchal party, would gladly join his intereſt with theirs; and thus, the king of Perſia becoming their ally, there was no kind or degree of ſucceſs which they might not reaſonably hope. But ſhould they finally be deceived, in any or in all their views againſt their domeſtic enemies, ſtill, while ſuch a fleet was theirs, retreats would not be wanting, where they might find, not only lands of which to poſſeſs themſelves, but alſo cities in which to ſettle.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 72.

The oligarchal party at Athens had always been apprehenſive that the nautic multitude, as Thucydides calls them, would not readily acquieſce under the change of government.

B. C. 411. Soon after 27 Feb.

Immediately therefore after the appointment of the council of Four-hundred, ten commiſſioners had been diſpatched for Samos, with inſtructions, in giving information of the change, to apologize, ſoothe and perſuade. The commiſſioners, however, meeting intelligence at Delos

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 77.

of the violent meaſures of the democratical party in the armament, the depoſition of the generals, and the appointment of Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus to the command, feared to proceed. Fortunately for Athens at this time, there was neither able conduct at the head of the Peloponneſian armament, nor union among

c. 78.

the

the members. Diſcontent grew ſo as to threaten mutiny or defection; and in this the Syracuſans took the lead. 'It was evident,' they ſaid, 'that the ſatrap meant no good to their 'cauſe. Not only the pay which he had in-'gaged to furniſh was reduced, but the redu-'ced pay was irregularly and deficiently iſſued. 'Under pretence of waiting for the Phenician 'fleet, which he did not intend ſhould ever 'join them, he had prevented action with the 'enemy when weak in numbers; he now con-'tinued to prevent it when they were perhaps 'yet weaker through ſedition; and their own 'commander-in-chief, either overreached or 'bought, yielded to him in everything.' Beginning of March. Ann. Thucyd. but rather beg. of April.

Urged by fear of ſedition among his own people while he was invited by intelligence of ſedition among the Athenians, Aſtyochus determined to lead the fleet againſt the enemy. But, when he arrived off Samos, things were already compoſed in the Athenian armament under Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, who were equal to their new command. All was order and vigilance within the harbour: an expreſs was ſent to the Helleſpont to require the return of Strombichides: he arrived quickly; and then the Athenian fleet, conſiſting of a hundred and eight triremes, moved toward the Peloponneſians, who declined the offered battle, and retired into the port of Miletus. Thucyd. l. 8 c. 79.

Such, after all the great loſs in Sicily, and while the commonwealth was ſo diſtracted by faction as to render it dubious where the go-

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vernment exiſted, was ſtill the naval power of Athens; while the Peloponneſians were ſo far from being able, with their own ſtrength, to ſupport the conteſt in naval war, that a diminution only of pecuniary aſſiſtance from Perſia, while ſome was ſtill afforded, reduced them immediately to diſtreſs. But while it was the policy of Perſia to keep alive the diviſions of the Greeks, the weakneſs of the Perſian government, and the militating intereſts of its officers in the command of provinces, afforded the Greeks reciprocal advantages. Pharnabazus propoſed to profit from the growing diſſatisfaction of the Peloponneſians with Tiſſaphernes. He ſent to inform them, 'that if they 'would bring their fleet to the Helleſpont, 'and connect their intereſts with his, he would 'furniſh faithfully and regularly that pay and 'thoſe ſupplies, which Tiſſaphernes was evi-'dently no longer diſpoſed to give.' At the ſame time there arrived from the Byzantines a propoſal to revolt, if ſupport could be obtained from the Peloponneſian fleet. Theſe overtures were deemed by the Peloponneſian commanders to require immediate attention; but to make their way to the Helleſpont, they muſt probably fight the Athenian fleet, which the commander-in-chief at leaſt deſired to avoid.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 80.

April. Forty ſhips therefore were ſent under Clearchus ſon of Rhamphias, with direction to take a circuitous courſe through the open ſea, that he might eſcape obſervation from the Athenian ſcouts. His paſſage was interrupted by a ſtorm.

Ten

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Ten of his triremes only, under Helixus the Megarian commander, made their way good to the Helleſpont; the reſt, being diſperſed, ſought again the port of Miletus, which they were fortunate enough to reach. Clearchus proſecuted his journey by land to take the Helleſpontine command, and on his arrival he found Byzantium, through the exertions of Helixus in concert with the Peloponneſian party there, already a member of the Peloponneſian confederacy.

With this diſpoſition among the dependencies of Athens to revolt, Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus were aware that they had undertaken what, with their own ſtrength, they ſhould ſcarcely be able to bring to a good concluſion. In looking around for means of ſupport, Alcibiades, whom the oligarchal party at home had in a manner diſcarded, and Tiſſaphernes, between whom and the Peloponneſians there was mutual diſſatisfaction apparently approaching to a breach, ſeemed to offer the faireſt ground of hope. It was accordingly reſolved to endeavor to gain Alcibiades. Notwithſtanding that he had been the firſt mover of the meaſures ſo far proſecuted toward the overthrow of democracy, they thought it very poſſible, in the preſent circumſtances, to perſuade the army to receive him as the future pillar of the democratical cauſe. His ſingle importance perhaps might not have decided them to the meaſure; but through him they hoped to gain the ſatrap of Caria, whoſe alliance they truſted would

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inſure, againſt both domeſtic and forein foes, not ſafety only, but large ſucceſs. An aſſembly was therefore ſummoned, of the Athenian citizens of the armament, as if the legal general aſſembly of the commonwealth. Thraſybulus undertook to explain the advantages to be expected from the reſtoration of Alcibiades: the aſſembly aſſented; and a reſolution, in the form of a decree of the Athenian people, declared him reſtored to the privileges of an Athenian citizen, and no longer liable, for any paſſed tranſaction, to either puniſhment or trial.

This being carried, Thraſybulus, whoſe meaſure principally it was, went himſelf to communicate information of it to Alcibiades, then reſiding with Tiſſaphernes. They returned together to Samos: the aſſembly was again convened, and Alcibiades ſpoke. After ſhortly lamenting the calamity of his exile, the injury that had inſued to his country, and the miſery to himſelf, he adverted to preſent circumſtances, and dwelt largely on the fair proſpect that appeared of future proſperity to Athens, through the benefits which his reſtoration would bring. 'Nothing,' he ſaid, 'was wanting to induce 'the ſatrap to take an active part in their fa-'vor, but ſufficient aſſurance of ſteddineſs in 'the government, and due adherence to in-'gagements made. Nor was it any ſecret what 'he would require; for he had repeatedly de-'clared, that he would freely treat with Alci-'biades, were the affairs of the commonwealth

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'again committed to him. In that caſe, not 'only his revenue ſhould ſupply the wants of 'Athens, but the Phenician fleet now at Aſ-'pendus, inſtead of reinforcing the Peloponne-'ſian, ſhould join the Athenian againſt the Pe-'loponneſians.' The aſſembly were ready to believe what they wiſhed to be true, and the ſpeech of Alcibiades made ſuch impreſſion, that he was upon the ſpot elected general: thoſe before appointed were continued as his col-legues; but the chief direction of affairs, with the approbation apparently of Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, paſſed immediately into his hands. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 82.

Things being ſo far ſettled, immoderate joy and thoughtleſs confidence pervaded the armament. Already they held the Peloponneſians in contempt. Revenge againſt the Four-hundred was their favorite object; they conſidered the means as in their hands, and they would ſail directly to Peiræus. Alcibiades however had influence, and he did not want prudence, to check the raſh deſign. 'The nearer enemy,' he ſaid, 'muſt not be ſo left, to act unoppoſed 'againſt the moſt valuable poſſeſſions of the 'commonwealth. With regard to himſelf, 'moreover, it would be utterly improper to 'run to diſtant enterprize, without going firſt 'to communicate perſonally with the ſatrap. 'Their intereſt required that he ſhould ſhow 'himſelf in the rank in which they had placed 'him; and, armed with the importance which 'that rank gave, conſult concerning the ar-'rangements to be made.' They yielded to

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theſe arguments; the aſſembly was diſmiſſed, and he ſet off immediately: anxious, ſays the hiſtorian, to ſhow Tiſſaphernes his power among the Athenians, as to impreſs the Athenians with an opinion of his influence with Tiſſaphernes; and as he could now be to both either a valuable friend or a formidable foe, he awed the Athenians with the name of Tiſſaphernes, and Tiſſaphernes with that of the Athenians.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 83.

Intelligence of theſe tranſactions in Samos, being conveyed to the Peloponneſian armament at Miletus, occaſioned a violent ferment there. The irregularity and deficiency of the iſſues of pay, before complained of, had increaſed ſince the appearance of the Athenian fleet on the coaſt, and the refuſal of battle by the Peloponneſian commanders. Alcibiades, lately their counſellor, and ſtill the man of moſt influence with the ſatrap, was now become commander in chief of the enemy. Not only the ſoldiers and ſailors, but the principal officers, openly accuſed Aſtyochus of compliance adverſe to their intereſt and that of their country. Weak and mean, they declared, they had always thought it, but they now pronounced it treacherous; and unleſs a ſucceſsful battle was fought, or new meaſures were taken to procure ſupplies, the crews, they ſaid, would and indeed muſt deſert to find ſubſiſtence.

c. 84.

While the reſt of the armament canvaſſed theſe matters among themſelves, the Syracuſan and Thurian ſeamen, with the licentiouſneſs and arrogance nouriſhed under a democratical

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mocratical government, went in a body to Aſtyochus, and, in a tumultuous manner, demanded the pay due to them. Aſtyochus, who appears to have had no talents for command, reproved them with Spartan haughtineſs; and not only threatened Dorieus the Thurian commander [11] (who, improperly enough, accompanied his people, and even ſpoke for them) but lifted his ſtick as if to ſtrike him. It is from Thucydides that we have this teſtimony to the rough manners of a Spartan general; to which the democratical Thurians made the rough return that might be expected. With a nautic ſhout, they ruſhed forward to protect and revenge their commanding officer. Fortunately for Aſtyochus, an altar was near, and he fled to it: the rioters reſpected the ſanctuary, and preſently diſperſed.

This was not the only wound which the Lacedæmonian command ſuffered. Lichas and his collegues had apparently learned to be more complaiſant to the ſatrap than when they firſt arrived from Sparta. Tiſſaphernes had taken a

[11] The ſcholiaſt, haſtily and careleſsly, conſidering Dorieus as a gentilitious name, interprets it to mean Hermocrates. In recollecting that the Syracuſans were a Dorian people, he ſeems to have forgotten that the Lacedæmonians were ſo. A Spartan general would ſcarcely diſtinguiſh a Syracuſan as *the* Dorian, by way of eminence. But in a preceding paſſage (c. 35. l. 8. Thucydides particularizes Dorieus ſon of Diagoras as the commander of the Thurian ſquadron in the Peloponneſian fleet; Dorieus ſon of Diagoras, apparently the ſame man, is mentioned by Xenophon, Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 2. and it is not the only inſtance in which we find Dorieus, like other gentilitious names among the Greeks, taken as the proper name of an individual.

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ſtrong meaſure to ſecure his authority in Miletus; he had built a fort within the walls of the city, and placed a garriſon there. In the neceſſity of the Mileſians, on firſt revolting from Athens, to procure protection, on any terms, againſt Athenian vengeance, it does not appear that this had occaſioned any oppoſition or complaint. But when they thought themſelves eſtabliſhed members of the Peloponneſian confederacy, they began to conſider ſuch a badge of forein ſervitude with uneaſineſs; and at length, the ſpreading diſcontent againſt Tiſſaphernes incouraging, they entered the fort by ſurprize with a ſuperior armed force, and compelled the garriſon to withdraw. Lichas condemned this violence: 'Their city' he ſaid, 'being ſituated in Aſia, was within the king 'of Perſia's proper dominion. It became them 'therefore to ſubmit to Tiſſaphernes as his of-'ficer, and the intereſt of the confederacy re-'quired that it ſhould be ſo.' A majority, however, of the allies in the armament, and, above the reſt, the Syracuſans, declared openly and vehemently their diſſent to the doctrine of Lichas, and their approbation of the conduct of the Mileſians. Accordingly the Mileſians perſiſted in excluding the Perſian garriſon and aſſerting their independency, and they manifeſted upon all occaſions, without ſcruple or reſerve, a warm animoſity againſt the Lacedæmonian commiſſioner.

Thucyd. I. 8. c. 85.

Things were in this ſtate at Miletus, when Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon to ſuperſede

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ſede Aſtyochus in the command in chief. Meanwhile Tiſſaphernes, notwithſtanding the intrigues of Alcibiades, had not changed his policy. It was his purpoſe ſtill to hold the balance between the contending parties in Greece; and it was as little his deſire now to break with the Lacedæmonians, as it had ever been to give them a deciſive ſuperiority. Aſtyochus remained in favor: for the ſame conduct which had rendered that general obnoxious to many of thoſe under his command, had been gratifying to the ſatrap. When therefore Aſtyochus returned home, Tiſſaphernes ſent with him Gauleites, a Carian, who ſpoke both the Greek and Perſian languages, in quality of his miniſter to Sparta. Gauleites was inſtructed to apologize for any apparent ſlackneſs in Tiſſaphernes toward the intereſt of the Peloponneſian confederacy, and to prefer complaints againſt the Mileſians, particularly inſiſting upon their affronting and injurious conduct in expelling the Perſian garriſon. The Mileſians, informed of this, ſent miniſters to vindicate themſelves; and Hermocrates, who, in conſequence of a change in the adminiſtration of Syracuſe, was ſuperſeded in the command of the Syracuſan force in Aſia, accompanied them to Sparta.

Such, fortunately for Athens, was the diſtraction of intereſts among its enemies, while there was an Athenian commonwealth in Attica and another in Samos, more virulently inimical to each other than to any forein foe. Meanwhile

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while the Four-hundred, through a ſtrange incautiouſneſs, met with a check in their propoſed negotiation for peace with Lacedæmon. Their ambaſſadors imbarked in a trireme with the crew from the herald-ſhip Paralus, devoted to the democratical party at Samos. In paſſing the Argolic coaſt, the crew mutinied, carried the veſſel into Nauplia, and delivered the ambaſſadors priſoners to the Argian adminiſtration. No independent Grecian ſtate was ſo intereſted in the ſchiſm of the Athenian commonwealth as Argos. The revolution had excited great alarm. It was apprehended that the abolition of democracy at Athens would be followed by the downfal of the democratical intereſt throughout Greece. Intelligence of the turn which things had taken at Samos, was proportionally gratifying: the opportunity to ſerve the democratical party, by checking the negotiation of their adverſaries, was ſeized with zeal; and as it was the purpoſe of the Athenian crew to join the fleet at Samos, the Argians ſent with them miniſters, commiſſioned to aſſure the democratical party there of their friendſhip and ſupport.

Thucyd. l. 8 c. 86.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 86.

The commiſſioners appointed by the Four-hundred to negotiate with the fleet and army, had ventured at length to proceed from Delos, and they arrived at Samos about the ſame time with the miniſters from Argos. Alcibiades was already returned; an aſſembly of the Athenian citizens in the armament was ſummoned, and the commiſſioners from Athens and the Argian miniſters

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miniſters were together admitted to audience. Tumult immediately began among the ſoldiers. 'Thoſe who had ſubverted the democracy,' it was exclaimed, 'ſhould receive capital puniſh-'ment.' The generals uſed their endeavors to reſtore order, and with ſome difficulty ſucceeded. The commiſſioners then addreſſed the aſſembly. Their firſt ſolicitude was to diſcredit the charges, really replete with falſehood, which had been alledged againſt the Four-hundred by Chæreas. They aſſured the ſoldiers and ſeamen 'that their friends and relations at Athens 'had never received the leaſt injury or moleſta-'tion from the preſent government.' Thus far they were heard with patience; but when they proceeded to vindicate the change made in the conſtitution, calling it 'ſtill a democracy, mo-'dified only in ſuch a manner as the preſent 'circumſtances rendered neceſſary,' they were interrupted with freſh tumult. When quiet was again reſtored, ſtill the commiſſioners could not gain attention: others would ſpeak; various opinions were given, various propoſals offered; and at length it appeared the prevailing diſpoſition, and even the decided reſolution, to ſail immediately for Peiræus, and at once reſtore the former conſtitution, and puniſh thoſe who had overthrown it.

Then, ſays Thucydides, for the firſt time, Alcibiades did his country a real ſervice, and ſuch a ſervice that perhaps no man ever did a greater. The aſſembly was on the point of paſſing the raſh decree, and, in the zeal of the moment,

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moment, it would have been carried into inſtant execution. Athens thus would have been plunged into the horrors of civil war, and every remaining dependency of the commonwealth in Ionia and on the Helleſpont would have paſſed almoſt inſtantaneouſly into the hands of the enemy. No man certainly, continues the hiſtorian, but Alcibiades was able to prevent this; and he did prevent it. He reproved the paſſion that had been ſhown in the proceedings, and the people bore his reproof: he demonſtrated the deſtructive tendency of what was propoſed, and the people were alarmed with their own meaſure: he procured acknowlegement that what had been adviſed by others was wrong; and taking upon himſelf to dictate the anſwer which ſhould be returned to Athens, the people yielded to his authority. 'He did not 'object,' he ſaid, 'to limiting the votes in the 'general aſſembly to five thouſand: but he 'would require the immediate abolition of the 'council of Four-hundred, and the reſtoration 'of the antient council of Five-hundred. If 'the new government had retrenched any ſu'perfluous expence, ſo that the forces ſerving 'abroad might be more certainly and plenti'fully ſubſiſted, they ſhould have his applauſe 'for it. He truſted they would not ſeparately 'make any treaty with the enemy. With the 'preſent ſtrength of the commonwealth intire, 'there was good hope that the enemy might be 'brought to a reaſonable accommodation: but 'were ſo large a portion as either the party now

'prevailing

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'prevailing in Samos, or the party now prevailing in Athens, to be cut off, there would 'ſoon be no commonwealth left for an enemy 'to treat with.' Alcibiades, having thus anſwered the commiſſioners, then addreſſed the Argian miniſters, thanking them in the name of the aſſembly for the zeal their commonwealth had manifeſted, and deſiring they would only hold themſelves in readineſs to give that aſſiſtance which might become important, tho in the moment it was not wanted.

This hazardous buſineſs being thus fortunately accommodated, it became neceſſary for Alcibiades to attend to the motions of Tiſſaphernes, who was gone to Aſpendus to viſit the Phenician fleet there, aud had taken with him the Lacedæmonian commiſſioner Lichas, with two Peloponneſian triremes under the command of Philippus, a Spartan, ſuperintendant of Miletus. 'No leſs than a hundred and forty-ſeven ſhips of war were actually aſſembled; a force ample to give the ſuperiority to whichſoever of the belligerent powers the ſatrap might chuſe to favor. Alcibiades followed him; probably too well acquainted with both his character and his deſigns either to fear that he would afford any very effectual ſupport to the Peloponneſians, or to expect that he would be diverted from a policy ſo congenial to his nature as that of wearing out both parties, while he gave hopes to both. He knew too that it was much an object with the ſatrap to gratify his court, by doing its buſineſs with the leaſt poſſible expence.

B. C. 411. P. W. 21. April. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 87.

c. 88.

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pence. But he had nevertheleſs his end in his journey. He gained the credit, with the Athenians, of preventing the junction of the Phenician fleet with the Peloponneſians, and he diſturbed the councils and meaſures of the Peloponneſians, by giving new force to the jealouſy and miſtruſt they had for ſome time entertained of Tiſſaphernes.

SECTION VII.

Schiſm in the new government of Athens: Theramenes: a ſecond revolution.

B. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. P. W. 21. April. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 89.

WHILE, at Samos, the democratical party were held together, and concert was maintained in their proceedings, through the decided ſuperiority of one man at their head, diviſion was growing among the many men of great abilities, but of various tempers, views and intereſts, who directed the affairs of the oligarchal party at Athens. Ariſtocrates ſon of Siceſius, Theramenes one of the generals of the eſtabliſhment, and ſome others in high offices, had been for ſome time diſſatisfied with the proſpect of their affairs, inſomuch that they wanted only opportunity to diſingage themſelves from their party. On the contrary Antiphon and Peiſander, whoſe ſtrong meaſures left no means of retreating, Phrynichus, who dreaded nothing equally with the return of Alcibiades, and Ariſtarchus, upon principle the moſt inveterate

c. 90.

and

and vehement of all the enemies of democracy, together with many other men of conſiderable weight, remained firm in their purpoſe of maintaining the oligarchy. SECT. VII.

The anſwer from Alcibiades, and the account brought by their commiſſioners of the ſtate of things in Samos, added to their knowlege of the inclination to ſeceſſion within their own party, gave much uneaſineſs, but produced no diſpoſition to yield. Their propoſed reſource was to make peace with Lacedæmon; and upon any terms, rather than not make peace. With an oligarchal government they truſted that they might eaſily obtain, not peace only, but alliance and certain protection: and indeed they conſidered the means of connection with Lacedæmon as their only ground of hope, even for perſonal ſafety. Their former embaſſy having been ſtopped, as we have ſeen, Antiphon and Phrynichus now undertook the negotiation: thoſe who directed the government at home, were in the mean time to take meaſures for obviating domeſtic oppoſition. With this view it was judged of much importance to forward the completion of a fort, ſome time ſince begun, on a ſpot called Eetioneia, commanding the entrance of the harbour of Peiræus, which was already ſo far advanced that they eſtabliſhed the public magazine of corn there; and they not only cauſed all corn imported to be there depoſited, but compelled all individuals in the city, who poſſeſſed any quantity, to ſend it thither.

Meanwhile

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 89.

Meanwhile the ſame anſwer from Samos, which urged the determined ſupporters of oligarchy to theſe ſtrong meaſures, incouraged the diſſentients in their propoſed ſeceſſion. That anſwer offered them a clear overture for an accommodation. Even in Athens the body of the people was ſtill inclined to democracy; and to reſtore ſuperiority to the democratical party, leaders only were wanting, in whom the body of the people might confide. To obtain their confidence therefore became the object of Theramenes and Ariſtocrates. This would give them importance with the chiefs of the armament at Samos, and ground on which to open a treaty.

Other circumſtances followed ſtill to incourage and incite them. Antiphon and Phrynichus returned from Lacedæmon, without effecting in any degree the purpoſe of their miſſion, or however without effecting any purpoſe that they dared declare. Preſently after, intelligence arrived of a fleet aſſembling in the Laconian ports, to favor the revolt of Eubœa. Appearances gave to ſuſpect that, inſtead of Eubœa, the fleet was intended for the Attic coaſt; and that the fort of Eetioneia was intended, as much to inſure the reception of a Peloponneſian fleet, as to prevent the entrance of the Athenian into the harbour of Peiræus. Nor was this ſuſpicion, in the opinion of Thucydides, unfounded. The firſt wiſh of the oligarchal party, ſays the hiſtorian, was undoubtedly to have the command of the Athenian empire

End of April.

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empire intire: if this could not be, they would have been glad to hold the independent dominion of Attica, deprived of the ſubject-ſtates, but preſerving the fleet and the walls of the city: rather however than ſubmit to the reſtoration of democracy, which would involve their certain ruin, they would have conſented to the demolition of the fortifications of Athens and the ſurrender of the whole fleet, that their perſons and eſtates only might be ſecure under Lacedæmonian protection. The conſtruction of the fort was therefore proſecuted with the utmoſt diligence; and, as it roſe, the diſpoſition of the gates and ſally-ports, ſays the hiſtorian, ſufficiently indicated its purpoſe. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 92.

Againſt theſe meaſures, which Thucydides, no friend in general to democracy, reprobates, and which ought to have united in oppoſition every honeſt hand and heart in Athens, the firſt ſignal blow was by aſſaſſination; an act in its nature too oppoſite to all juſtice, and too ſubverſive of all order, to produce any laſting good, in whatever cauſe it may be practiſed. A few days after the return of the ambaſſadors from Lacedæmon, toward mid-day, in the full agora, and not far from the ſtate-houſe, Phrynichus was ſtabbed by one of the city-guard, and died ſoon after of the wound. The murderer eſcaped, but an accomplice, an Argian, was taken; and being put to the torture by the Four-hundred, indicated no name, nor declared anything, but that there had been frequent and numerous meetings in different houſes, parti-

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cularly in that of the commander of the city-guard [12]. No information was obtained on which any proſecution could be founded: inquiry concerning the murder dropped, the deed being evidently popular; and Theramenes and Ariſtocrates, whether conſcious of the crime or not, were incouraged by the event to proceed in their deſign. Thoſe of their party, who were of the Four-hundred, meanwhile kept their ſeats in that council, and Theramenes his office as a general of the eſtabliſhment.

Lyſ. con. Agorat. p. 136. vel. 491. Lycurg. con. Leocrat. p. 217. t. 4. Or. Gr. Reiſke.

Things were in this ſituation when the alarming intelligence arrived, that the Peloponneſian armament, inſtead of going to Eubœa, had overrun the iland of Ægina, and was now at anchor in the harbour of Epidaurus, as if threatening Athens itſelf. Theramenes had foretold that this would happen. From the event thus confirming his prediction, he took occaſion farther to animate his party againſt the party of Antiphon. 'If preventive meaſures,' he ſaid, 'were not quickly taken, the 'Peloponneſian troops would be admitted into 'the fort of Eetioneia, and a Lacedæmonian 'would command in Peiræus.' It was accordingly reſolved to ſtrike the deciſive ſtroke:

[12] The orator Lycurgus, in his accuſation of Leocrates, relates the murder of Phrynichus differently, in regard to ſome facts of little conſequence; as that it was committed by night without the city, at a fountain near ſome willowbeds: but he remarkably confirms, what is more important in the account of Thucydides, the popularity of the deed, and of the principle, that aſſaſſination in the cauſe of the people was meritorious.

a large

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a large proportion of heavy-armed were already gained, the taxis commanded by Ariſtocrates, a body nearly correſpondent to our battalion, was on duty at the works of Eetioneia, and Hermon, an officer warm in their intereſt, commanded in Munychia. Under theſe favoring circumſtances, when meaſures were not yet completely concerted, the ſoldiers, in their zeal for the cauſe, arreſted Alexicles, the general commanding in Peiræus, a man zealous in the oligarchal intereſt, put him in cloſe confinement, and then ſet themſelves to demoliſh the fort of Eetioneia.

Intelligence of this violence paſſed to Athens while the council was ſitting and Theramenes preſent. The members of the oppoſite party, alarmed and indignant, accuſed Theramenes and his immediate friends as inſtigators of ſedition. Theramenes, with ready coolneſs, replied to the charge, and propoſed to go himſelf and releaſe his collegue. This being incautiouſly approved, he went inſtantly, taking with him one of his collegues preſent, whoſe political ſentiments he knew to agree with his own. Meanwhile alarm ſpred rapidly from the ſtatehouſe through the city; it was generally ſuppoſed that Alexicles was put to death, and that the democratical party had taken poſſeſſion of Peiræus, with intention to maintain themſelves there in oppoſition to the exiſting government. While therefore Ariſtarchus, with a ſmall body of the equeſtrian order, whom he could collect in the inſtant, haſtened after Theramenes,

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ramenes, all the younger and more zealous of the oligarchal party ran to arms. The elder interfered to check the indiſcretion of zeal on both ſides, and Thucydides of Pharſalus in Theſſaly, a public gueſt of the commonwealth, particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf in appeaſing the commotion. Quiet was thus ſo far reſtored that, except the few who accompanied Ariſtarchus, none marched in arms to Peiræus.

Ariſtarchus and Theramenes arrived nearly together. The latter immediately addreſſed the ſoldiers with the authority of general, and reproved their conduct. It was however known, by many, that his words did not perfectly expreſs his ſentiments; and, while ſome attended to his ſpeech, others continued the demolition of the fort. Ariſtarchus, with thoſe of the oligarchal party about him, with much indignation interfered in vain. The ſoldiers, addreſſing themſelves to Theramenes, aſked, 'If he 'really thought it for the public good that the 'fort ſhould be completed, or if the intereſt of 'the commonwealth did not rather require that 'it ſhould be deſtroyed?' Having had time then to look about him, and ſeeing that he ſhould have ſufficient ſupport, he anſwered, 'If they were of opinion that it ought to be 'demoliſhed, he could not diſſent.' This ſufficed for the ſoldiers: the whole body ſet immediately to work; and the word was paſſed, or rather a kind of ſhort proclamation was made through Peiræus, evidently not a momentary thought of the ſoldiers themſelves, but either pre-

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preconcerted among them, or communicated by the leaders of the party: 'Whoever is for 'the government of the Five-thouſand, inſtead 'of the tyranny of the Four-hundred, let him 'aſſiſt in demoliſhing the fort.' To have named democracy, or the government of the people at large, as treaſon againſt the exiſting government, would have rendered the delinquents obnoxious to capital puniſhment; but an appeal to the Five-thouſand was legal, by the conſtitution of the Four-hundred themſelves. Numbers of the inhabitants of Peiræus obeyed the call, and the demolition of the fort proceeded rapidly.

Next day, the fort being completely deſtroyed, the ſoldiers releaſed their general Alexicles, and then going to the theater of Bacchus, adjoining to Munychia, there held a regular aſſembly. The reſult of the debate was a reſolution to march into Athens, and take poſſeſſion of the Anaceium, the precinct of a temple of Caſtor and Pollux, as a place of arms. The regularity of their proceedings, the appeal to the Five-thouſand, and the care taken to do nothing that a majority among any five thouſand of the citizens might not perhaps approve, alarmed and diſtreſſed the oligarchal leaders more than if greater violences had been committed. The Four-hundred, however, aſſembling at their uſual hour, ſent a committee to confer with the troops. Addreſſing themſelves more to individuals and to ſmall parties than to the aſſembled body, the committee endeavored

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 93.

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to conciliate the more moderate, and to perſuade them to uſe their endeavors to pacify the more violent: 'The Five-thouſand,' they ſaid, 'ſhould be immediately declared; the Four-'hundred now in office ſhould lay down their 'authority in due time; and it ſhould be for 'the Five-thouſand to decide the kind of rota-'tion and the mode of election by which their 'ſucceſſors ſhould be appointed. Meanwhile 'every deareſt intereſt ought to warn the ſol-'diers not, by any violences, to afford thoſe op-'portunities to an enemy at their gates, which 'might ſuperinduce the deſtruction of the com-'monwealth.' Theſe arguments, urged in a conciliating manner, had their effect: and it was at length agreed that, on a day named, a general aſſembly ſhould be held in the precinct of the temple of Bacchus, to conſider of means for effecting a permanent reconciliation of parties.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 94.

The day appointed being come, the people were already moving toward the temple of Bacchus, when intelligence was communicated that the Peloponneſian fleet under Hegeſandridas, conſiſting of forty-two triremes, having croſſed the gulph from Epidaurus, and touched at Megara, was at that time off Salamis. Immediately the whole force of Athens of both parties, united for the moment by the fear of a common enemy, ran down to Peiræus as by conſent; and without waiting, and moſt of them without caring, for orders from the exiſting government, each did what the exigency

of

of the moment appeared to him to require: ſome went aboard the triremes afloat; others launched thoſe hauled aſhore; ſome took poſt upon the walls, and ſome at the mouth of the harbour. The Peloponneſians however made no attempt upon the Attic coaſt, but doubling the headland of Sunium, proceeded to Oropus. SECT. VII. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 95.

New alarm then ſeized the Athenians. The diſpoſition in Eubœa to revolt was known. Already deprived of the produce of Attica by the garriſon of Deceleia, the added loſs of Eubœa, would nearly deprive them of means to ſubſiſt. Corn, meat, every article of food came principally from Eubœa. Haſtily, therefore, and under no regular direction, as in a diſſolution of government, they manned ſome triremes with ſuch crews as in the moment offered, and under the command of Thymochares, the ſquadron moved immediately for Eretria: ſome triremes ſtationed there made their total number thirty-ſix. Among the numerous proofs in hiſtory of the great defects in the antient ſyſtem of naval war, what followed is not the leaſt remarkable. Thymochares landed his crews to get refreſhment. The Eretrians, prepared for revolt, had concerted meaſures with Hegeſandridas. No proviſions were to be found in the public market; the Athenians could ſupply themſelves only from private houſes far from the port, and the crews in conſequence diſperſed over the town. A ſignal was given by the Eretrians; the Spartan admiral made acroſs the channel; and the Athenian fleet was attacked

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while the crews were in confuſion, and before all could be got aboard. After ſome reſiſtance, therefore, it was compelled to fly. Some of the ſhips eſcaped into the harbour of Chalcis; the reſt moſtly ran upon the Eretrian coaſt, and the crews fled by land. Thoſe who reached a fort occupied by an Athenian garriſon, adjoining to Eretria, were ſafe; but others, who, confiding in the friendſhip of the Eretrians, entered the city, were all put to death. Two and twenty triremes fell into the hands of the Peloponneſians; and preſently all Eubœa except Oreus revolted to them.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 96.

The conſternation at Athens, on receiving the news of this event, was greater than even from the defeat in Sicily. Attica itſelf was leſs valuable to Athens than Eubœa; not only as the ſoil was leſs fertile, but as the appropriation of the produce was leſs certain, to a power, hitherto the firſt upon earth by ſea, but inferior to its enemies by land. Nor was this the only diſtreſſing conſideration; for, had the enemy puſhed with their victorious fleet immediately for Peiræus, they might have poſſeſſed themſelves of the harbour. What preciſely might have been the conſequence was beyond human foreſight; but thus much, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, may be eſteemed certain, that nothing leſs than the return of the fleet from Samos, which would have ſuperinduced the loſs of Ionia, the Helleſpont, and in ſhort the whole forein dominion, could have ſaved Athens. It was not however upon this occa-

c. 97.

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ſion only, he continues, that the Lacedæmonians ſhowed themſelves moſt accommodating enemies to the Athenians; and thus the misfortune, which threatened the ruin of the commonwealth, proved the prelude to its reſtoration.

Before 24 June.

Twenty triremes remained ſtill in the port of Peiræus, and they were immediately manned. But, in the preſent ſtate of fermentation, who ſhould undertake the direction of public meaſures, or who could undertake it with effect, was not eaſy to determine. Probably nothing could prevent the people from aſſembling wherever public affairs were to be debated. A propoſal hazarded for ſummoning them to the Pnyx, where, under the democracy, the general aſſemblies had been moſt commonly held, met with general appprobation and no avowed oppoſition. In the Pnyx accordingly the people met; the democratical chiefs found the power in their hands; and a decree propoſed was paſſed with all the antient forms, declaring, 'That the council of Four-hundred ſhould 'be diſſolved; that the ſupreme authority ſhould 'be immediately veſted in Five-thouſand; that 'all at the time in Athens upon the roll of the 'heavy-armed ſhould be of the Five-thouſand; 'that no man in any office under the common-'wealth ſhould receive any pay.'

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 98.

This change was no ſooner decided, and the party of Theramenes in conſequence poſſeſſed of a clear ſuperiority, than Peiſander, Alexicles, Ariſtarchus, and many others of the principal

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cipal ſupporters of oligarchy, quitted Athens, and moſt of them went to Deceleia. Ariſtarchus uſed the means which his office of general afforded, in abandoning his country, to ſtrike a blow againſt it. Œnoë, that town on the Attic border againſt Bœotia, the ineffectual ſiege of which, by the army under Archidamus, had twenty-one years before been the firſt object of the Peloponneſian arms in the war, was ſtill held by an Athenian garriſon. The troops paſſing between Deceleia and Peloponneſus were frequently annoyed from it, and a party of Corinthians had been lately cut off. The Corinthian government, thus inſtigated, had invited the Bœotians to join them in reducing the place; and the ſiege was formed. When Ariſtarchus determined to fly, he commanded the attendance of ſome of the barbarian bowmen in the Athenian ſervice; and ſelecting for the purpoſe, according to the hiſtorian's phraſe, the moſt barbarian, he went to Œnoë. Having quickly concerted matters with the beſiegers, he told the garriſon that a treaty was made with Lacedæmon, according to which Œnoë muſt be immediately ſurrendered to the Bœotians. The garriſon, excluded from other information, gave credit to a man known to be in the office of general of the commonwealth; and obtaining from the beſieging army a ſafe-conduct, evacuated the place.

Antiphon, with a few oligarchal leaders of leſs note, ventured to remain in Athens; Antiphon apparently truſting in his policy, his

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eloquence, his perſonal influence, and the quiet conduct he had obſerved; directing the ſecret councils of the party, but leaving others to be the oſtenſible conductors of every meaſure. Upon the flight however of the more active leaders, oppoſition to Theramenes and his aſſociates had ceaſed. Many aſſemblies of the people were ſucceſſively held, according to the antient forms of the commonwealth, in the Pnyx: the reſtoration of Alcibiades, and of all who, for the ſame cauſe, had abſented themſelves from their country, was decreed; and the conſtitution was ſettled, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, upon a better footing than at any time within my memory[13]; a mixed government being eſtabliſhed, with the ſupreme authority judiciouſly divided between the Few and the Many.

In this conciſe eulogy is contained the whole of the account, given by Thucydides, of the form of government eſtabliſhed by Theramenes; and upon no occaſion does he leave us ſo much to regret the want of explanation and detail. Upon no occaſion, however, do we ſee the hiſtorian more ſtrongly marked as the true patriot. Frequently we find him reprobating the extravagancies of an unbalanced democracy ſo ſtrongly, that we might ſuſpect him of ſome partiality for oligarchy. But here, as indeed

[13] Ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ. *In my opinion*, Smith.—*Meo judicio*, Duker. But Duker adds, in a note, *Acacius ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ non malè vertit meâ quidem memoriâ.* I have no doubt in preferring the verſion of Acacius.

throughout

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throughout his account of the oligarchy eſtabliſhed by Peiſander, he ſhows himſelf a decided enemy to tyranny in every ſhape, and the warm partizan only of whatever government might beſt ſecure univerſal freedom through equal law.

SECTION VIII.

Tranſactions of the Peloponneſian fleet under Mindarus, and the Athenian under Thraſyllus and Thraſybulus. Naval action near Abydus. Wily and treacherous policy of Tiſſaphernes. Naval action near the Trojan ſhore. Critical arrival of Alcibiades. Naval action near Cyzicus, and capture of the Peloponneſian fleet. Laconic official letter. Liberality of Pharnabazus to the Peloponneſians. Able conduct and popularity of Hermocrates, the Syracuſan general.

B. C. 411. P. W. 21. Thucyd. l. 8. c. 99.

DURING theſe tranſactions at Athens, the Peloponneſian armament, on the Aſiatic coaſt, had been wholly ingaged with the diſtreſſes, to which the want of an adequate revenue of their own, and the failure of the ſatrap Tiſſaphernes in his ingagements, had reduced them. While all their diſpatches from their commiſſioners, Philippus who attended the ſatrap to Aſpendus, and Hippocrates a Spartan ſtationed at Phaſelis, confirmed the opinion long entertained of the faithleſſneſs of Tiſſaphernes, and of his determined purpoſe to deceive them, freſh overtures arrived from the ſatrap of Bithynia.

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Pharnabazus, having obſerved the advantage which Tiſſaphernes derived from his Grecian connection, the recovery of dominion over the Grecian towns within his ſatrapy, and of the tribute from them, which for a long time had paſſed to Athens, renewed his inſtances to the Peloponneſian commanders. Theſe united motives were ſtrong enough to induce Mindarus, the new commander-in-chief, to reſolve upon moving with the fleet to the Helleſpont. But the Athenian fleet at Samos was in the moſt favorable ſituation to intercept his paſſage; and tho his numbers were ſuperior, he deſired to avoid a general action. Secrecy and caution, however, he hoped might prevent interruption; but a ſtorm, coming upon him in the paſſage, compelled him to take ſhelter in the harbour of Icarus, and remain there five or ſix days.

During this interval, intelligence paſſed to Samos, that the Peloponneſian fleet had quitted the port of Miletus for the northward. Thraſyllus, with whom, in the abſence of Alcibiades and Thraſybulus, the chief command reſted, in all haſte moved with fifty-five triremes for the Helleſpont, anxious to arrive before the Peloponneſians; but, in his paſſage, learning that Mindarus, from Icarus, had gone with his fleet to Chios, and remained there, he put into Methymnë in Leſbos. Beſide that Methymnë was a commodious ſtation for watching the Peloponneſian fleet, the affairs of that valuable iland required his attention. Some men of the firſt families of Methymnë, exiles

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 100. Beginning of July.

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exiles on account of their averſion to democracy and the Athenian intereſt, had propoſed to profit from preſent circumſtances for reſtoring themſelves to their country; the Peloponneſian armament being at hand, the two ſatraps friendly, and Athens diſtracted by ſedition. Having accordingly collected a ſmall force on the continent, in purſuance of the common prejudice in favor of a leader from the mother-country, they put themſelves under the conduct of Anaxarchus, a Theban; the Bœotians being eſteemed the parent people of the Æolian race, and particularly of the Leſbians [14]. Their firſt attempt was a ſurprize upon Methymnë itſelf: but the vigilance of the Athenian commander in Mitylenë diſappointing them, they haſtened acroſs the heights which divide

[14] Ἀναξάρχου Θηβαίου, κατὰ τὸ συγγενὶς, ἡγουμένου. Hoc Thucydides, 3. 86. 6. 88. & alibi de populis ejuſdem originis & conſanguineis dicit. Quænam autem ſit Thebanorum, & Methymnæorum, vel Cymæorum, ſi quis hoc ad eos pertinere putabit, συγγένεια, nunc non ſcio, nec vacat quærere. Duker.— I own I am better pleaſed with ſuch direct confeſſion, than when thoſe who undertake to be commentators, paſs by difficult paſſages, often of much more hiſtorical importance, as if there were no difficulty in them. One cannot, however, but wonder at Duker's difficulty here, becauſe the conſanguinity of the Leſbians and Bœotians not only is mentioned by Thucydides in his account of the Mitylenæan revolt, (b. 3. c. 2.) but the ſcholiaſt, commenting upon the paſſage, explains it clearly thus:— Καὶ παρασκευάζονται (οἱ Αἰόλιοι) ὥστε ἀποστῆναι, ξυλλαμβανόντων αὐτοῖς Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν. Τὸ δὲ ΣΥΓΓΕΝΩΝ ΟΝΤΩΝ ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἐκτέον· οὗτοι γὰρ κατὰ τὸ Αἰολικὸν συγγενεῖς τῶν Αἰολίων. Nor is this explanation warranted by the ſcholiaſt alone; Strabo is full on the ſubject.

I have

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divide the iland, and by a ſudden aſſault took Ereſus. Intelligence of theſe circumſtances had called Thraſybulus with five triremes to Leſbos; he found there two Athenian triremes and five Methymnæan, and Thraſyllus now joined him with fifty-five. The heavy-armed were debarked, and preparations was made to attack Ereſus by ſea and land.

Meanwhile Mindarus, ſtill deſirous to avoid action with the Athenian fleet, and conſidering the buſineſs of Ereſus as a ſmall concern, left his Methymnæan friends to their fate, and made his courſe along the Aſiatic ſhore for the Helleſpont. Thucydides has thought important enough for notice what would now appear utterly trifling, except as it marks, more ſtrongly than anything that has yet occurred, the imperfection of the marine of that age. Speed was the great point with Mindarus, both for avoiding the Athenians in the paſſage, and for being before them in the Helleſpont: but as

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 101.

I have been induced to inlarge ſo far on this little matter, principally on account of the teſtimony which we here find from Thucydides, in confirmation of Strabo's account of the origin of the Æolian Greeks of Aſia, which has been followed in the account given of the Æolic migration, in the ſecond ſection of the fifth chapter of this Hiſtory. It is indeed, not without attention to ſuch little detached ſcraps of information, wherever they can be found among the works of the moſt authoritative antient writers, that we are inabled to collect the ſcattered members of early Grecian Hiſtory; to detect the ſuppoſititious and doubtful among what is related by inferior or later authors; to aſcertain and arrange the genuine; and, without the aſſiſtance of invention, to form, of parts ſo broken and diſperſed, ſomething of a harmonizing whole.

oars

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oars were his inſtruments of motion, intervals of reſt were neceſſary for his crews; and, as we have already had occaſion to obſerve, the conſtruction of a trireme was ſuch, and the crews ſo numerous for the ſpace, that refreſhment could not conveniently be taken aboard. Mindarus therefore landed his crews to dine at a port of the Phocæan territory, and to ſup at Arginuſæ in the Cumæan territory, overagainſt Leſbos, where lay the Athenian fleet, which he was ſo anxious to avoid. Moving again, however, in the night, he dined next day at Harmatous, and proceeding in the afternoon with the utmoſt haſte, part of his fleet arrived before midnight at Rhœteium, within the Helleſpont, and the reſt in the harbour of Sigeium at its mouth. Eighteen Athenian triremes were lying in the harbour of Seſtos. Fire-ſignals from the Aſiatic ſhore announced to them their danger, and they haſtened to get out of the narrow ſea. Four were intercepted[15]; one, forced aſhore near a temple dedicated to Homer's hero Proteſilaus, was taken with its crew; the crews of the other three eſcaped.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 102.

[15] Smith gives to ſuppoſe, by his tranſlation, that eight were taken; the Latin verſion more happily imitates all that is dubious in the original. I think Thucydides meant to ſpeak only of four taken. The matter is not important; but it may be obſerved that, as Thucydides never completed his Hiſtory, the latter chapters, and indeed much of the laſt book, bear marks of undigeſted compilation, and, in ſome places, of uncorrected phraſe. I ſhould however rather ſuppoſe the whole his own unfiniſhed work, than that the concluding part was written by another, it has been ſaid by his daughter, from his materials.

The

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The Athenian commanders had truſted that the Peloponneſian fleet could not paſs Leſbos without being diſcovered by their ſcouts. Receiving intelligence that it was already in the Helleſpont, they followed immediately, and in their paſſage took two Peloponneſian triremes, which had incautiouſly puſhed too far in purſuing the Athenian ſquadron from Seſtos. On the ſecond day they arrived at Elæus, upon which place Mindarus had been making an unſucceſsful attempt. His fleet, reïnforced with a ſquadron which he found at Abydus, conſiſted of eighty-ſix triremes. Thraſybulus and Thraſyllus, with only ſixty-eight, reſolved to offer him battle [16]. Five days they employed in preparation in the harbour of Elæus, and then moved into the ſtrait, with their line of battle formed ahead. The Peloponneſians came out of the harbour of Abydus, and formed for action. The Athenians extending their line, to prevent being taken in flank by the more numerous enemy, weakened their center, which the Peloponneſians in conſequence broke, and driving fifteen triremes aſhore, debarked and deſtroyed them. This advantage, however, produced diſorder in the Peloponneſian line, of which Thraſybulus, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, inſtantly took advantage;

Middle of July.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 105.

[16] There can be no doubt but Acacius and Hudſon are right in their correction of the ſtatement of the numbers of the two fleets in this place. It does not reſt on conjecture, or on the authority of Diodorus, but is ſupported by the clear teſtimony of Thucydides himſelf.

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and being quickly well ſeconded by Thraſyllus, they put the whole Peloponneſian fleet to flight, and took twenty-one ſhips: the reſt found refuge in the neighbouring port of Abydus. The Peloponneſians acknowleged their defeat, by the uſual application through heralds for the reſtoration of the dead, and the Athenians erected their trophy on the headland of Cynos-ſema.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 106.

This victory, gained with inferior numbers, was very opportune for the Athenians. The depreſſion of the ſpirits of the ſeamen, produced by the defeats at Syracuſe, was done away, and they no longer feared the Peloponneſians as their equals in naval action. A trireme, ſent to Athens with the news, diffuſed more than common joy. It was as the firſt ſymptom of recovery from a mortal diſeaſe; the more welcome as the more unexpected. Leaders and people were equally incouraged to bear preſent evils, and exert themſelves with good hope; giving, their attention particularly to, what in the moment moſt preſſed, the revolt of Eubœa, and the diſorders occaſioned by the late ſedition.

c. 107. The advantages, to be expected from a ſucceſsful battle, followed the victory of Cynos-ſema: the allies and dependants, remaining to Athens, were confirmed in their fidelity; thoſe who had revolted were leſs ſatisfied with the part they had taken; and means were opened for new enterprize. The fleet ſailed for Cyzicus; eight Peloponneſian triremes, returning from Byzantium, were taken by the way; and Cyzicus,

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Cyzicus, unfortified, ſurrendering without a blow, paid for its change of politics by a heavy contribution. Meanwhile the Peloponneſian commanders, afraid to keep the ſea, and apprehenſive of loſing all they had gained on the Aſiatic and Helleſpontine ſhores, ſent for their fleet from Eubœa to reïnforce them. Alcibiades ſoon after rejoined the Athenian fleet with thirteen ſhips, bringing with him the incouraging aſſurance, that he had completely diverted Tiſſaphernes from his purpoſe of permitting the Phenician fleet to join the Peloponneſian, and that he had finally conciliated him to the Athenian intereſt. He ſeems, however, not to have obtained any pecuniary ſupply. To procure means therefore for ſubſiſting the armament, for which little or no remittance could be expected from home, he went ſouthward again with a ſquadron of twenty-two triremes; levied large contributions at Halicarnaſſus, and in the neighbouring country; and fixing upon the iland of Cos as a convenient ſtation, from which to command the Carian ſeas and ſhores, he raiſed a fort and left a garriſon there.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 108.

Tiſſaphernes, meanwhile, more wily than wiſe, and true to nothing but his evervarying opinion of his own intereſt, was very uneaſy at the departure of the Peloponneſian fleet from Miletus. He not only apprehended the loſs of advantages derived from his Grecian alliance, but he envied the probable acceſſion of thoſe advantages to Pharnabazus. From Aſpendus, therefore,

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therefore, he haſtened back into Ionia, and on his arrival found freſh cauſe of diſſatisfaction. The Cnidians, after the example of the Mileſians, had expelled his garriſon from their citadel. Nor did the evil reſt there. The Greeks under the Perſian dominion, in general perhaps leſs rigorouſly treated than under the Athenian, would yet be more liable, eſpecially in the decay of the empire, to occaſional oppreſſion from the temper of individuals in command. Arſaces, an officer under Tiſſaphernes, of a cruel and faithleſs diſpoſition, had made himſelf particularly odious, by treacherouſly aſſaſſinating ſome of the Delians whom, on their expulſion from their iland by the Athenians, the kindneſs of the ſatrap Pharnaces had eſtabliſhed in Atramytteium. The Antandrians, oppreſſed by this man, and fearing further oppreſſion, had applied to the Peloponneſians at Abydus; and a body of Peloponneſian heavy-armed, whom they conducted over the heights of Ida, aſſiſted in expelling the Perſian garriſon from their citadel.

Thucyd. l. 8. c. 109.

c. 108. Ch. 16. ſ. 5. of this Hiſt.

Alarmed by all theſe circumſtances, Tiſſaphernes reſolved to go himſelf to the Helleſpont, to confer and remonſtrate with the Peloponneſian commanders. Stopping in his way at Epheſus, he performed a ſacrifice to Diana. Such a compliment to ſuch a religion as the Greek, from a Perſian, tho a weak man, in the high ſituation of Tiſſaphernes, and whether ſuperſtition or policy produced it, appears ſtrong proof that decay in various ways had been making

c. 109. Beg. of Aug.

king rapid progreſs in the Perſian empire. With the mention of this very remarkable fact, the narrative of Thucydides ends abruptly. SECT. VIII.

Fortunately for Grecian hiſtory and for literature, another cotemporary author, little inferior in abilities, at leaſt equal in acquirements, and even of more extenſive communication among men, has left us a continuation. But the narrative of Xenophon begins as abruptly as that of Thucydides ends; and tho there appears no material chaſm, nothing important omitted, yet the connection is not complete [17].

[17] It has been diſputed among the learned, whether the account of Xenophon begins preciſely where that of Thucydides breaks off. Unqueſtionably Xenophon has intended a complete continuation; and Dodwell, in his Xenophontean Chronology, appears to me to have proved ſatisfactorily that there is no chaſm, or next to none, in the narrative. But there is a circumſtance, unnoticed, I believe, by the commentators, which very ſtrongly contradicts the notion of a chaſm: it is the mention made by Xenophon of the completion of the journey of Tiſſaphernes, (the beginning of which is related by Thucydides) ſtating the time of his arrival at the Helleſpont. The Hellenics, or Grecian Annals, are however, evidently enough, a work which has not received the finiſhing touches of the author: in the very beginning of it he ſeems rather to have taken ſome ſhort notes of Thucydides, or to have made ſome of his own, and left them for future correction, which was never given; and thus, tho all the principal facts intended for mention are recorded, yet they are neither ſeparately ſo clearly related, nor is the connection ſo perſpicuous, as might be expected from ſuch a writer. The firſt paragraph, Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλαῖς ἡμέραις ὕστερον, κ. τ. ε. bears all the appearance of an undigeſted note. Μετὰ ταῦτα has ſcarcely been intended to relate to the ſacrifice of Tiſſaphernes at Epheſus, with the mention of which the Hiſtory of Thucydides ends, but rather to ſomething in the courſe of relating which, had the work received the finiſhing touches of the author, the place of the inſuing action would have been ſtated.

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. f. 1. The firſt fact mentioned by Xenophon in his Grecian annals, is, that Thymochares, the Athenian commander in the unfortunate action near Eretria, arriving with a few ſhips from Athens, had a ſecond action with the Peloponneſian ſquadron under Hegeſandridas, and was again defeated. Where this action happpened, whether ſtill on the Eubœan coaſt, or whether Hegeſandridas obeyed the ſummons of Mindarus, and Thymochares followed him toward the Helleſpont, we are not informed.

B. C. 411. P. W. 21. End of Sept. Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. f. 2. Soon after this, and a little after the autumnal equinox, the Thurian commander, Dorieus ſon of Diagoras, coming from Rhodes to the Helleſpont with fourteen triremes, notice of his approach was communicated by ſignals to the Athenian commanders in Seſtos, and twenty triremes were ſent to intercept them. The Peloponneſian fleet ſtill lay at Abydus: the commander in chief, Mindarus, was at the time in the neighbouring town of Ilium, on or near the ſite of antient Troy, performing a ſacrifice to Minerva. The ſituation commanded a view of the ſtrait, and of the adjacent ſea; and he ſaw the movement of the Athenians, and the danger of Dorieus. Haſtening to Abydus, he led his whole fleet out of the harbour. The whole Athenian fleet upon this moved, and a general action inſued. Through the greateſt part of the day it was maintained with various ſucceſs in different parts of the line; but toward evening eighteen Athenian triremes were ſeen coming into the ſtrait from the ſouthward. They were

f. 3.

the

the ſquadron of Alcibiades returning from the Carian coaſt. Then the Peloponneſians fled toward Abydus; but Abydus had no harbour that could protect them: that dubious kind of action between land and water, of which we have already obſerved many examples, could alone defend their ſtranded galleys. Fortunately for them, the ſatrap Pharnabazus was at hand with a conſiderable land-force. Of widely different character from the deceitful and timid Tiſſaphernes, Pharnabazus rode at the head of his cavalry, as far as his horſe would carry him, into the ſea, to relieve his diſtreſſed allies. Through the protection thus afforded, the crews moſtly eſcaped; but the Athenians carried off thirty triremes. Thraſyllus went to Athens to announce the victory, and deſire reïnforcement; and Alcibiades, judging forty triremes now ſufficient for the ſtation at Seſtos, ſent the reſt of the fleet various ways, to collect contributions which might ſupply immediate need. SECT. VIII. Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 4. ſ. 5.

Nothing further of importance had occurred, when Tiſſaphernes arrived at the Helleſpont [18]. Alcibiades went to wait upon him, expecting a reception more favorable than formerly, in proportion as his own circumſtances were improved, as he had leſs need of perſonal aſſiſtance, and more power to ſerve or injure. He did not however neglect to carry preſents, both ſuch as Grecian hoſpitality preſcribed, and ſuch as the ſ. 6.

[18] Εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον.

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eaſtern great were wont to expect, or be gratified with [19]; but he found himſelf greatly deceived. The faithleſs ſatrap, alledging orders from the king to conſider the Athenians as enemies, cauſed him to be arreſted and ſent priſoner to Sardis. After a confinement of about a month, however, he eſcaped to Clazomenæ, a city of the Athenian alliance; whence with ſix ſhips [20], which he found there, he returned to his fleet in the Helleſpont.

B. C. 410. Ol. 92. 2. P. W. 22. March.

While Alcibiades was thus abſent, and the Athenian fleet ſcattered, Mindarus having received reïnforcements which made his fleet ſixty triremes, propoſed to attack the forty which lay at Seſtos; but timely intelligence of his intention coming to the commanders, they withdrew by night to Cardia, at the bottom of the gulph on the other ſide of the Cherſoneſe. Alcibiades joined them there; but he joined them with other hopes than he had given, both the armament and the people at home, to entertain. All the expectations, which he had raiſed ſo high, of aſſiſtance from the great king through the ſatrap of Lydia, the coöperation of the

[19] Thus I ſuppoſe the ξένιά τε καὶ δῶρα of Xenophon may be interpreted, the former word relating to the Grecian cuſtoms, the latter to the Perſian.

[20] Σὺν πέντε τριήρεσι καὶ ἑπακτίδι. Cum quinque triremibus et una navi actuaria. Xenophon ſeems afterward to reckon the ἑπακτὶς among the ναῦς. I do not recollect that Thucydides ever gives the title of ναῦς to any but ſhips of war, except once to a merchant-ſhip of very large ſize, ναῦς μυριοφόρος, in the harbour of Syracuſe. l. 7. c. 25.

Phenician

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Phenician fleet, and, what was of ſtill more importance to the commonwealth and what would be incomparably more felt by the armament, the pay which would never fail, were at an end. Deprived of Ionia, of the Helleſpontine cities, of the Thracian colonies, of Attica itſelf, and retaining but a precarious dominion over a part of Eubœa, the ſources of that revenue, by which the commonwealth had hitherto been powerful, were gone; and the pay of Perſia, promiſed by Alcibiades, was what both the armament abroad and the people at home depended upon, for means to recover their loſſes, and to ſupport even a defenſive war.

In theſe circumſtances, Alcibiades ſaw that daring meaſures and quick deciſion were neceſſary, both for himſelf and for the commonwealth. Mindarus, diſappointed of his purpoſe againſt the fleet at Seſtos, by its retreat to Cardia, had moved to Cyzicus; and, Pharnabazus meeting him with his land-forces, that defenceleſs town was compelled again to receive its law from the enemies of Athens. Alcibiades reſolved, tho with a force conſiderably inferior, to ſeek them there. From Cardia he moved to Seſtos; and every preparation being made that circumſtances admitted, orders were already iſſued for proceeding up the Propontis, when Theramenes arrived from Macedonia, and Thraſybulus from Thaſus, each with twenty triremes. This fortunate reïnforcement made new conſideration neceſſary: it was important to conceal from the enemy the increaſed numbers of

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. f. 9.

f. 8.

f. 10.

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of the fleet. On arriving therefore at the iland of Prœconneſus, a proclamation was iſſued, denouncing capital puniſhment againſt any who ſhould be taken in the attempt to croſs to the Aſiatic ſhore. The ſoldiers and ſeamen were then ſummoned, as to a popular aſſembly; and Alcibiades, addreſſing them, ventured to declare, without reſerve, the neceſſities of their ſituation. 'Supplies,' he ſaid, 'to the amount 'that the proſecution of the war would require, 'were not within their preſent power to obtain, 'or within the means of the commonwealth to 'afford: the enemy on the contrary, ſupported 'by the wealth of Perſia, knew no want. Vi'gorous exertion and quick deciſion were there'fore indiſpenſable: they muſt prepare for ac'tion both by ſea and land; and by land both 'in the field, and in the attack of fortifications.' Paſt ſucceſs, ſuperiority of preſent ſtrength, and an opinion of their general's ability, gave confidence, and the ſpeech of Alcibiades was received with applauſe; the aſſembly was diſmiſſed, all were ordered aboard, and the fleet, conſiſting of eighty-ſix ſhips, got under way.

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 11.

A heavy rain preſently came on, which favored the purpoſe of ſurprizing the enemy. As the fleet approached Cyzicus, the weather cleared, and the enemy's fleet, of ſixty triremes, was ſeen exerciſing, at ſuch a diſtance from the port that its return was already intercepted. The Peloponneſians, diſcovering the Athenian fleet ſo much ſtronger than they had expected, were in great conſternation. They had no hope of

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ſucceſs in naval action, and the enemy was between them and their port. The reſource which the nature of the antient marine afforded, was to make for the neareſt ſhore, and depend upon the aſſiſtance of their land-force for the protection of their ſtranded ſhips. Alcibiades, aware of their intention, paſſing with twenty ſhips beyond their line, debarked his people. Mindarus, ſeeing this, alſo debarked, met Alcibiades, was defeated, and himſelf ſlain. The crews of the whole Peloponneſian fleet then fled; and except the Syracuſan ſquadron, burnt by its own people, every ſhip was carried off by the Athenians. Cyzicus was abandoned, both by the Peloponneſians and by the ſatrap; and next day the Athenian fleet approaching, the inhabitants immediately ſurrendered.

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 12.

ſ. 13.

This important ſucceſs, which left the enemy in the moment without a fleet, would of courſe go far to reſtore the animation of the armament, and the popularity of the commander. But the ſituation of Alcibiades was ſtill of extreme difficulty. The government at home could not yet the more for his victory ſupply his armament. Inſtead therefore of proſecuting operations againſt the enemy, his firſt attention was neceſſarily ſtill to be given to the providing of ſubſiſtence for his own people. Remaining twenty days at Cyzicus, he raiſed large contributions there. The hiſtorian remarks that the Cyzicenes experienced no other ſeverity; as if he thought another general might not have been ſo indulgent: tho in the defenceleſs ſtate of their

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their town, to have avoided contending with the united force of the Peloponneſians and the ſatrap, it ſhould ſeem, could not very reaſonably be imputed to them as a crime. The fleet then went to Perinthus and Selymbria, where contributions were alſo raiſed. Proceeding thence to Chryſopolis in the Chalcedonian territory, near the entrance of the Euxine, Alcibiades cauſed that place to be fortified, and eſtabliſhed there a cuſtom-houſe for levying a duty of a tenth in value of all cargoes paſſing the ſtrait. This mode of collecting a revenue requiring force, he left, beſide a garriſon, thirty ſhips there, with Theramenes and Eubulus to command. With the reſt of the fleet he returned to the Helleſpont.

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 14.

ſ. 15. While Alcibiades was thus profiting from victory, the Peloponneſians were ſuffering diſtreſs, of which a very remarkable picture remains in the letter written to the Spartan government by Hippocrates, to whom the command-in-chief devolved on the death of Mindarus. It was intercepted by the Athenians, and, being reported in the original dialect by Xenophon, is among the moſt curious and authentic ſpecimens of Laconic writing. In any change of language it muſt ſuffer, but it ran nearly thus: 'Succeſs hath turned againſt us: 'Mindarus is ſlain: the men hunger: what to 'do we know not.' Theſe four ſhort ſentences made the whole of the diſpatch.

ſ. 16. The Peloponneſians, however, found an able and generous friend in the ſatrap Pharnabazus, who

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who not only relieved their wants but ſoothed their feelings: 'Their loſs in men,' he ſaid, 'had not been great, and the meer loſs of ſhips 'ought not to diſpirit them: the king's domi-'nions abounded with materials; and they 'ſhould ſoon have another fleet.' Diſtributing then to every man of the armament a garment, and ſubſiſtence for two months, he ſent the generals [21] and commanders of triremes to Antandrus, at the ſouthern foot of Mount Ida, where timber abounded, to ſuperintend the conſtruction of a fleet; directing, that as many veſſels ſhould be built for every ſtate of the confederacy as had been loſt by each in the late action. That the ſeamen might not in the mean time be totally idle or uſeleſs, furniſhing them with heavy armour, which was a gratification, inaſmuch as an idea of ſuperior honor was attached to the ſervice of the heavy-armed, he appointed them to the guard of the maritime territory.

Xenoph. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 17.

While the Peloponneſians were employed in building a fleet at Antandrus, the Antandrians themſelves were buſied in raiſing walls for the defence of their town. But among the numbers of the Peloponneſian armament, in this

[21] Military and naval command were conſtantly, among the antients, united in the ſame perſon, whence they had but one title for the commanders-in-chief in the two ſervices. The complete ſeparation of the two commands, with us, has produced diſtinct titles; and hence we are without a word to expreſs the office which united the two, as the antient languages are without terms to expreſs the diſtinction. The term General here is not accurate, but we have none more ſo.

unavoidable

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unavoidable intermiſſion of military enterprize, ſome would have times of total leiſure; and ſome, notwithſtanding the endeavors of Pharnabazus to obviate the evil, would be likely to abuſe that leiſure. In theſe circumſtances, none among the various people who compoſed the armament, behaved ſo unexceptionably toward the people of the country as the Syracuſans: and this was the more remarkable, as diſcipline was much leſs inforced by law among them than among any of the Peloponneſian forces, or even the Athenian; the Syracuſan democracy being a conſtitution far leſs well regulated than the Athenian. But Hermocrates had been reſtored to the command of the Syracuſan ſquadron; and he not only himſelf poſſeſſed the confidence of all under him, but he taught the ſuperior officers to acquire the confidence of the inferior, and theſe that of the multitude. Thus a gradation of influence ſupplied the place of ſubordination inforced by penalty, and a ſtrict diſcipline was founded upon reverence and affection. To effect this requires the moſt capacious mind united with the moſt refined temper, and is indeed among the moſt exalted efforts of human genius. The benevolence of Hermocrates led the way for thoſe under his command to be benevolent, and the leiſure of the Syracuſans was employed in aſſiſting the Antandrians in the conſtruction of their fortifications. In gratitude for this kindneſs, a decree of the Antandrian people gave the freedom of their city to all the people of Syracuſe.

Xen. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 21.

Meanwhile Syracuſe, led by faction, was preparing a moſt ungrateful return for its meritorious officers. Hermocrates and his collegues, for he had not been intruſted alone with the chief command, were not only ſuperſeded, but, without a trial, without an opportunity to ſpeak for themſelves, and while they were ignorant even that they were accuſed, baniſhment was decreed againſt all of them. The news of their being deprived of the rights of citizens in their own country, reached them juſt as their good deeds had procured an extenſion of the rights of citizenſhip to every one of their fellowcountrymen; a privilege indeed little likely to be very advantageous to many individuals, but honorable to the commonwealth, as well as to the generals and army for whoſe ſake it was given. The troops and ſeamen were called together, and Hermocrates addreſſed them for himſelf and his collegues. 'Irregular as the proceedings againſt 'them,' he ſaid, 'had been, and unjuſt as the 'condemnation, they ſhould nevertheleſs ſubmit to the voice of their country; and as their 'legal authority was abrogated, and their appointed ſucceſſors not arrived, it would be 'proper for the armament to elect their own 'commanders for the interval.' Xen. Hellen. l. 1. ſ. 1, c. 18.

His ſpeech was anſwered with ſhouts from the ſoldiers and ſeamen, declaring their approbation of the conduct of their preſent generals. The principal officers not only declined to offer themſelves for the command, but, in the name c. 19.

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of the whole armament, desired that Hermocrates and his collegues would hold it till the new generals should arrive. In reply, they admonished to avoid whatever might bear the appearance of sedition. 'The time will come,' they said, 'when, in a constitutional manner, 'we shall desire your honest support to us 'against a malicious prosecution. You will 'then declare how many battles you have 'fought, how many ships you have taken, what 'general success has attended you under our 'command; and you will relate the testimony 'of the whole confederate armament to your 'merit and ours, manifested in the post of ho-'nor which has been constantly assigned to us 'upon all occasions, by sea and land.' The admonition had the full effect proposed from it. Nothing disorderly insued. A unanimous declaration only was made, that the generals were without blame, and the request was persisted in, that they would hold the command till their appointed successors arrived. Soon afterward Demarchus, Myscon and Potames came from Syracuse, and the command passed into their hands without any commotion. The armament however showed that they would not have suffered any violence to the persons of their former generals; and most of the trierarchs entered into an agreement upon oath, to exert themselves, on returning to Syracuse, for procuring their restoration to their country.

Xen. Hellen. l. 1. s. 1. c. 20.

History affords few examples of so warm an attachment in an armament to the persons of their

their generals, united with ſo juſt a conſideration of the welfare of the country, and of the conſtitutional authority of thoſe to whoſe party principles they were adverſe, and with whoſe meaſures they were highly and juſtly diſſatisfied. Hermocrates, diſmiſſed from his command, was ſtill capable of ſerving the common cauſe, and of promoting thoſe meaſures for ruining the power of Athens, for which he had long been zealous. He went to Lacedæmon, where he was honorably received, and explained to the government there the ſtate of things in Aſia; particularly the conduct, the character, and the deſigns of the Perſian ſatraps, the frank generoſity of Pharnabazus, and the crafty intereſtedneſs of Tiſſaphernes. Having thus confirmed the reſolution to carry on the war, and opened views to the means, and at the ſame time ſtrengthened his own intereſt among the principal men of Lacedæmon, which might be important toward the promotion of his views at Syracuſe, he returned to Aſia, where Pharnabazus received him with diſtinguiſhed friendſhip. Not waiting for ſolicitation, the generous Perſian was forward to relieve his wants and promote his wiſhes; giving money unaſked, with which Hermocrates prepared triremes and hired ſeamen, to aſſiſt the common cauſe in which he had ſhown ſo much zeal and ability; and to aſſiſt afterward, if occaſion ſhould be, the party with which he was connected in his own country, and promote his reſtoration.

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Xen. Hellen. l. 1. ſ. 1. c. 2.

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SECTION IX.

Effects of the naval ſucceſſes of the Athenians. Reïnforcement under Thraſyllus: His tranſactions on the Ionian coaſt. Winter campaign of Alcibiades. Defeat of Pharnabazus. Weakneſs of the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration.

B.C. $\frac{410}{409}$. Winter. THE affairs of Lacedæmon were at this time ill adminiſtered; while Athens, ſo lately ſuppoſed ruined in Sicily, and ſince upon the point of bringing deſtruction upon itſelf, was again riſing toward a ſuperiority over the Peloponneſian confederacy, tho the Peloponneſian confederacy was ſupported by the wealth of Perſia.

Xen. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 23. The effects of returning proſperity ſpred: a party in Thaſus, in the Athenian intereſt, roſe upon the Lacedæmonian ſuperintendant, and expelled him, together with thoſe citizens who principally favored the Peloponneſian cauſe. Paſippidas, who had been ſent from Lacedæmon to take the command-in-chief on the Aſiatic ſtation, and had collected a ſmall ſquadron at Chios, was accuſed of being privy to the revolt, induced by bribes from Tiſſaphernes. What intereſt of Tiſſaphernes this meaſure was to promote, does not appear; but the accuſation ſo far had credit at Sparta, that Paſippidas was recalled and baniſhed, and Crateſippidas was ſent to ſucceed him in the command.

About the ſame time an occurrence within Attica itſelf, otherwiſe little important, contributed to raiſe the ſpirits of the Athenian people, and to confirm the hope which had begun to revive among them, that they ſhould be finally ſuperior in the war. Agis, marching out of Deceleia for plunder, approached Athens. Thraſyllus, taking the command as a general of the eſtabliſhment, led out the whole force of the city, and formed for battle near the gymnaſium of the Lyceium. Agis had apparently not expected ſuch a meaſure, only becauſe in the whole courſe of the war the Athenians had hitherto avoided it. Being probably now not ſtrong enough prudently to meet their numbers, he withdrew haſtily; and the Athenian light-armed, following his retreat, made ſome ſlaughter of his rear. Great credit was given to Thraſyllus for his conduct on this occaſion. The reïnforcement for the armament in the Helleſpont, which it was his principal buſineſs in Athens to requeſt, was voted with alacrity; a thouſand heavy-armed, a hundred horſe, and fifty triremes; and he was authorized to ſelect the heavy-armed from among the citizens inrolled for that ſervice. To give more ſecurity then to the communication by ſea from Athens eaſtward, particularly with Eubœa, and perhaps to afford ſome protection to the ſilver mines of Laureium, Thoricum, near the Suniad promontory, was fortified, and a garriſon eſtabliſhed there. Xen. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 24.

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Agis, not a prince of ſhining abilities, had however the merit of diligence in his command. On his firſt appointment, he ſeems to have been highly ſatisfied with it; but the late turn in the fortune of war in favor of Athens, was likely to render it leſs agreeable. Hitherto he had had a decided ſuperiority: all Attica was either under his orders, or liable to the terror of his arms; and even the glory of conqueror of Athens ſeemed within his hope. But ſhould the Athenians acquire a decided ſuperiority in the Helleſpont and on the Aſiatic coaſt; ſhould Alcibiades then return with his powerful fleet and troops flushed with conqueſt; and ſhould the Perſian ſatrap not furniſh money to inable the Lacedæmonians to maintain, together with a powerful fleet, ſuch a force through the year in Deceleia as the ſupplies to be obtained from their own confederacy certainly would not inable them to maintain; he might be reduced to act on the defenſive, and riſk even to be without means to defend himſelf. Urged by theſe conſiderations, he ſent a remonſtrance to the government at home. It was to little purpoſe, he obſerved, that he and the army with him had been ſo long uſing their diligence by land to deprive Athens of the produce of Attica, if the ſea could furniſh the city with that plenty, which, before his eyes, was continually paſſing into the harbour of Peiræus. He therefore propoſed that a ſquadron ſhould be ſtationed at Byzantium and Chalcedon, to intercept the veſſels from the Euxine (for it was from the fertile ſhores of that

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 25.

that ſea that Greece had long been accuſtomed to ſupply the deficiency of its produce in corn) and he recommended Cleärchus ſon of Rhamphias, a public gueſt of the Byzantines, for the command. The propoſal was approved; fifteen ſhips were collected from the allied ſtates, moſtly from Megara, for there were none in the ports of Laconia; and, under the Spartan Cleärchus, they ſailed for their deſtination. In paſſing the Helleſpont, three were taken by the nine Athenian guardſhips always ſtationed there: with the remaining twelve, Cleärchus was fortunate enough to reach Byzantium. Herod. l. 7. c. 147.

In ſpring the armament under Thraſyllus ſailed from Peiræus. It was reſolved that, before it joined the fleet under Alcibiades, ſomething ſhould be undertaken in Ionia. Poſſibly, while Alcibiades occupied the attention of Pharnabazus and the Peloponneſian commanders, ſome part of that rich country might be reco- Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 1, 2. B. C. 409. Ol. 92. 4.[23] P. W. 23.

[23] This date is Dodwell's. Xenophon is far from being equally accurate with Thucydides in marking times and ſeaſons; but he has ſpecified the year, here intended, as an Olympic year, and, unleſs interpolation is to be ſuſpected, as that of the ninety-third olympiad; which, according to the chronologers was the year 408 before the Chriſtian æra. I am utterly unſatisfied with Dodwell's correction, in which he has followed Diodorus: I much rather give credit to Xenophon for knowing what happened in the year of the ninety-third Olympiad. But, doing ſo, I am unable to divide the years of the Peloponneſian war, from the time when the narrative of Thucydides ends, ſo that Xenophon and Thucydides may agree. Dodwell's boaſt may perhaps ſuffice for my apology: Intelliget autem operis a nobis ſuſcepti difficultatem, qui expenderit quid viri maximi tentarint in primis Xenophontis annis, Petavius et Petitus, nec tamen operam noſtram ſupervacuam fecerint. Dodw. Ann. Xen. in ann. Bel. Pel. 21.

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vered to the Athenian dominion. But if no laſting acquiſition could be made, contributions might be levied; and, by hoſtile incurſions, thoſe ſupplies might be taken from the territories acknowleging the authority of Tiſſaphernes, which were no longer to be expected from that ſatrap's friendſhip. To give more efficacy to the force he commanded, Thraſyllus armed five thouſand of his ſeamen as targeteers. Uſually they carried only light armour; but he propoſed to make them act with his regular middle-armed. Having touched at Samos, he proceeded to the Mileſian coaſt, and, debarking near Pygela, ravaged the country. A body of Mileſians coming to aſſiſt the Pygelians in the protection of their property, fell upon the Athenian light-armed, ſcattered in queſt of booty, and put them to flight. But the numerous targeteers of the Athenian armament were at hand; and ſupported by only two lochi of heavy-armed, they attacked the purſuing Mileſians, and routed them with conſiderable ſlaughter. Two hundred ſhields were taken, and the ſucceſs was thought important enough to warrant the erection of a trophy [24].

Thraſyllus, however, did not follow the blow; whether he found the ſtrength of Miletus too great, or intelligence received induced him to turn his arms another way. On the day follow-

[24] The SHIELD, ἀσπὶς, always implies a heavy-armed ſoldier. Two hundred targets, πέλται, taken, would by no means have been of equal conſequence, and two hundred light-armed ſlain would ſcarcely have been thought worth mention.

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ing the action, reïmbarking his forces, he proceeded to Notium, an Athenian colony; and marching thence to the neighbouring city of Colophon, where a ſtrong party favored the Athenian intereſt, he gained admiſſion, and Colophon was reſtored to the Athenian alliance. On the next night he entered Lydia, burnt many villages, and collected much booty, chiefly money and ſlaves. Stages, a Perſian who commanded in the neighbourhood, interfered with a body of horſe, but with little effect. Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2, ſ. 3.

Thus far ſucceſsful, Thraſyllus reſolved next upon a more important enterprize; but he ſeems to have been too long and too open in preparation. It became evident that he had a deſign upon Epheſus; and againſt Grecian arms Tiſſaphernes invoked efficaciouſly the aid of Grecian ſuperſtition; to which, as we have ſeen, he had been paying compliments, that, from a Perſian of his high rank, appear extraordinary. He ſent through the towns of his ſatrapy, urging that Diana was threatened, and it behoved all Greeks to exert themſelves in her defence. It was not till the ſeventeenth day after the invaſion of Lydia that Thraſyllus arrived off Epheſus. He debarked his forces in two diviſions; the heavy-armed near mount Coreſſus; the horſe, who would be but few, with the targeteers and light-armed, on the other ſide of the city, near the marſh. ſ. 4. July.

Tiſſaphernes had already collected a large army at Epheſus. The Aſian Greeks were numerous. The Syracuſans from the twenty ſhips ſ. 5.

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deſtroyed near Cyzicus, and from five lately arrived from Syracuſe, with the Selinuntines from two ſhips, were together perhaps five thouſand men. The ſatrap himſelf headed a body of horſe; and to all this were added the numerous population of the city. Such a force would not wait to be beſieged by the ſmall army of Thraſyllus. Taking advantage of his apparently faulty arrangement in dividing his ſtrength, they quickly overpowered his heavy-armed, purſued to the ſhips, and killed about a hundred. They proceeded then againſt the other diviſion, leſs likely to make effectual reſiſtance, and killed three hundred. For this double ſucceſs they erected two trophies, and they decreed the ariſteia to the Syracuſans and Selinuntines. The ſum given upon the occaſion was conſiderable, and preſents were beſides made to individuals who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves.

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 7.

The ſpirit of Hermocrates ſeemed ſtill to animate the Sicilian forces. Their conduct altogether was ſo acceptable to the Epheſians, that a perpetual immunity from taxes (probably thoſe aſſeſſed upon ſtrangers) was granted to all citizens of Syracuſe and Selinus who might at any time reſide in Epheſus; and the Selinuntines, having lately loſt their home (for Selinus had been taken by the Carthaginians) were preſented univerſally with the freedom of the city.

ſ. 8.

Thraſyllus, after his defeat, proceeded toward the Helleſpont. While he ſtopped at Methymnë in Leſbos, the Syracuſan ſquadron of

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of twenty-five triremes (the munificence of Pharnabazus, ſeconded by the diligence of the Syracuſan officers, having already repaired the loſs at Cyzicus) was ſeen paſſing from Epheſus. Thraſyllus took four with their crews: the reſt eſcaped back to the port whence they came. Among the priſoners one was remarkable: he was a firſt-couſin of the general Alcibiades, and of the ſame name. He had accompanied his kinſman in his flight, when perſecuted for the buſineſs of the Mercuries; but, inſtead of the Lacedæmonian, had ingaged in the Syracuſan ſervice; and, apparently ſatisfied with it, under the admirable regularity which Hermocrates had eſtabliſhed, he continued to fight againſt his country. Thraſyllus nevertheleſs gave him his liberty. The other priſoners, being ſent to Athens, were put into the ſtone quarries of Peiræus, in retaliation for the confinement of the Athenian priſoners in the quarries of Syracuſe. They were, however, leſs carefully guarded, or the priſon was leſs ſecure; for in the following winter, digging a paſſage through the rock, and flying by night, all eſcaped, ſome finding their way to Deceleia, and the reſt to Megara.

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 9.

The ſucceſſes of Thraſyllus ſeem to have been very inferior to the expectation formed of his expedition; and the delay in the junction with Alcibiades, appears to have prevented that active general from undertaking anything of conſequence againſt the enemy. Thirty triremes being ſtationed at the entrance of the Euxine,

on

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on the indiſpenſable duty of collecting revenue, his force remaining in the Helleſpont was unequal to great enterprize; and the occupation to which he was himſelf obliged principally to direct his attention, was the maintainance of his forces. The ſummer was far advanced when he was joined by Thraſyllus at Seſtos; but he ſeems to have had, then ready formed, a plan for winter operations. He conducted the whole fleet to Lampſacus on the Aſiatic ſhore. There the ſhips were as uſual laid up. The town being without defence, he employed the troops in raiſing fortifications. But a point of honor occaſioned ſome diſturbance: thoſe who had been ſerving under Alcibiades refuſed to rank with thoſe newly arrived under Thraſyllus: they had been always unconquered; thoſe under Thraſyllus were tainted with the diſgrace of defeat. Alcibiades ſeems not to have oppoſed a prejudice, dangerous only under weak command, and from which, on the contrary, abilities might derive advantage. He quartered them ſeparately, and employed them ſeparately on the fortifications.

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 10. End of Sept.

From Lampſacus an extent of territory, ſubject to Perſia, was open to inroad; but, in the neighbouring city of Abydus, Pharnabazus had his winter reſidence, attended by a large force of cavalry. Alcibiades led his army toward Abydus, purpoſely to invite a battle. The ſatrap unadviſedly met him; was defeated, and, being purſued by the ſmall body of Athenian cavalry,

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cavalry, led by Alcibiades, was ſaved only by the ſwiftneſs of his horſe and the darkneſs of ſupervening night. After this action, in which the ſoldiers under Thraſyllus had their equal ſhare, the reſt of the army ſaluted them as cleared from diſhonor, and no longer refuſed to aſſociate with them in quarters, or join them in arms in the field. The victory deterring oppoſition from the enemy, ſeveral incurſions were made into the country during the winter, with ſome profit to the Athenians, and extenſive injury to thoſe whom the power of the Perſian empire ought to have protected.

The Lacedæmonian government was at this time diſtracted with domeſtic diſturbance. A rebellion had taken place among the Helots; a large body of whom, getting poſſeſſion of ſome ſtrong poſts among the mountains toward the Malean promontory, defended themſelves with ſuch ſucceſsful obſtinacy, that a capitulation was at length granted, allowing them to go and ſettle themſelves anywhere out of the Lacedæmonian territory. While ſuch was the derangement at home, we ſhall not expect from the Lacedæmonian adminiſtration able attention to diſtant concerns. The pride of command, however, and the jealouſy of their prerogative among the republics of their confederacy, did not ceaſe Little as they were able to ſupport their colony of the Trachinian Heracleia, they were diſſatisfied with that interference of the Thebans, which had probably ſaved it from utter ruin; and they had again

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 12.

ſent

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ſent their own governor thither, who, in conjunction with the Theſſalian Achaians, led the whole force of the colony againſt the Œtæans, its perpetual enemies. The Achaians betrayed their allies, the governor was killed with ſeven hundred of his people, and the colony was thus reduced to a weaker ſtate than when the Thebans interfered for its preſervation.

SECTION X.

Important ſucceſſes of Alcibiades. Friendly communication opened with the ſatrap Pharnabazus. An Athenian embaſſy to the king of Perſia. Return of Alcibiades to Athens.

THE ſucceſſes of Thraſybulus and Alcibiades having reſtored ſuperiority to the Athenian arms, the next, and a moſt important object, was to reſtore to the commonwealth a revenue equal to the expences of a war, which, long as it had laſted, was not yet likely to be ſoon concluded. Through the meaſures already taken, ſomething accrued from the trade of the Euxine; but it was neceſſary, at a great expence, to keep a large force conſtantly employed for the purpoſe, while the enemy, from Byzantium and Chalcedon, could interrupt the collectors and ſhare the profit. Alcibiades therefore reſolved to direct his next meaſures againſt thoſe two towns. They being recovered,

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vered, the whole revenue from the trade of the Euxine would accrue to Athens, and her dominion on the ſhores of the Propontis and Helleſpont would be nearly reſtored to its former extent. A deciſive ſuperiority on the Helleſpontine coaſts might induce Pharnazabus to treat; Tiſſaphernes would become alarmed for his Ionian towns, naturally the next objects for the Athenian arms; and thus an opening might be gained for counterworking the negotiations of Lacedæmon, and ſtopping thoſe ſupplies from Perſia, which alone inabled the Peloponneſian confederacy to maintain its fleet.

B. C. 408. Ol. 92: 4: P. W. 24. After 25th March. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 1.

With theſe views, in the twenty-fourth ſpring of the war, Alcibiades led his whole force to the iland of Prœconneſus. The Chalcedonians had ſuſpected that attack would ſoon approach them, and this movement confirmed the ſuſpicion. Immediately they ſtripped their country of every moveable of value; which, however, they would not truſt within their city, but committed all to the care of their neighbours the Bithynians, a Thracian hord. Intelligence of this being carried to Alcibiades, he put himſelf immediately at the head of his cavalry, directed a ſelect body of heavy-armed infantry to follow, and the fleet at the ſame time to attend his motions; and going to the Bithynian frontier, he threatened fire and ſword to the country if all the Chalcedonian property was not ſurrendered to him, together with hoſtages and pledges to inſure peaceful conduct from the Bithynians themſelves. His demands were complied

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complied with, and he then directly formed the ſiege of Chalcedon.

Xen. Hell. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 4, 5, 6.

Hippocrates, a Lacedæmonian, commanded in that city. He had ſent information of his danger to Pharnabazus, who haſtened to his relief with an army ſtrong in cavalry; but before he could arrive, the Athenians had completed a circumvallation from ſea to ſea, except where a river interfered. Nevertheleſs Hippocrates, aware of his approach, ſallied with the whole garriſon, while the Perſians endeavored to force a paſſage through the circumvallation, by the bed of the river. Thraſyllus oppoſed Hippocrates, and a fierce conflict was long equally maintained between them. Alcibiades in the meantime compelled Pharnazabus to retire, and then led his cavalry, with a ſmall body of heavy-armed, to the aſſiſtance of Thraſyllus. Hippocrates was thus overpowered, himſelf killed, and his ſurviving troops fled into the town.

ſ. 7.

After this ſucceſsful action, Alcibiades committed the conduct of the ſiege to the generals under him, and paſſed himſelf to the Helleſpont, to prepare for other enterprize, and at the ſame time to promote that buſineſs which was unceaſingly requiring his attention, often to the interruption of enterprize, the collection of ſupplies. Meanwhile Pharnabazus, finding himſelf unable to relieve Chalcedon, ſent propoſals to the generals commanding the ſiege. His connection with the Peloponneſians had not anſwered his expectation: they had been defeated

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feated in every action they had attempted; ſeveral of the Grecian towns which acknowleged his dominion and their alliance, were already taken; the fate of Chalcedon was ſure, if not prevented by a treaty; if the maritime towns of Æolis ſhould next be attacked, he was unable to protect them; and to judge of the future by the paſt, the Lacedæmonians were equally unable. His overtures were accepted by the Athenian generals, and an accommodation was ſhortly concluded on the following terms: 'that Pharnabazus ſhould pay twenty talents 'as ranſom for Chalcedon: that the Chalce-'donians ſhould in future pay tribute to Athens 'as formerly, and ſhould alſo pay all the ar-'rears of tribute: that Pharnabazus ſhould 'conduct ambaſſadors from Athens to the king: 'that till the return of the ambaſſadors, the 'Athenians ſhould commit no hoſtilities againſt 'the Chalcedonians.' Apparently Chalcedon was to be conſidered ſtill within the ſatrapy and under the protection of Pharnabazus, as formerly we have ſeen Potidæa tributary to Athens, while under the ſovereinty of Corinth.

Meanwhile Alcibiades, having aſſembled the whole Grecian military force in the Cherſoneſe, and a body of Thracian foot, with between three and four hundred horſe, (for he had property in the Cherſoneſe, and great perſonal intereſt among both Greeks and Thracians there) he made himſelf maſter of Selymbria, on the northern coaſt of the Propontis, and was taking meaſures to form the ſiege of Byzantium. Pharna-

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 8.

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Pharnabazus, informed of his approach, ſent to require his ratification of the articles agreed upon concerning Chalcedon. What had been done ſeems to have correſponded with the views of Alcibiades; but he nevertheleſs refuſed to confirm it by his oath, as the ſatrap required, unleſs the ſatrap would enter into reciprocal obligation to him with the ſame ceremony; meaning, apparently, to aſſert his claim to equal rank. Pharnabazus conſenting, he croſſed to Chryſopolis; where two Perſians, Metrobates and Arnapes, attended to receive the oath from him, while Euryptolemus and Diotimus waited upon the ſatrap for the ſame purpoſe in Chalcedon. This public ceremony being concluded, private compliments and mutual aſſurances paſſed, that might form the foundation of an intercourſe of friendſhip.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 3. ſ. 9.

The next buſineſs to be arranged was that of the embaſſy to the Perſian court. Euryptolemus and four other Athenians were appointed, together with two Argians. Intelligence of this being communicated to the Lacedæmonian generals at the Helleſpont, excited conſiderable jealouſy there. An embaſſy from Sparta was already at Suſa; but application was nevertheleſs made to Pharnabazus, that other miniſters might go at the ſame time with the Athenian and Argian, which he readily granted. Of no great abilities, but of an open generous diſpoſition, averſe to wily policy, the ſatrap ſeems to have meant equal friendſhip to both parties, and to have propoſed no advantage to himſelf

but what might ariſe from general eſteem, Paſippidas, the commander-in-chief, put himſelf at the head of the Lacedæmonian embaſſy; Hermocrates the Syracuſan, and his brother, Proxenus, ſtill exiles from their country, accompanied him. Cyzicus was the appointed place of meeting for all, and Pharnabazus in perſon undertook to be their common conductor. SECT. X.

Matters being thus ſettled for the country on the Aſiatic ſide of the Helleſpont, ſo that his ſatrapy was in peace, Pharnabazus appears not to have concerned himſelf about Byzantium. The Lacedæmonian, Clearchus, commanded there. In addition to the inhabitants, he had ſome troops from old Greece, a ſmall body of Lacedæmonians of thoſe called Periœcians and Neodamodes, ſome Megarians under Helixus, and ſome Bœotians under Cyratadas. The Athenians attempted all the modes of aſſault, known in that age, without ſucceſs; but they completed a contravallation, and the place was ſoon preſſed by famine. f. 10, 11, 12.

Thus reduced to diſtreſs, while the Peloponneſian commanders, who ſhould have endeavored to relieve him, were paſſive, Cleärchus formed the bold project of going himſelf to infuſe vigor into their counſels, and collect a fleet with which to make a diverſion, ſuch as might compel the Athenians to raiſe the ſiege. He depended upon money from Pharnabazus. There were ſome triremes in the Helleſpont, which Paſippidas had ſtationed for the protec-

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tion of the maritime towns; ſome were juſt completed at Antandrus; Hegeſippidas commanded a ſquadron on the Thracian coaſt. All theſe he propoſed to aſſemble, and to promote the building of more. But Cleärchus, tho an able man, wanted the policy of Braſidas. Thucydides informs us, that the fame of the conciliating and liberal conduct of Braſidas was extenſively ſerviceable to the Lacedæmonian cauſe, long after his death: Braſidas was conſidered as a ſample of the Lacedæmonian character; generally to the grievous diſappointment of the people who allied themſelves with Lacedæmon; for the governors or ſuperintendants, placed in every city with the modeſt title of Harmoſtes, Regulator, aſſumed almoſt univerſally a deſpotic authority. Cleärchus was not leſs deſpotic than the reſt. When proviſions began to fail in Byzantium, his ſoldiers from old Greece were ſtill ſupplied: the Byzantine people were diſregarded. General diſcontent inſued: an Athenian party had always exiſted in the city; it now gained ſtrength, and the abſence of Cleärchus added incouragement. While famine grew more and more preſſing, communication was managed with Alcibiades; a gate was opened for him by night; the Athenian troops entered; and Helixus and Cyratadas, to whom the command had been committed by Cleärchus, after ſome reſiſtance, were compelled to ſurrender themſelves priſoners.

Xen. Hel. l. i. c. 3. ſ. 13.

The ſervices which, by the reduction of Byzantium, Alcibiades had completed for his country,

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country, leſs brilliant than ſome, were yet perhaps, in importance, equal, and, by the union of ability and vigor diſplayed in an extenſive and complicated command, even ſuperior to what any Athenian or any Greek had ever before performed. When the forces firſt placed him at their head, Athens ſcarcely commanded more territory than its walls incloſed; revenue was gone, and the commonwealth depended for exiſtence upon its fleet, which was at the ſame time diſpirited and mutinous. He had reſtored loyalty to the fleet; he had reſtored dominion to the commonwealth; he had deſtroyed the enemy's fleet; and, under his conduct, the navy of Athens again commanded the ſeas: and, what was not leaſt in the liſt of ſervices, his ſucceſſes and his reputation, without ſolicitation or intrigue, had conciliated the adverſe ſatrap Pharnabazus, and opened probable means for checking thoſe ſources of ſupply to the enemy, the failure of which would reſtore to Athens certain ſuperiority in the war. In this ſtate of things he thought he might with advantage reviſit his country, whence he had been abſent ſix years; and he propoſed at the ſame time, as winter was approaching, to gratify the greater part of his forces with means of ſeeing their friends, and attending to their domeſtic concerns.

Plut. vit. Alcib.

Xen. Hel. l. i. c. 4. ſ. 4.

Theſe being his purpoſes, after he had ſettled the affairs of Byzantium and the other dependencies of the commonwealth on the Propontis and the Helleſpont, he led the arma-

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ment to Samos. Thence he ſent Thraſybulus with thirty ſhips to the Thracian coaſt; and, the reſtored reputation of the Athenian arms ſeconding the meaſures of that active and able officer and ſtateſman, all the cities which had lately revolted were quickly recovered. Alcibiades went himſelf with twenty ſhips to the Carian coaſt; and, in tribute or contribution, collected a hundred talents for the public treaſury. On his return to Samos, reſerving twenty ſhips, he ſent the reſt, under the conduct of Thraſyllus, to Attica. There was yet a ſtrong party in Athens ſo inveterately inimical to him, tho ſince the laſt revolution it had leſs dared to ſhow itſelf, that he would not venture thither till the temper of the people ſhould be more completely manifeſted in the reception of the returned fleet. Meanwhile he went with his ſquadron to the coaſt of Laconia, under pretence of gaining intelligence of the deſigns of the enemy, and obſerving what was going forward in the port of Gythium.

Xen. Hel. l. i. c. 4. ſ. 5.

ſ. 4. Information from his confidential friends reached him at ſea, that he had been elected general of the commonwealth, and that Thraſybulus, who was alſo abſent, and Conon alone of officers preſent, were appointed his collegues. Upon this he made immediately for Attica.

ſ. 5. It happened that he entered the harbour of Peiræus on the day of the Plynteria, a kind of mourning religious ceremony, when the ſtatue of Minerva was veiled; and tho to any other Greek, ſuch was Grecian ſuperſtition, not

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eſteemed unlucky, on that day no Athenian dared tranſact any important buſineſs. Many people, as the cotemporary hiſtorian tells us, conſidered this as an ill omen both to Alcibiades and to the commonwealth.

Xen. Hel. l. i. c. 4. ſ. 6.

Nevertheleſs, the approach of Alcibiades being announced, a vaſt croud, attracted by curioſity, both from Peiræus and from the city, aſſembled about the port. The general language was, 'that Alcibiades was the moſt meritorious of citizens: that his condemnation had been the wicked meaſure of a conſpiracy of men, who ſcrupled nothing to promote their own intereſt: that his abilities were tranſcendent; his liberality unbounded: his oppoſition to his country had been forced; his eagerneſs to return to its ſervice proved his patriotic inclination. As for danger to the democracy, men like him had no temptation to innovate; the favor of the people gave him all the power and preëminence he could wiſh for. Accordingly he had never oppreſſed any: whereas his opponents had deſtroyed by aſſaſſination the moſt deſerving citizens; and if ever they appeared to poſſeſs any popular confidence, it was only when the death or exile of all better men left them without competitors for the leading ſituations in the commonwealth [26].' While theſe were the ſentiments ſounded

[26] Αυτοὺς δὲ μόνους λειφθέντας, δι' ἀυτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅτι ἑτέροις βελτίοσιν οὐκ ἐῖχον χρῆσθαι. This expreſſion of Xenophon ſtrongly marks the diſtinction of ranks yet exiſting in

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ſounded by the general voice, a few were heard to ſay leſs loudly, 'that Alcibiades had alone 'been the cauſe of all the paſt misfortunes, and 'it was to be feared he would ſtill be the pro-'moter of meaſures dangerous to the common-'wealth.' Alcibiades was not yet ſo aſſured of the prevalence of ſentiments in his favor, but that he approached the ſhore with apprehenſion. He even heſitated to quit his galley, till from the deck he ſaw his couſin-german Euryptolemus ſon of Peiſianax, with others of his relations and confidential friends. Nor did even they confide intirely in the protection which the eſtabliſhed government, hardly indeed yet eſtabliſhed, could or would afford. They came prepared to reſiſt any attempt that might be made againſt his perſon; and, ſurrounded by them, he proceeded to the city.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 8.

His firſt buſineſs was to attend the council of Five-hundred; his next to addreſs the general aſſembly. Before both he took occaſion to aſſert his innocence of the ſacrilegious profanations of which he had been accuſed, to apologize for his conduct during his baniſhment, and to criminate his proſecutors. Many after him ſpoke ſtrongly to the ſame purpoſes; and the current of popular favor became ſo evident, that not a word was heard in oppoſition to him; for the people, ſays Xenophon, would not have borne it. He was choſen, with a title appa-

public opinion among the Athenian people, when legal diſtinction was moſt exploded.

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rently new, governor-general, or commander-in-chief with ſupreme authority [26], as the only perſon capable of reſtoring the former power and ſplendor of the commonwealth. So nearly allied we commonly find democracy with abſolute monarchy; and not in effect only, but often in form alſo.

Soon after he was veſted with this high dignity, an opportunity occurred for Alcibiades to gratify the people who conferred it, and to acquire at the ſame time, at an eaſy rate, no ſmall addition to his renown through Greece. Since Deceleia had been occupied by a Lacedæmonian garriſon, the Athenians had never dared to make the myſterious proceſſion of Ceres to Eleuſis, according to the cuſtomary forms, along that called the Sacred Way: it had always paſſed by ſea, and many of the preſcribed ceremonies were neceſſarily omitted or imperfectly executed. Alcibiades, with the forces returned from Aſia added to the ſtrength of the city, undertook to conduct the proceſſion by land,

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. ſ. 8.

[26] Ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ. The title of the generals of the Athenian ordinary eſtabliſhment was not Ἡγεμὼν, but Στρατηγὸς, Αὐτοκράτωρ was the term by which the Greeks afterward rendered the Roman title *Dictator*. What was the kind and degree of power committed to Alcibiades with the title of Ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ does not clearly appear; but as the Στρατηγὸς, the chief of the board of general officers, had, through his privilege of ſummoning at pleaſure the general aſſembly, and of acting as repreſentative of the commonwealth in communication with forein ſtates, large civil authority in addition to his military command, the Ἡγεμὼν ἁπάντων αὐτοκράτωρ would of courſe have all thoſe powers, and ſome beſides which the Στρατηγὸς did not poſſeſs.

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and protect it in the fullest performance of every accustomed rite. He was completely successful: the train went and returned, escorted by the army, without an attempt from the enemy to give any disturbance.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. s. 9.

With the new glory and new favor acquired in this mixture of military and religious pageantry, Alcibiades proceeded to direct the inrolment of the forces and the equipment of the fleet, with which he proposed again to cross the Ægean.

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CHAPTER XX.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Return of ALCIBIADES to ATHENS till the Concluſion of the PELOPONNESIAN War.

SECTION I.

State of the Perſian empire: Cyrus, younger ſon of Darius II. appointed viceroy of the provinces weſt of the river Halys. Lyſander commander-in-chief of the Peloponneſian fleet: Seafight of Notium, and its conſequences.

WHILE proſperity was reſtored to the Athenian arms, under the conduct of Thraſybulus and Alcibiades, the Lacedæmonians had had ſucceſs in negotiation, which might overbalance many victories. We have little authentic information of the detail of tranſactions in the interior of the Perſian empire; but we learn that troubles, frequently recurring, were in a great degree the cauſe of that remiſſneſs concerning the diſtant provinces, in conſequence of which the ſatraps of Aſia minor were reduced to the neceſſity of paying court to one party among the Greeks, to inable them to ſupport themſelves againſt oppreſſion

oppreſſion from the other. The rich kingdom of Media, we find, had revolted; but in the year preceding the return of Alcibiades, through the exertions of Darius in perſon, it had been reduced to ſubmiſſion. Apparently in the idea that his empire was too extenſive and unwieldy to be duly and ſecurely adminiſtered under a ſingle government, Darius ſeems then to have had in view to divide it. Detaching a portion, as an appanage for Cyrus his younger ſon, which under able conduct might form a very powerful kingdom, he might ſtill leave, for his eldeſt ſon Artaxerxes, an empire ſcarcely leſs powerful, inſomuch as it would be more compact and manageable, than what himſelf commanded. After the recovery of Media, the provinces bordering on the Grecian ſeas principally demanded his attention. But, growing infirm as he advanced in years, he found a repugnance to undertake the troubleſome taſk of regulating matters duly in regard to that nation of little military republics, by which, for near a century, himſelf and his predeceſſors had been conſtantly troubled, and ſometimes materially injured. He therefore reſolved to commit the buſineſs at once to Cyrus; a youth of great hopes; who ſeems to have wanted only a better education, to have made him a great prince; but whoſe active and ambitious temper, never duly either reſtrained or directed, gave diſturbance and excited jealouſy in the ſeat of government.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 12.

ſ. 1. Such nearly was the ſtate of things in the Perſian court, when a Lacedæmonian embaſſy arrived

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arrived there; having made the journey apparently through the assistance of Tissaphernes. The political circumstances of the empire had prepared a good reception for them; and, being uncontradicted probably in their assertions, as without competition in their solicitation, and, what seems to have been most important, paying their court ably and successfully to the young prince who was going to assume the command of the western provinces, they obtained the declared favor of the monarch to their confederacy, and particularly to Lacedæmon, in opposition to Athens. This point being gained, they set out on their return to the coast of Lesser Asia.

Meanwhile Pharnabazus, with those ambassadors, Athenian and Peloponnesian, whom he had undertaken to conduct to Susa, had proceeded in autumn as far as Gordium in Phrygia, where he passed the winter. In spring he was proposing to prosecute the journey, when the other ambassadors arrived on their return, accompanied by Persian officers commissioned to announce the approach of Cyrus, to take the command of the western provinces. This stopped Pharnabazus. Cyrus arriving soon after, the Athenian ministers applied themselves to win the favor of that prince, and ingage him to their country's cause; but finding him immoveably attached to the Peloponnesians, they desired to prosecute their journey to the Persian court. Pharnabazus would still have assisted them, but Cyrus interfered: refusing them permission

B. C. 408. P. W. 24.

B. C. 407. P. W. 25.

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miſſion either to proceed on their embaſſy, or to return home, he required that they ſhould be delivered to him. The upright ſatrap conſidering himſelf as their ſworn protector, would not give them up; but it was three years before he could obtain leave to ſend them home.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 2. ſ. 5.

It was a rule jealouſly obſerved by the Lacedæmonian government (perhaps the treaſon of Pauſanias might have given occaſion to it) that none ſhould hold the command-in-chief of the fleet beyond a year; and perhaps it was from a congenial principle, that the command of the fleet was not committed to the kings. After a long dearth of eminent men in Lacedæmon, ſome were now coming forward, likely to give new vigor to her councils, and new energy to her arms. Lyſander, who ſucceeded Crateſippidas in the important command of the Aſiatic ſtation, was little of the antient Spartan; but he was formed to advance himſelf and his country in a poliſhed and corrupt age, when the ſimplicity of antient manners had no longer its former eſteem, and the ſimplicity of antient policy no longer its former efficacy. Receiving his appointment early in winter, he paſſed to Rhodes; and taking the command of a ſquadron which lay there, he proceeded to Cos and Miletus, and thence to Epheſus; where, with the ſhips he had collected by the way, he found himſelf at the head of a fleet of ſeventy triremes.

B. C. 408. P. W. 24. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 1.

As

As ſoon as he heard that Cyrus was arrived at Sardis, he haſtened, in company with the ambaſſadors newly returned from Suſa, to pay his court there, and he found a moſt favorable reception. 'The prince told him, 'that it was 'equally his father's command and his own 'inclination, to join the Lacedæmonians in 'zealous proſecution of the war againſt Athens: 'that he had brought with him five hundred 'talents, about a hundred and twenty-five 'thouſand pounds ſterling, for that particular 'purpoſe; and he would not ſpare his own re-'venue in the ſame cauſe;' adding, in the warmth of youthful zeal, and in the hyperbolical manner of the eaſt, 'that he would cut up 'the throne on which he ſat,' which was of ſolid ſilver and gold, 'rather than means for 'proſecuting the war ſhould fail.' In the treaty concluded with the Perſian court, it was ſtipulated that the king ſhould allow thirty Attic minæ for the monthly pay of every trireme; which made three oboli, not quite fourpence ſterling, for each man daily [1]. Incouraged by the free promiſes of the prince, and not yet accuſtomed to the extravagance of oriental diction, Lyſander propoſed, that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence ſterling, ſhould be allowed for daily pay to every ſeaman. 'The increaſe of expence,' he ſaid, 'tho it

B. C. 407. P. W. 25.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 2.

ſ. 3 & 4.

[1] This, if all were paid alike, would give two hundred and ſixty-ſix men to every trireme. Commonly we find, in the Grecian ſervice, the pay of inferior officers and privates the ſame, and that of ſuperior officers only double.

'might

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'might on a hasty view appear extravagant, 'would in the end be found economical; inas- 'much as the desertion that would insue among 'the enemy's seamen would beyond all things 'accelerate a happy conclusion of the war.' Cyrus, who had not expected that such an advantage would be taken of his warmth of expression, answered nevertheless, with much politeness, 'that he had no doubt of the ad- 'vantage of what was proposed, but he could 'not exceed the king's command.' Lysander, with the complacency of a courtier already formed, implicitly assented; and the prince, satisfied altogether with his behavior, invited him to supper. Wine usually circulated freely at a Persian entertainment, and Cyrus did not always stint himself to moderation. Lysander's manner and conversation were insinuating; the prince's spirits were elevated; and, drinking to Lysander after the Persian manner, he asked 'what he could do for him that would give 'him most satisfaction?' Lysander answered, 'that nothing would gratify him equally with 'the addition of a single obolus to the seamen's 'daily wages.' Pleased with the apparent disinterestedness and generosity of the Spartan general, the prince consented, and the pay was augmented accordingly. The armament was of course highly gratified; and whether his influence with the prince was considered, or his generous preference of the common welfare to his private emolument, for which such an opportunity'

Xen. Anab.

Xen. Hel. ut sup.

portunity ſeemed offered, very great credit accrued to Lyſander. SECT. I.

The people of Athens were not apprized of the acquiſition of the alliance of Perſia by the Peloponneſian confederacy, when Alcibiades, in the third month after his return, ſailed again from Peiræus. His armament conſiſted of fifteen hundred heavy-armed foot, a hundred and fifty horſe, and a hundred triremes. Ariſtocrates and Adeimantus were appointed generals of the land-forces under him. He directed his courſe firſt to Andros, which had revolted. The ilanders, aſſiſted by a ſmall body of Lacedæmonians, were raſh enough to meet him in the field. They were defeated with ſome loſs; but Alcibiades, finding their walls too ſtrong to be readily forced, ſatisfied himſelf for the preſent with erecting a trophy for the little ſucceſs obtained, and proceeded with his armament to Samos. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 4. f. 9. f. 10.

The intelligence which greeted him on his arrival, of the treaty concluded by Lacedæmon with Perſia, the favor of the young prince toward the Lacedæmonians, and the treatment of the Athenian miniſters, was highly unwelcome, and threw a damp on the ſpirits of the whole armament. It was not the military force, but the wealth of Perſia that was dreaded, as it would give efficacy to the military force of the Peloponneſian confederacy; and a greater portion than before of that wealth was now likely to be ready for purpoſes of hoſtility to Athens. The active mind of Alcibiades was immediately c. 5. f. 5.

turned

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turned to counterwork the effect of the Lacedæmonian negotiation, and circumſtances affording hope occurred. According to the antient policy of the Perſian empire, the ſatraps, within the extenſive country which was put under the command of the prince, retained ſtill a ſhare of independent authority in their reſpective ſatrapies. Nevertheleſs Tiſſaphernes, in a manner eclipſed by the prince's ſuperior rank and power and the greater ſplendor of his court, fell comparatively into neglect and contempt, particularly with the Lacedæmonians. Hence, notwithſtanding his late injurious treatment of Alcibiades, it was thought intereſt might now poſſibly reünite him with the Athenians, and through him means might be obtained for negotiation, from which ſome advantage might be drawn. Tiſſaphernes was actually gained; but he was in no favor with Cyrus, and all his endeavors to procure a reception for Athenian miniſters were ineffectual.

This turn of things greatly injured Alcibiades, both with the armament at Samos and with the people at home. His promiſes of Perſian aſſiſtance, which he, and he only, could procure, had firſt and principally led to his reſtoration. That aſſiſtance alone, he had ſaid, and his confidential friends had always maintained, could ſave the commonwealth. Not only theſe promiſes had totally failed, but that important aſſiſtance had accrued to the enemy; and in a greater degree than he could ever promiſe it. Alcibiades felt theſe circumſtances, and

SECT. I.

and was hurt by the temper of the armament which followed. His naval force was yet ſuperior to that of the enemy; but quick deciſion alone probably could either ſecure his own ſituation in command, or avert impending ruin from the commonwealth. He led his fleet therefore to Notium, on the Aſiatic ſhore, within view of Epheſus, where Lyſander lay. Information came to him that Thraſybulus, who had wintered with his ſquadron in the Helleſpont, had quitted his port there, and was employed in fortifying Phocæa on the Æolian coaſt. Poſſibly Alcibiades thought it might be advantageous to withdraw himſelf, till the moment offered for important action. He left his fleet, however, to go and concert meaſures with Thraſybulus, intruſting the command to Antiochus, but with ſtrict orders to avoid a general ingagement.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 6, & 7.

During his abſence, Antiochus, whether actuated by honeſt but injudicious zeal, or coveting a glory to which he could not honeſtly aſpire, went with a few triremes to the harbour of Epheſus, as if to explore, but paſſed by the very prows of ſome of the enemy's fleet, as if to provoke purſuit. Lyſander, who had now ninety triremes, was yet employed in improving the ſtrength and condition of his fleet, without meaning to ſeek an action. The conduct of Antiochus induced him to order a few galleys to be haſtily launched and manned, and to purſue. Notium was ſo near that this movement could be ſeen, and a ſuperior force preſently

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advanced to relieve Antiochus. Lyſander, being now prepared, led out his whole fleet. The Athenians, not equally prepared, haſtily, and as they could in the exigency of the moment, put all their ſhips in motion. Lyſander began the action with his fleet regularly formed. The Athenians, one after another endeavoring to get into the line, maintained the fight for ſome time in a confuſed and ſcattered manner, but at length fled for Samos. Fifteen of their ſhips were taken, but moſt of the men eſcaped; a few were made priſoners; Antiochus was among the killed. Lyſander erected his trophy upon the headland of Notium, and carried his prizes to Epheſus.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c 5. ſ. 9.

This was a moſt mortifying event for Alcibiades. He haſtened back to his fleet, and, highly anxious to repair its diſgrace, he went to the mouth of the harbour of Epheſus, and offered battle. Lyſander however, being conſiderably inferior in force, would not move, and Alcibiades returned to Samos.

Plut. vit. Alcib.

The policy of the Lacedæmonian government ſeems to have met the vanity of Lyſander, in the endeavor to give more than its due ſplendor to the victory of Notium. Nine ſtatues were dedicated at Delphi on the occaſion, the effigies of Lyſander himſelf, of Hermon the maſter of his ſhip, and of Abas his ſoothſayer, with thoſe of Caſtor, Pollux, Juno, Apollo, Diana, and Neptune. That victory, little in itſelf, became important, as Plutarch juſtly obſerves, by its political conſequences.

Pauſan. l. 10. c. 9. p. 818.

The

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The credit of Alcibiades had already received injury among the ill-judging multitude of Athens. They held that he ought not to have left the revolted iland of Andros unſubdued: yet there can be no doubt but he would have been inexcuſable in waſting the time of his powerful armament upon that little object, when concerns of importance ſo beyond compariſon greater to the commonwealth, called him to the Aſiatic coaſt. His commiſſion excuſed him from that conſtant communication with the people, uſually required of Athenian generals: but it might nevertheleſs be not difficult to perſuade the people, that the neglect of ſuch communication was diſreſpectful, and marked an unbecoming arrogance; nor is it indeed improbable that Alcibiades may ſometimes have uſed the ample powers committed to him, in a more lordly ſtyle than prudence would juſtify. But, as Plutarch continues to obſerve, his very glory injured him: the people expected that nothing ſhould reſiſt the man to whom, whether ſerving or oppoſing his country, all had ſeemed hitherto to yield. When information came that he had quitted Andros without ſubduing it, they bore the immediate diſappointment; but it was with the daily expectation of intelligence that Chios and all Ionia were conquered. When therefore the news arrived that the fleet had fled before an inferior force, with the loſs of fifteen ſhips, Athens was in uproar. Intelligence of a much more threatening misfortune, the alliance of Perſia with

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 19.

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Lacedæmon, communicated at the ſame time, made no comparable impreſſion. The enemies of Alcibiades took immediate advantage of the popular temper; and thoſe in the city were aſſiſted by ſome who came from the fleet for the purpoſe. Of theſe, Thraſybulus ſon of Thraſon, mentioned on this occaſion only in hiſtory, principally diſtinguiſhed himſelf. An aſſembly of the people being convened, and curioſity eager for the detail of an unexpected and alarming event, Thraſybulus mounted the bema, and exclaimed vehemently againſt the commander-in-chief: 'His pride,' he ſaid, was intolerable, 'and his negligence of the public ſervice ſhameful. His abilities indeed were great, but he 'was continually quitting the fleet: and while 'he pretended to be employed in raiſing contributions for public ſervice, his time was 'ſpent among Ionian courtezans, in the indulgence of the moſt extravagant luxury. In a 'ſtation in view of the enemy's fleet, he had 'intruſted a command which involved the being 'of the commonwealth, to men who had no 'merit, but that of flattering his pride and miniſtering to his deſires. The late ignominious 'diſaſter had had no other ſource. As for any 'regard for Athens or the Athenian people, it 'was evident he had none; and if, in conſequence of a better knowlege of him, their partiality toward him ſhould ceaſe, he was prepared to do without them. While veſted with 'ſo great a command, his attention had been 'more given to his eſtate in the Thracian Cher-

Plut. Vit. Alcib.

'ſoneſe

'ſoneſe than to their ſervice. A caſtle, which 'he had built there, was already prepared to 'receive him, in that ſecond baniſhment which 'he ſo well deſerved, and which he evidently 'expected.' SECT. I.

Some mixture of known truths with the falſehood and malignity of this accuſation, probably aſſiſted to give it efficacy. There ſeems to have been no ground for the imputation of negligence. Indeed ſome of thoſe points in the character of Alcibiades, which were moſt exceptionable in his youth, appear to have been improved with increaſing years and increaſing experience; and as paſſion cooled and reaſon ſtrengthened, and misfortune inſtructed, the leſſons of Socrates were remembered and had their effect. In his conduct ſince his reſtoration, whether in military or political buſineſs, neither raſhneſs ſhows itſelf, nor diſhoneſty. On the contrary, all his projects appear to have been formed with ſingular prudence, as they were executed with ſingular vigor. However he may have failed in regard to the perſon to whom he intruſted the command of the fleet, during that ſhort abſence which proved ſo unfortunate, in every other inſtance his choice of aſſiſtants and deputies in command was judicious, liberal, and happy. The confidence which he continued always to give to Thraſybulus ſon of Lycus, and to Thraſyllus, at the ſame time conferred and reflected honor. But theſe conſiderations eſcaped the Athenian people, called upon, in a

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moment of indignation and anxiety, to decide upon a matter of the utmoſt conſequence, and plied by the eloquence of intereſted men, while the information neceſſary for due diſcuſſion of the queſtion was not before them. Without waiting to know how their general might apologize for his conduct, or what neceſſity, or what view of public ſervice might have directed it, the multitude, whoſe momentary will decided without controul the moſt important meaſures of executive government, paſſed the fatal decree. Thraſybulus was involved with Alcibiades; and thus the two men who were by experience, added to ſingular gifts of nature, beyond all others perhaps then in the world, qualified to relieve the commonwealth in its almoſt deſperate circumſtances, were diſmiſſed from their employments. Ten generals were appointed in their room, and the long liſt requires notice: they were Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Eraſinides, Ariſtocrates, Archeſtratus, Protomachus, Thraſyllus, Ariſtogenes.

How that balance in the powers of government at Athens, which Thucydides mentions to have been ſo judiciouſly eſtabliſhed when the council of Four-hundred was aboliſhed, became deranged to the degree that we now find it, Xenophon has omitted to inform us; nor do we learn clearly what was the ſtate of parties. But the derangement was evidently great; parties at the ſame time violent and weak; much ſubdivided, none deciſively prevalent; and

and the government in consequence unsteddy in extreme. Among the newly appointed generals, Pericles was the near relation of Alcibiades; Aristocrates had been his general of infantry in his last command; Thrasyllus one of his most active partizans, and among those whom, as an officer, he had most favored and trusted. But Conon, the first of the ten, a man of superior qualifications, appears to have been not his friend. Meanwhile Epigenes, Diophanes and Cleisthenes, men of high birth, led the mob; while on the vague accusation of being unfriendly to the multitude [2], some who had taken part with the Four-hundred were condemned without trial, by a single vote of the general assembly, and executed; many suffered confiscation of their property, some were banished, some incapacitated for honors and public employments; some were compelled to purchase their safety. Under these circumstances, Alcibiades reasonably avoided to trust his fate to such a judicature as the assembled Athenian people. He was indeed not actually summoned, but he would of course have to give an account of his conduct, and probably to defend himself against impeachment. Thrasybulus, less obnoxious to the jealousy of party, seems to have remained with the fleet, retaining the command of his trireme. Alcibiades retired to his estate in the Thracian Chersonese.

SECT. I.

Lys. Δῆμ. καταλύς. Apolog. p. 74. l. vel 778.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. l. 10.

[2] Οὐκ ἔυνους τῷ πλήθει.

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SECTION II.

Conon commander in chief of the Athenian fleet; Callicratidas of the Peloponneſian. Mitylene beſieged by Callicratidas. Seafight of Arginuſæ.

B. C. 407. P. W. 25. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 11.

CONON, at the time of his appointment to be one of the new generals-in-chief, was abſent, being employed in the ſiege of Andros, where he commanded. A decree of the people directed him to go immediately, with the ſquadron of twenty ſhips under his orders, and take the command of the fleet at Samos. It was already late in the year, and, on his arrival at Samos, he found a dejection in the armament not inviting to great undertakings. Fortunately the enemy's fleet was not yet ſo ſtrong as to incourage them to enterprize. Selecting therefore ſeventy triremes, and ſtrengthening the crews by draughts from above thirty more, he divided them into ſquadrons, which were ſent various ways; and they were ſucceſsful in executing his orders to collect contributions and plunder in ſeveral parts of the coaſt of Aſia and the neighbouring ilands, which acknowleged the dominion of Perſia or the alliance of Lacedæmon.

c. 6. ſ. 1, 2, 3.

In the inſuing winter, Callicratidas was ſent from Sparta to take the command-in-chief of the Peloponneſian fleet. Callicratidas, widely different from Lyſander, was one of the pureſt models of the old Spartan character; a zealous and

and ſincere diſciple of the ſchool of Lycurgus [3]. On his arrival at Epheſus, Lyſander told him, that he reſigned to him a victorious fleet which commanded the ſeas. Callicratidas replied, 'Paſs then with your fleet to the weſtward of 'Samos, and deliver up the command to me in 'the harbour of Miletus.' The Athenian fleet lay at Samos, and paſſing to the weſtward of that iland would put a general action to the choice of the Athenian admiral. Lyſander excuſed himſelf by alledging, that in ſo doing he ſhould go beyond his duty, ſince the officer appointed to ſuperſede him was arrived. Callicratidas, gratified with the implied acknowlegement that the fleet was not ſtrong enough to meet the enemy, made it his firſt buſineſs to increaſe its force. He ſent to Chios, Rhodes, and other ſtates of the confederacy; and having thus col- SECT. II.

[3] Barthelemi has not ſcrupled, on the authority of ſo late a writer as Ælian, and given in not the cleareſt terms, to affirm that Callicratidas, Lyſander and Gylippus, were all born in that claſs of freemen of Lacedæmon which was of acknowleged ſervile origin; and he adds, 'that they obtained the full rights of 'citizens only as the reward of ſignal exploits,' for which he ſeems to have had no warrant whatever. He appears to have forgotten that Gylippus was ſon of Cleandridas, who held the high ſtation of regent during the minority of Pleiſtoanax ſon of Pauſanias, and that it was the clear dignity of a Spartan, which, according to Thucydides, made him a fit perſon for the Sicilian command. If we may truſt Plutarch, whoſe authority is at leaſt as good as Ælian's, Lyſander was of the Heracleid family, eſteemed the firſt in Greece. But Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, all make it ſufficiently evident that, in their time, no men of ſervile, or any other neodamode families, could reach thoſe high ſituations under the Spartan government, which Gylippus, Lyſander and Callicratidas held.

lected

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lected fifty triremes, which made his number all together a hundred and forty, he then propoſed without delay to ſeek a battle.

The condeſcending politeneſs of Lyſander, ſo different from what was uſually experienced from Spartan commanders, his apparent diſintereſtedneſs, and his attention to the welfare of thoſe under him, together with the ability he had ſhown in every kind of buſineſs, had rendered him highly acceptable to the armament and to the allied cities. Callicratidas had not been long in his command before he diſcovered that ſome of the principal officers, devoted to his predeceſſor, were forming a party againſt him. They not only obeyed negligently and reluctantly, but endeavored to excite diſcontent in the armament and among the allies. 'The Lacedæmonian ſyſtem,' they ſaid, 'was 'moſt impolitic. Such continual change of the 'perſon at the head of things muſt produce im-'moderate inconvenience. A moſt important 'naval command thus fell into the hands of men 'unverſed in naval affairs; and thoſe who had 'had no communication among the allies, were 'to preſide over the intereſts of the allies. The 'conſequences would be ruinous, both to the 'allies and to the fleet.'

The meaſure taken by Callicratidas to obviate this dangerous cabal, as it ſtands reported by the cotemporary hiſtorian, ſtrongly marks his character. Calling together the Lacedæmonians of the armament, he ſpoke to them in the following ſtyle of Laconic eloquence: 'I could

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 5.

'be

'be very well contented to ſtay at home; and 'if either Lyſander, or any other, pretends to 'more ſkill in naval command, I ſhall not 'gainſay it. Being however, by the appoint-'ment of the Lacedæmonian government, ad-'miral of the fleet, it is my buſineſs to act in 'that ſituation to the beſt of my ability. I 'therefore now require your advice. You know, 'as well as I, what the purpoſe of the govern-'ment is, which I am anxious to have duly 'performed. Will it then be better for me to 'remain here; in which caſe you will give me 'your zealous coöperation; or ſhall I go home 'and relate the ſtate of things?' This ſpeech had in a great degree the deſired effect. All were anxious to obviate accuſation at home, and all were in conſequence forward to demon-ſtrate, both by word and deed, that they meant no reſiſtance to legal commands, and no back-wardneſs in their country's ſervice. SECT. II. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 6.

The difficulties of Callicratidas, however, did not end here. His rough manners, ill accom-modated to relieve, on the contrary irritated the regret of his predeceſſor in reſigning a very high ſituation; and his ſimple and unſuſpicious honeſty did not conceive any political neceſſity for condeſcending communication with the man whom he came to ſuperſede, not for any plea-ſure of his own, but for the ſervice of his coun-try. Lyſander had a large ſum of money re-maining, of what had been committed to him by Cyrus for the pay of the fleet. Noway deſi-rous of gratifying Callicratidas, he would not make

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make it over to him, but, to earn credit with the prince by a diſplay of his economy, returned the whole into the Perſian treaſury. Callicratidas immediately found himſelf in want. He made, however, no difficulty of going to the court of Sardis, to aſk for a ſupply, which he ſuppoſed was to be iſſued of courſe: but to provide for a favorable reception by any previous intrigue or any ceremonious compliment, or to obviate any ill impreſſion that Lyſander or the friends of Lyſander might have made, did not come within his imagination. On arriving at Sardis, he applied for an audience. He was anſwered, that he muſt wait two days. Patience was a Spartan virtue, and he did not immediately feel the affront. But, on going according to the appointment, he met ſtill with procraſtination; and as he repeated his fruitleſs attendance in the antichambers, everything he ſaw, the pomp, the inſolence, the ſervility, which ſtruck his firſt notice, and the faithleſſneſs and venality which ſoon became evident, all excited his indignation. At length, in complete diſguſt, he departed without having ſeen the prince, and with his buſineſs in no part done; exclaiming, 'that 'the Greeks were indeed wretched who would 'ſo truckle to barbarians for money! He ſaw,' he ſaid, 'what would be the conſequence of 'their quarrels among one another; and if he 'lived to return home, he would do his utmoſt 'to reconcile Lacedæmon with Athens.'

SECT. XI.

On arriving at Epheſus, his firſt care was to move his fleet from a place ſo near Sardis, and ſo immediately under the controul of Perſia. He conducted it to Miletus, whoſe people preſerved more independency. Thence he ſent a ſmall ſquadron home for a ſupply of money. For intermediate need he obtained a loan from the Mileſians and Chians, and he then proceeded to employ the force he had collected, his fleet conſiſting of a hundred and ſeventy triremes. Methymnë in Leſbos was his firſt object, and he took that city by aſſault. All the effects were given up for plunder, and the ſlaves were collected in the market-place, to be ſold for the benefit of the armament. The allies propoſed the ſale of the Methymnæans themſelves: but Callicratidas, with a ſpirit of liberal patriotiſm, of which inſtances are rare in Grecian hiſtory, declared that, 'where he commanded, 'no Greek ſhould be made a ſlave.'

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 7, 8.

ſ. 9.

While Callicratidas had been ſo increaſing his fleet, Conon adhered to the different ſyſtem which he had adopted on firſt taking the command, reducing the number of his triremes, to have more ſelect crews. If we may gueſs at the purpoſe, of which we are not poſitively informed, it was what the circumſtances of Athens made neceſſary, and what had not a little interfered with the operations even of Alcibiades, the collection of ſupplies for the maintainance of the armament. With ſelect ſhips and ſelect crews he could be quicker in his motions, make ſudden attacks upon defenceleſs places, purſue merchant-

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chant-ſhips or ſmall ſquadrons, and avoid an enemy too ſtrong to be oppoſed: and hence apparently the expreſſion which Xenophon reports of Callicratidas, 'that he would ſtop Conon's 'adultery with the ſea [4];' implying that it was not by a fair ſuperiority, but through a furtive kind of ſucceſs, that Conon had appeared in ſome degree to command that element.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 10.

The Peloponneſian fleet was lying at Methymnë, when Conon was ſeen paſſing with ſeventy triremes. Callicratidas purſuing, endeavored to intercept the retreat of the Athenians to Samos. Conon fled for Mitylenë; but the Peloponneſian rowers exerted themſelves with ſuch vigor, that Callicratidas entered the harbour with him. Conon, thus compelled to fight againſt numbers ſo ſuperior, loſt thirty triremes, the men however eſcaping. The other forty triremes he ſecured by hauling them under the town-wall, ſo that they might be protected from the battlements. Callicratidas, ſtationing his fleet in the harbour, and ſending for infantay from Methymnë and Chios, formed the ſiege of Mitylenë by ſea and land. After theſe ſucceſſes, unaſked ſupplies came to him from Cyrus.

ſ. 11.

ſ. 12.

ſ. 13.

The ſituation of Conon was highly diſtreſſing. The city was populous and unprovided; and not only he was without means to procure ſupplies, but he was at a loſs for means even to ſend information of his diſtreſs. To attempt this

[4] Κόωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐλὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλατσαν.

however

however was neceſſary. In all his triremes a guard was conſtantly kept. From two, of known ſwiftneſs, he moved the ſoldiers [5] before day, and put, in their ſtead, crews of his beſt rowers, who gave place again to the ſoldiers after dark. This was repeated four days. On the fifth, at noon, the apparent inattention of the enemy, while their crews were aſhore at their dinner, ſeemed to afford the wiſhed-for opportunity: the two triremes puſhed out of the port; and, according to orders, one directed its courſe weſtward, immediately for Athens, the other northward, toward the Helleſpont. This however could not be done unſeen by the enemy. In ſome confuſion cutting the cables [6] of ſome of their ſhips, they were quickly in purſuit, and one of the Athenian triremes was taken about ſunſet the ſame day; the other reached Athens. SECT. II. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 13. ſ. 15. ſ. 16.

The exertion which the Athenian commonwealth was ſtill able to make, after all its loſſes and all its internal troubles, ſhows extraordinary vigor in the ſyſtem which owed its origin to the daring genius of Themiſtocles, and its improvement and permanence to the wiſdom of Pericles; yet which perhaps could never have exiſted, or could not have laſted but for the well-conſtructed foundation which the wiſdom of Solon had prepared. The circumſtances required every effort. A hundred and ten tri- ſ. 17.

[5] Τοὺς ἐπιβάτας. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 14.

[6] Τὰς ἀγκύρας ἀποκόπτοντες.

remes

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remes were equipped and manned; but, to effect this, not only every Athenian citizen, within age for forein ſervice, of the two lower orders, but many of the order of knights imbarked, who on all common occaſions were exempt from naval ſervice; and all being inſufficient, numerous ſlaves were added to complete the crews. The total number wanted would not be ſo few as twenty thouſand. In thirty days, however, this numerous fleet was ready for ſea: the generals before appointed were directed, as admirals, to take the command (for, in ſpeaking of the Greek naval ſervice, we have continual difficulty to chuſe between theſe titles) and under the orders of thoſe who were at the time in Athens, it proceeded to Samos. Ten Samian triremes reïnforced it there; and requiſition being ſent to the other allied and ſubject ſtates, for the utmoſt naval force that they could furniſh, allowing no able-bodied citizens to avoid the ſervice[7], an addition was thus collected which made the whole upward of a hundred and fifty: its courſe was then directed toward Leſbos.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 18.

ſ. 16. At the time of Conon's defeat, Diomedon, another of the ten generals, was cruizing with a ſeparate ſquadron of twelve ſhips. Receiving information of his collegue's diſtreſs, he made an effort, apparently with more zeal than judgement, to relieve it. Callicratidas took ten of

[7] Ἐσβαίνειν ἀναγκάσαντες ἁπάντας.

his

his ſhips: Diomedon himſelf eſcaped with the other two. SECT. II.

The Spartan admiral was yet with his whole force at Mitylenë, when intelligence reached him that a powerful fleet from Attica was arrived at Samos. Leaving then fifty triremes, under Eteonicus, to continue the blockade, he went with a hundred and twenty to meet the enemy. The ſame evening utting his people aſhore, according to the uſual practice, upon the headland of Malea in Leſbos, for their ſupper, as night came on he diſcovered the fires of a naval camp on the little ilands of Arginuſæ, between Leſbos and the main; and, ſoon after, information was brought to him that the Athenian fleet was there. About midnight he weighed, propoſing a ſurprize; but a thunder-ſtorm coming on, compelled him to wait for day. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 19. ſ. 20.

Early in the morning the approach of the enemy became known to the Athenian commanders, who immediately imbarked their crews, ſteered ſouthward for the open ſea, and formed their order of battle. Eight of the ten generals of the commonwealth were aboard the fleet. Xenophon informs us, but without accounting for it, that the Peloponneſian ſhips were at this time generally ſwifter than the Athenian; ſo that, ſince the firſt years of the war, the circumſtances of naval action were inverted, the Lacedæmonians propoſing to profit from rapid evolution, while the Athenians directed their principal care to guard againſt it. The Lacede- ſ. 21. ſ. 22.

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monian fleet therefore was formed in a ſingle line. The Athenian order of battle was remarkable: each of the eight generals commanded a ſquadron of fifteen ſhips; and the eight ſquadrons, in two lines, formed the wings of the fleet; the allies held the center, in a ſingle line; and with them were poſted three Athenian captains, Thraſybulus, Theramenes, and another, not named, who had all formerly commanded as admirals, and ten who held the rank of taxiarch in the land ſervice, which ſeems to have been ſuperior to that of trierarch in the navy. The attention to rank, here marked by Xenophon, deſerves notice, as it was leſs to be expected in a democracy, and as it accounts for the regularity with which the Athenian military ſervice was conducted, while, in ſome of the Greek democracies, ſubordination was very defective.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 25.

ſ. 23.

Xenophon ſeems to have thought the diſpoſition of the Athenian fleet judicious, and the maſter of the Spartan admiral's ſhip, Hernon, a Megarian, apparently ſaw that it was. More experienced probably in naval affairs than his commander, he augured ill of the approaching battle, and adviſed retreat from ſuperior numbers. Callicratidas anſwered, with the ſpirit of a diſciple of Lycurgus, but not with the judgement which the great command intruſted to him required, 'that his death would be a 'ſmall loſs to Sparta, but flight would be diſ-'graceful.'

SECT. II.

The fleets met, and the action was long disputed in line. Various exertions then broke the regularity of order, and still the fight was maintained for some time with much equality. At length Callicratidas, who commanded in the right wing of his fleet, in the shock of his galley striking an enemy with the beak, fell overboard and perished. About the same time the Athenian right, commanded by Protomachus, made an impression upon the Peloponnesian left: confusion spred to the right, no longer directed by the orders or animated by the exertion of the commander-in-chief; and shortly the whole fled. Above seventy triremes were either destroyed or taken: of the Lacedæmonian squadron, consisting of ten, only one escaped. Twenty-five[s] Athenian ships were sunk or disabled.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. s. 24.

The Athenian admirals, when pursuit ended, held a council of war to consider of measures next to be taken. To collect the wreck and the dead, but more particularly to relieve the living, who might be floating on the ruins of galleys, or endeavoring to save themselves by swimming, was commonly an important business after naval action. Diomedon proposed that this should be the first concern of the

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. s. 25. & c. 7. s. 3. & 10.

[s] In Xenophon's account of the battle, twenty-five is the number of ships mentioned as lost, together with their crews. In a following passage (c. 7. s. 10.) twelve only are stated to have been lost; and the context proves that in the latter passage there has been no error in transcription. Unable more satisfactorily to reconcile the contradiction, I have stated the twenty-five as sunk *or* disabled.

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whole fleet. Eraſinides, on the contrary, was for proceeding immediately with the whole fleet to the relief of Conon, the primary object of their inſtructions. The enemy's fleet under Eteonicus, he ſaid, if due diligence were uſed, might be taken intire; the deſtruction of their navy would thus be nearly complete; and the exigencies of the commonwealth required that ſuch an opportunity ſhould not be loſt in the endeavor to ſave the wrecked, which the growing roughneſs of the weather would render utterly unavailing. Thraſyllus differed from both: he inſiſted that, as the fleet was equal to both objects, neither the relief of the wrecked ſhould be neglected, nor aſſiſtance to Conon delayed. His opinion prevailed; and it was reſolved that forty-ſix ſhips ſhould remain to collect the wreck, while the reſt of the fleet proceeded to Mitylenë.

There is in this affair, which had important conſequences, ſome myſtery, of which whether party-ſpirit or private friendſhip or whatever may have cauſed the reſerve, it may be ſuſpected that Xenophon knew more than he has choſen to unfold. None of the generals took the command of the large ſquadron appointed to the relief of the wrecked: it was committed to Theramenes and Thraſybulus, who both had been in high naval commands, but were then only in the ſituation of captains of triremes. To make the appointment more reſpectable, ſome of the taxiarchs were ordered upon the duty with them. All the generals were in the mean

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 25.

mean time to go with the main body of the fleet to Mitylenë. Neither meaſure however could be executed. The increaſing violence of the ſtorm compelled the whole fleet to ſeek the ſhelter which the Arginuſan ilands afforded, and the unfortunate crews of twelve ſhips, wrecked in the battle, were thus all left to periſh. SECT. II. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 6. ſ. 24, 25.

In the night, nevertheleſs, one of thoſe ſmall light veſſels called keletes, which had attended the Peloponneſian fleet for the purpoſe of carrying intelligence or orders, reached Mitylenë with news of the defeat. Eteonicus, who commanded the blockade, ordered the captain to go immediately to ſea again, obſerving the moſt careful ſecrecy, and to return into the harbour by broad daylight, with his crew wearing chaplets, as was uſual for the meſſengers of victory, and proclaiming that Callicratidas had deſtroyed the Athenian fleet. This was punctually executed. Eteonicus then aſſembling his troops in ſight of the Mitylenæan ramparts, performed the evangelian ſacrifice, the thanks-offering for good news, and, at the concluſion of the ceremony, ordered that all ſhould immediately take their ſupper. Meantime he cauſed his principal ſtores to be imbarked in the veſſels of burden attending his fleet: the crews of the triremes were then haſtened aboard, and, the wind being favorable, all ſailed for Chios, while after ſetting fire to his camp, he led the infantry to Methymnë. ſ. 26. ſ. 27.

Theſe unexpected motions of the beſieging armament, which were ſo ably conducted as to ſ. 28.

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give no opportunity for advantage againſt it, firſt intimated to Conon the defeat of Callicratidas. Haſtening to launch his triremes, he met the victorious fleet already approaching from Arginuſæ, and himſelf communicated the information that his deliverance was already complete. The fleet then went to Chios; but, no opportunity offering for any blow againſt the enemy, it proceeded to Samos, the uſual ſtation.

SECTION III.

Impeachment of the generals who commanded at the battle of Arginuſæ.

THE victory of Arginuſæ, the greateſt obtained by the Athenians during the war, in which, with above ſeventy ſhips, more than ten thouſand men muſt have been loſt by the enemy, might have gone far to procure final ſucceſs to Athens, had Athens had a government capable of any ſteddineſs, or even ſecure againſt acts of madneſs. Fruitful of ſuperior men, ſhe never had more citizens equal to the conduct of the greateſt affairs than at this time. At leaſt three, Alcibiades, Thraſybulus, and Conon, already of large experience in great commands, and yet in the prime of life, were ſcarcely inferior to any known in her annals. But, ſince the reſtoration of democracy, the people, frantic with the wild joy of recovered power, and not leſs mad

mad with jealouſy of ſuperior men, were more than ever dupes to the arts of deſigning orators; and, like a weak and fickle tyrant, whoſe paſſion is his only law, tho no ſingle tyrant can really be ſo lawleſs, were led as the flattery, or the ſtimulation, moſt in conſonance with the paſſion of the moment, pointed the way. SECT. III.

Hence followed one of the moſt extraordinary, moſt diſgraceful, and moſt fatal ſtrokes of faction known in hiſtory. Of the eight generals who commanded at the battle of Arginuſæ, Protomachus and Ariſtogenes only remained with Conon at Samos: Diomedon, Pericles, Lyſias, Ariſtocrates, Eraſinides and Thraſyllus went home; little expecting the fate that was to meet them there. Matters had been prepared by intrigues, which are known to us only by their effects. A decree of the people had deprived all the generals of their command, Conon only excepted, to whom Adeimantus and Philocles were given as new collegues. As ſoon as the ſix arrived, Eraſinides was arreſted. Archedemus, then the popular orator, and conſidered as head of the democratical intereſt, had preferred an accuſation againſt him for embeziling public effects out of ſhips in their paſſage from the Helleſpont, and for other miſconduct in his command; and the court[9] before which the charge was exhibited, ordered the victorious general to priſon. It remained then for the other five to Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 8. ſ. 2.

[9] Τὸ Δικαστήριον.

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give, before the council, an account of tranſactions under their orders. At the concluſion it was moved by Timocrates, that all ſhould be put in ſafe cuſtody, to anſwer before the people for their conduct. The council accordingly ordered all the five into confinement.

When the aſſembly of the people met, Theramenes came forward as the principal accuſer; Theramenes, to whom with Thraſybulus, when in the ſituation of ſimple trierarchs, the accuſed generals had intruſted the command of a fleet of forty-ſix triremes, with the charge of ſaving thoſe wrecked in the battle of Arginuſæ; yet the crime now alledged againſt the generals was the neglect of that very duty. Xenophon has not accounted for this apparent contradiction[10]. The council, however, was evidently guilty of the groſſeſt and moſt tyrannical oppreſſion. The accuſed were not allowed to conduct their defence in the uſual form; advantages which the law poſitively preſcribed were denied them; and each was permitted only to make a ſhort ſpeech to the people.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 3.

Thus reſtricted, all made nearly the ſame apology. 'After a moſt glorious victory,' they ſaid, 'they had taken upon themſelves 'a very important and urgent duty, the purſuit

[10] The account of Diodorus, differing in ſome ſmall circumſtances from Xenophon's, agrees with it in the reſult. It aſſiſts indeed little to explain, but it tends to eſtabliſh the fairneſs of Xenophon's account, who, as a cotemporary, acquainted with ſome of the perſons concerned, and intereſted in the event, might be ſuppoſed liable to ſome partiality.

'of

'of the enemy, and the relief of the beſieged armament. In the mean time time the care of the wrecked, as far as depended on them, had not been omitted or ſlighted: it had been intruſted to officers whom none would deny to be competent for ſuch a duty, to officers who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in great commands and arduous enterprizes. If then there had been a failure, thoſe alone were fairly accountable, to whom the execution had been committed. It was, however, not their purpoſe to accuſe: injurious treatment ſhould not provoke them to be unjuſt: they imputed to none any failure in duty; well knowing that the violence of the ſupervening ſtorm rendered the ſaving of the wrecked impoſſible. For this there was no want of reſpectable witneſſes; every maſter of the fleet would bear teſtimony to it; and many perſons actually ſaved from the wrecked ſhips knew it, among whom was one of the generals included in the preſent accuſation.' SECT. III.

A ſhort ſpeech to this purpoſe having been made ſeverally by each of the generals, the queſtion was put. It was evident that a majority of the aſſembly was for the acquittal of the accuſed. But the party which had reſolved on their deſtruction had on their ſide the proëdri and a majority in the council. Their reſource therefore was to procure a declaration from the proëdri, 'That in the duſk of evening, then 'advanced, the number of hands could not be 'diſtinguiſhed, and that the deciſion muſt be Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 4.

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'referred to the next aſſembly.' Acquieſcence under this determination ſeems to have incouraged them to puſh their point, and they proceeded to move, 'That, in the interval, the 'council ſhould conſider and determine in what 'manner, in the next aſſembly, the trial ſhould 'be conducted.' To move any queſtion when it had been already decided that the aſſembly could not proceed to a diviſion, ſeems a ſtrange incongruity; but the motion made ſhows that they depended upon the paſſions, and not upon the reaſon of the people. It was no leſs than a propoſal to authorize the council to diſpenſe with the forms eſtabliſhed by the conſtitution, for the ſecurity of the ſubject in caſes of criminal accuſation. But the party was ſtrong, and the body of the people thoughtleſs and impatient: the friends of the accuſed were apparently ſurprized, and perhaps fearful of irritating the haſty and unwary: the queſtion was carried without a diviſion, and the aſſembly was diſmiſſed.

Having thus obviated the acquittal of the unfortunate generals, which, according to Xenophon, a majority of the aſſembly had actually pronounced, and which wanted only the declaration of the proëdri to give it effect; having procured authority for the council to ſubſtitute, at their pleaſure, any mode of trial inſtead of that preſcribed by law, the party were ſtill apprehenſive that they might fail of their purpoſe; and the conſequence of failure, in ſo violent an effort of faction, might not improbably be ruin

to

SECT. III.

to themſelves. Recourſe was therefore had to a kind of oratory ſuited to excite that popular paſſion which would favor their views. It was the ſeaſon of the Apaturia, a feſtival derived from patriarchal times, in which families aſſembled, and the chief of each received a kind of homage from its members. A number of perſons, clothed in black, and with their heads and beards cloſe ſhaven, as was cuſtomary in mourning, were procured to ſhow themſelves about the city, as relations of thoſe loſt in the ſtorm after the battle of Arginuſæ. This artifice was not without effect among the lower people. Meanwhile, in the council, the buſineſs was managed by Callixenus, who was a member, and who ſucceeded to the utmoſt wiſh of his party.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 5.

When the aſſembly was held which was to decide the fate of the generals, Callixenus came forward to report the reſolution of the council, which was to guide the proceedings. The reſolution, as it ſtands reported by Xenophon, ran thus: 'The accuſation of the generals having been heard in the aſſembly, together with 'their defence, the council hath decreed, "That "the people ſhall proceed immediately to ballot "by wards: that there ſhall be for each ward "two vaſes: that proclamation ſhall be made "by the herald, informing the people, That "whoever deems the generals criminal in neg-"lecting to ſave from the waves thoſe who were "conquerors in the battle, muſt put his die in-"to the firſt vaſe; whoever deems them inno-"cent,

ſ. 6.

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"cent, into the ſecond: that the puniſhment, "in caſe of condemnation, ſhall be death, to "be inflicted by the Eleven" (magiſtrates whoſe office bore a reſemblance to that of our ſheriff) "with confiſcation of all property, a tenth to "the goddeſs, the reſt to the commonwealth."

In the whole of theſe proceedings the oppreſſion of the individuals accuſed was ſo flagrant, and the violation of the conſtitution of ſo dangerous a kind, that the party thought ſomething might be ſtill wanting to inflame paſſion ſufficiently among the people, and ſtifle juſt conſideration. Their reſources however ſeem to have been, according to the account of Xenophon, ſuch that we cannot but wonder at their ſucceſs. A man was produced who declared before the aſſembly, 'that having been 'in one of the wrecked ſhips, he had ſaved 'himſelf on a flour-barrel; and that his drowning comrades had conjured him, if he ſhould 'eſcape that fate which for them was inevitable, 'not to let it paſs unknown to the Athenian 'people, how the generals had abandoned thoſe 'who had deſerved ſo well of their country.'

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 7.

Athens was not yet without a conſtitution, and laws, as well for the ſecurity of the conſtitution itſelf, as for the aſſurance of juſtice to individuals; tho faction, ſupported by a majority in the aſſembly, might ſometimes violate both. The friends of the generals therefore did not yet give up their defence, in which Euryptolemus ſon of Peiſianax took the leading part. Nor was there wanting a conſiderable body among

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among the people diſpoſed to ſupport him, when he remonſtrated againſt the violation of the conſtitution attempted by the decree of the council, and declared that he would cite Callixenus to anſwer according to law as the propoſer. The reſource of the oppoſite party was ſtill in popular paſſion. They directed their rhetoric to the jealous temper of democracy: 'It was 'intolerable,' they ſaid, 'for an individual to 'preſume to ſet limits to the authority of the 'people;' and immediately an angry multitude vociferated, 'That it was intolerable for an in-'dividual to preſcribe bounds to the will of 'the people.' Thus incouraged, Lyciſcus, one of the leading men, declared, 'That whoever 'ſhould preſume to check the authority of the 'aſſembly, he would move that his fate ſhould 'be decided by the ſame ballot with that of the 'generals.' The aſſembly upon this was again in uproar. Euryptolemus feared, by irritating the multitude, to injure the cauſe he meant to defend, and, retracting his propoſed citation of Callixenus, declared his ſubmiſſion to the will of the people. SECT. III.

This legal impediment being thus violently overborne, ſtill oppoſition occurred to the purpoſe of the proſecutors. The prytanes had the virtue to declare, that they would not put the queſtion for a decree ſubverſive of the conſtitution, and which the law forbad. Callixenus, imboldened by the ſupport he had already found, and deeply intereſted in carrying his meaſure, again mounted the bema, and addreſſing the people, Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. l. 9.

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people, accuſed the prytanes of refuſing their duty. The multitude, with renewed jealouſy of their ill-conceived and undefined rights, indignantly called for thoſe to appear who reſiſted the orders of the people. The virtue which had incited to oppoſe a meaſure ſo deſtructive of the conſtitution, and ſo iniquitous toward individuals, then yielded to fear; and the prytanes, with only one very remarkable exception, obeyed the tyrannical command. The ſon of Sophroniſcus, Socrates, who was of their number, perſiſted in declaring that nothing ſhould move him to act otherwiſe than according to law; but his collegues conſented to propoſe the queſtion, and take the ballot according to the reſolution of the council.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 9, & mem. Socr. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 18. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32.

This point being thus decided, Euryptolemus ventured again to aſcend the bema; no longer to oppoſe the reſolution of the council, but to ſpeak in favor of the accuſed, as the law authorized, what the people would yet bear to hear. Fearful, however, of exciting outcry, he began with cautiouſly declaring, 'That his intention was partly to accuſe, as well as partly to defend, Pericles his near relation, and Diomedon his intimate friend; and at the ſame time to adviſe the aſſembly what in his opinion the public good required.' Obſerving then no diſinclination to hear him, he proceeded: 'I accuſe them of a miſdemeanor in their command, inaſmuch as they diſſuaded what ought to have been done, and what their collegues otherwiſe would have done, the ſending information

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 10.

'mation in their diſpatches to the council and 'to you, that the duty of relieving the wrecked 'had been committed to Theramenes and Thra-'ſybulus, and had not been performed. This 'was their crime only, yet their collegues are 'involved in the accuſation: a crime againſt 'the public it muſt be confeſſed, tho not of a 'very hainous nature; it was an act of benevo-'lence toward thoſe very officers who are now 'requiting the charity by a capital proſecution, 'conducted in a new and unheard of form of 'ſeverity, againſt their benefactors.'

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Having ſtated his accuſation and his defence, he proceeded to his advice, which marks ſtrongly the ſtate of the Athenian government at the time. Frequent experience of being miſled by deſigning men, into meaſures which they found occaſion ſeverely to repent, made the antient democracies generally jealous of advice given by their orators, unleſs it flattered ſome paſſion which in the moment ſwayed the popular mind. 'In what I have to recommend,' ſaid therefore Euryptolemus, 'neither I nor any man can lead 'you into any dangerous error. For it muſt 'always be in your power to inforce againſt of-'fenders, equally whether many be involved in 'one common judgement, or each be allowed a 'ſeparate trial, any puniſhment at your pleaſure. 'I therefore moſt earneſtly wiſh and recom-'mend, that you would allow each of the ac-'cuſed generals at leaſt one day for his ſeparate 'defence; and I moſt anxiouſly deprecate your 'giving confidence to thoſe who would perſuade

'you

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'you, that it can be dangerous to take time for 'ſuch deliberation as may produce a reaſonable 'conviction in your own minds, and that it is 'ſafer to truſt others than yourſelves.

'The decree of Canonus, that powerful 'ſanction of the democratical authority, is well 'known to you all [11]. It declares, "That if any "ſhall injure the Athenian people, he ſhall an- "ſwer before the people in bonds: if he is "found guilty, he ſhall be puniſhed with death; "his body ſhall be thrown into the Barathrum; "and all his property ſhall be forfeited; a tenth "to the goddeſs, the reſt to the commonwealth." 'I deſire no other, Athenians, than that the 'generals be tried according to the proviſions 'of that ſevere law; and, if you think proper, 'let Pericles, my near relation, be the firſt to 'abide your ſentence.

'The crimes held moſt atrocious among men 'are ſacrilege, and high-treaſon. The generals 'before you are accuſed of none ſuch. But if 'the decree of Canonus is, in your opinion, 'too mild for them, let the law againſt ſacri- 'lege and treaſon be your guide. Even ſo, 'each will have his ſeparate trial: a day for 'each will be divided into three parts: in the 'firſt you will inquire and determine whether 'there is cauſe for putting the accuſed upon his 'trial; the ſecond will be allotted to the ac- 'cuſation; the third to the defence. Let it be

[11] Τὸ Κανώνου ψήφισμα. If there is anywhere any farther account of this remarkable law, than what we have here from Xenophon, it has eſcaped me. I think it is not noticed by either Petit or Potter.

'recollected

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'recollected how lately Ariſtarchus, the moſt 'obnoxious of thoſe who overthrew the demo-'cracy, and who afterward, in his flight from 'Athens, performed the ſignal treachery of be-'traying Œnoë to the Thebans, even Ariſtar-'chus was allowed his day, and even to chuſe 'his day for his defence. Will you then, 'Athenians, who were ſo ſcrupulouſly juſt to 'one whoſe treaſon was ſo notorious, and whoſe 'conduct ſo groſsly injurious, will you deny 'the common benefit of the laws to thoſe who 'have ſo ſignally ſerved their country? Will 'you break down the barriers of that conſtitu-'tion by which individuals have hitherto been 'ſafe, and by which the commonwealth has 'become great, to deliver to the executioner 'your meritorious generals, covered with the 'recent glory of the moſt important victory that 'has been gained in a war of twenty-ſix years? 'If you would conſult the juſtice, the honor, 'or the ſafety of the commonwealth, you will 'rather reward them with crowns, their due as 'conquerors, than, yielding to the malicious 'arguments of wicked men, condemn them to 'an ignominious death. To what therefore I 'have at preſent to propoſe, I truſt you cannot 'but aſſent: it is, "That each of the generals "be ſeparately tried, according to the provi-"ſions of the decree of Canonus."

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 11.

According to the forms of the Athenian aſ-ſembly, the queſtion was at the ſame time put upon the motion of Euryptolemus and that of Callixenus. The majority was declared for the

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motion of Euryptolemus; but, at the requiſition of Menecles, the holding up of hands being repeated [12], it was declared for that of Callixenus. The reſolution of the council being thus confirmed, in conformity to that reſolution the people proceeded to ballot. The fatal vaſe pronounced ſentence of death againſt the eight generals, and the ſix preſent were executed [13].

Plutarch relates of Alcibiades, that when, on his recall from Sicily, he avoided returning to Athens, being aſked, 'If he could not truſt his 'country?' he replied, 'Yes; for everything 'elſe; but in a trial for life, not my mother; 'leſt by miſtake ſhe ſhould put a black ball for 'a white one.' Whatever authority there may have been for this anecdote, it contains a very juſt reproof of the Athenian mode of giving judgement on life and death, by a ſecret ballot; which, without preventing corruption, excludes reſponſibility and covers ſhame.

But while, under the ſecurity of our own admirable conſtitution, we wonder at the defective polity of a people whom we find ſo many cauſes to admire, it is not a little advantageous for the writer of Grecian hiſtory, that circumſtances have been occurring, in a nation calling itſelf the moſt poliſhed of the moſt poliſhed age of the world, which render all the atrocious,

[12] Ὑπομοσαμένου δὲ Μηνικλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης.

[13] Lyſias mentions this tranſaction in his oration againſt Eratoſthenes, (p. 123. vel. 406.) and his account, as far as it goes, confirms that of Xenophon.

and

and before ſcarcely credible violences of faction among the Greeks, not only probable, but almoſt make them appear moderate. At the ſame time it may not be digreſſing improperly to remark, that as what has been paſſing in France may tend to illuſtrate Grecian hiſtory, and to exculpate the Grecian character from any innate atrocity, beyond what is common among other nations, there occurs alſo in Grecian hiſtory, what may inable to form a juſter eſtimate of the French character, than a view of the late enormities, compared only with what has at any time paſſed in our own country, might lead us to conceive: and if the inability of wiſe and worthy men, ſuch as undoubtedly muſt have exiſted in France, to hold their juſt influence among the people, and prevent thoſe diſgraceful proceedings, appears itſelf a diſgrace both to themſelves and to the nation, Grecian hiſtory, and the extant writings of the ableſt Grecian politicians, will perhaps furniſh their faireſt apology. SECT. III.

For, ſo many men of the brighteſt talents and higheſt acquirements, as in Greece turned their thoughts, with the cloſeſt attention, to a ſubject ſo univerſally and deeply intereſting, not one ſeems to have been able even to imagine a form of government which might, in a great nation, reconcile the jarring pretenſions ariſing from that variety of rank among men, without which even ſmall ſocities cannot ſubſiſt. Our own writers, through meer familiarity with the object, as foreiners from unacquaintance with it, have very much overlooked what, in impor-

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tance, is perhaps not inferior to any one circumſtance in the ſingular conſtitution of our government. It is not till ſince the troubles in France began, that a refugee, who has been in ſituations inabling him to ſee and compelling him to obſerve, has diſcovered, what, but for thoſe troubles, would perhaps never have occurred to his notice; that, 'nowhere elſe in the 'world, ſuch harmony ſubſiſts between the ſe-'veral ranks of citizens as in England.'

Lettre au Roi par M. de Calonne.

This harmony is indeed the foundation, the firm foundation, on which the proud ſuperſtructure of the Britiſh conſtitution reſts. Ranks vary, as much, or perhaps more than elſewhere. But no one rank has that gigantic preëminence which can inable it to trample upon its next inferior. In the ſcale of ſubordination, the diſtance from top to bottom is great; but the gradation is ſcarcely perceptible and the connection intimate. Each rank is intereſted in the ſupport of its next ſuperior; for none are excluded from the hope of riſing; and, of all the various ranks, the higheſt is moſt intereſted in the ſupport of all. We cannot conſider without wonder, that an order of things apparently the moſt natural as well as the moſt beneficial, never ſubſiſted in any country but our own.

It has not always perhaps been duly recollected by ſpeculative politicians, that, among the antient republics, no ſuch order of citizens exiſted as that which in Paris, after the firſt revolution, aſſumed deſpotic power, and, while the repreſentatives of the nation were deliberating

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on the rights of man, trampled under foot all rights. The functions of that order of citizens were in Athens performed by slaves; and without keeping this circumstance constantly in mind, we cannot but be liable to the grossest error in applying the rules of antient policy to modern times. Those writers who would infer, that formerly the lower people in England were not free, because the lowest rank were actually slaves, attempt a fallacy upon their readers. In treating of Athens, Lacedæmon, or Rome, they would have distinguished, as they ought to do, slaves from citizens. It is unquestionable that, from the Anglo-Saxon conquest downward, the constitution of this country has been always free: and tho, in unsettled times, and especially under the first Norman kings, law might be overborne by the violence of accidental power, yet both the law, and the established mode of administering the law, never were otherwise than highly and even singularly favorable to the freedom and property of even the lowest citizens [14].

Montesquieu has undertaken to foretel the fall of the English constitution; and a credit

[14] It seems to deserve a notice which I think it has not yet met with, that the monarchs to whom our constitution is most indebted, Alfred, Henry II. and Edward I. were conquerors. It is certainly a most unworthy slander upon those uncommon great men, as well as upon the parliaments from Edward the first till the time when Fortescue wrote under Henry VI. to assert, as often has been done, that England had no valuable constitution, and no true freedom, till the opposition to the Stuarts, or till the expulsion of the Stuarts, procured them.

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has been given to him, proportioned rather to the merit of the prophet than of the prophecy. Monteſquieu, evidently, had not duly adverted to that peculiar amalgamation of ranks in England, through which all coaleſce; or, if it may be ſo expreſſed, to that concatenation, by which the loweſt end of a long chain is as firmly connected with the higheſt, as the intermediate links with one another. Through this advantageous conſtitution of things, England has always avoided, and it may well be hoped will continue to avoid, that violence of internal fermentation, which continually diſordered, and at length deſtroyed the governments of Athens and Rome; and hence ſhe has been inabled to reſiſt the contagion of French politics, ſo alluring in diſtant proſpect, ſo hideous in near approach, which perhaps no other European government, whoſe mildneſs would allow it equal admiſſion, could without forein aſſiſtance have withſtood.

Nor is it, I apprehend, as ſome political writers have aſſerted, of no importance to trace the freedom of the conſtitution of this country beyond the civil wars of the laſt century. For the purpoſe indeed of eſtabliſhing the right of the Britiſh people to freedom, it is utterly unneceſſary. But, toward a clear comprehenſion of the conſtitution itſelf; toward a certain knowlege of the broad and deep foundation on which it reſts; toward a ready and juſt perception of the manner in which it may be affected, through the various changes to which all human things

things are liable, and through ſome which we have already ſeen; extenſion of dominion, influx of riches, increaſe of population, increaſe of revenue, immoderate debt, and the poſſible reduction of that debt; toward a juſt judgement how far any of theſe changes are beneficial, and how far injurious, and when alteration or remedy may be wanting, and what, in any given circumſtances, will be the probable effect of any alteration or remedy propoſed; toward all theſe an acquaintance with the hiſtory of our conſtitution, from earlieſt times, is of great importance. SECT. III.

If then it is to ourſelves important to know the hiſtory of our conſtitution from earlieſt times, it will alſo be not a little important to other nations, if any ſuch there are, who would form a conſtitution on the model of ours, or who would improve the conſtitution they poſſeſs, after our example. Nor will it be leſs important to thoſe who, without any good foundation to build on, and without any valuable experience within their own country, propoſe to raiſe, with the airy materials of theory, a conſtitution more perfect than the moſt perfect that has yet exiſted upon earth. For want of attention to the breadth and antique firmneſs of the baſis on which our envied and truly enviable government reſts, the ſingular manner in which the materials of the ſuperſtructure are adapted to each other, and how they are held together by their natural fitneſs to coaleſce, the complexion of Europe ſeems to threaten many

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new and memorable leſſons in politics; leſſons for every order that can exiſt in a ſtate ſeparately, and leſſons for nations united. Happy then thoſe, who, gathering wiſdom from the ſufferings and dangers of others, can avoid the miſeries which many will probably feel [15].

In

[15] As M. de Calonne's Letter, above referred to, tho printed, was never publiſhed, it may not be ſuperfluous to give here, in its original language, the paſſage where the obſervation noticed occurs.

J'ignorois, lorſque j'ai commencé cette lettre, à quel point la diviſion éclatoit déjà entre la Nobleſſe et le tiers Etat, dans les différentes provinces de votre royaume: depuis que je l'ai appris, j'en frémis. Vu la ſituation où les choſes ont été amenées, il n'y a pas lieu d'eſpérer que la concorde puiſſe ſe rétablir d'elle-meme, et ſans qu'on ait extirpé les germes de diſſention qu'on n'a que trop fomentés. Il faut donc y pourvoir par quelque moyen nouveau, puiſſant, et efficace. Celui que je propoſe eſt éprouvé. C'eſt par lui qu'il exiſte en Angleterre, entre les Grands et le Peuple, plus d'accord qu'il n'y en a, je penſe, dans aucune autre nation; nulle part ailleurs l'eſprit public n'eſt auſſi marqué; nulle part l'intéret n'a plus d'empire pour réunir tous les Etats.

Or il eſt conſtant que rien n'y contribue davantage que l'inſtitution d'une Chambre Haute et d'une Chambre Baſſe dans le Parlement, ainſi que leur compoſition reſpective, les diſtinctions qui les ſéparent, et les rapports qui les uniſſent. Plus on étudie cet enſemble, plus on trouve à l'admirer: Les Lords qui forment la Chambre Haute, et qui tous ſont titrés (ce ſont les ſeuls qui le ſoient en Angleterre) partagent dans une meme aſſociation, ſans préjudice néanmoins à leurs qualifications diſtinctives, l'honneur de la Pairie; et c'eſt, ſans contredit, le premier corps de l'Etat. Leur prérogative n'eſt jamais conteſtée ni enviée par les Communes, qui ont parmi leurs Membres les fils cadets, les frères, les parens, de ces memes Lords et des plus grandes maiſons du royaume. C'eſt ce mélange, cette transfuſion, ſi je le puis dire, de la plus haute Nobleſſe dans le corps repréſentatif du peuple, qui entretient l'harmonie entre l'un et l'autre, et qui reſſerre le nœud de leur union; c'eſt ce qui fait que les deux Chambres fraterniſent ſans ſe confondre, qu'elles ſe contrebalancent ſans ſe rivaliſer,

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In digreſſing thus far, I truſt I have not overſtepped the limits within which the writer of Grecian hiſtory may claim, not an excluſive, but a common right. A Grecian hiſtory, and indeed any hiſtory perfectly written (theſe volumes pretend to no ſuch merit) but eſpecially a Grecian hiſtory perfectly written, ſhould be a political inſtitute for all nations.

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rivaliſer, que l'une empeche l'autre d'empiéter, et que toutes deux concourent également au maintien de la prérogative royale et à la conſervation des droits nationaux. Lettre addreſſée au Roi, par M. de Calonne, le 9 Fevrier, 1789. p. 67, 68.

The very great advantage to a free conſtitution, of having a hereditary firſt magiſtrate, the depoſitary of the ſupreme executive power, ſo diſtinguiſhed by ſuperior rank as to exclude all idea of competition, has been very well explained by Mr. De Lolme; but the benefit of that ſingular amalgamation of various rank among the people, which prevails in England, has, I think, nowhere been duly noticed. In no court of Europe, I believe, is rank ſo exactly regulated among the higheſt orders, as in England, and yet there is no rank perfectly inſulated; all are in ſome way implicated with thoſe about them. To begin even with the heir apparent; as a ſubject, he communicates in rank with all other ſubjects. The king's younger ſons rank next to the elder, but their rank is liable to reduction: their elder brother's younger ſons will rank before them. The Archbiſhops and the Chancellor, and the great officers of ſtate rank above Dukes not of royal blood, but their rank is that of office only: the Dukes, in family rank, are commonly much above the Archbiſhops and Chancellor. Thus far our rule, I believe, differs little from that of other European courts: what follows is peculiar to ourſelves. The peers, all equal in legal, differ in ceremonial rank. The ſons of peers of the higher orders, rank above the peers themſelves of the lower orders; but, ſuperior thus in ceremonial rank, they are in legal rank inferior. For the ſons of all peers, even of the royal blood, being commoners, while in ceremonial rank they may be above many of the peers, in legal rank they are only peers with the commoners. This implication of the peerage with the body of the people is the advantageous circumſtance which

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Sedition at Chios. Lyſander reäppointed commander-in-chief of the Peloponneſian fleet; in favor with Cyrus. Unſteadineſs of the Athenian government. Meaſures of the fleets: Battle of Aigoſpotami.

B. C. 407. P. W. 25. WHILE Athens, by a violent exertion of power in the ſoverein aſſembly, overthrowing the barriers of the conſtitution and trampling on law and juſtice, was preparing her own downfal, there occurred, among the Peloponneſian forces on the other ſide of the Ægean, what will deſerve notice, as it affords additional proof how little all Greece was prepared to receive a conſtitution that could eſtabliſh peace throughout her confines, and give ſecurity to all or to any of her people. After the death of

which has particularly ſtruck Mr. de Calonne. But there is another thing which perhaps not leſs ſtrongly marks the wiſe moderation of our anceſtors, to whom we owe the preſent order of things. No diſtinction between ſubjects can be really more eſſential than the being or not being members of the legiſlative body; yet the rank of a member of parliament is known neither to the law, nor to the ceremonial of the country. Among untitled commoners indeed there is no diſtinction of rank that can be very exactly defined; and yet a diſtinction always ſubſiſts in public opinion, decided partly, and perhaps ſometimes too much, by wealth, partly by conſideration given to birth, connections or character, which upon the whole, perhaps more than under any other government, preſerves the ſubordination neceſſary to the well-being of large ſocieties.

Calli-

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Callicratidas and the diſperſion of the Peloponneſian fleet, the Peloponneſian cauſe ſeems to have been neglected by Cyrus. The ſquadron, which had eſcaped from Mitylenë, remained at Chios; where its commander Eteonicus joined it from Methymnë, but without money to pay it. Accuſtomed as the Greeks were to ſubſiſt on military ſervice by their own means, this gave at firſt no great uneaſineſs. In ſo rich an iland, the induſtrious found opportunity to earn ſomething, by working for hire; and wild fruits, or thoſe cheaply bought, were reſources for the leſs handy or more idle; ſo that, in the joy of recent eſcape, and with the hope of ſpeedy relief, the wants that occurred during ſummer were patiently borne. But when, in advancing autumn, clothes became ragged, ſhoos worn out, wants of all kinds increaſed while means of earning leſſened, and as the ſtormy ſeaſon approached, the hope of relief grew fainter, reflection began then to excite the moſt ſerious apprehenſions. In this ſtate of things, the compariſon of their own circumſtances with thoſe of the wealthy Chians, was obvious to remark; and the tranſition was ready to the obſervation, that, having arms in their hands, it depended only upon themſelves to change ſituations. A conſpiracy was in conſequence formed, for making themſelves maſters of the iland; and it was agreed that, for diſtinction, every aſſociate ſhould carry a reed.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 1.

Intelligence of this plot did not reach Eteonicus till the number of aſſociates was ſo great, that

ſ. 2.

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that to oppoſe it by open force would have been highly hazardous. If we may judge from the expreſſion of Xenophon upon the occaſion, compared with ſo many of Thucydides, Plato, and other writers, which ſhow how widely it was held among the Greeks that might made right and that the uſeful was the meaſure of the honeſt, Eteonicus would not much have regarded the robbery of his allies, even with the maſſacre that muſt probably have attended, if diſadvantageous conſequences had not been to be apprehended to his commonwealth, and blame on that account to himſelf. The fear of a general alienation from the Lacedæmonian cauſe, according to Xenophon, determined his oppoſition to the conſpiracy; and rather an arbitrary power, conceded on the neceſſity of the caſe to military commanders, than any defined and conſtitutional authority, inabled him to oppoſe it with effect. Selecting fifteen confidential perſons, and arming them with daggers, he went through the ſtreets of Chios. The firſt perſon obſerved, bearing a reed, was a man with diſordered eyes, coming out of a ſurgeon's ſhop, and he was inſtantly put to death. A crowd preſently aſſembled about the body; and inquiry being anxiouſly made, anſwer was, in purſuance of direction from Eteonicus, freely given, 'that 'the man was killed for carrying a reed.' Information of theſe circumſtances was communicated quickly through the city. The conſpirators, themſelves unprepared, were ignorant what preparation might have been made againſt them;

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 3.

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them; and every one, as the report reached him, haſtened to put away his reed. Eteonicus, who watched the event, without giving time for recovery from ſurprize, ordered all aboard. The mark of diſtinction was gone; none of the conſpirators any longer knew whom to truſt; all became anxious to avoid crimination; ready obedience would be the firſt proof of innocence; and preſently not a man of either land or ſea forces remained aſhore. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 4.

Eteonicus then aſſembled the Chian magiſtrates, informed them what a danger they had eſcaped, and repreſented the neceſſity of providing for the preſent wants of the armament. A ſupply was inſtantly given him, with which he repaired to the fleet, and diſtributed a month's pay for each man. In doing this he paſſed through every ſhip, and ſpoke to all the ſoldiers and ſeamen of their ſeveral duties, and particularly of the probable buſineſs of the inſuing campaign, as if he had known nothing of the conſpiracy. All were happy to receive this tacit aſſurance that they were free from danger; all became anxious to ſhow themſelves zealous in the public cauſe; and thus, with only the death of one man, not the moſt guilty perhaps, but certainly connected with the guilty, a mutiny was completely ſmothered, which, under a heſitating commander, might not have been quelled without ſhedding many times more blood, and not being quelled, would have ſpred havoc over the richeſt and moſt populous iland of the Ægean.

It

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Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 5.

It was about the time when this dangerous buſineſs was ſo fortunately ſettled, that a congreſs of the Peloponneſian confederacy was held at Epheſus. The Chians, and probably all the Aſian Greeks of the confederacy, ſent their deputies particularly commiſſioned for the purpoſe. For the European ſtates, the principal officers of their reſpective forces moſtly acted as repreſentatives. What had been paſſing in Athens was unknown, or imperfectly known; and the ſame wiſdom and ſpirit in council at at home, the ſame ability and energy in operation abroad, which had ſo wonderfully reſtored the Athenian commonwealth from agony to vigor and victory, were expected ſtill to continue. It was therefore a queſtion of moſt ſerious concern, not only how the war ſhould be conducted, but who ſhould direct operations. Much would depend on the good-will and ready aſſiſtance of the Perſian prince, and with him it was therefore deemed proper to communicate. The reſult of the deliberations was a reſolution to ſend miniſters to Lacedæmon, in the joint names of the prince, the armament, and the allies, with information of the ſtate of things, and a requeſt that Lyſander might be reäppointed to the command in chief.

No Spartan, Braſidas alone excepted, had ever ſo conciliated the allied cities as Lyſander; no Spartan knew equally how to render himſelf agreeable to a Perſian prince: his military as well as his political conduct had been able, and his ſucceſs againſt the Athenian fleet at Notium

had gained him fame. At another ſeaſon, nevertheleſs, the Lacedæmonian government might perhaps not have been perſuaded to contravene a rule which was deemed important, never to commit the command in chief of the fleet twice to the ſame perſon. But the conſideration of the great defeat they had received, and of their utter inability to ſupport their Aſiatic allies, or to diſpute the command of the ſeas with the Athenians, without the aid of Perſian money, diſpoſed them to relax a little. Nominally however they ſtill adhered to their rule, while by a ſubterfuge they gratified the Perſian prince and their Grecian confederates: Aracus was appointed navarc, admiral of the fleet, for the year; but Lyſander was ſent to command in Aſia, with the title of epiſtoleus [16], vice-admiral. SECT. IV.

Lyſander, arriving at Epheſus when winter was not yet far advanced, made it his firſt concern to provide that in ſpring he might have a fleet able to meet that of Athens. The ſquadron under Eteonicus at Chios, and all other detached ſhips, were ſent for to Epheſus, examined, and the neceſſary repairs directed: meaſures were at the ſame time taken to forward the completion of the triremes building at Antandrus; and when this buſineſs was duly put B. C. 407. P. W. 25. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 7. & 9.

[16] The word ſeems to have meant originally an officer *ſent* by a ſuperior officer to command for him; but it appears to have become the uſual title for the ſecond in command in the Lacedæmonian ſervice. See Xen. Hellen. l. 1. c. 1. ſ. 15. It is pretty exactly rendered by the Roman title Legatus.

in

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in train, Lyſander haſtened to pay his compliments perſonally to the Perſian prince at Sardis. He had the ſatisfaction to find that abſence had not diminiſhed his intereſt there: he was received with diſtinguiſhed attention, and treated as a confidential friend. Cyrus ſhowed him a particular account of the ſums iſſued for the pay of the fleet; remarked that they much exceeded what the king had given him for the purpoſe; but added, 'that as the country 'which the king had put under his command 'afforded a great revenue, and his good incli-'nation to Lyſander and the Lacedæmonians 'remained perfect, money ſhould not be want-'ing for the proſecution of the war.' Lyſander, returning to Epheſus with an ample ſupply, paid the armament all the arrears due, according to the rate before eſtabliſhed; and with goodwill thus conciliated toward himſelf, and zeal for the ſervice apparent among all ranks, he was proceeding to make arrangements for opening the campaign, when a meſſage arrived from Cyrus, deſiring his preſence again at Sardis.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 8.

Condeſcendingly as the Perſian prince conducted himſelf toward the Greeks, his haughtineſs among his own people was extravagant. Aſſuming the tone of ſoverein, he required thoſe marks of ſervile reſpect which cuſtom had appropriated to the monarch of the empire. The court-dreſs of Perſia had ſleeves ſo long, that, when unfolded, they covered the hand; and the ceremonial required of thoſe who approached

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proached the royal preſence, to inwrap the hands, ſo as to render them helpleſs[17]. Two youths, nearly related to the royal family, refuſing this mark of extreme ſubordination to Cyrus, were, in purſuance of an arbitrary command from that prince, put to death. Complaint was made at Suſa by their unhappy parents, and indignation was loud and general againſt the cruel and dangerous pride of Cyrus. Darius, an indulgent father, deſirous of repreſſing the evil, but tender about the means, ſent a meſſage mentioning only, that he was laboring under a ſevere ilneſs, and therefore wiſhed to ſee his ſon. Cyrus did not refuſe obedience to the paternal ſummons; but, before he would leave Sardis, he ſent for Lyſander. The Spartan general, haſtening to the call, was received with diſtinction, even more flattering than before. Cyrus expreſſed the warmeſt intereſt in the Lacedæmonian cauſe; anxiouſly diſſuaded the riſking a general action at ſea, without a decided ſuperiority; remarked that, with the wealth of Perſia, ſuch a ſuperiority was certainly to be acquired; ſhowed an account of the revenue ariſing from the countries under his own command; and, directing

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Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 9.

[17] In the Eaſt faſhions change little, and the ſtrange one here mentioned, it ſeems, is retained to this day. 'The beneeſh,' ſays one of the moſt intelligent and exact of modern travellers, 'is the ceremonial dreſs of the Mamalukes. It covers very 'completely the whole body, even the fingers' ends, which it is 'held very indecent to ſhow before the great.' Volney's Travels in Egypt.

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a very large ſum to be put into the hands of the Spartan general, for the expences of the war, parted with this kind exhortation, 'be mindful 'of my friendſhip for Lacedæmon and for 'yourſelf.'

Lyſander, returning to Epheſus thus abundantly ſupplied, with a ſecond iſſue of pay ſtill elevated the already high ſpirits of his forces. In the mean time, ſuch had been the effect of his well-directed attention, ſeconded by an unfailing treaſury, that the fleet was already equal in ſtrength to the Athenian. He propoſed therefore to proceed upon offenſive operation, but not to riſk the uncertain event of a general ingagement, which no neceſſity of his circumſtances required. His view was directed leſs immediately againſt the fleet, than againſt the ſubject dependencies of Athens, the ſources of the revenue by which the fleet was ſupported. Accordingly he led his armament firſt to the Carian coaſt, where he took the town of Cedreia by aſſault. His troops ſhared the plunder; among which were reckoned the inhabitants, a mixed race, Greek and barbarian, who were ſold for ſlaves.

In every one of the towns on the Helleſpont and Propontis, which the ſucceſſes of Alcibiades and Thraſybulus had reſtored to the dominion of Athens, a Lacedæmonian party remained. In giving efficacy to the efforts which ſuch a party might be able to make, two very important objects might be at once accompliſhed, the checking of the revenue

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which ſupported the Athenian fleet, and the recovery of the trade with the Euxine, which furniſhed the beſt ſupplies of corn. The Helleſpont was therefore the point to which Lyſander propoſed to direct his principal attention; having apparently no immediate view beyond the objects abovementioned. Deſirous to avoid the Athenian fleet in the paſſage, he made his way cloſe along the friendly ſhore of Aſia, and, without interruption, reached Abydus. Of all the towns on the ſhores of the Helleſpont and Propontis, which the defeat in Sicily had given to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, Abydus alone had not been retaken. The harbour of Abydus therefore was made the ſtation of the fleet. The city was populous; its force of infantry was added to the infantry of the armament, and all put under the command of Thorax, a Lacedæmonian. The neighbouring city of Lampſacus being then attacked by land and ſea, was taken by aſſault. The plunder, which was conſiderable (for Lampſacus was rich, and large ſtore of proviſions had been collected there) was given to the troops and ſeamen, but the free inhabitants were not moleſted in their perſons.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 11, 12.

The government of Athens ſeems not to have recovered conſiſtency, after that violent ſtruggle of faction which produced the condemnation of the generals. It was not long after (ſo Xenophon ſays without mentioning how long) that the Athenian people, repenting, directed their anger againſt thoſe who had miſled them to the

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 7. ſ. 12.

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atrocious deed; and Callixenus was compelled, with four others, to find ſureties for their appearance before the ſame tremendous tribunal, which had conſigned the victorious generals to the executioner. At the ſame time opportunity was taken to procure the recal of the baniſhed, and the reſtoration of the diſhonored; while the people, brought to their ſenſes, (ſuch is the expreſſion of the democratical Lyſias, confirming the account of Xenophon) more gladly directed their vengeance againſt the authors of intereſted and malignant proſecutions under the democracy, than againſt thoſe who had ruled under the oligarchy. Xenophon proceeds, with evident ſatisfaction, to relate, that Callixenus, who found opportunity to fly, and afterward found means to make his peace and return, lived nevertheleſs univerſally hated and avoided, and, among thoſe public diſtreſſes which will hereafter occur to notice, was ſtarved to death.

Lyſ. Δημ. καλλιλ. απολ.

Xen. & Lyſ. ut. ſup.

It was however vainly attempted, by an oath of concord, taken by the whole people, to put an end to the ferment of party. Adminiſtration was weak, and democratical jealouſy interfered in every meaſure. The command-in-chief of the fleet was already divided between three officers, Conon, Adeimantus, and Philocles. Three more were now added with equal powers, Menander, Tydeus, and Cephiſodotus. For ſubſiſtence, the armament depended upon itſelf. It was indeed able to collect the tribute aſſeſſed upon the ſubject-ſtates of Aſia and

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 11.

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and Thrace, and it could ſometimes raiſe contributions from the enemy's country: but this buſineſs unavoidably ingaged the attention of the generals, to the hindrance of that enterprize which was neceſſary toward final ſucceſs in the war; while the Peloponneſian commanders, having all their pecuniary wants ſupplied by the wealth of Perſia, could chuſe their meaſures.

The fleet which the Peloponneſians were thus inabled to raiſe and maintain in energy, far greater than had ever formerly been ſeen in wars between the Greeks, made it neceſſary for the Athenians to aſſemble their whole naval force in one point; and that deciſive action, which it was the obvious policy of the Peloponneſians to avoid, was poſſibly to the Athenians neceſſary. In ability for command, perhaps, Conon did not yield to Lyſander; and his fleet, at leaſt equal in number, for it conſiſted of a hundred and eighty triremes, and probably ſuperior in the proportion of practiſed ſeamen among the crews, was inferior only by the diviſion of the ſupreme authority. Confident therefore in ſtrength, and elate with recent victory, the Athenians paſſed from Samos to the Aſiatic coaſt, and plundered the country acknowleging the ſovereinty of Perſia. They moved then for Epheſus, to offer battle to the enemy; but in their way they received intelligence that Lyſander had already paſſed northward. In alarm for the dependencies of the commonwealth on the Helleſpont, they haſtened after him. Arriving at Elæus, they

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 13.

ſ. 11.

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were informed that Lampſacus was already taken, and the enemy's fleet there. Stopping therefore only while they took refreſhment, they proceeded to Seſtos, where they procured proviſions for the night, and arrived the ſame evening at Aigoſpotami, directly overagainſt Lampſacus. The hiſtorian, deſcribing their progreſs, particularizes, what deſerves notice as it marks the manner of antient naval operations, that they dined at Elæus and ſupped at Aigoſpotami, where they formed their naval camp.

The ſtrait between Lampſacus and Aigoſpotami being ſcarcely two miles wide, the arrival of the Athenian fleet was inſtantly known to Lyſander, and his plan almoſt as inſtantly formed. On the ſame night his orders were iſſued. By daybreak next morning his crews had taken their meal, and went immediately aboard. All was completely prepared for action, but no movement made. By ſunriſe the Athenian fleet was off the harbour of Lampſacus in order of battle. The Peloponneſians remained motionleſs: the Athenians waited till evening, and then returned to Aigoſpotami. As the Athenian fleet withdrew, Lyſander ordered ſome of his ſwifteſt galleys to follow them, with inſtruction to the commanders to approach the oppoſite ſhore enough to ſee the enemy debark, and form ſome judgement of their immediate intentions, and then to haſten back with the information. This was punctually executed: Lyſander meanwhile kept his fleet in readineſs for action; and, not till he was aſſured that the enemy's motions indicated

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c 1. ſ. 15.

dicated no enterprize, he diſmiſſed his crews for their refreſhment. On the morrow theſe movements were exactly repeated, and ſo for the two following days. SECT. IV.

Since the battle of Notium, Alcibiades had reſided in his caſtle in the Thracian Cherſoneſe. The two fleets in his neighbourhood of courſe attracted his attention, and he was at leaſt ſo far ſenſible to the welfare of his country as to be uneaſy at what he ſaw. Aigoſpotami had neither town nor defenſible harbour, but only a beach on which the galleys might be hauled, or near which, in the ſhelter of the ſtrait, they might ſafely ride at anchor. The ground was commodious for incamping; but in the defective military ſyſtem of that age, the ſeamen and ſoldiers went to Seſtos, two miles off, for a market. The enemy meanwhile, at Abydus, had the ſecurity of a harbour for their fleet, with a town for their people, where, always in readineſs for every duty, they could procure all neceſſaries. Alcibiades went to the Athenian camp, and communicated with the generals on theſe circumſtances; obſerving, that if they moved only to Seſtos, they, equally with the enemy, would have the benefit of a town with a harbour, and equally, as from their preſent ſituation, might fight when they pleaſed; with the advantage, which in their preſent ſituation they could not command, of fighting only when they pleaſed. This admonition, ſlighted by the other generals, was treated by Tydeus and Menander with unmannerly diſdain, and Alcibiades withdrew.

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 5. ſ. 10.
l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 16.
Xen. ut ſup. Plut. vit. Alcib. & Lyſand.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. s. 17. Lyſander, meanwhile, had obſerved that every day's experience of his inaction increaſed the confidence and negligence of the Athenians. Not confining themſelves to the market of Seſtos, they wandered wide about the country, to ſeek proviſions, or on pretence of ſeeking them. Still they continued in the morning to offer battle, returning in the afternoon to their camp. On the fifth day, he directed the commanders of his exploring ſhips, if the Athenians debarked and diſperſed as uſual, to haſten their return, and communicate notice to him by the way by elevating a ſhield. The whole armament was kept in readineſs, the landforces under Thorax were aboard, the expected ſignal was made, and the fleet moved acroſs the ſtrait.

s. 18. Conon alone, of the Athenian generals, was in any ſtate of preparation. As ſoon as he ſaw the enemy in motion, he ordered the call to arms, and the ſignal for all to go aboard: but ſoldiers and ſeamen were equally diſperſed; ſome of the triremes were wholly without hands; and the diſtance was ſo ſmall, that the Peloponneſians were upon them long before any effectual meaſures for defence could be taken. Conon's trireme, with ſeven others of his diviſion and the ſacred ſhip Paralus, had their complete crews aboard; and theſe puſhed off from the ſhore. All the reſt were ſeized by the enemy, at anchor or upon the beach. No effort, within the power of nine ſhips, could have any other

s. 19. effect than adding the loſs of thoſe nine to that of the reſt of the fleet. While therefore the enemy

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enemy were intent upon their great capture, made without a blow, but ſtill to be ſecured againſt the Athenian landforce, Conon fled unpurſued; not unmindful, however, of ſuch ſervice as his ſtrength might accompliſh. Sails were an incumbrance to the antient galleys in action. Within ſo narrow a ſtrait therefore, and with his port at hand, Lyſander had left thoſe of his fleet aſhore. Conon had intelligence that the ſtore was not within the walls of Lampſacus, but at the point of Abarnis. Accordingly landing there, he carried off all the mainſails [18], and then haſtening to the mouth of the Helleſpont, eſcaped to ſea.

Meanwhile Lyſander, having ſecured poſſeſſion of the Athenian ſhips, to the number of a hundred and ſeventy, directed his attention to the ſcattered crews and troops. Some of theſe found refuge in the neighbouring towns and fortreſſes [19]; but the greater part, together with all the generals [20], were made priſoners. In the evening of the ſame day on which the fleet was taken, Lyſander ſent away an account of his extraordinary ſucceſs. A Mileſian privateer [21] was choſen to convey it; and the captain, Theopompus, uſed ſuch diligence, that on the third day he reached Lacedæmon. Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 1 ſ. 20.

[18] Τὰ μεγάλα ἱστία

[19] Τὰ τειχύδρια al. χείδρια.

[20] So I think Xenophon muſt be underſtood; and the expreſſion of Plutarch, in his life of Lyſander, tho rather looſe, tends to confirm the interpretation.

[21] Μιλήσιον λῃστὴν.

The

Xen. Hel. l. 1. c. 1. f. 21. The priſoners in the mean time being conveyed to Lampſacus, it became matter of very ſerious conſideration how to diſpoſe of numbers, ſo beyond all common example of battles among the Greeks. The allies were aſſembled for conſultation; and that animoſity appeared among them, which the antient manner of warfare was likely to excite. Many accuſations were urged againſt the Athenians, of what they had done, and what they had propoſed to do. Of two triremes, a Corinthian and an Andrian, lately taken, the crews by order of the Athenian general Philocles, had been put to death by being thrown down a precipice. It was averred, and Xenophon ſeems to acknowlege it as a truth, that the Athenians, in a council of war, had determined to cut off the right hand of every priſoner to be made in the action which they were ſeeking. Adeimantus alone, of the generals, is ſaid to have oppoſed
f. 22. this inhuman reſolution. Many other enormities were alledged, and the council reſolved, that all the priſoners who were Athenian citizens, except Adeimantus, ſhould be put to death. Lyſander, after reproaching Philocles with ſetting the firſt example among the Greeks of a moſt cruel violation of the law of war (which however, as in the courſe of this Hiſtory we have had too much occaſion to obſerve, was neither the firſt nor peculiar to the Athenians) began the execution, for ſo much the expreſſion of Xenophon ſeems to aſſert, by killing that general with his own hand. The Athenian citizens

tizens who fell victims to the vengeance of the allies, and perhaps in ſome meaſure to the convenience of the Spartan general, were, according to Plutarch, three thouſand. SECT. IV. Plut. vit. Lyſ.

Adeimantus, alone ſaved from this bloody execution, did not eſcape with his character clear: it was aſſerted that, being corrupted by Lyſander with Perſian gold, he had betrayed the fleet. The charge, however, was never proved; nor does it appear how Adeimantus could have commanded the circumſtances which put the fleet into the enemy's hands [22]; and the execution of the other generals, who indeed ſeem never to have been accuſed, appears proof of their innocence. The narrative of Xenophon, however, is far from giving all the information we want. The conduct of the Athenian generals altogether was totally inexcuſable; tho in what degree any one was ſeparately blameable does not appear. While the command of gold, which Lyſander poſſeſſed, excites one kind of ſuſpicion, the haſte and the extent of the execution, together with the little ſcrupulouſneſs uſual among the Greeks, may excite another. At the ſame time it is poſſible that the miſconduct in the Athenian armament may have ariſen from diviſion of command and violence of Xen. Hel. ut ſup.

[22] We find, in the Grecian ſervices, where a command was committed to many, it was common for each to take his day in turn (Herod. l. 6. c. 110. et Thucyd. l. 6. c. 91.); but the hiſtorian does not ſay that the day of the action was the day of Adeimantus's command, or that, till the attack made by Lyſander (except in the negligence of the Athenians, which had increaſed gradually) the circumſtances of that day differed from thoſe of the four preceding.

party.

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party. To carry any ſteddy authority may have been impoſſible; and while none could confide in the government at home, all would fear it; not for their miſdeeds, but for the prevalence of a faction, adverſe to the faction with which they were connected.

Athens, the trap and grave of her victorious generals, would not be the place where, in the preſent diſaſtrous circumſtances, Conon would expect refuge for himſelf, or where nine ſhips could probably be of any important ſervice to the public. As ſoon therefore as he was beyond danger of purſuit, he diſpatched the ſacred ſhip Paralus alone to bear the news of a defeat, which could be ſcarcely leſs than the ſtroke of death to the commonwealth; and with his remaining ſquadron he went to Salamis in Cyprus, where he was kindly entertained by Evagoras, tyrant of that city.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 1. ſ. 19

SEC-

SECT. V.

SECTION V.

Conſequences of the battle of Aigoſpotami. Siege of Athens. Concluſion of the Peloponneſian war.

THE ruin of the Athenian marine, effected at Aigoſpotami, put all the dependencies of the commonwealth at once into the power of the enemy: Lyſander had only to direct the courſe of his victorious fleet, and take poſſeſſion. The command of the ſtrait communicating with the Euxine ſea was his firſt object. As ſoon as he appeared between Byzantium and Chalcedon, both thoſe important places deſired to capitulate. The Athenian garriſons were allowed to depart in ſafety; but policy prompted this apparent lenity. Lyſander already looked forward to the conqueſt of Athens; and, againſt the uncommon ſtrength of the fortifications of that city, famine would be the only weapon of certain efficacy. As therefore any augmentation of the numbers within would promote his purpoſe, he permitted all Athenian citizens to go to Athens, but to Athens only. Thoſe Byzantines who had taken a leading part in delivering their city to Alcibiades, apprehenſive perhaps more of their fellowcitizens than of Lyſander, retired into Pontus. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 1.

Meanwhile the Paralus, arriving by night at Peiræus, communicated intelligence, ſuch as no crew perhaps of the unfortunate fleet, not protected ſ. 2.

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protected by the ſacred character of the ſhip, would have dared to carry. Alarm and lamentation, beginning immediately about the harbour, were rapidly communicated through the town of Peiræus, and then paſſing from mouth to mouth by the long walls up to the city, the conſternation became univerſal; and that night, ſays the cotemporary hiſtorian, no perſon ſlept in Athens. Grief for the numerous ſlain, the beſt part of the Athenian youth, among whom everyone had ſome relation or friend to mourn, was not the prevailing paſſion; it was overborne by the dread, which pervaded all, of that fate to themſelves, which, however individuals might be innocent, the Athenian people as a body were conſcious of deſerving, for the many bloody maſſacres perpetrated at their command. The treatment of the Hiſtiæans, Scionæans, Toronæans, Æginetans, and many other Grecian people (it is ſtill the cotemporary Attic hiſtorian who ſpeaks) but above all of the Melians, a Lacedæmonian colony, recurred to every memory, and haunted every imagination.

Athens was not even now without able men, capable of directing public affairs in any ordinary ſtorm. But, beſide that the remaining ſtrength of the commonwealth was utterly unequal to the force that would be brought againſt it, the laſting ſtrife of faction, and the violence of inteſtine tumult, had nearly deſtroyed all coherence in the conſtituent parts of the government. Nothing remained of that public confidence, which, after the Sicilian overthrow, had

had inabled thoſe who took the lead to ſurprize all Greece with new exertion, and even to recover ſuperiority in the war. Nevertheleſs, on the morrow after the arrival of the fatal news, a general aſſembly was held, and ſuch meaſures were reſolved on as the exigency of the moment moſt required. Immediate ſiege by land and ſea was expected. To raiſe a fleet able to oppoſe that of the enemy was no longer poſſible. It was therefore determined to block up all the ports except one, to repair the walls, to appoint guards, and prepare every way to ſuſtain a ſiege. SECT. V.

Meanwhile Lyſander, after receiving the ſubmiſſion of the Helleſpontine cities, ſailed to Leſbos, where Mitylenë immediately ſurrendered to him. He ſent Eteonicus, with only ten ſhips, to the Thracian coaſt, and all the Athenian dependencies there acceded to the Lacedæmonian terms. All the ilands haſtened to follow the example, Samos alone excepted. The Samians, in the ſavage fury of democracy, anſwered the ſummons by a maſſacre of the men of rank [23] among their citizens, and prepared for defence. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 3.

Means to puniſh this inſulting barbarity were not likely to be wanting: at preſent a greater object called Lyſander. He ſent information, at the ſame time to Lacedæmon and Deceleia, that he was ready to ſail for Peiræus with two hundred triremes. The Lacedæmonian go- ſ. 4.

[23] Τῶν γνωρίμων.

vernment

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vernment determined upon a ſtrong exertion, to put a ſpeedy end to a war which had laſted, with ſcarcely any perfect intermiſſion, twenty-ſix years. The Peloponneſian allies were ſummoned to arms, conſiſting now of all the ſtates of the peninſula except Argos. The whole force of Laconia was at the ſame time ordered to march: the king, Pauſanias, ſon of the regent who won the battle of Platæa, commanded in chief. With the powerful army thus aſſembled, Pauſanias entered Attica; Agis joined him with his troops from Deceleia, and they fixed their head-quarters together in the celebrated gymnaſium of Academia, cloſe to Athens.

The interval of leiſure for the fleet, during the preparation for the march of the army, was employed by Lyſander in an act of juſtice and charity, likely to bring great credit to himſelf, and popularity to the Lacedæmonian name. There were, wandering about Greece, ſome Melians and Æginetans, who by accidental abſence, or ſome other lucky chance, had eſcaped the general maſſacre of their people by the Athenians. Theſe Lyſander collected and reïnſtated in their ilands. From Ægina he proceeded to Salamis, which he plundered; and then, with a hundred and fifty triremes, took his ſtation at the mouth of the harbour of Peiræus, to prevent ſupplies to Athens by ſea.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 5.

ſ. 6. Without an ally, without a fleet, without ſtores, and blockaded by ſea and land, the Athenians made no propoſal to their victorious enemies:

enemies: in ſullen deſpondency they prepared, to the beſt of their ability, for defence, without a reaſonable view but to procraſtinate their final doom, and certain to ſuffer in the interval. But the conſideration, for the cotemporary hiſtorian dwells upon that point, that without even revenge for a pretence, in meer wantonneſs of power [24], they had doomed to maſſacre and extirpation ſo many Grecian ſtates, whoſe only crime was alliance with thoſe who had now obtained ſuch a ſuperiority in arms, incited to ſtubborn reſiſtance and deterred intreaty. Not that there was unanimity on this ſubject within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the relics of the party which had eſtabliſhed the government of the Four-hundred, ſtill conſiderable, rather hoped to profit from the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arms. But animoſity againſt that party, and the apprehenſion of being reduced under its power, ſtill more perhaps than fear of Lacedæmonian vengeance, or averſion to Lacedæmonian dominion, ſtimulated the reſolution of the democratical party not to ſubmit.

SECT. V.

Lyſ. adv. Agor. & Eratoſth.

Meanwhile the operations of the beſiegers tended meerly to blockade; no aſſault was attempted: the purpoſe was to make the effect of famine ſure; and before long it was ſeverely felt by the Athenians. Not however till many had died of hunger did they even talk of capitulation. At length a deputation was ſent to

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 7.

[24] Οὐ τιμωρούμενοι—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ὕβριν ἐῴκουν.

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king Agis, for he appears to have remained alone to command the blockade, propoſing alliance offenſive and defenſive with Lacedæmon, which in the language of Grecian politics implied political ſubjection; ſtipulating only for the preſervation of their fortifications and their harbour. Agis gave for anſwer, 'that he had no 'power to treat; propoſals muſt be addreſſed 'to the adminiſtration at Lacedæmon.' Miniſters were then ſent into Peloponneſus: but at Sellaſia, on the border of Laconia, a haughty meſſage from the ephors commanded their immediate return; informing them, 'that the 'terms they brought were known at Lacedæ-'mon; and if they deſired peace, they muſt 'come better inſtructed.'

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 8.

This anſwer, communicated at Athens, filled the city with deſpair. Condemnation of the Athenian people to ſlavery was the leaſt evil now expected from the revenge of a conquering enemy; and before even another deputation could bring an anſwer from Lacedæmon, many muſt periſh of hunger. In this nearly-threatening wreck of the commonwealth, the council of Areiopagus, ſtill holding a dignified exiſtence, tho with curtailed authority, endeavored to mediate between the contending factions, and propoſed to undertake that negotiation, for preſerving the ruins of the falling ſtate, which the enemy refuſed to enter into with one party, and the people pertinaciouſly refuſed to commit to the other. But popular jealouſy prevented the ſalutary meaſure.

Lyſ. adv. Eratoſth. p. 428.

ſure. The Many were taught to fear that the Areiopagus would join the oligarchal party, and make terms for their excluſive advantage. It was underſtood that the Lacedæmonians, among other things, required the demolition of the long walls for the ſpace of ten furlongs. Archeſtratus, a member of the council, only declaring his opinion in his place, that ſuch a requiſition ought not to prevent a treaty, which might ſave the wretched remains of the commonwealth, was impriſoned; and a decree of the people paſſed, forbidding even to conſult about ſuch an article.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 9. Lyſ. adv. Eratoſth. p. 412. & adv Agor. p. 451, 453. Xen. ut ſup.

But, in holding out the requiſition to demoliſh the walls, no aſſurance having been given that ſlavery ſhould not be the common doom, the dread of this made the people ſo untractable, that the leading men ſeem to have been at a loſs to know what they might ſafely even propoſe in ſo preſſing an exigency. At length Theramenes ventured to offer, that if he might be commiſſioned to go to Lyſander, as well as to Lacedæmon, he would undertake to bring certain information whether there was a ſerious intention to reduce the Athenian people to ſlavery, or whether the demolition of the walls was required only to inſure political ſubjection. The people in aſſembly gave their approbation, and Theramenes went; but, according to Xenophon, who was evidently not his friend, he did not execute his commiſſion with perfect good faith. Indeed, notwithſtanding the high terms in which he is mentioned by many antient wri-

Xen. ibid. & Lyſ. adv. Agor. p. 451.

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ters, no eminent character of the age appears ſo dubious as that of Theramenes. He remained with Lyſander more than three months, waiting for the time when the total failure of proviſions ſhould inforce patient attention to any advice that might be offered.

How the Athenians were inabled to ſupport themſelves ſo long, after mortality from famine was begun among them, the hiſtorian has omitted to mention: but ſome incidental information remaining from Iſocrates, conſidered together with Xenophon's account of the circumſtances of the ſiege, ſuffices in ſome degree to explain it. The Peloponneſians, maſters of Attica, and commanding the ſeas, truſted that they could ſtarve the city into ſubmiſſion, without the great labor and expence of a contravallation, ſuch as the circuit of Athens and Peiræus, and the walls connecting them, would require; and, more completely to deter the introduction of proviſions, they denounced, by proclamation, immediate death againſt any who ſhould be taken in the attempt. But the preſſure of want, and the dread of captivity, coïnciding with the paſſion for diſtinction, ſtrong in Athenian breaſts, excited to daring action; and the Peloponneſian army could not completely guard the extenſive circuit of the walls, nor the fleet, in all weathers, perfectly block the harbours. In theſe circumſtances the captain of the Paralus (the ſame who had been ſent by Conon with the news of the defeat at Aigoſpotami) diſtinguiſhed himſelf by ſucceſsful adven-

Iſocrat. adv. Callim. p. 364. t. 3.

SECT. V.

ture. His name is unknown to us; but through the incident that Iſocrates afterward pleaded a cauſe for him, we learn that he, together with his brother, found means, not only to introduce proviſions into the harbour of Peiræus, but ſometimes even to intercept veſſels bringing proviſions for the Peloponneſian fleet; and that they were rewarded with crowns, and with the public thanks of the Athenian people, ſolemnly pronounced before the ſtatues of the eponymian [25] heroes.

Notwithſtanding theſe occaſional ſupplies, want, and the apprehenſion of want, grew more and more preſſing in Athens. Theramenes, therefore in the fourth month after his departure, truſting that the ferocity of the democratical ſpirit might be ſufficiently tamed, ventured to return, without having performed what he had undertaken. To the anxious multitude, aſſembled in haſte to learn the reſult of his tedious negotiation, he excuſed himſelf, by imputing his detention to Lyſander; who diſmiſſed him, he ſaid, at laſt, with a declaration, 'that he 'had no authority, either to grant terms, or 'to ſay what the Lacedæmonian government 'would require; and that application to any 'purpoſe could only be made to the ephors.' It was no longer time for heſitation. An embaſſy, conſiſting of ten perſons, with Theramenes at the head, was immediately appointed

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 11.

[25] The eponymian heroes were thoſe from whom the wards of Attica were named. Their ſtatues ſtood near the prytaneium. Potter's Antiq.

to

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to go to Lacedæmon, with the fulleſt authority to treat concerning the fate of Athens, and ſave the miſerable remains of the commonwealth if they could.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 12.

The ſacred character of ambaſſadors procured free paſſage for Theramenes and his collegues as far as Sellaſia. There, as the former embaſſy, they were met by an officer from the ephors, who would not permit them to proceed, till they had given ſatisfactory aſſurance of the fulneſs of their powers. On their arrival at Lacedæmon, an aſſembly of the deputies of the Lacedæmonian confederacy was held, in which the fate of Athens was to be decided. The Corinthian and Theban deputies contended vehemently 'that no terms ſhould be granted: 'the Athenian commonwealth, the enemy of 'the common liberties of Greece, ſo nearly 'ſucceſsful in the horrid attempt to inſlave or 'exterminate the whole nation, ought to be 'annihilated.' Many of the other deputies ſupported this opinion: but the Lacedæmonians, whoſe adminiſtration was little ſubject to paſſionate counſels or haſty deciſion, ſeem to have predetermined otherwiſe. Deprived of its navy and of the revenue and power derived from tranſmarine dependencies, Athens, under oligarchal government, they thought might be a valuable dependency of Lacedæmon; and perhaps the recollection of what had happened but a few years before, when almoſt all Peloponneſus had been united in war againſt them, might give to apprehend that, at ſome future period,

period, they might want a balancing power againſt Corinth, Thebes, or Argos. They declared therefore, with oſtentation of regard for the common welfare and glory of Greece, that it would not become the Peloponneſian confederacy, and leaſt of all the Lacedæmonians, to reduce to ſlavery a Grecian people, to whom the nation was beholden for the moſt important ſervices, in the greateſt danger that ever threatened it. Accordingly, they propoſed, and it was reſolved, that the conditions upon which the Athenians ſhould be permitted to exiſt in civil freedom, ſhould be theſe: 'That all ſhips 'of war ſhould be ſurrendered, except twelve; 'that the long walls and the fortifications of 'Peiræus ſhould be deſtroyed; that all exiles 'and fugitives ſhould be reſtored to the rights 'of the city; that the Athenians ſhould hold 'for friends or enemies all other people as they 'were friends or enemies to Lacedæmon; that 'the Athenian forces ſhould go wherever Lace-'dæmon ſhould command, by land and ſea.' SECT. V.

With theſe terms Theramenes and his colleagues haſtened back to Athens. Already ſuch numbers had periſhed for want, that to hold many days longer was impoſſible. The arrival of the ambaſſadors therefore was no ſooner announced, than the people from all parts of the city crowded about them, in the moſt painful anxiety, leſt an irreſiſtible enemy ſhould ſtill have refuſed to treat, and no choice ſhould remain but to die of hunger, or ſurrender to the mercy of thoſe from whom they had ſcarcely a pretence Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. ſ. 13.

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pretence to ask mercy. Information that a treaty was concluded, gave for the night general relief. On the morrow an assembly of the people was held. Theramenes declared the terms, which, he said, were the best that himself and his colleagues had been able to obtain, and such as, in his opinion, the people, in the present most unfortunate state of things, would do well to accept. A considerable body, nevertheless, even now affirmed pertinaciously, that they would not consent to the demolition of the walls. A large majority however, yielding to the pressure of extreme necessity, carried a decree, ratifying the treaty concluded by their ambassadors.

Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 2. s. 14.

The acceptance of the offered terms being notified to the besieging armament, Agis took possession of the walls, and Lysander entered the harbour of Peiræus with his fleet. The demolition of the walls was a principal circumstance of triumph to the Peloponnesians. It was set about by the army, with much parade, to the sound of military music, and with an alacrity, says the cotemporary Athenian historian, natural to those who considered that day as the era of restored freedom to Greece. Notices were then sent to the exiles and fugitives, mostly men of the best families of Athens, to whom this sad reverse in the fortune of their country would alone give the means of returning to it, and recovering their property. Their presence was necessary toward the probable permanence

5 May. B. C. 405. Ol. 93. 4. Ann. Thu.

manence of the next meaſure, the change of the government to an oligarchy. The popular aſſembly was aboliſhed, and the ſupreme authority was committed, for the preſent, to a council of thirty, among whom Theramenes found a place. They were directed to conſider of a new form of political adminiſtration, ſuch as Lacedæmon ſhould approve, preſerving the antient laws and civil government of the commonwealth, as far as might conſiſt with oligarchy. SECT. V. Xen. Hel. l. 2. c. 3. ſ. 1, 2. ſ. 3.

Things being ſo far ſettled in Athens, Agis led away the Peloponneſian army, including the garriſon of Deceleia; and all Attica, but Attica only, became once more the quiet poſſeſſion of the Athenians. Lyſander conducted the fleet to Samos. The people of that iland, after ſuſtaining a ſiege for ſome time, capitulated; and the terms granted were milder than their conduct had intitled them to expect: they were permitted to depart in ſafety whither they pleaſed; carrying, however, only the clothes they wore. The lands, houſes, ſlaves, cattle, the whole iland in ſhort, with all it contained, were given to their fellowcitizens of the ariſtocratical party. After having ſettled this buſineſs, Lyſander diſmiſſed the ſhips of the allies, and with the Lacedæmonian ſquadron ſailed for Laconia. ſ. 5. ſ. 6.

So ended the Peloponneſian war, in its twenty-ſeventh year; and ſo Lacedæmon, now in alliance with Perſia, became again decidedly

CHAP. XX. the leading power of Greece; and the ariſtocratical, or rather the oligarchal, triumphed over the democratical intereſt in almoſt every commonwealth of the nation.

VOL. IV.

ERRORS OF THE PRESS.

Page.	line.	
11,	12,	for Decius, read Ducetius.
19,	20,	for broke between, r. broke out between.
185,	25,	for Iatraphy, r. Iatrapy.
304,	in the marginal note,	for 1. 1, c. 10, r. c. 1, l. 20.
305,	in the marginal note,	for l. 1, c. 22, r. c. 1, l. 22.
350,	23,	for infantry, r. infantry.
353,	9,	for

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

CHAP. XX. the leading power of Greece; and the aristocratical, or rather the oligarchal, triumphed over the democratical interest in almost every commonwealth of the nation.

VOL. IV.

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Page.	line.
11,	12, *for* Dcetius, *read* Ducetius.
19,	20, *for* broke between, *r.* broke out between.
185,	25, *for* satraphy, *r.* satrapy.
304,	*in the marginal note, for* s. 1, c. 20, *r.* c. 1. s. 20.
305,	*in the marginal note, for* s. 1, c. 22, *r.* c. 1, s. 22.
350,	23, *for* infantay, *r.* infantry.
353,	9, *for* utting, *r.* putting.

